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ABSTRACT
Access regulation has become an important tool for promoting competition in utility 
industries in many countries, including Australia. A “fair” access regime aims to limit 
the market power of the access provider, while still guaranteeing that the firm is 
adequately compensated for use of its infrastructure. As a substantial proportion of the 
costs incurred by utilities are capital costs, the allowed fair rate of return and the method 
of asset valuation employed by the regulator, are crucial for determining the regulated 
access price. The level of the access price has been a subject of ongoing debate, and 
concerns have been raised about the potential impact it has on allocative, production, 
and dynamic efficiency. Using a number of models this thesis examines the impact that 
the fair rate of return and the method of asset valuation can have on allocative, 
production and dynamic efficiency.
The Averch and Johnson (1962) model of rate-of-retum (ROR) regulation is used to 
examine the impact of the allowed fair rate of return on the production and allocative 
efficiency of the monopoly. It is illustrated that an identical outcome to ROR regulation 
is achieved, by providing the monopoly with the appropriate capital subsidy and 
subjecting it to a lump-sum tax. This equivalence result is then used to confirm and 
extend existing welfare results on the optimal fair rate of return established by 
Sheshinski (1971), Bailey (1973) and Yang and Fox (1994).
To assess the impact regulatory asset valuation has had in practice, an overview is 
provided of the forward-looking (FL) total element/service long-run incremental cost 
(TELRIC/TSLRIC)-based method that has been used to price access in US and 
Australian telecommunications. This suggests that claims made about below-cost rates 
and under-investment in the network have been exaggerated. To assess the impact of 
asset valuation formally, a model is established that compares the outcomes under 
backward-looking (BL) and FL cost regulation for an existing investment, in an industry 
experiencing continual technological progress. This illustrates that where both schemes 
allow the investor to recover costs, a constant BL cost-based price generates a better 
outcome for society. The superiority of BL costs is achieved without having to appeal 
to the investment timing and uncertainty that is central to the analysis of Guthrie, Small 
and Wright (2001).
Finally, to examine the impact of access regulation on dynamic and static allocative 
efficiency, a model is established that examines investment timing. The outcomes for a
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competitive investor and a monopoly investor are examined. Similar to Gans (2001), it 
is found that the socially-optimal outcome is achieved by a two-part tariff, which is both 
static allocative and dynamically efficient. The optimal linear price for each investor is 
a second-best price that is neither allocatively nor dynamically efficient. The 
framework captures a number of important policy considerations highlighted in two 
Productivity Commission reports on access regulation from 2001.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Access Pricing Issues
Over recent decades there has been significant reform across a number of countries in 
the treatment of utility industries like gas, electricity, telecommunications and rail. The 
reforms have included such things as: the structural separation of vertically-integrated 
monopolies; a transition from state- to privately-owned regulated monopolies; the 
adoption of more incentive-based or light-handed forms of regulation; and allowing 
entry into previously legislatively-protected markets. A common theme of many of 
these changes was the attempt by governments to decrease the market power of 
incumbent firms, and establish a framework through which sustainable competition 
could eventually emerge. As the Productivity Commission notes, the benefit to society 
from having competition between suppliers of goods and services is that it leads to 
“lower prices, a wider range of products and better service of customers”.1
In the network-based wholesale access market, which deals with the reticulation of 
sendees to the downstream retail market, regulators have recognised that it is difficult to 
induce competitive entry. This is due to persistent economies of scale and scope and the 
significant sunk costs that are presently associated with constructing new network 
segments. In the interim, to prevent an incumbent access provider from exploiting any 
market power it may have, regulators have stipulated terms upon which firms in 
downstream markets can access these “essential facilities”. Access regulation has 
become an important tool for assisting regulators in promoting competition in utility 
industries. It ensures that even where there is little or no entry in the facilities-based 
market, this does not preclude competition from arising in the downstream retail market.
In Australia, the importance of access regulation is well documented in the separate 
Production Commission (PC) Inquiry Reports into Telecommunications Competition 
Regulation (PC, 2001a) and the National Access Regime (PC, 2001b). The PC (2001a) 
states in its key messages (at page 243, Box 8.1) that “appropriately set access prices” 
are,
1 Productivity Commission (2001b) at page 35.
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...more likely than other measures to increase efficient competition in 
final markets with gains, such as, lower retail prices, greater innovation 
and product differentiation and heightened incentives for cost cutting by 
the incumbent.
While the PC (2001b) notes in its key messages (at page XII) that:
Access regulation provides a means for businesses to use the services of 
‘essential’ infrastructure...that is uneconomic to duplicate. Without 
such regulation service providers might deny access to their facilities or 
charge monopoly prices for their services. This could be costly for the 
community.
The significance of access regulation is also highlighted by the observation that in 
Australia, it has “a material impact on well in excess of $50 billion of assets”.2
Ideally a “fair” access regime should balance the competing interests of the access 
provider and the access seekers. This involves setting a regulated price for 
interconnection that limits the market power of the access provider, yet guarantees the 
access provider receives adequate compensation for use of its facility. Such a price 
ensures that there is not only scope for downstream market competition, but also 
ongoing incentives for the incumbent and potential entrants to invest in the facilities- 
based market. In practice though, access providers in a number of countries, including 
Australia, have consistently claimed that access prices are set at below-cost rates and 
have failed to encourage the necessary levels of investment. The PC (2001b) has 
acknowledged the controversy surrounding access regimes, stating (at page 35) that:
The merits of access regulation have been the subject of much debate.
This is not surprising given its potential ramifications for providers of 
essential services, users of those services and investors in infrastructure.
1.1.1 Access Pricing and Capital Costs
Access regimes still predominantly use cost-based pricing methods. Chapter 13 of the 
PC (2001b) outlines that a substantial proportion of the costs incurred by firms in utility 
industries are capital costs. For example, it maintains (at page 353) that for access 
providers in the Australian gas industry, “around 70 per cent of total revenue is required 
to fund capital costs”; and also quotes from the work of Parry (2000), who states (at 
page 140) that:
PC (2001b) at page 55. For a significantly larger figure see “Waiting for the Lights to Go Out” by Henry Ergas (Australian 
Financial Review, 23 September 2003). Ergas claims that, “decisions o f  Australian regulators affect more than $120 billion of  
assets.”
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Importantly, it is the capital-related costs (return on and return of 
capital) that dominate the total revenue requirements for the 
infrastructure assets involved in access to major utilities such as 
electricity, gas, telecommunications and rail.
The importance of capital costs means that the allowed fair rate of return, and the
method of asset valuation used by the regulator, both play a crucial role in determining
the final access price. The PC notes that these two issues have become “contentious
areas”.
Grout (1995) highlights the significant impact that a small change in the allowed fair 
rate of return can potentially have upon revenues earned by regulated firms in the UK. 
According to his analysis (at page 386, Table 16.1), at the time, a one percentage point 
increase in the allowed rate of return on equity across utility industries in the UK would 
have led to an additional £562 million of revenue being earned by these regulated firms. 
In Australia, two recent articles in the Australian Financial Review (AFR) highlight the 
importance of the allowed fair rate, and the opposing sides that have been taken in the 
debate.
In “Waiting for the Lights to Go Out” (AFR, 23 September 2003), Henry Ergas 
criticises Australian regulators for setting rates of return too low, leading regulated 
firms to under-invest in essential infrastructure. He claims that compared with 
Australia, “regulated rates of return in the United States are substantially more generous 
to investors”, and that “returns in the UK...are significantly higher once differences in 
market risk are taken into account.” The Chairman of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC), Graeme Samuels, responded to these criticisms in 
“ACCC Aims to Get Balance Right” (AFR, 25 September 2003). This article provides 
evidence that there has been significant investment in gas transmission since the 
introduction of the access regime, and cites a positive assessment of energy regulation 
in Australia from the ratings agency Moody’s. In contrast to Ergas, Moody’s finds that 
allowed rates of return for gas and electricity transmission in Australia are higher than 
those in the UK, and above the market requirements.
The debate over the method of asset valuation has emerged due to a recent preference 
by regulators for using forward-looking (FL)/current/replacement costs, instead of the 
traditional backward-looking (BL)/original/historical/embedded costs, to value the 
capital assets of the regulated firm. The adoption of FL costs appears to be based on the 
belief that, unlike BL costs, it removes the incentives for cost inefficiency, and provides 
the correct signal for potential investors to the industry. However, the FL cost standard
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employed by regulators has been the subject of controversy. It is widely claimed that as 
regulators are now able to value existing assets on the basis of some new lower-cost 
technology, there is the potential for access to be under-priced. The present doubts over 
the use of FL cost regulation are reflected by the PC (2001b) report, which maintains (at 
page 366) that it has led to “considerable additional costs and uncertainty for regulated 
firms and access seekers alike”, and its “conceptual superiority is not often evident in 
these cases.”
1.1.2 Access Pricing and Efficiency
A key concern of access regulation is the impact it has on the efficient use of, and 
investment in, essential infrastructure. As in other countries, regulators and industry 
commentators in Australia have identified three types of efficiency that access regimes 
should aim to achieve — allocative efficiency, production efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency. For example, these efficiencies are specifically discussed in the Hilmer 
Report (Independent Committee of Inquiry, 1993), by the ACCC (1997) in its access 
pricing principles guideline issued for telecommunications, and by the Productivity 
Commission in its two reports on access regulation — PC (2001 a,b). Additionally a 
number of commentators have recognised that for an access regime to maximise the 
benefits to society, it may need to trade-off the various types of efficiency. For 
example, NECG (2001a, 2001b) in its submissions to the Productivity Commission, 
suggests that there will be a static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off associated 
with setting the appropriate regulated access price.
There has been great deal of theoretical microeconomic analysis of the two static 
efficiency concepts — production and allocative efficiency. Hence, there are well- 
established definitions of these terms, and it is generally accepted by regulators and 
industry commentators that:
■ allocative efficiency involves ensuring that resources are allocated to those 
producers and consumers who value them most highly;3 and
This definition o f allocative efficiency adopted by regulators and industry commentators is from the literature on welfare and 
public economics. It is important to recognise here that there is a very different definition in the applied econometrics literature, 
which examines productivity efficiency using the data envelopment analysis (DEA). As illustrated by Uri (2000), in the 
literature on DEA, the term “allocative efficiency” is customarily used to capture a type o f  production efficiency.
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■ production efficiency involves the firm producing the given level of output at the 
minimum cost to society.
Dynamic efficiency is often vaguely defined as being associated with ensuring that 
incentives are maintained for the access provider to innovate and invest in the essential 
infrastructure over time. Unlike the static efficiency concepts though, there appears to 
be disagreement over the precise meaning of the term. This is highlighted by “dynamic 
inefficiency” being used to describe instances where the investment is not undertaken 
immediately, and instances where it is delayed relative to some often undefined 
“socially-optimal” time. The inconsistency in referring to the terms dynamic efficiency 
or inefficiency may stem from the fact there appears to have been little formal 
microeconomic analysis of the concept.
1.2 Analysis of Access Pricing in the Thesis
This thesis examines the issue of access pricing for a regulated monopoly. In particular, 
if focuses upon the fair rate of return and the method of asset valuation, and the 
implications this has for investment and allocative, production and dynamic efficiencies. 
The efficiency or welfare analysis in this thesis generally uses models where it is 
assumed there is no uncertainty. Consequently, this thesis does not use models that 
explicitly address the type of asymmetric information problems dealt with in the work 
of Laffont and Tirole.4
Excluding the Introduction and Conclusion, the thesis comprises six Chapters. Each 
contains a brief literature review in its introduction, and explores a different type of 
efficiency implication, or efficiency trade-off, associated with access regulation. As the 
results and contributions to the literature are detailed in the introduction of each 
Chapter, the brief structure of the thesis outlined here provides a more general overview 
of the particular capital cost issues and efficiency implications that are being addressed.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the impact the allowed fair rate of return has on the 
monopoly, by using the Averch and Johnson (1962) model of rate-of-retum (ROR) 
regulation. Chapter 2 looks at the issue of production efficiency under ROR regulation. 
It compares the capital-subsidised and ROR-regulated monopoly, and highlights a link
4 For examples of the models of regulation based on asymmetric information see Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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between the behaviour of the monopoly subject to a fair rate of return and a monopoly 
receiving a capital subsidy. Chapter 3 uses the link established in Chapter 2 between 
the fair rate and capital subsidy, to assess the impact ROR regulation has on overall 
welfare. It examines the production and allocative efficiency trade-off associated with 
ROR regulation, and the properties of the optimal fair rate of return that maximises 
welfare.
Chapters 4 and 5 address the issue of the method of asset valuation used by the 
regulator. Chapter 4 contrasts the history of telecommunications regulation in the US 
and Australia, and describes the FL access-pricing regime known as total 
element/service long-run incremental cost (TELRIC/TSLRIC), that has been adopted to 
price interconnection to telecommunication networks in both countries. It summarises 
the various criticisms of the FL TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation made in the US and 
Australia, and looks at empirical evidence in relation to the impact it has had on 
network investment. Chapter 5 establishes a formal multi-period model to assess the 
outcomes when BL and FL cost regulation are applied to an existing investment, in an 
industry experiencing a constant rate of cost-decreasing technological progress. It 
compares the fair rate of return required for cost recovery, and the benefit to society 
under each access regime. As it is assumed there is no incentive to pad costs, the 
benefit to society is captured by measuring the levels of allocative efficiency derived 
from BL and FL cost regulation over a number of time periods.
Chapters 6 and 7 look at the effect regulation has on static allocative and dynamic 
efficiency, by employing a model that contrasts the impact access regulation has on the 
investment timing of a firm with an exclusive (monopoly) right to invest, and a firm 
facing perfect competition to undertake the investment. Chapter 6 assesses the impact 
of a two-part access tariff, while Chapter 7 explores the impact of a linear access price. 
Both Chapters also briefly consider the effect of ROR regulation. By adopting a 
standard for dynamic efficiency that is consistent with a definition used by the PC 
(2001b) for the socially-optimal investment time, the framework captures a number of 
important policy considerations highlighted in the PC (2001a, b) reports.
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CHAPTER 2: RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION AND THE
CAPITAL SUBSIDY — AN EQUIVALENCE 
RESULT
2.1 An Introduction to Rate-of-Return (ROR) Regulation
Rate-of-Retum (ROR) regulation was established in the late nineteenth century by the 
American judicial system. It was designed to restrict the market power of utilities — 
such as gas, electricity and telecommunications — while still ensuring that these firms 
remained financially viable. It soon became the major institution for monopoly 
regulation for both state and federal regulatory bodies in the US.1 Although the 
majority of legal issues, pertaining to the manner in which ROR regulation was 
implemented, were settled by the mid-twentieth century,2 the economic issue of whether 
the regime was efficient remained unresolved. Of particular concern to economists was 
the high administrative cost associated with ROR regulation, and the incentives it 
provided for inefficient investment. Despite the problems being identified in the early 
1960s, the use of ROR regulation remained widespread throughout the US until the 
early-to-mid 1980s, at which time it was gradually phased out. In both Australia and 
the UK, the traditional US-style ROR regulation was never formally adopted.3
During the early 1980s there was a trend towards more incentive-based and less heavy- 
handed forms of regulation. This trend led regulators in the US, UK and Australia, to 
gradually adopt a mix of price-cap regulation for end-user prices, and benchmark 
regulation for the access prices to essential inputs or facilities.4 In both these forms of 
incentive-based regulation, calculation of the fair rate of return still plays a very
1 See Chapter 8 of Berg and Tschirhart (1988) and Chapter 7 of Sherman (1989) for a historical perspective on ROR regulation in 
the US.
2 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
'XJ Forsyth (1999) claims that something more akin to ROR regulation is used in some jurisdictions of Australia.
4 Vogelsang (2001).
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important role in determining the appropriate price cap or access price. It is for this 
reason that understanding the literature on ROR regulation, and its potential 
consequences, should still be of significance to academics and regulators today.
2.1.1 The Importance of Calculating a Fair Rate of Return in Price-Cap Regulation 
Price-cap regulation — sometimes referred to as CPI -  X or RPI -  X regulation5 — was 
first formally proposed by Littlechild (1983) as a method for regulating British 
Telecom,6 and was adopted by the UK government in 1984.7 Seen as a more light- 
handed and incentive-based form of regulation, it was soon adopted by regulators in 
Australia, Europe and the US, to regulate end-user prices for a number of utility 
industries.8 Estimation of the fair rate of return though is still necessary in 
implementing price-cap regulation. In particular, the fair rate of return, or cost of 
capital estimate, is still used to update or reset the so-called ‘X’ term in the price cap.9 
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) highlight the importance of calculating a fair 
rate at page 183:
At first sight it might seem strange to emphasize the role of the cost of 
capital and the asset base when one of the objectives of the RPI -  X 
system is to escape the well-known inefficiencies of rate-of-retum 
regulation. But each regulator has the duty to ensure the firm can 
finance its operations, and it is clear that regulators pay close attention 
to these issues when setting X and K factors.
5 Sometimes the term “K” is added to RPI -  X and CPI -X  regulation. This term reflects the fact that a certain portion o f the 
costs that increase over time should be passed onto the consumers. RPI -  X + K regulation is particularly relevant for water 
reticulation systems, where the costs o f  maintaining minimum quality standards for water appear to have increased significantly 
over time.
6 Price-cap regulation derives its theoretical origins from the papers o f  Baumöl (1967) and Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979).
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Vogelsang (2001) outlines that price-cap regulation was first used in the US to regulate Michigan Bell between 1980 and 1983.
O
Rohlfs (1996) points out that in the US, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) estimated that between 1990-3 the 
gain to consumers from the transition to price-cap regulation o f  AT&T was as high as US$1.8 billion.
9 In practice, calculation o f  the cost o f  capital appears crucial for resetting the ‘X ’ term in such industries as gas and electricity, 
but less important for resetting the ‘X ’ in the telecommunications industry. In the telecommunications industry, because o f the 
rapid rate o f technological progress, the change in total factor productivity appears to be the most important piece o f  
information for resetting X.
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2.1.2 The Importance of the Fair Rate in Benchmark Regulation 
With the break-up of many vertically-integrated utility monopolies, and the lifting of 
artificial barriers to entry throughout the US, UK and Australia, access to essential 
facilities by downstream firms has become an important issue. In determining the 
appropriate regulated access price that encourages both efficient use of, and investment 
in such essential infrastructures as gas, electricity and telecommunications networks, 
regulators have generally adopted some form of benchmark regulation. That is, access 
to the essential facility has been priced using some estimate of the long-run incremental 
cost associated with providing access.10 As capital is the most significant portion of the 
overall costs in these industries, the allowed fair rate has subsequently become a key 
component in calculating the regulated access price.
In Australia, the importance of the fair rate of return in setting the regulated access 
prices has been reflected in the Productivity Commission (2001b) report, Review of the 
National Access Regime.* 11 The Government, in an interim response to this report, has 
largely endorsed the core recommendations made by the Productivity Commission.12 In 
particular, the Government has agreed to include pricing principles in Part IIIA of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, one of which stipulates that the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) must have regard to setting regulated access prices that 
should “include a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory and 
commercial risks involved.”13
2.1.3 The Literature on ROR Regulation
Averch and Johnson (AJ, 1962) were responsible for the first theoretical model to 
analyse ROR regulation. Their paper showed that if the regulator sets a fair rate of 
return less than the monopoly rate of return, but higher than the normal rate of return on
10 For example, in Australia and the US, telecommunication regulators have adopted the forward-looking total element/service 
long-run incremental cost method o f  pricing known as TELRIC/TSLRIC. These access prices are examined in greater detail in 
Chapter 4.
11 See in particular Chapters 4, 11, 12 and 13.
1 ? The report, Government Response to Productivity Commission Report on the Review o f the National Access Regime is available 
online at http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/publications/NationalAccessRegime.asp
13 See the Government response to Recommendation 6.3 in the Government Response to Productivity Commission Report on the 
Review o f the National Access Regime.
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capital, the firm has an incentive to engage in inefficient over-capitalisation in 
producing any given level of output. The significance of their paper is not only 
highlighted by the many papers it has spawned clarifying and extending their results, 
but also the fact that the inefficient over-capitalisation resulting from their model is now 
commonly referred to as the Averch-Johnson Effect or AJ Effect.
While AJ provided the first theoretical exposition of the cost inefficiencies that could 
potentially occur under ROR regulation, not long after their seminal piece two other 
papers emerged by Wellisz (1963) and Westfield (1965). While both authors found the 
same inefficient over-capitalisation as in the AJ model, they also raised other efficiency 
concerns in relation to ROR regulation. Wellisz highlighted that ROR regulation 
provided natural gas pipeline companies with the incentive to distort the efficient peak 
and off-peak prices.14 Westfield meanwhile examined the potential for electricity 
utilities to purchase capital equipment at inflated prices when subject to ROR 
regulation, and was the first to address the more serious form of production inefficiency, 
the potential for capital waste or gold plating to occur under ROR regulation.15
Throughout the late 1960s to the early 1970s, much of the academic literature on ROR 
regulation was preoccupied with criticising or clarifying the results and implications of 
the model established in the AJ paper. For example:
■ Takayama (1969) used mathematical techniques to highlight the results of the AJ 
model;
■ Zajac (1970) provided a graphic exposition of the AJ model, which confirmed many 
of Takayama’s results by mapping the impact of the regulatory constraint into an 
input-space diagram;16
■ Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) combined the approaches of Takayama and Zajac to 
assess, refine and correct many of the original assertions made by AJ;
■ Sheshinski (1971) and Klevorick (1971) analysed the welfare implications of ROR 
regulation in the AJ model; and
14 In recognition o f the fact W ellisz’s paper emerged only shortly after that by Averch and Johnson, Kahn (1988) refers to the 
inefficient over-capitalisation by a firm subject to ROR regulation as an example o f  the AJW effect.
15 Sherman (1988) provides a detailed analysis and discussion o f  the work by Westfield (1965). Sherman also advocates the 
benefits o f  using the Westfield model over the more popular AJ model.
16 See Train (1991) Chapter 1 for another excellent graphic exposition o f the AJ model o f ROR regulation in the input space.
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■ McNicol (1973) examined the comparative static properties of the AJ model.
Arguably, Bailey (1973) provides the most comprehensive analysis of the AJ model, in 
her book titled Economic Theory o f the Regulatory Constraint. In this work she not 
only further examined and refined the results of the papers outlined above, but also 
provided some of the first simple extensions to the AJ model.
While a number of papers in the 1970s attempted to test empirically, whether ROR- 
regulated firms over-capitalised in production,17 the majority of the analysis from the 
1970s to the late 1980s, centred on making extensions to the AJ model. In particular, 
analysts were keen to assess whether the AJ effect would remain after such things as 
non-linear pricing,18 a regulatory lag,19 uncertainty,20 and dynamic considerations,21 
were incorporated into the AJ framework. The majority of these papers found that the 
AJ effect would still arise, although the level of the inefficient over-capitalisation was 
generally found to decrease.
With the advent of price-cap regulation, analysis of the AJ model of ROR regulation 
gradually began to subside during the 1990s. However, even over the last decade there 
have still been a number of papers that have made important contributions to the AJ 
model by extending and analysing their results. For example:
■ Sherman (1992) and Blank (1996) both examined the issue of capital waste or gold 
plating. Blank proved that in order for gold plating to arise, it had to be the case that 
either the marginal product of capital was less than zero, or that the revenue function 
was non-concave. As the AJ model of ROR regulation assumed a positive marginal 
product of capital and a strictly concave revenue function, Blank effectively showed
1 7 . .
For empirical papers that support the hypothesis o f over-capitalisation under ROR regulation see Spann (1974), Courville 
(1974) and Petersen (1975). For a paper finding evidence o f  under-capitalisation see Baron and Taggart (1977).
1 O
Crew and Kleindorfer (1971), Bailey (1973) and Waverman (1975), all examine the effect o f  ROR regulation on a peak-load 
pricing scheme, while Sherman and Visscher (1982) examine the effect o f  ROR regulation when two-part tariffs are being used.
19 Bailey and Coleman (1971).
20 Peles and Stein (1976) and Das (1980).
21 Bawa and Sibley (1980) and Logan, Masson and Reynolds (1989).
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once and for all, that it was an inappropriate model for considering the issue of pure 
capital waste;22 and
■ Yang and Fox (YF, 1994) incorporated a property tax — i.e. a tax on the capital 
assets of the firm — into the AJ model of ROR regulation.23 By analysing the 
effects of the introduction of this capital tax, they showed amongst other things that:
-  changing the capital tax had exactly the same impact on the firm’s capital, 
labour, price, output and profits, as changing the regulated fair rate; and
-  increasing the level of the capital tax could potentially increase welfare.
In light of the latter of these two results the authors contended (at page 59) that, 
“this contradicts the long-established belief that a lower (or no) tax is preferred to a 
higher tax rate in maximising welfare.”
In relation to the analysis of ROR regulation done in this and the following Chapter, the 
results of the YF paper are of particular interest.
2.1.4 The Results and Contributions of the Chapter
Given the large body of literature over the past four decades commenting on, criticising 
and extending the results of the AJ model, it is surprising that there never appears to 
have been any definitive recognition of the similarity between the behaviour of the 
ROR-regulated monopoly and the monopoly receiving a capital subsidy. This Chapter 
contributes to the academic literature by highlighting the previously unrecognised link 
that exists between the capital subsidy and fair rate of return. From the equivalence 
result a number of important theoretical and practical implications are derived, and an 
alternative model of ROR regulation is developed.
To establish the link between the monopoly receiving the capital subsidy and the ROR- 
regulated monopoly in the AJ model, the Chapter is structured in the following manner. 
Section 2.2 examines the behaviour of an unregulated monopoly and illustrates that 
compared to a competitive market, the firm under-invests. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 show 
that if capital is a normal input, this problem can be somewhat alleviated by either,
22 Zajac (1972) and Bailey (1973) already established that capital waste could not occur under the AJ model. However, neither 
offered a clear explanation for why the result emerged.
23 Bailey (1973) page 99-101 originally discussed the invariance properties of a property tax, but did not go on to formalise any of
her results.
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providing the monopoly with a capital subsidy, or using ROR regulation. However, a 
problem with each scheme is that it leads to inefficient resource use, as the monopoly 
over-capitalises in production. Section 2.5 emphasises the similarity between the two 
regimes, by deriving an equivalent capital subsidy that leads to the capital-subsidised 
and ROR-regulated monopoly employing an identical input mix. It also explores some 
theoretical and policy implications of the equivalence result. Section 2.6 uses this link 
established between the fair rate and capital subsidy, to develop an alternative model of 
ROR regulation with a shareholder and manager. It yields exactly the same pattern of 
inefficient over-capitalisation as in the AJ model, and derives a formula that expresses 
the equivalent capital subsidy s for any given fair rate/ set by the regulator. Section 2.7 
concludes the Chapter.
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2.2 The Unregulated Monopoly
This Section initially sets up the assumptions that are used throughout the course of the 
Chapter to evaluate the effects of ROR regulation and an input subsidy on capital on the 
monopoly. It then proceeds to examine the input choice and overall level of production 
for an unregulated monopoly. This highlights the familiar result that compared to the 
outcome in a competitive industry, the unregulated monopoly supplies a lower level of 
output. While this leads to allocative inefficiency, the input-space diagrams illustrate 
that the unregulated monopoly will be efficient in producing the level of output it 
chooses to supply.
2.2.1 The Assumptions of the Model
As in Averch and Johnson (AJ, 1962) and Westfield (1965), the analysis in this Chapter 
uses a simple static model of production. To establish their framework, it is assumed 
here that:
■ the monopoly is a single-product firm that produces the level of output q using the 
two inputs capital k and labour n (i.e. q = h(n,k));
■ capital is purchased from a competitive factor market at price pk per unit, and to 
simplify the analysis further pk is set equal to 1,24 It is employed during the initial 
period, time 0, and has an infinite lifespan;25
■ to purchase the capital stock the firm raises financial capital at time 0. It does this by 
issuing financial instruments that it repays in each successive time period I . . . 0 0  at 
the constant competitive market determined risk-free interest rate r;
■ labour is purchased from a competitive factor market at price w per unit. At each 
time period l...cx> the same amount of labour is combined with the capital installed 
at time 0 to produce the same given level of output;
■ the production function of the firm h{n,k) exhibits technology such that dh/dn, dh/dk 
> 0, d2hldn2, d2h/dk2 < 0, and &hidkdn -  d2h/dkdn > 0;26
24 Setting the acquisition cost per unit of capital equal to one is consistent with the approach used in the AJ framework. See 
Westfield (1965), Bailey (1973) and Yang and Fox (1994), for examples of the AJ model where the acquisition cost per unit of 
capital is not set equal to one.
This is consistent with the assumption explicitly stated by Westfield (1965).
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■ to supply a positive quantity of output the firm must have positive amounts of both 
capital and labour, otherwise q =  h(n,0) = h(0,k) = 0;
■ the production functions h(.) satisfies the Inada conditions so, lim^odh/dk = oo, 
limŵ.odh/dn = oo, \imk^dh/dk  = 0 and \imn̂ ,oodh/dn = 0;
■ all production is consumed, and the level of demand remains constant during each 
period l...oo;
■ total revenue of the firm is R(q) =p(q).q, which is a strictly concave function;27 and
■ there is no uncertainty and no change in technology or the quality of inputs.
Unless otherwise stated it should be presumed that these assumptions hold throughout 
the course of the analysis in this Chapter.
2.2.2 Maximising Profit for the Unregulated Monopoly
The unregulated monopoly employs an amount of capital at time 0 and an amount of 
labour in each successive time period I ...00, in order to maximise the present value of 
the future net income streams (NPV) that it receives.
max N pv -  V p(Kn,m «  k)-_Wn _ ,
tr (1 + r)‘
Using the assumptions, all potential dynamic influences can be ruled out, and as in 
Westfield (1965) the above expression can be simplified for the annual level of 
economic profit n. That is,
NPV = \_p(h(n,k))h(n,k)~ vv«] — - ~ k
1=1 (1 + r )
p[h(n,k))h(n,k)-wn }
—  /v
r
=> n -  r.NPV -  p (h (n ,k ))h(n ,k )-wn-rk
zo These assumptions imply that there is substitutability in the input choice, which means that input distortions will occur when the 
monopoly is given an input subsidy on capital or subject to ROR regulation.
97 Blank (1996) shows that the assumption that the revenue function is concave and the marginal products are strictly positive, 
rules out any possibility o f the monopoly engaging in pure capital waste or gold plating when it is subject to ROR regulation. 
For a model that incorporates the potential for gold plating see Kennedy (1977).
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Therefore, the monopoly will choose to employ a level of labour and capital to,
max n — p  (h(n,k)) h(n,k) - w n - r k
n,k
(2 .2 .2)
The first-order conditions (FOCs) from maximising the level of annual profit are,
dn —  h(n,k) + p(h(n,k)) dh n ------w = 0
dn
dn dn ^—  h(n,k) + p(h(n,k)) dh----- r — 0
dk
As dhldn and dh/dk denote respectively the marginal product of capital (MPk) and the 
marginal product of labour (MPn), and the bracketed term in both equations is the 
marginal revenue of production (MR), the above can be simplified, then solved to give
MR.MPn = w (2.2.3a)
MR.MPk = r (2.2.3b)
Denoting the unregulated monopoly outcome by subscript m, the above two conditions 
simultaneously determine the amount of physical capital km employed by the firm at 
time 0, and the amount of labour nm employed at each time period t = l,...oo. Given 
this input choice, the monopoly produces qm units of output in each period to maximise 
its level of annual profit nm.
Equations (2.2.3a) and (2.2.3b) can also be used to derive the familiar condition that an 
unregulated monopoly continues to produce until marginal revenue is equal to marginal 
cost, and to show that an unregulated monopoly is economically efficient in producing 
output qm.
By rearranging equations (2.2.3a) and (2.2.3b) in terms of the marginal revenue of 
production and then equating the respective expressions, yields the familiar relationship 
between the marginal revenue and marginal cost of production (MCe) for an unregulated 
firm. That is,
MR(qm) =
M P M M  MPk(nm,km)
= MCe(qm) (2.2.4)
Due to its market power, the unregulated monopoly has an incentive to under-invest and 
supplies a lower level of output than a competitive firm. While this results is some form 
of allocative inefficiency, the unregulated monopoly still uses an efficient input mix in 
producing output qrn. This is illustrated by dividing equation (2.2.3a) by (2.2.3b), which
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yields the familiar condition that the ratio of the marginal products is equal to the ratio 
of the exogenously and competitively-determined factor prices.
MPn/MPk =w/r (2.2.5)
2.2.3 Illustrating the Unregulated Monopoly Outcome in the Input-Space Diagram 
The results of the previous section are illustrated and described in the following input- 
space diagrams of Figure 2.2.1 and Figure 2.2.2.
Denoting the respective outcomes for the unregulated monopoly and the competitive 
industry by subscripts m and c, Figure 2.2.1 shows that where capital and labour are 
normal factors of production, compared to the outcome in the competitive industry, the 
unregulated monopoly:
■ under-invests in capital at time 0 (i.e. km < kc)',
■ employs less labour in each period t — 1,.. .oo (i.e. nm < nc); and
■ produces a lower level of output (i.e. qm < qc).
While the allocative inefficiency created by the monopoly cannot be captured in the 
input space, it is possible to show in the input-space diagram that the unregulated 
monopoly is still efficient in its production of output qm.
FIGURE 2.2.1 THE UNREGULATED MONOPOLY AND COMPETITIVE MARKET OUTCOME
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In Figure 2.2.1, the output expansion path qepe depicts the locus of points where the 
input mix used by the firm produces any given level of output at minimum cost. That 
is, the output expansion path represents all the points where the isocost line is tangent to 
the isoquant, and along this line the condition for production efficiency in equation 
(2.2.5) will be satisfied. As the unregulated monopoly, like the competitive firm, uses 
an input mix along this expansion path, it must be efficient in its production of qm. 
Therefore, the overall efficient cost (in units of labour) of producing the levels of output 
qm and qc, will be denoted in the input-space diagram by Cm and Cc.28
Aside from showing the input choice and cost of production for the unregulated 
monopoly, it is also possible using the input-space diagram to illustrate the amount of 
revenue and profit that the monopoly earns. This is done in Figure 2.2.2.
FIGURE 2.2.2 UNREGULATED MONOPOLY PROFIT IN THE INPUT SPACE
To analyse Figure 2.2.2, it must initially be recognised that the unregulated monopoly 
earns an overall rate of return on its investment of,
( 2 .2 .6)
28 These can be expressed in dollar terms by multiplying through by w.
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That is, the monopoly rate of return rm is comprised of, the opportunity cost of capital r, 
and the monopoly rent earned on each of the km units of capital employed by the firm.
Hence, the line that depicts the amount of revenue earned by the unregulated monopoly 
will have the slope -w/rm. As the monopoly rate of return rm exceeds the normal rate of 
return on capital r, in Figure 2.2.2, the revenue line passing through the input choice km 
and nm must be flatter than the corresponding isocost line. It is then possible to denote 
the overall amount of revenue earned by the unregulated monopoly (in units of labour) 
by Rm, and the total cost of production (in units of labour) by Cm. The profit earned by 
the unregulated monopoly nm, is the distance between these two points.
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2.3 The Monopoly with an Input Subsidy on Capital
If the sole aim of the government is to increase the level of capital the monopoly 
employs, the government could provide the firm with an input subsidy on capital. It is 
shown that this increases the level of capital and monopoly profit, and provided capital 
is a normal factor of production, also increases the overall level of output produced. 
However, any benefit from this increase in output will be partially offset by the firm 
over-capitalising in its production. The production inefficiency from using this 
distorted input mix is illustrated in an input-space diagram, along with the resulting 
revenues and costs to the firm and society.
2.3.1 The Profit-Maximising Monopoly with a Capital Subsidy
When the monopoly receives a per-unit input subsidy on capital s, where r > s > 0, it
will choose labour and capital in order to maximise the expression,
max n — p (h (n ,k ) )h (n ,k ) -w n - (r - s )k , where r > s > 0  (2.3.1)
n,k
Deriving the FOCs from the above maximisation and solving yields
MR.MPn =w (2.3.2a)
MR.MPk = r - s  (2.3.2b)
Denoting the outcome for the capital-subsidised monopoly by subscript s, the above
conditions can be used to simultaneously determine the amount of capital ks and labour 
ns employed by the subsidised monopoly to produce qs units of output. Once again the 
conditions can also be used to derive the relationship between marginal revenue and the 
private marginal cost of production faced by the monopoly receiving the input subsidy 
on capital (.MCS).
MR(q,) =
w _ r - s  
M P n ( n , A )  MPk (nt ,kt )
= MCs(qs) (2.3.3)
As the marginal product of both factors is greater than zero, the marginal revenue in 
equation (2.3.3) is positive (i.e. MR > 0), and the demand for the output produced by the 
capital-subsidised monopoly, own-price elastic.
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While the amount of capital employed by the monopoly must always increase when r 
falls29 — such that ks is greater than km — what happens to output qs depends on the 
impact the input subsidy has on the private marginal cost of production faced by the 
firm. If the input subsidy on capital results in the private marginal cost decreasing, the 
level of output rises, while if the marginal cost increases, the level of output falls. To 
assess the effect of the input subsidy on the firm’s marginal cost of production, the 
standard proof using Young’s Theorem and Shephard’s Lemma is worked through 
below.
8MC d (  dC'  
dr d ry d q ,
d_(dC* 
dq \ d r ,
(Young’s Theorem)
k (By Shephard’s Lemma)
dMC _ dk 
dr dq
(2.3.4)
The above condition illustrates that if capital is a normal factor of production (dk/dq > 
0), an input subsidy on capital decreases the marginal cost of production (dMC/dr > 0) 
and results in output increasing. In contrast, where capital is an inferior factor of 
production (dk/dq < 0), the capital subsidy increases the marginal cost (dMC/dr < 0), 
leading to a decrease in output. In the case where capital is neither normal nor inferior 
(dk/dq = 0), the marginal cost and the level of output remain unchanged.
Ferguson (1971) provides a detailed analysis of the impact that inferior factors have on 
the level of output produced by a firm.30 He derives general results for a firm producing 
a single product q with N  factors of production. Applying his results to the model here, 
where there are only the two factors of production — capital and labour — capital will 
be an inferior factor if and only if,
. dMPn dMPn MP.----- n-  -  MP_----- n-  < 0 (2.3.5)
■?Q
The reason for this is that there is no such thing as a Giffen factor o f production, as the substitution and output effects will 
always reinforce one another.
30 Chapter 9.
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Provided the expression in equation (2.3.5) is greater than zero, capital will be a normal 
factor of production, and the input subsidy will result in the monopoly increasing its 
level of output from qm} x While this will result in some improvement in allocative 
efficiency, this benefit will be partially offset by the capital subsidy causing the 
monopoly to distort the input choice away from the economically-efficient-cost- 
minimising input mix. Analytically, this is demonstrated by dividing equation (2.3.2a) 
by (2.3.2b) to yield,
MPn / MPk -  w/(r -  s) > w/r (2.3.6)
As the assumptions made about production imply that the production isoquants are 
convex to the origin in the input space, the above inequality reflects the fact that the 
firm is inefficiently over-capitalising in its production of output qs?2
2.3.2 The Production Inefficiency of a Capital-Subsidised Monopoly 
Ignoring any changes in allocative efficiency for now (until Chapter 3), the production 
inefficiency that results from using the distorted input mix associated with equation 
(2.3.6) to produce qs, can be illustrated in the following input-space diagrams of Figure 
2.3.1 and Figure 2.3.2.33 Throughout this analysis it is assumed that the input subsidy 
on capital 5 is set at a level so that the amount produced by the subsidised monopoly qs 
is strictly less than the competitive level of output qc.
In Figure 2.3.1, if the firm used the efficient input mix to produce output qs, it would 
choose an input combination coinciding with point A. That is, the firm would produce 
along the efficient output expansion path qepe, and incur the minimum cost of 
production to society Ce. However, the input subsidy on capital results in the monopoly 
producing qs with the distorted input mix coinciding with point B , and choosing an input 
combination along the inefficient output expansion path qepd. While the private cost to
i t
If the expression in equation (2.3.5) is equal to zero, capital is neither normal nor inferior and the input subsidy on capital has 
no impact upon the level o f output produced by the monopoly.
The ability to substitute between inputs in production is responsible for the resulting production inefficiency. If the production 
technology did not allow for substitutability in the input choice, e.g. Leontief production technology, then there would be no 
such distortion occurring. In the case o f Leontief production technology though, there is the potential for pure capital waste.
TT . . .  . . . . .
The diagrammatic analysis used here to illustrate the production inefficiency that is generated from the input subsidy on capital, 
is similar to that used by Albon (1998), who analysed the production inefficiency resulting from having a tax on one o f two 
inputs.
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the monopoly as a result of the subsidy payment decreases to Cs, as the firm no longer 
uses the cost-minimising input combination, the cost to society is Q .34 The production 
deadweight loss or inefficiency resulting from the input subsidy will be Q  -  Ce\ the 
total subsidy payment Cd -  Cs; and the total cost saving derived by the subsidised 
monopoly over the unsubsidised monopoly Ce -  Cs. This implies that the government 
effectively bears the burden of paying for the production deadweight loss, and Ce -  Cs 
can be interpreted as the net-subsidy payment that is made to the monopoly.
FIGURE 2.3.1 THE EFFECT OF A CAPITAL SUBSIDY
The rate of return on capital earned by the capital-subsidised monopoly rs, is equal to; 
the sum of the opportunity cost of capital with the input subsidy (r -  s), and the 
economic rent earned on each of the ks units of capital employed by the firm.
rs = y - + ( r - s )  (2.3.7)
K
34 This cost to society assumes that there is a zero marginal excess burden associated with the raising the funds to pay the capital 
subsidy. If the marginal excess burden o f the tax were greater than zero, then the total cost to society o f  the capital subsidy 
would be greater than Cj.
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Using rs, it is possible to depict the total amount of revenue Rs that is earned by the 
capital-subsidised monopoly in Figure 2.3.2. By then subtracting the total cost of 
production Cs from Rs, the resulting distance represents the level of profit earned by the 
capital-subsidised monopoly ns.
FIGURE 2.3.2 REVENUE AND PROFIT FOR THE CAPITAL-SUBSIDISED MONOPOLY
/ -w/r
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2.4 The AJ Model of ROR Regulation of the Monopoly
In the previous Section it was observed that a capital subsidy increases the overall level 
of capital, profit, and — provided capital is a normal factor of production — output. 
While ROR regulation of the monopoly constrains the profits earned by the firm, it 
appears to have a similar impact upon capital and the level of output produced by the 
firm.
This Section briefly reproduces the key results of the Averch and Johnson (AJ, 1962) 
model of ROR regulation. That is, it examines the behaviour of a monopoly that 
experiences a decrease in profits, as a result of being subject to a regulated fair rate of 
return that is set in excess of the normal rate of return on capital in the market. This 
highlights that, as with the capital subsidy, ROR regulation leads to an increase in the 
level of capital employed, and provided capital is a normal input, increases the amount 
of output that is being produced. However, as was also the case with the capital 
subsidy, the ROR-regulated firm inefficiently over-capitalises in producing this 
increased level of output. The over-capitalisation that arises in the AJ model of ROR 
regulation is now commonly referred as the “Averch-Johnson Effect” or “AJ effect”. 
As with the previous section, an input-space diagram is used to highlight the AJ effect 
and the production inefficiency that arises from employing the distorted input mix.
2.4.1 The Constraint on the ROR-Regulated Monopoly
ROR regulation operates by allowing the firm to earn no more than what the regulator 
deems to be a “fair” rate of return on its existing capital assets. Thus, at any time 
period, total revenue minus operating expenses, total tax liabilities and depreciation 
charges, divided by the current value of the capital stock (also known as the “rate 
base”), must be less than or equal to the fair rate of return /  set by the regulator. 
Mathematically, this constraint can be written as:
Gross Revenue -  Operating Expenses -  Depreciation -  Tax Liabilities
Capital Acquisition Costs -  Total Depreciation -  ^  ^ ^  ̂
To simplify the above equation so that it is consistent with the regulatory constraint that 
was used by Averch and Johnson, in addition to the earlier assumptions, it is assumed 
here that:
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■ the constraint is “effective”. This means, where r is the competitive rate of return in 
the capital market, and rm is the rate of return on capital for an unregulated 
monopoly, the fair rate of return set by the regulator /  must lie in the range rm> f> r .  
The fair rate cannot be set equal to rm, as this provides the regulated firm with no 
incentive to increase its level of investment in the industry. Further, the fair rate 
cannot be set equal to r, as there will then be no unique solution in the AJ model. 
Thus, in the AJ model, the regulator effectively overestimates the total capital costs 
incurred by the firm;35 and
■ the firm has no tax liabilities.
Combining these assumptions with those outlined in Section 2.2, in equation (2.4.1):
-  the tax liablility and depreciation terms can be ignored;
-  gross revenue is p(q)q\
-  total operating expenses are equal to the total level of labour expenses wn;
-  the total cost of acquiring capital is equal to the total amount of capital employed 
by the firm k; and
-  the effectiveness of the constraint means that the inequality sign in equation 
(2.4.1) can be replaced with an equality sign.36
Therefore, the constraint faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly under the AJ model is,
p(h(n,k))h(n,k)-wn (24 2)
k
2.4.2 The Behaviour of the Monopoly under the AJ Model of ROR Regulation 
Using the regulatory constraint outlined by equation (2.4.2), the AJ ROR-regulated 
monopoly employs an amount of capital and labour to,
35 The reliance on this assumption to generate all the interesting results o f  the AJ model has been heavily criticised by a number o f  
commentators. For example, Baron (1989) points out that the inability o f the regulator to accurately identify or target the true 
market rate o f return on capital r implies that it must have some imperfect information about the monopoly, which has been left 
unexplained by Averch and Johnson.
Takayama (1969) reached this conclusion. The intuition for this is that the regulated monopoly in the AJ model only maximises 
its level o f profit when it earns the highest possible return on capital under the constraint, which is just the fair rate o f  return/
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(2.4.3)
max p(h(n,k))h(n,k)-wn-rk
n,k
p(h(n,k))h(n,k)-wn 
k
The Lagrangian formed from this maximisation is
£(n,k,p) = p(h(n,k))h(n,k) - w n - r k -  p(p(h(n,k))h(n,k) - w n -  fk)
and the FOCs obtained are
^ -  = { ^ r h(n,k) + p 
on v on
- w - p ^ h{n,k) + p - w
dC, (dp \dh—3— = — h(n,k) + p ----- r - u
dk { dh dk vdh Jdk
—  = p(h(n,k))h(n,k) - w n -  fk = 0 
dp
=  0
=  0
Substituting the marginal revenue and marginal product terms into these conditions 
yields
MR.MPn - w -  p(MR.MPn -  w) = 0 (2.4.4a)
MR.MPk - r -  p(MR.MPk -  f )  = 0 (2.4.4b)
p(h{n, k))h(n, k) — wn — flc = 0 (2.4.4c)
Using subscript R to denote the outcome for the ROR-regulated monopoly, kji and nR 
are the amount of each input used to produce the profit-maximising level of output qR, 
and p * is the value of the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to this input choice. The 
FOCs can then be rewritten as the following three identities,
(1 -  p*)MR.MPn -  (1 -  p ) w  (2.4.5a)
(1 -  p*)MR.MPk = (1 -  p*)r + p  (r -  / )  (2.4.5b)
p{h(nR,kR))h(nR,kR) - w n R -  fkR =0 (2.4.5c)
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As AJ (1962), Takayama (1969) and Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) each establish that 
the value of the lagrange multiplier is between zero and one (ie 0 <// < l),37 the first two 
identities can be further simplified by dividing through by (1 -  /j. ) .
MR.MPn = w (2.4.6a)38
MR.MPk
(1 - P )
= r' (2.4.6b)
From these equations the expression derived for the marginal revenue of production is
MR(qR) =
M P n ( n R ’ k l>)
MLC(qR) (2.4.7)
This condition can be interpreted as requiring that the ROR-regulated monopoly 
continue to employ capital and labour until the marginal revenue equals the marginal 
cost of adding an extra unit of labour — that is the marginal labour cost of production, 
MLC. The firm does this in order to maximise the total return that is allowed on its 
capital assets, and subsequently the level of regulated profit t z r . A s the marginal 
revenue is greater than zero here (i.e. MR > 0), it indicates that as with the capital- 
subsidised monopoly, the demand for the output produced by the ROR-regulated 
monopoly is own-price elastic39
As the bounds on the multiplier and the assumption about the regulated fair rate of 
return imply that the term ju ( f -  r)/( 1 -  ju) in equation (2.4.6b) is positive, the effective 
rental cost of capital faced by the regulated firm when employing capital r ' must be less 
than the true cost of capital r. Therefore, the regulator, by setting the fair rate above the 
normal rate of return on capital, induces the regulated firm to behave as if it is receiving 
an input subsidy on capital. In order to highlight further similarities between the ROR- 
regulated and capital-subsidised monopoly, the impact of ROR regulation on production 
efficiency and the level of output are assessed.
^7
Takayama (1969) and Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) provide a more rigorous proof for the bounds o f the Lagrange multiplier 
than AJ (1962).
JO While equation (2.4.6a) provides the same condition as (2.3.2a), it is highly unlikely that the level o f  labour employed in the 
production will be the same. The reason for this is that the change in the level o f capital stock impacts upon the marginal 
product o f  labour and the marginal revenue o f  the monopoly.
T9J Train (1991) illustrates the ROR-regulated monopoly always produces in the elastic portion o f demand, in Result 3 at page 50.
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Dividing equation (2.4.6a) by (2.4.6b) yields the expression
MPn / MPk = w/r' > w/r (2.4.8)
This indicates that the ROR-regulated monopoly, like the monopoly receiving an input 
subsidy on capital, inefficiently over-capitalises in producing the regulated level of 
output. This inefficient over-capitalisation that arises in this model is now commonly 
referred to as the AJ effect.40
Kahn (1968) believed that the inefficient over-investment in capital in the AJ model 
could potentially be offset by the benefits derived from the increase in production under 
ROR regulation. Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) though, illustrated that no such benefit 
was guaranteed under ROR regulation. They found output would decrease in the AJ 
model if,
MPk dMPn
dn
-MP„ 8MPa
dk
>0 (2.4.9)
Baumöl and Klevorick interpret this equation (at page 178), as stating that, the quantity 
of output will decrease only if capital and labour are gross substitutes in production (i.e. 
dMPJdk < 0) and labour is “a better substitute for labour than it is for capital”. While 
they provide the alternative explanation that the condition in equation (2.4.9) will be 
satisfied if capital is a “regressive” input, it was left for Bailey (1973) to be the first to 
show formally, that output would only decrease in the anomalous case where capital 
was an inferior factor of production.41’42 The outcome is illustrated here by the fact that, 
the condition in equation (2.4.9) that must be satisfied for output to decrease under ROR 
regulation, is identical to the condition in equation (2.3.5) that must be satisfied for 
capital to be an inferior factor of production. Therefore, as was the case with the input 
subsidy on capital, output will increase in the AJ model if capital is a normal factor of 
production.
40 Industry commentators sometimes use the terms gold plating and AJ effect interchangeably. As already outlined though, there 
is a clear distinction between these two terms in the academic literature. Unlike gold plating, the AJ effect refers to the case 
where although an inefficient input mix is used to produce output, no capital is actually being wasted. According to Sherman 
(1989) page 211, gold plating or capital waste represents “the most serious departure from economic efficiency.”
41 Page 92-3.
42 Westfield (1965) and Sheshinski (1971) both mention that output decreases if  capital is an inferior factor o f production, but do 
not appear to prove this result formally in their papers.
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2.4.3 Depicting the AJ ROR-regulated Monopoly in the Input Space 
The impact of ROR regulation on the monopoly under the AJ model is shown in the 
input-space diagram of Figure 2.4.1. This captures the cost of production to society and 
the firm from ROR regulation, the production inefficiency associated with the AJ effect, 
and the overall level of profit that is derived by the ROR-regulated monopoly.
FIGURE 2.4.1 THE ROR-REGULATED MONOPOLY OUTCOME
Rather than using the efficient cost-minimising input mix associated with point A, the 
ROR-regulated monopoly in Figure 2.4.1 produces output qR using the inefficient input 
mix corresponding to point B. The result of this over-capitalisation, known as the AJ 
effect, is that there is a cost to the regulated monopoly and society of Q , which exceeds 
the efficient cost of production Ce. The regulated monopoly now bears the cost of the 
production inefficiency associated with the AJ effect, Q  -  Ce, because this inefficient 
input mix allows the firm to increase the total profits it earns at any given fair rate of 
return on capital f .  This fair rate of return enables the firm to generate total revenue Rr, 
achieve a total return on capital Rr -  Co, and earn a regulated level of profit tzr equal to 
Rr -  Cd.
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2.5 Comparing the ROR-Regulated and Capital-Subsidised Monopoly
The similarity between a monopoly receiving an input subsidy on capital and a ROR- 
regulated monopoly has already been alluded to in Section 2.4. This Section further 
emphasises this previously unrecognised link that exists between the capital subsidy and 
fair rate of return. It does this by designing an “equivalent” capital subsidy, which 
ensures that the capital-subsidised and ROR-regulated monopoly employ the same input 
mix. From the equivalence result it is possible to show:
(i) an identical outcome to ROR regulation in the AJ model can be achieved, by 
providing the monopoly with an equivalent capital subsidy, and then lump sum 
taxing an amount equal to the total capital subsidy payment made;
(ii) that a monopoly subject to a lower fair rate employs an input mix consistent with 
it receiving a higher input subsidy on capital;
(iii) that for a given level of production and zero marginal cost of funds, a production 
subsidy welfare-dominates ROR regulation. However, with a positive marginal 
cost of funds it is possible for ROR regulation to welfare-dominate a production 
subsidy;
(iv) an identical outcome to price regulation can be achieved, by providing the 
monopoly with an equivalent production subsidy, and then lump sum taxing an 
amount equal to the total production subsidy payment made;
(v) how Yang and Fox (1994) are able to achieve their results using a property tax 
(i.e. a capital tax) in the AJ model of ROR regulation;
(vi) why a post-tax cost of capital — rather than a pre-tax cost of capital — combined 
with accelerated depreciation, has the potential to increase investment in capital; 
and
(vii) why a regulator who over-estimates the capital costs of the firm, but sets the fair 
rate /  as close as possible to r, may not maximise the social welfare under ROR 
regulation.
2.5.1 ROR Regulation and the Equivalent Capital Subsidy
Under ROR regulation and an input subsidy on capital, the monopoly uses an identical 
condition to determine the amount of labour it employs (i.e. MR.MPn = w), and some
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lower user cost of capital than the market rate r to determine the amount of capital it 
employs. That is, the condition used by the ROR-regulated monopoly to employ capital 
is,
MR.MPk = r -  ju ( /  -  r ) /(1 — ju*) = r\ where r > r' (2.5.1)
and the condition used by the monopoly receiving an input subsidy on capital is,
MR.MPk = r - s  (2.5.2)
Intuitively, the reason this similarity exists between the two regimes is that, the level of 
profit the regulated monopoly is allowed to earn is now directly linked to the amount of 
capital stock that it employs. As the fair rate of return /  is set higher than the market 
rate of return r, the regulated monopoly, like the monopoly receiving capital subsidy, 
has the incentive to expand its capital base in order to increase the amount of net cash 
flow and profit it is allowed to earn. The result of this input distortion is a production 
inefficiency or deadweight loss.
Using equations (2.5.1) and (2.5.2), it is possible to design a scheme under which, the 
ROR-regulated monopoly, and the monopoly receiving an input subsidy on capital, 
employ the same level of capital and labour. By setting the capital subsidy in the 
following manner,
s = ß(f-r)l\ f t ' )  (2.5.3)
the ROR-regulated monopoly and the monopoly receiving the “equivalent” capital 
subsidy, now both use the following conditions to employ capital and labour.43
MR.MPn = w (2.5.4a)
MR.MPk = r' (2.5.4b)
This implies that there is a per-unit input subsidy s that corresponds to the given fair rate 
of return f. As equations (2.5.4a) and (2.5.4b) determine the levels of the two 
endogenous variables n and k, it follows that if r' is equal to r - s ,  an identical amount of
43 Kennedy (1977) suggests (at page 970) that one possible interpretation for the disparity in the ROR regulated firm’s cost o f  
capital and the true cost o f capital is that, the firm observes “the wrong input prices in its input decision”. Based on the analysis 
here, a better interpretation for this behaviour might be that the ROR-regulated firm is under the mistaken belief that it is 
receiving a per-unit input subsidy on capital.
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capital and labour is employed under the two schemes (i.e. ur = ns, Icr = ks). This leads 
to,
■ the same amount of output being produced (i.e. qR = qs);
■ an identical price being charged (i.e. pr =ps)‘,
■ the same amount of total revenue (i.e. Rr = Rs);
■ the same degree of inefficient over-capitalisation and production deadweight loss; 
and
■ although not analysed here — provided there are no marginal costs associated with 
raising the funds to pay the capital subsidy — the same overall change in welfare.
However, while all these outcomes are identical, it is important to recognise that the two 
schemes achieve very different distributional results.
The difference in the distributional outcomes between the ROR-regulated and capital- 
subsidised monopoly, arises due to the difference in the cost faced by each firm. While 
equation (2.5.4b) shows that both the capital-subsidised and ROR-regulated monopoly 
employ capital using the user cost of capital r', only the capital-subsidised monopoly 
actually receives the benefit of the reduced user cost of capital. The ROR-regulated 
monopoly must still repay the market rate of interest r on the financial capital borrowed 
in the initial period. Consequently, it incurs a higher overall cost of production, and as 
both firms earn the same amount of total revenue, the ROR-regulated monopoly also 
earns a lower level of profit than the capital-subsidised monopoly. These results are 
highlighted in Figure 2.5.1.
Figure 2.5.1 shows that for the given input subsidy and fair rate of return, under each 
scheme, the monopoly produces along the inefficient output expansion path qepd using 
the same distorted input mix at point B to produce output qR. While this enables both 
firms to earn the same amount of revenue (i.e. Rr = Rs), the over-capitalisation results in 
a production deadweight loss to society of Q  -  Ce. With an input subsidy on capital, 
the cost of this production deadweight loss Cd -  Ce is not borne by the producer. In fact, 
the over-capitalisation increases the size of the total subsidy payment made by the 
government, and overall the producer receives Q  -  Cs. This decreases the firm’s cost 
of production to Cs and results in the subsidised firm earning profit ns of Rr -  Cs. In 
contrast, the ROR-regulated monopoly absorbs the increased cost to society resulting 
from the production deadweight loss. Consequently, it incurs a cost of production of 
Q , and only earns profit Kr equal to Rr -  Cd.
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FIGURE 2.5.1 ROR-REGULATION AND THE EQUIVALENT CAPITAL SUBSIDY
------  qc
/  -wir/  -wl(r-s) / -w/f
In theory, based upon these results, it is possible to develop a scheme using the input 
subsidy on capital that will yield exactly the same distributional outcomes as under 
ROR regulation. This will arise if the government can initially grant the monopoly the 
equivalent per-unit capital subsidy 5 , and then after the production plans of the firm 
have changed, levy an unanticipated lump-sum tax T on the producer that is exactly 
equal to the total amount of the subsidy payment made (i.e. T -  s.ks). In Figure 2.5.1, 
the lump-sum tax T required to achieve the same distributional outcome must be equal 
to Cd -  Cs.
While there are obvious reasons why this scheme could never be considered a viable 
alternative to ROR regulation in practice, it provides a useful pedagogical tool for 
introducing and understanding the AJ model of ROR regulation.
2.5.2 The Lower the Fair Rate, The Greater the Assistance to the Monopoly?
The question here is, given that an equivalent scheme is initially in place, when the 
input subsidy on capital increases, what change must happen to the fair rate of return so 
that an identical input choice and level of output is maintained? To answer this question 
it is first necessary to consider what happens when there is an increase in the capital 
subsidy.
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When the input subsidy on capital granted to the monopoly increases, the level of profit, 
the degree of over-capitalisation, and the amount of output produced, all increase.44 In 
assessing what should happen to the fair rate so that it has the same impact on capital 
and output, the first instinct might be to think that as the increased input subsidy on 
capital increases profit, an equivalent outcome is achieved by increasing /. It is clear 
though, that providing an infinitesimal capital subsidy will have very little impact upon 
the input choice and the overall level of output, and that this will be equivalent to setting 
a fair rate /  that is only very slightly below the monopoly rate of return rm. Therefore, 
intuitively, it follows that for a larger increase in the capital subsidy s, in order to induce 
the same level of over-capitalisation and output, there must be a greater decrease in the 
fair rate of return /  set by the regulator. Takayama (1969) and Baumöl and Klevorick 
(1970) formally highlight this relationship between capital and the fair rate, by deriving 
the expression,45
dk __ k 
~df ~ (MRMPk -  / )
(2.5.5)
As k > 0 and/  > r > MRMPk, the expression in equation (2.5.5) for dkldf must be less 
than zero. This means that a decrease in the fair rate of return always leads to an 
increase in the level of inefficient over-capitalisation in production.
Therefore, in order to maintain the same input choice under each regime, an increase in 
the input subsidy on capital, must be met with a corresponding decrease in the fair rate 
of return. Alternatively, decreasing the fair rate for ROR-regulated monopoly is 
equivalent to increasing the rate of the per-unit capital subsidy. This result appears 
somewhat paradoxical. It implies that, the more restrictive the profit constraint imposed 
by the regulator, the higher the implicit per-unit subsidy on capital that is reflected in 
the input choice by the regulated firm. The result is highlighted in Figure 2.5.2.
Figure 2.5.2 shows that without ROR regulation or an input subsidy on capital, the 
monopoly uses the efficient input mix at point M  and produces qm units of output. 
When the monopoly faces the regulated fair rate of return fo or receives the equivalent 
input subsidy on capital so, the firm produces qw units of output using the inefficient
44 The increase in output and profit occurs because o f the assumption made that capital is a normal factor o f production.
45 Westfield (1965) and Zajac (1970) both use diagrams to show that a decrease in the fair rate / will lead to an increase in the 
overall level o f  capital employed by the firm.
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input mix associated with point A. This capital and labour choice by the firm lies along 
the distorted output expansion path qepdoif^so). For a lower fair rate of return f  or a 
higher equivalent input subsidy on capital s\, the monopoly will increase the level of 
production to qx\ units of output. However, the input mix at point B used to produce 
this higher level of output qR\, involves an even greater input distortion by the firm. 
This is evident in Figure 2.5.2 by the fact that the output expansion path associated with 
f\ and s\ — qepd\(f\,s\) — diverges even further away from the efficient output 
expansion path qepe.
FIGURE 2.5.2 DECREASING THE FAIR RATE AND INCREASING THE CAPITAL SUBSIDY
Where, S\ >  Sq 
fo>f
Instead of drawing a separate output expansion path for each given fair rate of return, 
Baumöl and Klevorick, and Bailey, use a diagram where one path maps all the distorted 
input mixes that are used by the firm for each given fair rate of return f  Bailey refers to 
this locus of points as the Averch-Johnson Path, and in Figure 2.5.2, this path is 
depicted by the line denoted AJP. This starts at point M  and passes through both points 
A and B.
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2.5.3 Does a Production Subsidy Welfare-Dominate ROR Regulation?
It has been established that subsidising production will normally be a more efficient 
way of stimulating an increase in output than subsidising only one factor of production 
such as capital.46 For the same increase in output, a capital subsidy creates an additional 
inefficiency, as it distorts the input choice of the firm. Consequently, if a production 
subsidy granted to the monopoly achieves the same level of output qs as a capital 
subsidy, it must lead to a higher level of welfare. Using the equivalence result, and 
ignoring the marginal cost associated with using distortionary taxes to raise the funds 
required to pay the subsidy — i.e. assuming a marginal excess burden of zero — it also 
follows that for a given level of output, i.e. qR = qs, the production subsidy leads to a 
higher level of welfare than ROR regulation. Using Figure 2.5.1, it is possible to 
illustrate this welfare-superiority of the production subsidy.
In Figure 2.5.1, the production subsidy leads to the monopoly producing output qR using 
the capital-labour input mix at point A, which lies along the efficient output expansion 
qepe. From this it is evident that compared to the capital-subsidised and ROR-regulated 
monopoly, the production subsidy leads to less capital and more labour being employed, 
and with a marginal excess burden of zero, the result is a lower overall cost of 
production to society Ce.
Where there is a positive marginal cost associated with using distortionary taxes to raise 
funds required for the subsidy payment — i.e. a positive marginal excess burden — it is 
possible that a production subsidy will no longer lead to a higher level of welfare than 
ROR regulation, when the same level of output is produced. For this to occur, the 
marginal excess burden associated with using distortionary taxes to fund the production 
subsidy, must be greater than the production deadweight loss that results from ROR 
regulation. Where the marginal excess burden is denoted by co, and the total subsidy 
payment required for the firm to produce qR is S, the distortionary impact of raising 
funds is equal to co.S. If ROR regulation results in a production deadweight loss that is 
equal to some amount X, then the condition that must be satisfied for ROR regulation to 
welfare-dominate the production subsidy is coS> X, or alternatively co > XIS. That is, 
the marginal excess burden must exceed an amount that is equal to: the production 
deadweight loss from ROR regulation, divided by the total production subsidy payment
46 This result is implicit in the analysis that has been done by Carlton (1979) and was made explicit in the work o f Albon (1998).
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that is required to produce the same level of output as under ROR regulation. As in 
Figure 2.5.1, the production deadweight loss is Q  -  Ce and the total subsidy payment is 
Ce -  Cs, the level the positive marginal cost of funds must exceed for society to be better 
off under ROR regulation, can also be expressed as,
co >
C„-C.
Ce-C s
(2.5.6)
Based upon estimates of the marginal excess burden in Australia by Campbell and Bond 
(1997), for a production subsidy to yield a lower level of welfare than ROR regulation, 
the value of the left-hand side of the condition in equation (2.5.6), will need to be less 
than 0.24.
2.5.4 Price Regulation and the Equivalent Production Subsidy 
As ROR regulation is equivalent to granting the monopoly a capital subsidy and lump 
sum taxing an amount equal to total capital subsidy paid, it follows that; price regulation 
is equivalent to, providing the monopoly with a production subsidy and lump sum 
taxing an amount equal to the total production subsidy paid.47 In Figure 2.5.1, the 
equivalent regime to price regulation, involves a production subsidy payment of Ce -  Cs, 
and then after the production plans of the monopoly have changed, an unanticipated 
lump-sum tax equal to this amount.
As the equivalent production subsidy combined with a lump-sum tax is identical to the 
outcome where there is a production subsidy with no marginal excess burden, it also 
follows that price regulation leads to a higher level of welfare than ROR regulation. As 
opposed to ROR regulation, under price regulation there is no inefficient over- 
capitalisation or distortion in the input mix used by the monopoly. The result provides 
an insight into why a form of price regulation, known as “price-cap regulation”, is now 
preferred by regulatory authorities to traditional US-style ROR regulation.
47 Stephen King also raised this point when discussing a paper 1 presented at the 2002 PhD Conference at the ANU, which this 
Section is based on.
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2.5.5 The Property Tax of Yang and Fox (1994)
Yang and Fox (1994) incorporate a property tax (i.e. a tax on the capital assets of the 
firm) into the AJ model of ROR regulation.48 By then solving for the FOCs, they 
formally show that:
■ changing the tax on capital has exactly the same impact on the firm’s capital, labour, 
price, output and profits, as changing the regulated fair rate;49 and
■ increasing the level of the capital tax can potentially increase welfare.
The intuition for why they are able to achieve both these results with the introduction of 
a capital tax becomes immediately obvious, once the equivalence result established in 
Section 2.5.1 is recognised.
Given that a ROR-regulated monopoly behaves as if it is receiving a capital subsidy, 
and that a lower fair rate translates into a higher implicit subsidy on capital, it follows 
that the introduction of a capital tax is equivalent to increasing the allowed fair rate of 
return. Therefore, in terms of the input choice, the capital tax has the effect of partially 
offsetting the original over-capitalisation and production inefficiency generated by ROR 
regulation. This can potentially lead to an overall increase in welfare if the benefits 
from the decrease in the production inefficiency, exceed the allocative efficiency losses 
from the decrease in the supply of output being produced. As welfare under ROR 
regulation is examined in Chapter 3, the situations where a capital tax increases welfare 
are addressed and illustrated in greater detail there.
2.5.6 Comparing the Pre-Tax and Post-Tax Cost of Capital
In Australia, the regulator generally determines the fair rate of return firms are allowed 
to earn across a number of regulated industries, by calculating a weighted average cost- 
of-capital, or what is commonly known as the “WACC”. The equivalence result 
established here can be used to assess whether a pre-tax or post-tax WACC, combined 
with accelerated depreciation, will encourage greater investment. Currently, this issue 
is relevant in Australia, in the regulation of gas pipelines.
4 0
Bailey (1973) page 99-101 originally discussed invariance properties o f  a property tax, but did not formalise any o f  the results.
49 Although this outcome suggests YF understand that a ROR-regulated monopoly behaves as if  it is receiving a capital subsidy, a 
detailed assessment o f  their paper —  done in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 —  indicates that they did not appreciate the equivalence 
result outlined here.
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After the Government recently decided to remove accelerated depreciation provisions 
across industries, objections from representatives of the gas industry, led to the 
provision being reinstated for gas pipelines. As accelerated depreciation is a form of 
capital subsidy, the Government may have been motivated to retain the provision, in an 
attempt to stimulate investment in pipelines. However, because the regulator calculates 
a post-tax WACC, this has led to bigger depreciation deductions, and pipeline owners 
ultimately receiving a lower regulated rate of return than they would otherwise have 
derived from accelerated depreciation. Consequently, industry participants have argued 
in favour of a pre-tax WACC, which allows the firm to keep the benefits of accelerated 
depreciation and effectively earn a higher regulated rate of return.
The equivalence result is of interest here, as it implies that a post-tax WACC, by 
lowering the rate of return, may lead to higher levels of investment than a pre-tax 
WACC, despite being less attractive to investors.50 Of course though, it must be 
recognised that this outcome relies on the regulator not setting the rate of return so low, 
that it causes investment to cease altogether.
2.5.7 The Better the Regulator, The Worse the Outcome?
Where there is little or no competition in an industry, regulators are often under a 
statutory duty to establish a framework that will simulate the effects of a competitive 
market. If reproducing the competitive market effects is interpreted by the regulator as 
setting a fair rate of return /  as close as possible to r, then the outcome in the AJ model 
indicates that it is possible for a regulator that is better in fulfilling this duty, to create a 
worse outcome for society.
In practice, a regulator will encounter problems in setting the fair rate equal to r. There 
has been significant disagreement over how the appropriate fair rate should be 
calculated. In recent years in Australia, the cost of capital calculation has been 
complicated by the need to account for dividend imputation.51 A consequence of this 
may be that a regulator, endeavouring to set the regulated fair rate equal to r, could set/
50 The merits o f whether increased capital investment is socially beneficial is not specifically addressed in this sub-section.
5 * Although it is accepted that offsetting imputation credits against tax paid by shareholders lowers the cost o f equity to the firm, 
Hathaway (1998) observes there is yet to be any agreement as to how to account for taxation and dividend imputation in the 
weighted average cost o f capital (WACC) calculation. For conflicting approaches see Officer (1994), Monkhouse (1993) and 
Brailsford and Davis (1995).
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either below or in excess of r. As consistently setting the fair rate below r leads to the 
regulated monopoly becoming insolvent and no service being provided, the regulator is 
more likely to set the fair rate conservatively, so that/is set slightly in excess of r (i.e ./ 
= r + s, where e > 0). The AJ model suggests that if the regulator is likely to over­
estimate the fair rate, then it may not be optimal for the regulator to attempt to set /  as 
close as possible to r.
Although setting /  closer to r further constrains profits and provided capital is a normal 
input, increases the quantity supplied, it also increases the level of inefficient over- 
capitalisation, as the firm behaves as if it is receiving a higher input subsidy on capital. 
Although the impact of ROR regulation on welfare in the AJ model is not explicitly 
dealt with until the next Chapter, the results here suggest that as the fair rate /  is 
decreased towards r, there is the potential for the marginal production inefficiency to 
outweigh any increase in the marginal net benefits from the additional units of output 
supplied. Such an outcome would decrease welfare, and the policy implication is that it 
is possible for a “better” regulator — one who sets the fair rate of return as close as 
possible to r — to reduce the gains to society achievable through ROR regulation.52 
The prevailing market conditions when it is optimal for the regulator to set f  in excess of 
r, are explored in the welfare analysis of Chapter 3.
J Sheshinski (1971) illustrates the potential for an outcome where the welfare-maximising fair rate exceeds r.
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2.6 An Alternative Model of ROR Regulation
The previous Section illustrated that an identical outcome to ROR regulation in the AJ 
Model is achieved if the Government provides an equivalent capital subsidy, and then 
levies a lump-sum tax equal to the amount of the total subsidy payment made. Here is it 
shown that an equivalent subsidy can be found, by establishing an alternative model 
where shareholders instruct the management of the ROR-regulated monopoly, to behave 
as if the firm is receiving a capital subsidy. In the framework adopted in this Section, 
there are three agents:
(i) a regulator who sets the fair rate /  such that, rm> f> r\
(ii) perfectly-informed-total-dividend-maximising shareholders; and
(iii) a manager who acts on the instructions of shareholders.
The set up here leads to exactly the same pattern of inefficient over-capitalisation as in 
the AJ model. While the assumptions are obviously unrealistic, as it implicitly relies on 
shareholders being better informed about the performance of the firm than managers, 
the advantage of using the model is that it derives an expression for the capital subsidy 
as a function of the fair rate set by the regulator. By doing this, it is possible to translate 
any given fair rate /  into an equivalent capital subsidy 5. This is illustrated 
diagrammatically using a simple numerical example, and confirms the outcome that, 
setting a lower fair rate is equivalent to providing a higher capital subsidy.
2.6.1 A Model of ROR Regulation with Shareholders and Management
2.6.1.1 Assumptions of The Model
In this model, the following modifications are made to the earlier assumptions outlined 
in Section 2.2 and 2.4:
■ the regulator sets the fair rate/ such that, rm > f>  r;53
■ the only source of financial capital for the firm is equity capital;
c - i
Unlike the AJ model it is assumed here that when f  is set equal to r, there is a unique solution where the firm still inefficiently 
over-capitalises in production.
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■ there are no capital gains here and shareholders receive all profits of the firm as 
dividends. Shareholders aim to maximise the total dividend payments they receive 
D, where D = r.k + zr,
■ shareholders are perfectly-informed about the impact ROR regulation has on their 
total dividend payments; and
■ management acts on the instructions of the shareholders.54
In this model of ROR regulation, shareholders realise the allowed fair rate restricts the 
total dividend payments they are able to achieve. Therefore, in order to maximise their 
total dividend payments, they instruct the manager to behave as if it is maximising the 
unregulated profits of a capital-subsidised monopoly.
2.6.1.2 The Behaviour of Management
As the shareholders of the ROR-regulated monopoly instruct the manager to behave as 
if it is receiving the per-unit capital subsidy s, the manager uses a production plan based 
on the discounted user cost of capital r - s  >0, and chooses capital and labour to,
max n -  pq -  wn -  (r -  s)k (2.6.1)
n.k
Using the analysis from Section 2.4, the FOCs can be simplified and solved here for
MRMPn = w (2.6.2a)
MRMPk = r - s  (2.6.2b)
Equation (2.6.2a) and (2.6.2b) can then be rearranged and expressed in terms of the 
marginal revenue.
MR = w/MPn =(r-s)/MPk (2.6.3)
The management of the firm continues producing until the marginal revenue is equal to 
the subsidised private marginal cost of production it observes. Denoting this private 
marginal cost of production by subscript 5, it will be equal to,
MCS = w/MPn = ( r -  s)/MPk (2.6.4)
54 Implicitly this relies on the manager being almost unaware or even ignorant o f the effects o f ROR regulation.
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As in the AJ model, in this model of ROR regulation with shareholders and 
management, the FOCs indicate that there is inefficient over-capitalisation in the 
production of output by the firm. That is, rearranging equation (2.6.3),
MP„ w w
--------- -  = ------------ >  —
MPk r - s  r
(2.6.5)
Now, if an explicit functional form is given for the production technology used by 
management of the firm and the inverse demand curve for the industry p(q), equations 
(2.6.2a) and (2.6.2b) can be solved for the following optimal outcomes,
kR = kR(w, r-s) (2.6.6a)
nR = nR(w,r-s) (2.6.6b)
qR = h{nR, kR) = qR(w, r - s) (2.6.6c)
Pr =  p(h(nR, kR)) = pR(w, r -s ) (2.6.6d)
The profit observed if the monopoly were subsidised is,
ns = n(nR, kR) =  ns(w, r-s)  (2.6.6e)
However, as the ROR-regulated monopoly does not actually receive the capital subsidy, 
and just behaves in this manner on the instruction of shareholders, the actual level of 
profits is,
nR = tts{w, r-s) -  skR(w, r-s) =  7iR{nR, kR) (2.6.6f)
This can then be used to solve to give the total dividend payments shareholders receive,
Dr = D(nR, kR) = Dr(w, r-s)  (2.6.6g)
2.6.1.3 The Behaviour of Shareholders
The issue addressed here is, how the shareholder should set the capital subsidy s, so that 
the manager maximises the total dividend payments shareholders receive at any given 
fair rate of return set by the regulator f. The total dividend payment to shareholders can 
be stated here as being equal to the fair rate of return times the number of units of 
capital employed; or the profit of the capital-subsidised monopoly, plus the total return 
on equity capital, minus the cost of the capital subsidy. That is,
Dr =flcR = 7TS + rkR -  skR (2.6.7)
Rearranging the above expression to ensure that the input subsidy on capital s is the 
subject of the equation yields,
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(2 .6 .8)s = ̂  + r - f
K
Substituting equations (2.6.6a) and (2.6.6e) into the above expression in (2.6.8), the 
capital subsidy 5 that shareholders instruct the manager to employ in the production 
schedule for any given regulated fair rate f  can be solved to give,
s = s(w,r,f) (2.6.9)
By substituting the expression for the capital subsidy into equations (2.6.6a) through to 
(2.6.6g), each of the identities can be re-expressed as a function of the given fair rate f. 
That is,
kR = kR(w, r ,f) (2.6.10a)
nR = nR(w, r,f) (2.6.10b)
qR = h(nR, kR) = qR(w, r,f) (2.6.10c)
pR = p{h(nR, kR)) = pR(w, r,f) (2.6. lOd)
ns = 7i{nR, kR) = ns(w, r,f) (2.6. lOe)
nR = 7ts -  skR = nr(w, r,J) (2.6.1 Of)
Dr = D(nR, kt0 = Dr{w, r j ) (2.6.10g)
2.6.2 ROR Regulation with Shareholders and Management: A Worked Example 
Assuming an explicit functional form for production technology and the industry 
demand curve, a worked example is provided here that derives the outcomes described 
in the previous Section. In particular, an expression is found that gives the per-unit 
capital subsidy s as a function of the fair rate of return on capital/ (i.e. sif)).
The firm is assumed to be subject to the Cobb-Douglas production technology of,
q = h(n,k) = n2 k 2 (2.6.11)
and face a linear industry inverse demand curve of,
p(h(n, k)) = a -  bq , where a,b>  0 (2.6.12)
Based on the assumptions about production technology and industry demand, the 
equilibrium price is equal here to,
i  I
p - a - b n k 2 (2.6.13)
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2.6.2.1 The Unregulated Monopoly Outcome 
Therefore, an unregulated monopoly will,
maxn -  [a-bn^k^1) n^k^2 - w n - r k
This yields the FOCs
^ L  = {a - 2 b n y W J k V l -  w = 0
\ n j
dk 2 v k )
- r  -  0
(2.6.14a)
(2.6.14b)
Using subscript e to denote the production efficient outcome, the FOCs are solved to 
give,
/ '
MR -  (a -  Ibn^k^2 j = MCe -  2w[ —
\ k .
(  k Y= 2 r —
\ n )
(2.6.15)55
This can be used to solve for the amount of labour and capital employed by the 
monopoly,
/
1 ( r \ I a X J4
nm = nm(W>r) = ^ \ ^ ) (2.6.16a)
k r n = k m ( ^ r )  =  [̂̂ y{̂ -w}/2r (2.6.16b)
Substituting these values into equation (2.6.11) yields the level of output supplied by the 
unregulated monopoly,
, . 1 (a  i/ i/^ (2.6.16c)
Substituting qm into equation (2.6.12), the unregulated monopoly price is,
, . ci Yi K
Pm = P Sw>r)= 2 + w r (2.6.16d)
^  As there is constant-retums-to-scale technology, this implies that in the absence o f any shared or common costs o f production, 
the expression for the long-run marginal cost here is also the expression for the long-run average cost.
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M ultiplying equation (2.6.16c) by (2.6.16d), leads to the unregulated monopoly earning 
total revenue of,
R = ' a * — \ w  r
and substituting in the expressions for nm and km, the total cost o f production is
2w ^ r ^  ( a  X XA
C -  wn + rk —----------- -------w r
b I 2
Thus, the unregulated monopoly earns total profit o f
nm=*m(w>r) = T b
r a y2 n2
---- w r
2
X (2.6.16e)
The rate o f return on the capital invested by shareholders in the unregulated monopoly 
is then equal to,
n  a f  r \ 2
= — + r = r M(w,r)  = -  -  
km 2 \  w )
(2 .6 .16f)
and the total dividend payment made to shareholders is
D - r  k -7 i  + rk = Dm(w,r) = —
2b
(2 .6 .16g)
Further, using equation (2.6.15) and equations (2.6.16a) and (2.6.16b), the efficient 
marginal and average cost o f production faced by the unregulated monopoly and society 
will be
MCe(w,r) = ACe(w,r ) = 2w ^r^  (2.6.16h)
Examining these solutions, it is apparent that the restriction that must be placed on the 
parameters to ensure that km, nm, qm, Dm > 0, and rm > r is,
a 2 > 4wr
2.6.2.2 The Behaviour of Management
A the manager o f the ROR-regulated monopoly is instructed by shareholders to behave 
as if  the monopoly receives a given capital subsidy s, it responds by,
max 7T =
n,k
-  wn — (r  — s ) k , where r > s
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As the problem is exactly the same as that faced by an unregulated monopoly, except 
there is now a lower cost of capital r -  s, it follows that the FOCs here can be solved to 
yield an expression for the private marginal cost of production that the manager bases it 
decision upon.
MR = ( a - 2 b n >ikyA  = MCs 2 w
\ K J
(2.6.17)
Using this condition, the following expressions are derived for the amount of labour hr 
and capital fa employed by the ROR-regulated monopoly,
nR=nR(w,r-s )  = ( r - s ' —  -  w^{r -  sY2
V w  J v  2  J
(2.6.18a)
kR=kR(w , r - s )  = U  W
\>2 f
b \ r - s )
a Yu---- w/2 (r -  s)
v2
(2.6.18b)
Using the above expressions the following solutions are derived,
<1r qR(w,r~s)  = ~  wy\ r - s ) Yl b \  2
(2.6.18c)
P R = PR(™,r - s) — + w^(r -  sY1 
2
(2.6. \8d)
ns = 7rs(w,r -  s) = -  w/2(r -  s Y
bK 2
(2.6.18e)
As the monopoly does not actually receive the benefit of the capital subsidy (i.e. sk), for 
any given per-unit capital subsidy, the level of profit the firm earns, or that is received 
by shareholders, is equal to kr, where
r _ \ f /  ... \>2^
---- w^(r-sY2 — -  \Y {r - sY2 - s
W
U  ) l 2 { r - s j J
(2.6.18f)
Hence, the total dividend payment to shareholders is
2 b \2
(2.6.18g)
Substituting the expressions for nR and kR into equation (2.6.17), the private marginal 
cost of production used by the manager is,
MCS =MCs{ w , r - s )  = 2wy (r-s2.6.18h)
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As s is strictly greater than zero, the restriction a2 > 4wr ensures that there are positive 
amounts for capital, labour, output and dividend payments.
2.6.2.3 The Maximisation Problem for Shareholders
To find the capital subsidy the shareholder instructs management to use in its 
production plan in response to any given regulated fair rate of return, equations 
(2.6.18b) and (2.6.18e) are substituted into equation (2.6.8) to give,
If this equation is correct, when the fair rate/is set equal to the monopoly rate of return 
rm, the capital subsidy provided by shareholders s should be equal to zero. To see that 
this holds, the expression for rm in equation (2.6.16f) is substituted in for / i n  equation 
(2.6.19), which yields,
Substituting equation (2.6.19) into the expression previously derived for capital, labour, 
output, price, profit and total dividend payments, equations (2.6.18a) through to 
(2.6.18f), can be expressed as a function of the given fair rate of return/  That is,
(2.6.19)
nR ~ nR(w>r,f) = —
1 f  2 / V  a 2 (2.6.20a)
b \  a A 2 a
(2.6.20b)
(2.6.20c)
(2.6.20d)
a
(2.6.20e)
(2.6.20f)
(2.6.20g)
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(2.6.20h)MC, = MCs( w , r J )  =
The importance of equation (2.6.19) is that it translates any given fair of return/ into an 
equivalent input subsidy on capital s. By taking the first and second derivatives of 
equation (2.6.19), it is illustrated that the equivalent capital subsidy 5 is decreasing and 
concave in the regulated fair rate f. That is,
ds
4f
d 2s
d f 2
(2.6.21)
To highlight this outcome, the parameter values are set so: a = 5, r =0.1 and w = 15. 
This implies that the expression in equation (2.6.20) will be equal to,
s ( / )  = 0.1-
12 f 2 
5
(2.6.22)
FIGURE 2.6.1 THE CAPITAL SUBSIDY AS A FUNCTION OF THE FAIR RATE
s( f )  -  0.1 -  12/2/5, where/  > 0.10 . 0 7
0 . 0 6
0 . 0 5
0 . 0 4
0 . 0 3
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 1
0 . 1 2 0 . 2 0  /0 .1 4 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 8
0 . 1 0
The values for the outcome illustrated in Figure 2.6.1 are outlined in Table 2.6.1.
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TABLE 2.6.1 THE FAIR RATE AND EQUIVALENT CAPITAL SUBSIDY
| § * ;  f  ^ s ( f )  ' v
r  = 0 .1 0 0 .0 7 6
0 .1 2 0 .0 6 5
0 .1 4 0 .0 5 3
0 .1 6 0 .0 3 9
0 .1 8 0 .0 2 2
0 .2 0 0 .0 0 4
Fm -  0 .2041 0
This alternative model of ROR regulation and the numerical example provided here, are 
explored again during the course of Chapter 3, which examines welfare under ROR 
regulation.
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2.7 Conclusion
This Chapter highlights the similarity between the behaviour of a monopoly subject to 
ROR regulation in the AJ model and a monopoly receiving a capital subsidy. By 
recognising the equivalence between the two schemes it is possible to illustrate a 
number of theoretical and potential policy implications. For example, it has been shown 
here that:
■ an identical outcome to ROR regulation in the AJ model can be achieved by simply 
combining the equivalent capital subsidy with a lump-sum tax equal to the total 
subsidy payment that was made;
■ there is the paradoxical result, that when the ROR-regulated monopoly is subject to a 
lower fair rate, it employs an input mix consistent with the capital-subsidised 
monopoly receiving a higher per-unit capital subsidy;
■ for a given level of production and where the marginal excess burden is zero, a 
production subsidy welfare-dominates ROR regulation. However, with a positive 
marginal excess burden, it is possible for ROR regulation to induce a higher level of 
welfare;
■ an identical outcome to price regulation is achieved by combining an equivalent 
production subsidy with a lump-sum tax equal to the total amount of the production 
subsidy payment;
■ the results achieved by Yang and Fox (1994) from using a property tax in the AJ 
model follow trivially, once it is recognised that the ROR-regulated monopoly faces 
the same incentives as the capital-subsidised monopoly;
■ a post-tax cost of capital — rather than a pre-tax cost of capital — when combined 
with accelerated depreciation has the potential to increase investment in capital; and
■ a regulator that is better at targeting the competitive outcome may not necessarily 
maximise social welfare under ROR regulation.
From the equivalent regime to the AJ model, an alternative model of ROR regulation 
was also designed. Although the model is slightly unrealistic, it derives a formula for 
the equivalent capital subsidy 5 that corresponds to any given fair rate of return /  set by 
the regulator. Assuming Cobb-Douglas production technology and a linear industry 
demand curve, a numerical example was provided to illustrate the relationship between 
the equivalent capital subsidy and fair rate of return by the regulator. This highlighted
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the paradoxical result established earlier that a lower fair rate set by the regulator is 
equivalent to a higher capital subsidy.
As economic students and practitioners tend to be more familiar with taxes and 
subsidies, rather than instruments of regulation, the equivalence result described here 
between the capital subsidy and fair rate, may be most useful as pedagogical tool for 
assisting in understanding the basic results and implications of the AJ model of ROR 
regulation.
The equivalence result established here is explored further in Chapter 3, to assess 
welfare in the AJ model of ROR regulation.
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CHAPTER 3: WELFARE UNDER ROR REGULATION
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter continues to analyse the AJ model of ROR regulation. The work here 
focuses upon the overall level of welfare derived under ROR regulation. In particular, a 
substantial portion of the Chapter is devoted to examining the production and allocative 
efficiency trade-off associated with setting the optimal fair rate of return.
3.1.1 The Existing Literature on Welfare under ROR Regulation
Sheshinski (1971) was the first to address the issue of ROR regulation and its impact 
upon welfare in the AJ model. Importantly, he showed in a partial-equilibrium 
framework that:
■ the introduction of ROR regulation leads to an unambiguous welfare gain;1 and
■ the welfare-maximising or optimal fair rate /* lies within the range rm > f  > r, and 
involves setting a regulated price that is equal to the marginal cost of production to 
society.
The first result shows that even though ROR regulation leads to some level of 
production inefficiency, the outcome from having some small amount of ROR 
regulation in the industry will always be better than having no regulation whatsoever. 
The second result highlights that due to the input distortion, there is an interior solution 
for the optimal fair rate of return. This means that a welfare-maximising regulator will 
not want to set a fair rate that is equal to the normal rate of return on capital r. Further, 
while the optimal fair rate appears to yield a condition consistent with a first-best 
outcome, the inefficient over-capitalisation means that the marginal cost to society here, 
exceeds the efficient marginal cost of production.
The paper by Klevorick (1971) followed soon after the work of Sheshinski, and also 
addressed the issue of the optimal fair rate of return in a partial-equilibrium model. In 
contrast to Sheshinski though, Klevorick assumed that if the fair rate of return/  were set
l Sheshinski (1971) was able to make this assertion, because he had already assumed that capital was a normal factor of
production. The importance of capital being a normal factor is highlighted in Section 3.2.
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equal to r, the regulated monopoly would use an efficient input mix in the production of 
output. Subsequently, his analysis concluded that in addition to having an interior 
solution for/*, it was possible that there would be an end-point solution for the optimal 
fair rate (i.e./* = r).
Bailey (1973) provides a summary of the work done by Sheshinski and Klevorick. This 
links and clarifies their results for the optimal fair rate in the partial-equilibrium 
framework.2 Importantly, it highlights the assumptions and cost conditions that are 
required to generate an interior and end-point solution for /  . Bailey also extends the 
analysis, using a diagram to examine the optimal fair rate in a general-equilibrium 
framework.3
Callen, Mathewson and Mohrig (1974) undertake a thorough pseudo-empirical analysis 
of the AJ model of ROR regulation in a partial-equilibrium model. Their analysis is 
similar to the pseudo-empirical work done by Klevorick, as they also assume Cobb- 
Douglas production technology and a constant-elasticity demand curve for the industry. 
The numerical results derived for the optimal fair rate confirms the analytical results of 
Sheshinksi (1971), Klevorick (1971) and Bailey (1973).
Yang and Fox (YF, 1994) investigate effect the introduction of a property tax — i.e. a 
capital tax — has upon welfare. Using an explicit social welfare function that is equal 
to the sum of consumer surplus, profit and tax revenue, the authors find that:
■ the introduction of a capital tax has the potential to increase welfare in the AJ model; 
and
■ a decrease in the fair rate has the same impact upon welfare as a decrease in an 
existing capital tax rate.
YF conclude (at page 59) that the first result “contradicts the long-established belief that 
a lower (or no) tax is preferred to a higher tax in maximising welfare”. According to the 
authors, the second result has the potentially interesting policy implication that, if the 
regulator misses the optimal fair rate by some amount -©, then the tax authority could 
intervene and offset this outcome by raising the capital tax by an amount 0 . They 
conclude (at page 66) however, that due to the different objectives that are likely to be
2 Page 104-7.
T
J See pages 108-110. Peles and Stein (1976) use a similar diagram in their general-equilibrium analysis at page 287.
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faced by the relevant authorities “this offsetting policy is likely to be only a theoretical 
possibility”.
3.1.2 The Results and Contributions of this Chapter
This Chapter provides a number of insights into the impact ROR regulation has upon 
welfare, and the optimal fair rate of return that should be set by the regulator. It 
contributes to the existing literature by:
■ using the equivalence result from Chapter 2 to establish a formal general-equilibrium 
(GE) model. This confirms the partial-equilibrium results of Sheshinski (1971), and 
extends his analysis by examining the outcome for the optimal fair rate when there is 
a distortion in a related market. The previous GE analysis done by Bailey (1973) 
and Peles and Stein (1976) used diagrams, and assumed there was no distortion in 
the related market;
■ reconciling the different price-quantity diagrams used by Sheshinski (1971) and 
Waterson (1988) to highlight the impact ROR regulation has on the monopoly in a 
partial-equilibrium setting;
■ linking the optimal capital subsidy 5* with the optimal fair rate of return/*; and
■ outlining the precise conditions when the introduction of the capital tax used by YF 
(1994), increases and decreases welfare.
To undertake this analysis, the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 uses the 
equivalence result from Chapter 2 to set up a two-period-two-sector-single-person- 
general-equilibrium (GE) model of ROR regulation to examine the welfare results of 
Sheshinski (1971). Section 3.3 applies the methodology of Carlton (1979) to the AJ 
model to reconcile the different approaches that have been used to capture the impact of 
ROR regulation in a price-quantity diagram. In Section 3.4 the analysis of Bailey 
(1973) is reproduced to highlight the solutions for the optimal fair rate f* under different 
assumptions and cost conditions. Section 3.5 revisits and modifies the alternative 
model of ROR regulation outlined in Section 2.6. From this, expressions are derived 
for the optimal fair rate f *  and the corresponding optimal capital subsidy 5*, and a 
numerical example is provided to assess welfare under optimal ROR regulation. In 
Section 3.6 the analysis from Section 3.4 is used to assess the welfare results of YF 
(1994). Section 3.7 summarises the key results of the Chapter.
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3.2 A GE Model of Welfare Under ROR Regulation
This Section sets up a two-period-single-person-general-equilibrium (GE) model, which 
is used to derive the uncompensated welfare change that results from providing the 
monopoly with a capital subsidy. Subsequently, from the equivalence result of Chapter 
2, this Section also analyses the impact ROR regulation has upon welfare in a GE 
framework. The previous GE analysis of ROR regulation done by Bailey (1973) and 
Peles and Stein (1976), used diagrams, rather than the formal framework that is outlined 
here.
Solving the GE model, an expression is derived for the dollar change in utility that 
arises when there is a policy change that affects the ROR-regulated or capital-subsidised 
monopoly, and there is an existing production tax distortion in the related competitive 
market. By assuming initially that there is either no related market effect, or no 
efficiency distortion in the related market, the partial-equilibrium welfare results of 
Sheshinski (1971) are derived. Removing these assumptions, the partial-equilibrium 
results are extended to the GE framework. This shows that if the product in the related 
competitive market is a complement (substitute), the regulator must set a lower (higher) 
fair rate than that recommended by Sheshinski.
The importance of the GE analysis established here is that in practice, it is likely there 
will be some related market effects and existing distortions in the regulation of public 
utilities. For example:
■ substitutability occurs between products such as gas and electricity; and
■ to cover the shared and common costs associated with networks, regulators often 
allow prices that are marked-up above the long-run marginal cost of providing the 
service.
3.2.1 Assumptions and Agents in the GE Framework
3.2.1.1 Assumptions of the Model
As the model in this Section is different from that used throughout Chapter 2, there are 
some slight variations in the notation used here. The assumptions made in the GE 
model are that:
■ there are only two periods — period 0 and period 1;
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■ in period 0 the consumer is endowed with an amount of good 0, x0. This can either
be consumed in some quantity jto, or invested and used as capital k in the production 
of output by the firms in the economy;
■ the consumer price of good 0 — zo — is equal to the producer price of good 0 — po 
— which is chosen as the numeraire (i.e. zo=po= 1);
■ in period 1, the consumer can consume leisure h for a maximum of T units of time. 
For each unit of the time (T -  h) that is supplied to the firms in this economy, a wage 
of w is paid;
■ there are two industries in this economy. Both combine the units of labour n 
provided in period 1, with the units of capital k provided in period 0, to produce 
goods 1 and 2 in period 1;
■ firm 1 is the ROR-regulated or capital-subsidised monopoly, that supplies the 
amount of good 1, q\. The other industry is competitive,4 and supplies an amount of 
good 2, q2\
■ in period 1, goods 1 and 2 are consumed in the amounts xi and *2;
■ initially there is a production tax on both goods, ti, where i = 1, 2. This drives a 
wedge between the present value of the relative price paid by the consumer — z„ i = 
1 ,2  — and the relative price paid to producers in period 1 — where i — 1,2. 
Subsequently, the present value of the relative prices faced by the consumer, will be,
z. = — — *■■■, where i = 1,2.
1 + r
These assumptions imply that in this economy, the market clearing conditions will be:
-  capital market (which determines the user cost of capital r): x0- x 0 = kl + k2
-  goods market (which determines the prices of goods 1 and 2, p\ and p 2): x\ = q\ 
and X2 = q2; and
-  labour market (which determines w): T = h + n\ + n2 
3.2.1.2 The Consumer
The consumer aims to maximise their utility subject to the budget constraint. In this 
framework the consumer derives utility from consuming good 0 in period 0 (i.e. xo), and
4 The competitive industry in this GE framework is treated as if  it is a single firm.
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consuming leisure, good 1 and good 2 in period 1 (i.e. h, x\, X2). Hence, the consumer’s 
utility function is
U = U(x0,h,x„x2) (3.2.1)
The value in period 0 of the total income I  that the consumer derives over the two 
periods, consists of:
-  the endowment of good 0 (i.e. 3c0 ) ;
-  the present value of the wage income from supplying labour (i.e. —— );
1 + r
-  the present value of the profits derived by the monopolist (i.e. n 1) and in the 
competitive industry (i.e. ^ 2). The profits of both output markets are distributed 
to the consumer, who is also the sole shareholder; and
-  the lump-sum transfers made to the consumer by the government (i.e. L).
The value in period 0 of the expenditure E by the consumer over the two periods, 
consists of:
-  the expenditure on units of good 0 consumed in period 0 (i.e. xo); and
-  the present value of the expenditure on the units of goods 1 and 2 consumed in 
period 1 (i.e. z,x/, i — 1,2).
As all income is spent, the present value of the budget constraint is,
w (T -h )I -  x0 + ----------- + 7T, + iz2 + L — x0 + z,x, + z2x2 = E (3.2.2)
1 + r
Hence, the individual consumer aims to
max U(x0,h,x{,x2)
xQ,h,Xi ,x2
_ w{T-h)
S.t. X q 4---- ----------h TTj + TC2 + E — x0 +  Z'jXj + ^2^2
(3.2.3)
3.2.1.3 The Monopoly and Competitive Industry Profits
The monopoly receiving the per-unit capital subsidy 5, where 0 < s < 1, earns the level 
of profit 7T\, which consists of:
-  the present value of the operating profit from selling each unit of output q\ in
period 1 at pricep\ (i.e. ); minus
1 + r
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the cost of capital k\ that the firm borrows from consumers in period 0, and that is 
subsidised by the government (i.e. (1 - s)k\).
In the competitive industry profit 712 is earned, which consists of:
-  the present value of the operating profit from selling each unit of output qi in
. , , . p7q7 -  wn7 xperiod 1 at price p 2 (i-e. ——------ minus
1 + r
-  the cost of the capital fo, which is borrowed from consumers in period 0.
Therefore the respective profits will be,
Monopolist: nx = —- ^ - - ( l - s ) ^ , where 0 < 5  < 1 (3.2.4)
Competitive: 7T2= ^ y —^ ^ - k 2 (3.2.5)
3.2.1.4 The Government
The other agent in the economy is the government. The government has a budget G that 
consists of:
-  the present value of the revenues from the production tax on goods 1 and 2 in 
period 1 (i.e. *#,•/( 1 + r), i= 1, 2);
-  the total cost of the capital subsidy payment made on the units of capital that are 
employed by the monopoly in period 0 (i.e. s£i); and
-  the total lump-sum payments or transfers made to consumers L.
Thus, the government budget can be formally written as
G = J & _  + M 2 . _ s k  r ( 3.2.6)
1 + r 1+r 1
3.2.2 The Conventional Welfare Equation
To derive an expression that captures the impact a change in government policy has 
upon welfare, the conventional Harberger (1971) analysis is used. This involves the 
government making a lump-sum transfer that balances the budget, and the welfare 
effects of this transfer then being examined. Sieper (1981) and Jones (2001, 2003) 
provide expositions of the working that is required to derive such an expression for the 
welfare equation.
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Assuming initially that there is no change in production taxes (i.e. dt\ = dt2 = 0), and 
later, that there is no production tax on the ROR-regulated or capital-subsidised 
monopoly (i.e. t\ = 0); the conventional welfare equation5 derived from following the 
methodology of Sieper and Jones is then,
dU
A
— dp, -  sdk. + 
\ + r 1 1 + r
dq2 (3.2.7)
The working to obtain the outcome in equation (3.2.7) is outlined in the Appendix of the 
Chapter in Section A.3.1.
As the Lagrange multiplier A is the marginal utility of income to the consumer, the 
expression in equation (3.2.7) represents the dollar change in utility that is experienced 
by a consumer as a result of any change in government policy, and captures the 
uncompensated welfare change. It shows that welfare:
■ rises by the extra tax revenues derived from the competitive industry (i.e. —— dq2);
1 + r
and
■ falls by the extra subsidy payment made to the monopoly as it employs more units of 
capital (i.e. sdk\), and by the increase in price charged by the monopoly (i.e.
JLl_
1 + r
dp,).
It is well established in the welfare economics literature, that in a GE framework, any 
welfare change can be captured over a change in the level of output or activity in the 
industry (i.e. dqfs). The reason for this is that the impact any change in government 
policy has upon welfare is reflected by the effect it has on the utility of the consumer, 
and the consumer’s level of utility depends upon its consumption of output. 
Consequently, it should be possible to convert the expression in equation (3.2.7) to 
reflect such an outcome.
The FOC for the capital-subsidised monopoly given by equation (A3.1.9) is
P\
1 + r
dq, H----—dp,------- dn, -  (1 -  s)dk, -  0
1 + r 1 + r
This can be rewritten as,
 ̂ This terminology is used in the analysis of Jones (2001) at page 5 and Jones (2003) at page 7.
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(3.2.8)- ~ ^ d p x = ~^—dqx- ~ ^ —dnx -(1 -  s)dkx 
1 + r 1 + r l + r
Where superscript 0 is used to denote the present value of various terms here (e.g. 
p\/\+r = p x), the present value of the private marginal cost of production that is faced 
by the monopolist receiving the capital subsidy 5 is,
MC
w dnx 
1 + r dqx
+ (1 - 5 )
Sg,
(3.2.9)6
As this marginal cost takes into account the way in which capital and labour adjust 
when the output of firm 1 increases, the marginal cost of either factor is the same, and 
equation (3.2.9) is also equal to both the marginal labour cost {MLC\) and marginal 
capital cost (MKC\).
From equation (3.2.9), equation (3.2.8) simplifies to
~ ~ ~ d p \  = (p°-M C°x)dqx 
1 + r
Therefore, the dollar change in utility can be expressed as
~ ~  = (a° - MC°s\)dcl\ ~ sdk\ + Adch
(3.2.10)
(3.2.11)
The private marginal cost MC°sX of the capital-subsidised monopoly, or alternatively the
marginal labour cost MLC\ of the ROR-regulated monopoly, determines the level of 
output produced by the firm. This is because the capital-subsidised monopolist 
continues to employ capital and labour until marginal revenue is equal to the private 
marginal cost of production in the presence of the capital subsidy; or the ROR-regulated 
monopoly continues to employ capital and labour until the marginal revenue is equal to 
the private marginal labour cost in the presence of a given fair rate. While the private 
marginal cost curves can be used to do positive analysis, to undertake welfare analysis 
and capture the true resource cost to society, it is necessary to derive the marginal cost 
to society in the presence of a capital subsidy or ROR regulation.
 ̂ Although the partial derivative notation is used in the expressions for the various marginal costs, in the GE framework, these 
partial derivative terms do not have the standard interpretation. The reason for this is that in these partial derivatives, the 
endogenous variables o f the wage rate, the output price and the rate o f return, are no longer held constant. In the GE model 
these terms are all changing in order to clear the respective goods, capital and labour markets.
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The present value of the marginal cost of production to society in the presence of the 
capital subsidy or fair rate is,
WCj, = — • ( 3 . 2 . 1 2 )  
"  1 + rdqtdq, e' V ’
This marginal cost is higher than the efficient marginal cost for firm 1 A/Ce°,, due to the
distortionary impact the capital subsidy has on the input mix used to produce output. 
From equation (3.2.12) it follows that equation (3.2.8) can be rewritten to give,
— - d p {-sdk^ = (p° -  MC°Rl)dq\ (3.2.13)
1 + r
Substituting equation (3.2.13) into equation (3.2.7), yields an expression for the welfare 
equation, which gives the dollar change in utility over a change in the level of output or 
activity in the industry i.e. some dqt term, where / = 1,2. That is,
(3.2.14)
3.2.3 The Welfare Effect of Changing the Capital Subsidy or Fair Rate
As the terms in equation (3.2.14) are all a function of the capital subsidy 5, the
following welfare equation can be derived.
* = — 1 =(/>?- we»,ds A ds
(3.2.15)7
This gives the welfare effect of a change in the specific capital subsidy, or alternatively, 
from adjusting the fair rate under ROR regulation. The expression in equation (3.2.15) 
is used here to initially illustrate the welfare result established in the partial-equilibrium 
analysis of Sheshinski (1971), and then to extend these results to a GE framework.
7
1 The partial derivative expressions on the right-hand side of equation (3.2.15) are true partial derivatives. The reason for these 
terms is that, the total differential terms in the welfare equation are initially expressed for some undefined change in 
government policy. Hence, until the policy change is defined as being a change in the capital subsidy, the effect of the capital
subsidy upon output is only one term in the expression for dq{, i = 1, 2, e.g. dq: = ^ -d s  +... . Once it is established that the
ds
impact of the capital subsidy upon welfare is being examined, the expression in equation (3.2.14) is equal to:
^ ( p t - M C l J & d s  + Z & d s
Dividing through by ds, the expression for the welfare equation in (3.2.15) is derived.
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3.2.3.1 The Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Sheshinski (1971)
Sheshinski (1971) examined welfare under ROR regulation in a partial-equilibrium 
framework and found that:
■ “some regulation via the fair rate of return is always advantageous”;8 and
■ there is an interior solution for the optimal fair rate f  (i.e. rm> f  > r), and at this fair 
rate the ROR-regulated price is set equal to the distorted marginal cost of production 
faced by society.9
The GE framework outlined here can be modified to illustrate the partial-equilibrium 
results of Sheshinski, if it is assumed that there is either:
■ no cross-price effect (i.e. dq^ds = 0); or
■ no existing distortion in the related competitive market (i.e. t2 = 0).
Setting dqi/ds or t2 equal to zero, the welfare equation (3.2.15) simplifies to,
W. = dU 1 
ds A
(3.2.16)
To establish that some capital subsidy or ROR regulation is beneficial to society, it is 
necessary to evaluate the outcome in equation (3.2.16) when there is no capital subsidy 
(i.e. 5 = 0), or the fair rate is set equal to the monopoly rate of return (i.e ./ = rm).
When there is no capital subsidy or the fair rate is ineffective, firm 1 will charge the 
unregulated monopoly price of p°ml. As there is also no input distortion in these 
circumstances, the private and social marginal cost for the firm will be equal to the 
efficient marginal cost MCf°,, and the expression for equation (3.2.16) when s = 0 is,
(3.2.17)
The sign of equation (3.2.17) now depends on the sign of dqjds.
8 Sheshinski (1971) at page 175.
9 Bailey (1973) illustrates that while the analysis o f Sheshinski is not incorrect, there are instances when there should be an end­
point solution for the optimal fair rate —  i.e ./*  = r. The circumstances where an end-point and interior solution exists for the 
optimal fair rate are explored in Section 3.4. For the purposes o f the analysis in this Section only the interior solution o f  
Sheshinski is examined, and the adjustment that needs to made to this interior solution in the GE framework.
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The level of welfare here is maximised by setting equation (3.2.16) — which captures 
marginal welfare gain from a change in the subsidy — equal to zero, and solving for the 
price. Therefore, the optimal capital subsidy s*, and the corresponding optimal fair rate 
f  must be set in period 0 so that in period 1,
Prx=MCri (3.2.18)12
This is the condition found by Sheshinski, and as he points out (at page 177) it 
“resembles the standard optimality rule” of setting price equal to the social marginal 
cost of production. However, because of the input distortion associated with ROR 
regulation, the social marginal cost of production faced by the monopolist here in period 
1 — MCr\ — exceeds the efficient marginal cost of production — MCei. The result in 
equation (3.2.18) is perhaps most appropriately described as an example of a “second- 
best efficient” outcome.13 That is, it represents the best outcome for society, given the 
constraint that, the government or regulator has committed to providing the monopoly 
with an input-distorting capital subsidy or fair rate of return. The outcome in period 1 
from setting the optimal fair rate /* or capital subsidy 5* in period 0, is illustrated in 
Figure 3.2.2.
The diagram highlights the relationship between:
■ the private marginal cost of production faced by the capital-subsidised monopoly at
the optimal capital subsidy 5* — i.e. MC5i(s*) — or alternatively, the marginal labour
• • *cost faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly at the corresponding optimal fair rate /  
— i.e. MLC\(f*). It depicts the outcome described in equation (3.2.9);
13 As it is assumed here that there is an interior solution for/* at price p ’R,, the distorted marginal cost MCRi exceeds the distorted 
average cost of production ACRi, and the ROR-regulated monopoly earns greater than zero profit. If ACRI were instead greater 
than or equal to MCRU then the marginal cost-based price will no longer yield greater than zero profits. Although not 
considered here, Section 3.4 outlines that such an outcome leads to an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate i.e./* = r.
1T Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-7) coined the phrase “second-best efficiency”. Their theory of second best was based around 
finding an efficient price in a market, given that there was an existing distortion in a related market. Specifically, they 
examined the optimal price that should be charged for a public utility’s output, where it was a substitute for a product provided 
by a private monopoly. However, more recently, the term second-best efficiency has been used to describe instances where the 
best possible outcome for society is achieved, given some existing distortion and no related market effects. An example of this 
more liberal usage of the term is found in the context of the natural monopoly problem, where a marginal-cost-based price fails 
to recover cost. There, the term “second best” has been used to describe a Ramsey-Boiteux price, which represents the linear- 
pricing regime that maximises efficiency, given that there is some revenue requirement placed upon the firm preventing a first- 
best outcome. It is this more liberal usage of the term that is relied upon here to describe the condition in equation (3.2.18) as 
being second best.
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The level of welfare here is maximised by setting equation (3.2.16) — which captures 
marginal welfare gain from a change in the subsidy — equal to zero, and solving for the 
price. Therefore, the optimal capital subsidy s*, and the corresponding optimal fair rate 
/* must be set in period 0 so that in period 1,
/>;, = MCri (3.2.18)^
This is the condition found by Sheshinski, and as he points out (at page 177) it 
“resembles the standard optimality rule” of setting price equal to the social marginal 
cost of production. However, because of the input distortion associated with ROR 
regulation, the social marginal cost of production faced by the monopolist here in period 
1 —  MCr\ — exceeds the efficient marginal cost of production — MCe\. The result in 
equation (3.2.18) is perhaps most appropriately described as an example of a “second- 
best efficient” outcome.13 That is, it represents the best outcome for society, given the 
constraint that, the government or regulator has committed to providing the monopoly 
with an input-distorting capital subsidy or fair rate of return. The outcome in period 1 
from setting the optimal fair rate /* or capital subsidy s* in period 0, is illustrated in 
Figure 3.2.2.
The diagram highlights the relationship between:
■ the private marginal cost of production faced by the capital-subsidised monopoly at 
the optimal capital subsidy 5* — i.e. MCs\(s*) — or alternatively, the marginal labour 
cost faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly at the corresponding optimal fair rate f  
— i.e. MLC\(f*). It depicts the outcome described in equation (3.2.9);
13 As it is assumed here that there is an interior solution for/* at price p'RX , the distorted marginal cost MCr\ exceeds the distorted 
average cost of production ACR\, and the ROR-regulated monopoly earns greater than zero profit. If ACr\ were instead greater 
than or equal to MCn, then the marginal cost-based price will no longer yield greater than zero profits. Although not 
considered here, Section 3.4 outlines that such an outcome leads to an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate i.e./* = r.
1 1 *Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-7) coined the phrase “second-best efficiency”. Their theory of second best was based around 
finding an efficient price in a market, given that there was an existing distortion in a related market. Specifically, they 
examined the optimal price that should be charged for a public utility’s output, where it was a substitute for a product provided 
by a private monopoly. However, more recently, the term second-best efficiency has been used to describe instances where the 
best possible outcome for society is achieved, given some existing distortion and no related market effects. An example of this 
more liberal usage of the term is found in the context of the natural monopoly problem, where a marginal-cost-based price fails 
to recover cost. There, the term “second best” has been used to describe a Ramsey-Boiteux price, which represents the linear- 
pricing regime that maximises efficiency, given that there is some revenue requirement placed upon the firm preventing a first- 
best outcome. It is this more liberal usage of the term that is relied upon here to describe the condition in equation (3.2.18) as 
being second best.
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■ the social marginal cost of production for any given level of the capital subsidy 5 or 
fair rate/  — i.e. MCs\(Vs,f). It is described by the outcome in equation (3.2.12); and
■ the efficient marginal cost of production — i.e. MCe\. This is the outcome for 
equation (3.2.12) when there is either no capital subsidy provided (i.e. 5 = 0) or the 
fair rate is set equal to the rate of return earned by the unregulated monopoly (i.e./=  
rm).
FIGURE 3.2.2 THE WELFARE-MAXIMISING CAPITAL SUBSIDY OR FAIR RATE
MCsl(s')=MLC(f')
Figure 3.2.2 illustrates that the private marginal cost of production for the capital- 
subsidised monopoly, or the marginal labour cost of production for the ROR-regulated 
monopoly, lies below both the efficient and social marginal cost curves — MCe\ and 
M C r \. A s the firm continues to produce until marginal revenue MR equals the private 
marginal cost of production MCs(s*) or the marginal labour cost MLC(f*), the optimal 
ROR-regulated or capital-subsidised monopoly supplies qRl units of output.
The input distortion here implies that as shown by Sheshinski (in Figure 1, page 177), 
the social marginal cost M C r \ lies above the efficient marginal cost of production MCe\, 
for all level of output greater than qm\. Further, this leads to the monopolist increasing 
output from qm\ to q*R{, which is less than the Pareto-optimal level of output qc\. The 
resulting welfare gain from the increase in output that is induced by imposing the
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optimal fair rate /*, or providing the optimal capital subsidy 5 , is captured in Figure
3.2.2 by the shaded area abc.
3.2.3.2 The GE Analysis of the Optimal Capital Subsidy or Fair Rate 
Substitutability and complementarity between products, and irremovable distortions, 
appear to exist in a number of public utility industries. For example there is 
substitutability in gas and electricity consumption, and regulators allow many networks 
to price above long-run marginal cost, to account for the shared or common costs that 
cannot be attributed to any particular service.14 Therefore, when considering ROR 
regulation, it seems useful to consider the optimal fair rate where there are existing 
distortions in related markets. Such an outcome can be captured using the GE model 
established in this Section.15
By examining the impact of introducing capital subsidies on two monopolists, the GE 
framework can be used to analyse the condition for the optimal fair rate when there is a 
related ROR-regulated monopoly market. Alternatively, the equivalence between price 
regulation and the monopoly receiving the production subsidy, (outlined in Section 2.5), 
could be adapted to analyse the impact ROR regulation has, when the monopoly in the 
related market is subject to price regulation.
Equation (3.2.15) describes the dollar change in utility that occurs from changing a 
specific capital subsidy or fair rate, when there is an existing production tax distortion in 
a related competitive market. The outcome given by equation (3.2.15) can be illustrated 
using the diagram in Figure 3.2.3.
If it is assumed capital is a normal input (i.e. dqi/ds > 0), then in period 1, the marginal 
welfare gain in market 1 from decreasing the existing fair rate or increasing the existing 
capital subsidy in period 0 — (p r \ -  MCR\)(dq\/ds) — will be equal to the vertical sliver
14 For example, in both the US and Australian telecommunications markets, the regulator allows an access price for the network 
that is set above the estimate for the long-run marginal cost. This is done to account for common costs o f  the network.
15 The analysis o f  Bailey was more concerned with highlighting that in a GE framework, there was an additional exchange 
efficiency consideration to take into account. Further, unlike the analysis done here, which only examines the Sheshinski 
outcome where there is an interior solution for the optimal fair rate, Bailey outlines that it is also possible for there to be an end­
point solution for the optimal fair rate when there is no existing distortion in the competitive industry. She establishes (at page 
108) that such an outcome will arise if  “society rates the output o f  the monopoly very highly relative to the competitive output”. 
As Bailey notes, this means “society is willing to trade the monopoly good for the competitive good even when the (production) 
inefficiency imposed is very great.”
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abed. However, unlike the partial-equilibrium framework, this does not capture the 
total marginal welfare change. The cross-price effect in the related market with the 
existing production tax, means that in period 1 there is now an additional marginal 
welfare change that must be assessed —  tiidqdds). This term is depicted in the diagram 
by the vertical sliver wxyz.
FIGURE 3.2.3 ROR REGULATION WITH A RELATED DISTORTED MARKET
Market 1: ROR Regulated Monopoly Market 2; The Related Distorted Market
To find the welfare-maximising condition that the optimal fair rate and capital subsidy 
must satisfy, equation (3.2.15) is set equal to zero. This yields the following expression 
for the welfare-maximising price pRl that should be charged in period 1,
pRX = MCrj +crt2, where a
' >o 1 >o
(3.2.19)
As it is assumed there are now cross-price effects, it is apparent from equation (3.2.19) 
that the distorted-marginal-cost pricing recommended in the partial-equilibrium analysis 
o f Sheshinski, w ill no longer be optimal.16 From equation (3.2.19), the relationship 
between the optimal price pRl, and the distorted marginal cost MCr\ in the regulated 
market, depends upon the sign o f the term <j . This term reflects, the substitutability in
16 The idea that marginal-cost pricing is not optimal when there is an irremovable distortion in a related market, is consistent with 
the theory o f second best outlined by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57). In their analysis however, they did not consider the 
impact input distortions would have on the social marginal cost o f production.
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consumption between the output in the related market, and the product supplied by the 
ROR-regulated monopoly.
Where cr> 0, then dqilds < 0, and the product in the related market with the irremovable 
distortion (in the form of the production tax), is a substitute. The welfare gain in the 
ROR-regulated market here must be traded-off against a Harberger (1971) rectangle 
welfare loss in the related market. Consequently, the optimal price p*Rl charged in the 
ROR-regulated must now be set above the distorted marginal-cost MCr\, and the 
optimal fair rate /*  here will be higher than that recommended by Sheshinski. This 
outcome is illustrated in Figure 3.2.4, where the welfare gain in the ROR-regulated 
market is equal to area abed, and the Harberger rectangle welfare loss is equal to area 
wxyz.
FIGURE 3.2.4 ROR REGULATION WITH A SUBSTITUTE PRODUCT
Market 1; ROR Regulated Monopoly Market 2: The Related Distorted Market
D\ D2
Where cr < 0, then dq^ds > 0, and the output in the related market is a complement. 
This implies that the welfare gain in the ROR-regulated market is now reinforced by a 
Harbeger rectangle welfare gain. The optimal price pR{ charged in the ROR-regulated 
market must now be set below the distorted marginal cost M C r \ , and the optimal fair 
rate f  will be lower than that recommended by Sheshinski.17
1 7  . •  . .
As the ROR-regulated monopoly cannot operate if/  is set below r, it assumed here that the resulting optimal fair rate in the GE
framework must still be greater-than-or-equal to the normal rate o f  return on capital r. Alternatively, the optimal price will be
greater-than-or-equal to the distorted average cost o f production ACr\.
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As the remaining work in this Chapter only examines the optimal fair rate in a partial- 
equilibrium framework, the subscripts and superscripts used in this GE model are 
dropped in the analysis that follows. These Sections revert back to using the simple 
notation that was employed throughout the course of Chapter 2.
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3.3 Depicting ROR Regulation in a Price-Quantity Diagram —
Sheshinski (1971) versus Waterson (1989)
The price-quantity diagrams used by Sheshinski (1971) and Waterson (1989) to portray 
the impact of ROR regulation on the monopolist appear very different. In the diagram 
of Sheshinski at page 177, the welfare change is depicted by an area lying above the 
additional units of output supplied under ROR regulation. In contrast, the diagram of 
Waterson at page 88, captures the welfare change, by subtracting an area lying above 
the units of output originally supplied by the unregulated monopoly, from an area lying 
over the additional units of output supplied as a result of ROR regulation.
This Section reconciles the two approaches used by Sheshinski and Waterson. It 
highlights that the different areas arise due to the different social marginal cost curves 
used by the authors. The social marginal cost curve of Sheshinski is drawn for all levels 
of the fair rate (i.e. V/), while the social marginal cost curve of Waterson is drawn for a 
given level of the fair rate (i.e. /  = fo). The analysis of Waterson is consistent with 
diagrammatic framework employed by Carlton (1979), which examined the impact of 
an input tax. In this diagrammatic framework, the inefficiency arising from the AJ 
effect can be categorised as an example of what Carlton referred to as a production- 
deadweight-loss “banana”. Subsequently the price-quantity diagram of Waterson 
illustrates that ROR regulation involves a welfare trade-off between a Carlton 
production-deadweight-loss banana, and an area that captures the standard allocative 
efficiency gain from an increase in output.
3.3.1 Bananas, Boxes and The Marginal Cost Curves of Carlton
Carlton (1979) showed how the positive and normative impact of an input-market 
distortion in an industry could be illustrated in the price-quantity space.18 The specific 
input market distortion Carlton examined, was an input tax levied on a competitive 
factor of production that was used to produce output in a competitive market. By 
deriving the private marginal cost curve faced by the firm, Carlton obtained the level of
1 o
10 Albon (1998) provides a good exposition of the methodology used by Carlton when he examines the welfare impact of the 
removal of the Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme in Australia.
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production in the industry. By deriving the distorted social marginal cost curve, Carlton 
showed the normative or welfare impact of the input tax.
A feature of the distorted-social-marginal-cost curve was that, the increase in the cost to 
society from the input distortion was captured in the price-quantity space by what 
Carlton described as a “banana-” and “box-shaped” area. Although Waterson (1989) 
does not draw any link to the formal analysis of Carlton, in his diagram illustrating the 
impact ROR regulation has on the monopoly, he implicitly employs a social marginal 
cost curve which has identical characteristics to that used by Carlton.
To show that a banana- and box-shaped area captures the overall change in the cost to 
society under ROR regulation, and to reconcile the diagram of Waterson with the 
diagram of Sheshinski, it is first necessary to derive the marginal cost curves used by 
Carlton. As in Albon (1998), this is done, by using the information contained about the 
total cost of production in the input-space diagram of Figure 3.3.1. To simplify the 
analysis in this Section it is assumed throughout that the firm is subject to constant- 
retums-to-scale production technology.19
FIGURE 3.3.1 THE TOTAL COST OF PRODUCTION IN THE INPUT SPACE
19 An implication o f constant-retums-to-scale technology is that both factors o f production are normal, so output will always 
increase with the introduction o f ROR regulation or an equivalent capital subsidy.
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In Figure 3.3.1, M  denotes the efficient input mix used by the unregulated monopoly to 
produce the level of output qm, at a cost to the firm and society of Cm. When the 
monopoly is granted the input subsidy on capital so, or subject to the regulated fair rate 
of return fo, the firm increases its level of production to qR units of output. However, 
because under each regime the monopoly employs the distorted input mix at point D, 
the firm inefficiently over-capitalises in its production, which leads to the social cost of 
production Q  exceeding the efficient cost of production Ce. While the ROR-regulated 
monopoly actually faces this social cost of production Q , the capital-subsidised 
monopoly incurs the lower private cost of production Cs.
FIGURE 3.3.2 THE MARGINAL COST CURVES OF CARLTON
▲
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As this is a long-run model and there are no shared or common costs of production, the 
assumption of constant returns guarantees that the marginal and average cost curves will 
be constant and equal to one another. Hence, each of the costs shown in the input-space 
diagram of Figure 3.3.1 will correspond in the price-quantity space, to an area under the 
average or marginal cost curves for the levels of output qm and qR. That is, in Figure 
3.3.2:
■ the area under MCe at output qm — area deqm0 — is equal to Cm and the area under 
MCe at output qR — area dcqRO — is equal to Ce;
■ the area under MCd(so,fo) at output qR — area abqRO — is equal to Q ; and
■ the area under MCs(sq) or MLC(fo) at output qR — area igqRO — is equal to Cs.
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Aside from the areas underneath the marginal cost curves corresponding to total costs, 
the three marginal cost curves used by Carlton — depicted in Figure 3.3.2 — have some 
very important and distinctive properties. For example:
■ the marginal cost curve MCe corresponds to the marginal cost of production along 
the cost-minimising, or efficient, output expansion path qepe’,
■ the marginal cost curve MCfso, fo) corresponds to the social marginal cost of 
production along the inefficient output expansion path drawn for the given input 
subsidy on capital so, or the given fair rate of return fo — i.e. qepfso, fo). As the 
distorted marginal cost curve MCfso, fo) reflects an inefficient input mix, it exceeds 
the efficient marginal cost curve MCe over all levels of output q in the price-quantity 
space. The importance of the distorted marginal cost curve is that it can be used to 
undertake the welfare analysis resulting from ROR regulation or a capital subsidy. 
This is the social marginal cost curve implicitly used by Waterson (1989); and
■ the marginal cost curve MCfso) corresponds to the private marginal cost of 
production faced by the monopoly receiving the capital subsidy so. For the regulated 
monopoly subject to the equivalent fair rate of return fo, this marginal cost curve is 
identical to the marginal labour cost curve MLCifo). The importance of these 
identical marginal cost curves, MCs(so) and MLCifo), is that both can be used to 
undertake positive analysis of the industry. For example, in order for the capital- 
subsidised monopoly to maximise profit, the level of output produced qR, is 
determined by the point where the private marginal cost curve MCs(so) intersects the 
marginal revenue curve MR(q). Meanwhile, in order for the ROR-regulated 
monopoly to maximise the total allowed return on capital — which subsequently 
maximises the regulated firm’s profits — the level of output produced qR, will be 
determined by the point where the marginal labour cost curve MLCifo) intersects the 
marginal revenue curve MRiq).
Using the information about the respective costs of production represented by the areas 
underneath the marginal cost curves, it is possible to conclude that in the price-quantity 
diagram, for the monopoly receiving the capital subsidy so:
■ area abgi corresponds to the total subsidy payment made to the monopoly Q  -  Cs;
■ area abed corresponds to the production inefficiency Q  -  Ce that arises from the 
over-capitalising in producing qR units of output; and
■ area degi is therefore the “net-subsidy” payment made by the Government to the 
monopoly.
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Meanwhile, for the ROR-regulated monopoly subject to the equivalent fair ratefy.
■ area abed corresponds to the production inefficiency Cj -  Ce, which is a cost that is 
borne by the ROR-regulated monopoly.
In addition to this, it is now possible to show that, the increase in the total cost to 
society arising from the capital subsidy or regulated fair rate, can be captured in the 
price-quantity space by what Carlton refers to as a “banana”- and “box”-shaped area. 
That is, in Figure 3.3.2, the change in the total social cost of production is equal to area 
abed plus ecqRqm, where:
■ area abed is the increase in the cost to society arising from using a distorted input 
mix to produce the q& units of output. It is the area Carlton (1979) referred to as a 
banana-shaped area,20 and it captures the production deadweight loss resulting from 
the inefficient over-capitalisation in production. Consequently, the inefficiency 
arising from the AJ effect, can be categorised as one example of the Carlton 
production-deadweight-loss banana; and
■ area ecqRqm is the increase in the efficient cost incurred as a result of increasing the 
level of production from qm to qR. It is what Carlton referred to as the box-shaped 
area.
FIGURE 3.3.3 THE INCREASE IN PRODUCTION COST USING A BANANA AND BOX
▲
P
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20 This area will more closely resemble a banana shape when there is an increasing or decreasing marginal cost curve.
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To highlight the increase in the social cost of production arising from following the 
methodology of Carlton for the ROR-regulated monopoly or capital-subsidised 
monopoly, Figure 3.3.2 is redrawn. In Figure 3.3.3, the dark-shaded area abed captures 
the Carlton banana, while the light-shaded area ecqRqm captures the Carlton box.
As the only difference between the outcomes under ROR regulation and the equivalent 
capital subsidy is in relation to distribution, to avoid any unnecessary repetition 
throughout the remainder of this Section, only the outcome under ROR regulation is 
considered.
3.3.2 The Social Marginal Cost Curves of Carlton and Sheshinski 
For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this Chapter, the different social marginal 
cost curves used in the diagrams of Sheshinski (1971) and Waterson (1989) to analyse 
ROR regulation, are referred to respectively as the Sheshinski social marginal cost 
curve, and the Carlton social marginal cost curve.
In Section 3.3.1, it was established that under ROR regulation, the Carlton social 
marginal cost curve, implicitly used in the price-quantity diagram of Waterson:
■ is drawn for a given fair rate of return on capital;
■ corresponds to points lying along the inefficient expansion path qepd, which in the 
input-space diagram of Figure 3.3.1, diverges from the efficient expansion path qepe 
over all the units of output produced; and
■ leads to some portion of the increase in the social cost of production, being captured 
over all the units of output produced by the ROR-regulated monopoly (i.e. from 0 to 
qR units of output).
In contrast, using the results established here and in Section 3.2, the Sheshinski social 
marginal cost curve:
■ is drawn for all the possible values of the regulated fair rate of return/;
■ corresponds to the points lying along the AJ Path, which in the input-space diagram 
of Figure 3.3.1, only diverges from the efficient output expansion path qepe for those 
units of output produced exceeding monopoly output qm\
■ leads to the increase in the social cost of production only being captured over the 
additional units of output that ROR regulation induces the monopoly to produce (i.e. 
from qm to qR units of output.)
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While the Carlton and Sheshinski social marginal cost curves have very different 
diagrammatic representations in the price-quantity space, due to the different expansion 
paths they correspond to in the input space, the analysis here shows that both yield 
identical outcomes in relation to the overall cost of production to society under ROR 
regulation. To link the two social marginal cost curves, it is useful to derive the social 
average cost curve that implicitly arises from the analysis of Sheshinski.21 This is done 
with assistance of the price-quantity diagram in Figure 3.3.4.
FIGURE 3.3.4 THE COST CURVES OF CARLTON AND SHESHINSKI
A/QCso/o) =  AC^SqJo) 
MCe -  ACe
MCs(s0) = MLC(f0)
To determine the shape of the Sheshinski social average cost curve under constant- 
retums-to-scale technology, it is necessary to find the points in the price-quantity space 
that the curve passes through. As the unregulated monopoly uses the efficient input mix 
to produce qm units of output, the social average cost curve drawn for all levels o f / — 
i.e. A C & fi)  — must initially be equal to the efficient average cost curve ACe, and pass 
through point e. Assuming that the regulator sets the fair rate fo, the total social cost of 
producing qR units of output is Q , which in Figure 3.3.4, is captured by area abqR0. As 
this area is the same regardless of the social average cost curve used, it must be the case 
that the Sheshinski social average cost curve ACR(\/f)  passes through point b. By
o i
Sheshinski did not derive a social average cost curve. For an analysis that does contain diagrams showing both the average and 
marginal cost curves drawn for all levels of the fair rate of return, see Bailey (1973) at page 106.
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mapping ACR( y f ) through points e and b, as shown in Figure 3.3.4, under constant- 
retums-to-scale technology the social average cost curve drawn for all levels of/  will 
be upward-sloping in the price-quantity space.
Once again, as the unregulated monopoly uses the efficient input mix, the Sheshinski 
social marginal cost curve MCR{\/f) must be equal to the efficient marginal cost curve 
MCe at qm units of output, and pass through point e. As the social average cost curve 
ACR(\/f) is increasing, it must also be the case that the Sheshinski social marginal cost 
curve MCR(\/f) drawn for all levels/is increasing and lies above ACR(\/f). Therefore, 
using the Sheshinski social marginal cost curve MCR(\/f) in Figure 3.3.4, the total cost 
of producing the regulated level of output qR associated with the fair rate of return / 0, 
will be captured by the area abqR0.22
Given that the social marginal cost curve MCR(\ff)  passes through point j  in Figure 
3.3.4, the combined areas deqm0 and ejqRqm will be equal to area abqR0, or alternatively 
area abed must be equal to area ejc. This implies that for the level of output produced 
by the monopoly under any given fair rate f  the Carlton production-deadweight-loss 
banana must be equal to the area by which the Sheshinski marginal cost curve MCR(\/f) 
exceeds the efficient marginal cost curve MCe. It follows from this that the different 
areas used by Sheshinski and Water son to depict the overall welfare change resulting 
from ROR regulation will also be equal.
3.3.3 The Efficiency Trade-Off: A Bigger Banana for an Increase in Output 
By incorporating a demand curve into the diagram of Figure 3.3.2, the price-quantity 
diagram used by Waterson to assess the impact of ROR regulation on the monopoly, is 
illustrated in Figure 3.3.5.23 In this diagram, the increase in output from qm to qR, leads 
to an increase in allocative efficiency of area Ijce, while the inefficient over- 
capitalisation in production (or AJ effect) results in a Carlton production-deadweight- 
loss “banana” equal to area abed. Therefore, as in the analysis of Waterson, the overall
22 This is consistent with the diagram o f  Bailey (1973), who shows (at page 106) that when the ROR-regulated monopoly is 
subject to constant-retums-to-scale production technology, the social and average marginal cost curve drawn for all le v e ls /is  
upward-sloping.
The price-quantity diagram used by Waterson (1989) does not incorporate a marginal labour cost curve. Waterson just specifies 
some level o f  output resulting from ROR regulation and unlike Figure 3.3.5, does make explicit why this level o f  output qR is 
being produced.
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increase in welfare that results from ROR regulation is now captured over two areas, 
and is equal to Ijbm -  amed.
FIGURE 3.3.5 WELFARE UNDER ROR REGULATION WITH CARLTON COST CURVES
In Chapter 2 it was established that there was a greater level of production inefficiency, 
the closer the fair rate f  was set to the normal rate of return on capital r. In terms of the 
price-quantity diagram this means that, while a lower fair rate will lead to an increase in 
output and a greater level of allocative efficiency, this must be traded-off against a 
bigger production-deadweight-loss banana. It is possible to imagine that a situation 
could arise where a further reduction in the fair rate leads to a decrease in welfare, as the 
subsequent increase in the production-deadweight-loss banana exceeds any increase 
experienced in allocative efficiency. A welfare-maximising regulator will be interested 
in avoiding such an outcome, and will set the fair rate to maximise the difference 
between the production-deadweight-loss banana and the increase in allocative 
efficiency.
To maximise welfare under ROR regulation, the fair rate of return must be set at a level 
/*, where the marginal production-deadweight-loss banana will be equal to the marginal 
gain in allocative efficiency from the additional units of output supplied. In order to:
■ assist with illustrating the welfare-maximising outcome for the ROR-regulated 
monopoly;
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■ highlight the different areas used in the analysis of Sheshinski and Waterson to 
capture the change in welfare under ROR regulation; and
■ show that under constant-returns-to-scale technology a fair rate /  set within an 
infinitesimal amount of r will not be optimal;
the Sheshinski social marginal and average cost curves are added to the diagram in 
Figure 3.3.6. To avoid having to change the labels for such things as the production
deadweight-loss banana, it is assumed here that the fair rate previously denoted fo in 
Figure 3.3.5, is also the welfare-maximising fair rate/  .
FIGURE 3.3.6 THE WELFARE-MAXIMISING FAIR RATE
MCJf  = r) -  A C J f - r )
In Figure 3.3.6, to maximise the total allowed return on capital at the welfare-
maximising fair rate /  *, the monopoly produces the level of output qR, where the
£
marginal revenue of production MR{q) is equal to the marginal labour cost MLCif ), 
and per-unit price charged is p*R . The welfare gain that results from setting the optimal 
fair rate can be illustrated using either the Sheshinski or Carlton social marginal cost 
curve. While the marginal cost curves capture the same increase in welfare, the areas 
used to depict this welfare gain differ. The Carlton social marginal cost curve, used in 
the analysis of Waterson, shows a welfare gain equal to Ijbm -  amed, while the 
Sheshinski social marginal cost curve illustrates that there is a welfare gain of Ije. 
Regardless of how the welfare gain from ROR regulation is measured, it is lower than
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that experienced under the first-best outcome, where there is an increase in welfare of 
loe.
To establish why a fair rate set within an infinitesimal amount of r will not be optimal 
here, it assumed that the ROR-regulated monopoly employs an input mix along the AJ 
path for any allowed fair rate /  that is set greater than or equal to r.24 In these 
circumstances, if /  were set equal to r, the firm would earn zero economic profit and 
over-capitalise in producing the break-even level of output q^ Although output qb 
exceeds the level of output achieved under the optimal fair rate /*, it leads to a lower 
level of welfare due to the substantial increase in production inefficiency. Using the 
Carlton social marginal cost curve, when /  is set equal to r, the production-deadweight- 
loss banana will be equal to pbnvd, and the overall welfare change is Inu - pbued. As it 
is possible for this welfare change to be negative, under constant-retums-to-scale 
technology, excessive ROR regulation of the monopoly can potentially induce worse 
outcomes than having an unregulated monopoly. Instances where there may be end­
point solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e. f*  = r), as opposed to the interior solution 
outlined so far (i.e. rm > f*  >r), are explored in Section 3.4.
24 See Bailey (1973) at pages 104-7.
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3.4 The Optimal Fair Rate of Return
Sheshinski (1971) was the first to address the issue of the optimal fair rate of return, and 
derived an interior solution for the optimal fair rate /  (i.e. rm> f  > r). Shortly after, 
Klevorick (1971) considered the same issue. However, unlike Sheshinski, he 
recognised that there could either be an interior or end-point solution for the optimal fair 
rate (i.e./* > r or/* = r). A distinguishing feature of the work done by Klevorick (1971) 
was that he assumed the monopoly would employ an efficient input mix when the fair 
rate /  was set equal to r. Bailey (1973) highlights the key results of the two papers at 
pages 104-7. Her analysis demonstrates that:
■ if it is assumed the firm operates at a point along the AJ path for all values of the fair 
rate/ greater than or equal to r, then:25
-  an interior solution is optimal (i.e. rm> /*  > r) if the average cost curve ACR(yf)  
lies below the marginal cost curve MC*(V/) at the end point on the AJ path;
-  an end-point solution is optimal (i.e./* = r) if the average cost curve ACR(\/f) is 
equal to or exceeds the marginal cost MCR(\/f) at the end point on the AJ path.26
■ if it is assumed the firm operates efficiently when the fair rate/  is set equal to r, then 
where the ROR-regulated monopoly faces constant or decreasing costs of average, 
there will be an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e./* = r). Otherwise, an 
interior solution exists for the optimal fair rate.27
This Section uses price-quantity diagrams similar to those employed by Bailey, to 
illustrate the outcomes for the optimal fair rate under different assumptions and cost 
conditions. While the exposition provided here is not original, and essentially
25 See Proposition 6.6 at page 104-5.
OftZD It is important to note that although not mentioned by Bailey, there is a reason why she did not use the terminology increasing- 
retums-to-scale in her analysis. Although increasing returns implies an unregulated monopoly faces a decreasing average and 
marginal cost curve, for a ROR-regulated monopoly this is not necessarily the case. Under ROR regulation, because o f the 
inefficient over-capitalisation in production, the marginal cost curve faced by the regulated monopoly MC«(V/) diverges from 
the decreasing efficient marginal cost curve MCe, and may be increasing over certain levels o f  production. Subsequently, under 
increasing returns it is possible that the average cost curve faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly ACR( \ / f )  could lie below 
MCÄ(V /), leading to an interior solution for the optimal fair rate.
97 See Proposition 6.7 at page 107.
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reproduces the work of Bailey, it is crucial for the analysis that is eventually done in 
Section 3.6. This assesses the results of Yang and Fox (1994), and examines the precise 
conditions where the introduction of a capital tax will increase and decrease welfare in 
the AJ framework.
This Section initially contrasts the solutions for the optimal fair rate obtained by 
Sheshinski and Klevorick, by examining an outcome where the ROR-regulated 
monopoly faces constant-retums-to-scale production technology. This example 
illustrates the discontinuous nature of the assumption made by Klevorick that the firm 
employs an efficient input mix when /  is set equal to r. The Klevroick assumption is 
subsequently ignored, and an outcome is illustrated where there will be an end-point 
solution for the optimal fair rate, under the alternative assumption that the ROR- 
regulated firm operates at a point along the AJ path for all/ greater than or equal to r.
3.4.1 Contrasting the Sheshinski and Klevorick Optimal Fair Rates 
The price-quantity diagram in Figure 3.4.1 is similar to the diagram of Figure 6-9(a) at 
page 106 of Bailey (1973). As in Bailey it is assumed here that capital is a normal 
input,28 and the diagram uses what was referred to in Section 3.3 as the Sheshinski 
average and social marginal cost curves — i.e. ,4(/(V /) and M6/(V/). To illustrate the 
different optimal fair rates derived by Sheshinski (1971) and Klevorick (1971), an 
example is used where it is assumed the ROR-regulated monopoly faces constant- 
retums-to-scale technology in production.
The analysis in Section 3.3.3 has already shown that with constant returns, there will be 
an interior solution for the optimal fair rate /*  (i.e. rm>f*>r)  when it is assumed that 
the firm employs an input mix along the AJ path for any /  set greater than or equal to r. 
In Figure 3.4.1, this leads to qR units of output being produced and a welfare gain of 
area awe. In contrast, if it is assumed the firm employs an efficient input mix when/is 
set equal to r, there will be an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate/*  (i.e./* = r). 
ROR regulation now induces a first-best outcome, as the regulated firm supplies the 
competitive level of output qc, and there is a welfare gain of area ace.
28 As shown in the previous Sections, this assumption implies that the introduction o f ROR regulation leads to an increase in
output and welfare.
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FIGURE 3.4.1 THE OPTIMAL FAIR RATE UNDER CONSTANT RETURNS
MLCif)
The outcome using the Klevorick approach highlights the arbitrary nature of the 
assumption he has made. In the AJ framework, as /  is set closer to the normal rate of 
return r, the firm increases its inefficient over-capitalisation in production and increases 
output towards qb. When the fair rate is within an infinitesimal amount of r (i,e./= r + 
s, where s>  0), the level of output will also be within an infinitesimal amount of qb (i.e. 
qb — qb — £)■ However, under the assumptions of Klevorick, when there is now a very 
slight reduction in the fair rate to r, this results in a substantial change in the input mix 
employed by the producer, a relatively large increase in output from qb -  £ to qc, and a 
large increase in the level of welfare.29
To avoid such a jump in the level of output and welfare for a very small change in the 
fair rate, the assumption of Klevorick is ignored throughout the remainder of the work 
done in this Section, and the course of the Chapter. To remove the problem of 
indeterminacy and having a discontinuous solution when /  is set equal to r, it is instead 
assumed that the firm continues to over-capitalise in production and employs an input
29 As outlined in Section 3.3, where the fair rate is set equal to r + e, e > 0, it is possible that there will be a welfare loss 
experienced from ROR regulation. In these circumstances, if  the assumption o f Klevorick were adopted, then a very small 
reduction in the fair rate o f  return to r, would lead to the overall welfare loss under ROR regulation being turned into an overall 
welfare gain.
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mix lying on the AJ path for all /  set greater than or equal to r (i.e./> r). This ensures 
the equivalence outcome with the capital subsidy is retained even when /  is set equal to 
r. Further, it implies that in Figure 3.4.1, if the fair rate of return/  were set equal to r, 
the firm produces the break-even level of output qb, which is less than the competitive 
level of output qc.
3.4.2 An End-Point Solution for the Optimal Fair Rate
To illustrate an instance where there is an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate, 
the price-quantity diagram in Figure 3.4.2 is used. This depicts a case where the ROR- 
regulated monopoly faces an average cost curve ACR(\/f)  that lies above the marginal 
cost curve MC/?(V/). It is similar to the diagram drawn by Bailey in Figure 6-9(b).
FIGURE 3.4.2 THE OPTIMAL FAIR RATE WITH A DECREASING AVERAGE COST
MLCif l )
In Figure 3.4.2, if the regulator were to set the welfare-maximising fair rate without 
having any regard to firm profit, price p*u would be set, which is equal to the marginal 
cost of production faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly, MCR(\/f). However, because 
this marginal cost curve MCr(\/J) lies below the average cost curve ACr(\if),  such a 
price leads to a long-run loss. Consequently, the socially-optimal unconstrained fair
86
rate f*  that corresponds to price p *u, lies below the break-even or normal rate of return
r.30 To ensure that the welfare-maximising outcome is achieved, subject to the 
constraint that the regulated firm recovers its long-run costs, the regulator here must set 
the optimal fair rate/*  equal to r (i.e./* = r).31
In Figure 3.4.2, when the fair rate /is set equal to r, the level of output q*R is supplied. 
This leads to an overall welfare gain from ROR regulation equal to area abde. 
Compared to the price p*u that arises from setting the socially-optimal unconstrained
fair rate, there is an inefficiency of bwd. While setting the fair rate equal to r represents 
the best outcome for society under ROR regulation, given the constraint that the 
monopoly recovers its long run costs of production, it does not yield a Ramsey-Boiteux 
price. For such a second-best outcome, the level of output qs must be supplied, which 
would lead to a welfare gain of area ashe. The reason ROR regulation is not second- 
best efficient is that the firm still over-capitalises in its production when / is set equal to 
r, and the average cost curve AC(\/f) exceeds the efficient average cost of production 
ACe. It seems more appropriate to describe the outcome achieved by the end-point 
solution here as being “third-best”. That is, it represents the best the regulator can do 
given that the monopoly is constrained to earning zero profit, and that ROR regulation 
induces the firm to inefficiently over-capitalise in its production.
3  ̂ Technically, the AJ path is not defined for any fair rate/less than r. Subsequently, to conceptualise the marginal cost curve and 
level o f  output associated with fair rate f ’ , it is necessary to imagine that f'u corresponds to some optimal capital subsidy s'.
Unlike the regulated monopoly earning the fair rate f ’ , the optimally-capital-subsidised monopoly continues its production,
and employs an input mix lying on the AJ path. The outcome depicted in Figure 3.4.2, where the end-point solution for/ *  no 
longer corresponds to the optimal capital subsidy s’, is why only the interior solution o f  Sheshinski was considered in Section 
3.2.
T 1 . . .
J 1 Although not depicted in Figure 3.4.2, as outlined in the introduction o f  this Section, there will also be an end-point solution for 
the optimal fair rate when the marginal cost curve A/CR(V /) is equal to the average cost curve ACR(\/f) at the end point on the 
AJ path. In contrast to the outcome illustrated here, in such circumstances, the socially-optimal unconstrained fair rate f'u will
be equal to the normal rate o f return r, and also identical to the optimal fair rate f . The end-point solution would then lead to a 
distorted-marginal-cost-based price that would allow the firm to earn zero economic profit and recover its long-run costs o f  
production.
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3.5 The Optimal Fair Rate — A Worked Example
This Section examines the issue of the optimal fair rate and the equivalent optimal 
capital subsidy, by revisiting and building upon the alternative model of ROR regulation 
outlined in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2. To find the optimal fair rate, the additional 
assumption made here is that there is a perfectly-informed regulator who aims to 
maximise welfare. By using the same Cobb-Douglas production technology and linear 
demand as in Section 2.6, the welfare-maximising condition established in Section 3.2 
is solved, and an analytical solution derived for both the optimal fair rate and the 
corresponding optimal capital subsidy. By also adopting the same parameter values as 
in Section 2.6, the outcomes for the unregulated and ROR-regulated monopoly subject 
to the optimal fair rate f  are calculated, and then contrasted in a diagram. From this, 
the size of the production-deadweight-loss banana and welfare gain are found, and 
optimal ROR regulation is compared with a production subsidy when there is a positive 
marginal excess burden. The results once again highlight the equivalence between the 
capital-subsidised monopoly and the ROR-regulated monopoly in the AJ model.
3.5.1 The Behaviour of a Perfectly-Informed-Welfare-Maximising Regulator 
In Section 2.6 it was shown that an equivalent outcome to the AJ model could be 
generated, by having perfectly-informed shareholders instructing management of the 
ROR-regulated monopoly, to behave as if the firm were receiving a capital subsidy. 
From this, an expression was derived for the capital subsidy as a function of the fair 
rate. To find the welfare-maximising fair rate and corresponding optimal capital 
subsidy, the framework used in Section 2.6 is modified here, so that there is now:
(i) a perfectly-informed-welfare-maximising regulator;
(ii) perfectly-informed-total-dividend-maximising shareholders; and
(iii) a manager that acts on the instructions of shareholders.
As the fair rate /  is set closer to r, the regulator recognises that the shareholders will 
instruct the manager to behave as if it is receiving a higher capital subsidy. This means 
that, as in the AJ model, the benefit of increased production is partially offset by an 
increase in the level of inefficient over-capitalisation. Therefore, the welfare- 
maximising regulator will set a fair rate that induces shareholders to instruct 
management to behave as if they are receiving a capital subsidy, which equates the
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marginal gain in allocative efficiency with the marginal loss in production efficiency. 
Such a fair rate can be found by using the equation for the optimal condition described 
in Section 3.2. Solving this, and denoting the welfare-maximising outcomes with 
superscript *, the optimal fair rate of return set by the regulator is,
/  = />,'•)
s.t f* > r
(3.5.1)
Substituting this expression into equation (2.6.9) implies that the corresponding optimal 
capital subsidy set by shareholders is,
s = s \w ,r ) (3.5.2)
Further, substituting equation (3.5.1) into equations (2.6.10a) through to (2.6.10g), the 
following optimal identities are derived.
kR=k*R(w,r) (3.5.3a)
n R  = n R { w , r ) (3.5.3b)
qR=h(nR,k*R) = qR(w,r) (3.5.3c)
Pr = p { K n R,k*R)) = p R(w,r) (3.5.3d)
7TS = 7r(nR,kR) = 7r*s(w,r) (3.5.3e)
nR=Xs(nR,k*R)-sk*R=7rR(w,r) (3.5.3f)
Dr = D(nR,kR) = DR(w,r) (3.5.3g)
3.5.2 The Maximisation Problem for the Regulator
The welfare-maximising regulator induces the shareholder to provide the socially- 
optimal capital subsidy by setting the appropriate fair rate. This fair rate is found by 
solving the welfare-maximising condition derived in Section 3.2 and outlined in 
equation (3.2.16). In the partial-equilibrium framework used here, this condition 
translates to the requirement that,
pAw ,r ,s )d^ {W’r’SK ^ h l l  (3.5.4)
ds ds
Substituting equations (2.6.20c) and (2.6.20d) into the above, with the linear demand 
and Cobb-Douglas technology of Section 2.6, the left-hand side of equation (3.5.4) is,
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PR(w,r,s)
dqR(w,r,s) 
ds 2b
+ w/2{r — s)
A r - s j
(3.5.5a)
As C denotes the actual cost of production faced by the firm and society,
C(w, r, s) = wnR (w, r, s) + rkR (w, r, s)
Substituting in the expressions for hr in equation (2.6.20a), and Jcr in equation (2.6.20b), 
and simplifying, the total cost of production to society in the presence o f a capital 
subsidy or ROR regulation is,
— - w / 2{ r -  sY1 
2
(2 r - s )
Therefore the right-hand side of the welfare-maximising condition given by equation 
(3.5.4) is
dC(w,r,s) 
ds
r w ^  ras{r-sY2 + 4 w ^ (r -s )2  ̂
1 4 b { r - s Y 2
(3.5.5b)
Substituting equations (3.5.5a) and (3.5.5b) into (3.5.4), it is possible to solve for the 
welfare-maximising capital subsidy set by shareholders s*,-32
s*(w,r) = r
2a r
36w
(3.5.6)
Substituting equation (3.5.6) into (2.6.19) and simplifying, yields the expression for the 
optimal fair rate f  that the perfectly-informed regulator should set.
f \ w , r )  =
^ 4 ^a r
48w2
(3.5.7)
To ensure that s is strictly positive, and /  is greater than the normal rate of return r, a 
tighter restriction than a2 > 4wr must be imposed upon the parameters of the model. 
That is, the parameters must satisfy the inequality,
36wr > a 2 > A ^ w r  (3.5.8)
Substituting equation (3.5.7) into (2.6.20a) through to (2.6.20h), the expressions for the 
welfare-maximising level of capital, labour, output, price, capital-subsidised monopoly
T9J As the equation is highly non-linear, this solution was found with the assistance o f  Mathematica.
90
profit, ROR-regulated monopoly profit, total dividend payments, and the marginal cost 
of production used by managers, is as follows.
nR = = -
l ( -  ^
b v6w
a I war 
2 ” 6 )
kR=k*R(w,r) = 6w2 ^
V u '  J
war
V o  y
^  = ^ ( w>r) = T
r war^ X"
2 6 J
* . , a ( war v*
P R = P R ( w , r )  =  -  +  ^ —
= n \  0
1 a ' war^ x ~
b 2 l  6 J
KR=n\(w,r) rwar 
v~6”
1- f48wV2Y^
£>* =D*R{w,r) = a war 
2 ' { ~ 6 ~
y f
y
(3.5.9a)
(3.5.9b)
(3.5.9c)
(3.5.9d)
(3.5.9e)
(3.5.9f)
(3.5.9g)
MCs(s*) = MC*s(w,r) = 2 (3.5.9h)
In addition, by substituting equation (3.5.7) into C, and dividing through by qR, an 
expression is derived for the Carlton average and marginal cost of production to society 
MCd at fair rate f*. That is,
MCd(f*) = MC'd(w,r) =
f  r  2 2 ^6w r
v j
(3.5.9i)
3.5.3 A Numerical Example
The numerical example provided here, is done purely for illustrative purposes. It serves 
to further highlight the link between the fair rate and equivalent capital subsidy, by 
showing that the results of the alternative model of ROR regulation used here, are 
consistent with the theoretical outcomes of the AJ model. The example is not designed
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or purported to represent actual outcomes that might arise under ROR regulation, and 
for this reason only one numerical example is used. This is unlike the detailed pseudo- 
empirical analysis of Klevorick (1971) and Callen, Mathewson and Mohrig (1976), 
which derive numerical results for the AJ model using many different parameter values.
To find numerical outcomes for the optimal identities derived in this model of ROR 
regulation, the same parameter values are adopted as in Section 2.6. That is, a = 5, r  =  
0.1 and w = 15. Here, the additional assumption that must be made is that the slope of 
the linear demand curve b is equal to 0.001. Applying these values to the equations 
outlined here, and the unregulated monopoly outcomes in Section 2.6, yields the results 
outlined in the following table.
TABLE 3.5.1 RESULTS FOR THE UNREGULATED AND ROR-REGULATED MONOPOLY
U n re g u la te d  M o n o p o ly
.....■
R O R -R e g u la te d  M o n o p o ly
b-m 15618.6 k'R 19811.9
nm 104.1 nR 102.2
OCe k m /  Tim 150.0 a R ~ kR/nR 193.9
qm 1275.26 q R 1422.78
P m 3.73 Pr 3.58
1626.28
K 's
2024.31
1575.77
Dm 3188.14 D\ 3556.96
MCe 2.45 MCS{s*) 2.15
MCJf*) 2.47
rm 0.2041 f 0.1795
*
5 0.0226
2.92 4 2.51
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From Table 3.5.1, it is clear that the numerical results derived for this alternative model 
of ROR regulation, are consistent with the theoretical results of the AJ model of ROR 
regulation. For instance:
■ constant-retums-to-scale technology implies that both capital and labour are normal 
factors of production, and as Bailey (1973) showed, in the AJ model, this leads to the 
fair rate inducing an increase in the level of output that is supplied. Table 3.5.1, 
illustrates that this outcome also occurs here, as the level of production has increased 
from 1275 to 1423 units of output;
■ Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) show that with constant-retums-to-scale technology, 
the ROR-regulated monopoly has a higher capital-labour ratio than the unregulated 
monopoly. Table 3.5.1, illustrates this outcome holds in this model of ROR 
regulation, as the capital-labour ratio for the unregulated monopoly is ae = 150, 
while the capital-labour ratio for the ROR-regulated monopoly is aR = 193.9;
■ in Section 3.3 it was shown that the Carlton social marginal cost curve in the AJ 
Model of ROR regulation, was higher than the efficient marginal cost curve, due to 
inefficient over-capitalisation in production. This outcome is confirmed in Table 
3.5.1. The marginal cost faced by society at the optimal fair rate f  is MCdif) = 2.47, 
which exceeds the efficient marginal cost of production MCe-  2.45. Subsequently, 
there is a Carlton production-deadweight-loss banana here;
■ ROR regulation in the AJ model is also considered to be a constraint on the profits 
that the monopoly is allowed to earn. This is captured in Table 3.5.1 by the owners 
of the regulated monopoly, only receiving profit of n\ -  1575.77, while the owners 
of an unregulated monopoly receive profit of nm = 1626.28.33 The price that the 
ROR-regulated monopoly receives on each unit of output sold p\ = 3.58, is also less 
than the price the unregulated monopoly receives on each unit of output sold pm = 
3.73;
■ Section 3.4 demonstrated that with constant-retums-to-scale technology, when the
firm is assumed to use an input mix on the AJ path for all / >  r, the optimal fair rate
* *  ̂ # 
of return /  lies within the bounds rm> f  > r. The outcome derived here, is
consistent with this result, as f  = 0.1795, while rm = 0.2041 and r = 0.1.
33 Although the table indicates total dividend payments have increased under ROR regulation, if  it is assumed that each unit o f  
capital is equal to a share in the firm, the dividend payment on each share (i.e. the rate o f  return) has decreased.
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■ Chapter 2 showed that in the AJ model, the ROR-regulated monopoly produces in 
the elastic portion of the demand curve. That is, the price elasticity of demand £, is 
greater than 1. Table 3.5.1 indicates that such an outcome also arises here, as the 
price elasticity of demand under the optimal fair rate of return is e*R =2.51.
To assist with further discussion of the results in Table 3.5.1, and to illustrate the points 
and areas that the terms correspond to, the following price-quantity space diagram is 
provided in Figure 3.5.1.
FIGURE 3.5.1 THE ROR-REGULATED MONOPOLY OUTCOME
MC&*)
The right-hand-side (RHS) of the diagram in Figure 3.5.1 shows the average and 
marginal costs of production as a function of the capital-labour ratio a, under constant- 
retums-to-scale production technology. The left-hand-side (LHS) of the diagram in 
Figure 3.5.1 shows the corresponding outcome in the price-quantity space.
Point A in the RHS of Figure 3.5.1 shows that the unregulated monopoly is efficient in 
its production, as it employs the efficient capital-labour ratio ae, which coincides with 
the minimum point on the social average and marginal cost curve AC{w,r). In the 
price-quantity space on the LHS, this outcome corresponds to efficient marginal cost 
curve MCe. As the firm continues to employ capital and labour and to produce output 
until MR equals MCe, it leads to qm units of output being supplied, an unregulated 
monopoly price of pm, and a level of profit nm equal to area gpmcd.
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When the firm is subject to the welfare-maximising fair rate f  , the shareholder instructs 
the manager to act as if it is receiving the optimal capital subsidy s . The RHS of Figure 
3.5.1 illustrates that the overall result of this is that there is over-capitalisation in the 
production of output. As the manager behaves as if it is receiving the capital subsidy, 
they use the lower cost of capital r — s*, and employ the capital-labour ratio aR, which 
is higher than the efficient capital-labour ratio ae. This outcome coincides with point
C, the minimum point on the average private and marginal cost curve that the manager 
is using on the instruction of shareholders, AC(w, r -  5*). In the LHS diagram, the 
private marginal cost of production used by the manager is depicted by the marginal 
cost curve MCs{s). It is the point where this curve intersects the marginal revenue 
curve MR(q), that determines the level of output supplied by the regulated firm qR . 
This leads to the price pR being charged for each unit of output, and in the RHS of 
Figure 3.5.1, this coincides with point B on average revenue curve AR(xv,J*). Based on 
this level of production, if the firm were actually subsided, profit of ns would be
earned, which is equal to area ep*R kj.
The distorted input mix however, leads to the owners of the firm, and society, incurring 
a higher marginal cost of production. This is illustrated in the RHS of Figure 3.5.1. 
The firm and society face an average and marginal cost of production that coincides 
with point D on AC(w, r). This lies above the minimum cost at point A. In the price- 
quantity space, the production inefficiency is captured by the Carlton social marginal 
cost curve MCJf*). Therefore, the level of profit that accrues to the owners of the firm 
is nR , which is equal to area ep*R bh. Here, area hbkj is equal to the total amount of the 
capital subsidy s* k*R that the management acts as if it is receiving under ROR 
regulation.
As in Section 3.3, the regulator must trade-off the gain in allocative efficiency from the 
additional units provided as a result of a decrease in the fair rate, with the increase in the 
production-deadweight-loss banana that results from the increased over-capitalisation in 
production. At the optimal fair rate f* = 0.1795, and the corresponding optimal capital 
subsidy 5* = 0.0226, the production-deadweight-loss banana is equal to area hbci, while 
the gain in allocative efficiency is equal to area egdi. This yields an overall welfare 
gain represented by the shaded area egah -  abed
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Using the values from Table 3.5.1, numerical solutions can be obtained for the gain in 
allocative efficiency, the production deadweight loss (DWL), and the overall welfare 
change, that arises from the regulator setting the optimal fair rate f  equal to 0.1795. 
That is,
Allocative Efficiency 
Gain ^(p„ - p;)0;-<?d +( ^ - MC7(<?«-̂ )=177-76 (3-5-10)
Carlton Production-/)WL “Banana” = {MCd(f*) -  MCe ĵqR = 28.46 (3.5.11)
Subtracting the production inefficiency from the gain in allocative efficiency yields,
A Welfare = 149.30 (3.5.12)
Therefore, the optimal fair rate/  results in an overall welfare gain of $149.30.
Using these calculations it is also possible to compare ROR regulation with a 
production subsidy when there is some positive marginal excess burden. As outlined in 
equation (2.5.6) in Section 2.5, where the marginal excess burden is denoted by co, for 
ROR regulation to be superior to a production subsidy that induces the same level of 
production qR , the following relationship must be satisfied.
Cd - C p Production-/) WL Banana
co > — ------ -  = -----------------------------------------------
Ce -  Cs Production Subsidy Payment
(3.5.13)
Based on estimates of co in Australia by Campbell and Bond (1997), ROR regulation 
will be superior to a production subsidy in this example, if the value of the right-hand- 
side of equation (3.5.13) is less than approximately 0.24. As the value production- 
deadweight-loss banana has already been found, an estimate is required for the amount 
of the production subsidy payment that must be made to induce the monopoly to 
produce output q*R .
Total Production Subsidy Payment = (m Cs(s*) -  MCe^q\ = 426.83 (3.5.14) 
This implies that the value of the RHS of equation (3.5.13) is,
C'd ~ C‘ = 28,46 =0.067 (3.5.15)
Ce- C s 426.83
The above result suggests that in this numerical example, the optimal fair rate is less 
costly for society to use than a production subsidy that induces the same level of output.
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3.6 The Impact of a Capital Tax on Welfare in the AJ Model
Yang and Fox (YF, 1994) show that it is possible to increase welfare by levying a 
capital tax (or what they refer to as “property tax”) on the ROR-regulated monopoly. 
This Section initially summarises the main results established by YF. Using the 
analysis and diagrams done in Section 3.4, it then establishes when the introduction of a 
capital tax will increase and decrease welfare. It is illustrated here that a capital tax 
decreases welfare if there is:
■ an interior solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e. rm > f  > r), and the regulator 
initially sets the fair rate /  above the optimal fair rate /  (i.e. rm> f  > f  > r)\ or
■ an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate ( i .e ./  = r).
Based on these results it is necessary to clarify and restate some of the findings and 
conclusions originally made by YF about the properties of the welfare-improving 
capital tax.
3.6.1 The Main Results of Yang and Fox (1994)
In the YF variation on the AJ model, the ROR-regulated monopoly maximises the after­
tax profits of the firm subject to the regulatory constraint. That is, where t denotes the 
tax rate on the value of the capital equipment, the regulated firm
max n  — p(h(n,k)) )h(n,k)  -  wn ~ (r  + t)k
n,k
s.t.
p(h(n ,k)) )h(n ,k ) -  wn
= f  and f  > r
(3.6.1)34
YF employ the same mathematical techniques as Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) to solve 
the model, and present the results in a series of seven propositions. For the purposes of 
the analysis here the important results are summarised by the following three points:
(i) a change in the capital tax t has exactly the same effect on labour, capital and 
output as a change in the regulated fair rate of return/;
(ii) the introduction of a capital tax, or an increase in an existing capital tax, can 
improve welfare. YF recognise that this result arises due to the tax offsetting the
34 This is not quite the same maximisation done by YF. They also assume there is some positive price paid for each unit o f  
physical capital acquired c. For simplicity, as in the AJ model, it is assumed here this per-unit acquisition cost c=  1.
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inefficient over-capitalisation from the AJ effect. They contend that this means 
the property tax can be categorised as a “Pigouvian tax” on capital. Further, they 
state (at page 59) that it yields an interesting theoretical result, because it 
“contradicts the long-established belief that a lower (or no) tax is preferred to a 
higher tax in maximising welfare”;35 and
(iii) a change in the capital tax has the same overall impact on welfare as a change in 
the fair rate. YF point out that this result has an interesting policy implication. It 
means that if the regulator misses the optimal fair rate by some amount 0 , then 
the tax authority can intervene and maximise welfare by adjusting their tax rate by 
the amount -0. However, they also suggest (at page 66) that the different 
objectives of the relevant authorities, means that “this offsetting policy is likely to 
be only a theoretical possibility”.
The first result has already been addressed in Chapter 2. There it was outlined that the 
equivalent impact of the capital tax could be attributed to the ROR-regulated monopoly 
subject to a lower fair rate, behaving as if it were receiving a higher capital subsidy. 
While the result suggests YF may have understood that the ROR-regulated monopoly 
behaves as if it is receiving a capital subsidy, from a detailed assessment of their 
statements and conclusions in Section 3.6.5, it is apparent that they did not appreciate 
this insight.
YF identify the potential for the capital tax to improve welfare, by initially finding 
conditions where the same increase in the tax rate and fair rate, leads to an increase in 
tax revenue that exceeds the increase in profit. By then assuming that there is a linear 
demand curve and an explicit social welfare function W — comprised of consumer 
surplus, profit and the total tax revenue from the capital tax t, i.e. W= CS + n+ T — YF 
show that:
■ it is possible for dW/dt to be greater than 0, and
■ dW/dt is equal to dW/df.
To assess the second and the third results in greater detail, it is necessary to investigate 
the precise circumstance when a capital tax leads to a welfare gain and loss. A thorough 
critique of the results is left for the final part of the Section.
35 A similar statement is made by YF at page 65.
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3.6.2 The Impact of a Capital Tax on the Unregulated and Regulated Monopoly 
To understand the impact of levying a capital tax on the ROR-regulated monopoly, it is 
instructive to first analyse the impact such a tax has on the unregulated monopoly. As 
the capital tax is effectively a negative capital subsidy, the results of Section 2.3 apply 
here in reverse. That is, the monopoly subject to the capital tax t under-capitalises in 
production, and as it assumed throughout that capital is a normal input, it leads to a 
lower level of output being produced. Using the Carlton marginal cost curves from 
Section 3.3, the increased cost to society and the decreased level of output produced by 
the unregulated monopoly is captured in Figure 3.6.1.
FIGURE 3.6.1 THE IMPACT OF A CAPITAL TAX ON THE UNREGULATED MONOPOLY
In terms of the welfare change, the reduction in the quantity of output supplied from qm 
to qt decreases allocative efficiency by badg, while the under-capitalisation in the 
production of output qh leads to a production-deadweight-loss banana equal to area 
ecgpc. Consequently, for the unregulated monopoly, the capital tax results in an 
unambiguous welfare loss of area badg + ecgpc.
In contrast, when a capital tax is placed on the ROR-regulated monopoly, it will reduce 
the level of output and allocative efficiency, but increase the level of production 
efficiency. This is achieved by partially offsetting the over-capitalisation that originally 
arises from the AJ effect. Whether the capital tax increases overall welfare though, 
depends upon whether the marginal benefit derived from the increase in production
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efficiency, is greater than the marginal cost created by the decrease in allocative 
efficiency. In turn, this depends upon the combination of:
(1) the level of the fair rate set by the regulator; and
(2) the marginal and average cost curves faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly.
3.6.3 Where the Introduction of a Capital Tax Increases Welfare 
It is assumed here that the firm operates at a point along the AJ path for all values of the 
fair rate /  greater than or equal to r. Consequently, it follows from the analysis done by 
Bailey (1973), and outlined in Section 3.4, that if ̂ 4C/?(V/) lies below MC/?(V/) at the 
end point on the AJ path, there will be an interior solution for the optimal fair rate /*  
(i.e. rm> f * >  r). In these circumstances, if the regulator sets the fair rate of return /  
above the optimal fair rate/*, so that/  > /  > r, then even though the firm earns greater 
than zero profits, from society’s perspective the fair rate is being set too low — i.e. 
there is excessive ROR regulation. In terms of efficiency, constraining the monopoly to 
earning such a fair rate is equivalent to providing the monopoly with an excessive 
capital subsidy (i.e. s>s  ). It will therefore be possible to increase welfare by imposing 
the appropriate capital tax. Figure 3.6.2 provides an illustration of an instance where 
the introduction of a capital tax on the ROR-regulated monopoly can increase welfare. 
In this diagram, as in Figure 3.4.1, it is assumed the firm faces constant-retums-to-scale 
production technology.
FIGURE 3.6.2 THE CAPITAL TAX WITH AN INTERIOR SOLUTION FOR THE FAIR RATE
t )
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In Figure 3.6.2 the marginal and average social cost of production are depicted by the 
curves MQ(V/, t) and ACR(\/f  t). These curves are similar to the Sheshinski marginal 
and average cost curves used in Section 3.3, which were drawn for all possible values of 
the fair rate/  (i.e. V/). The only difference here is that the marginal and average cost 
curves are not only drawn for all values of the fair rate f  but also for all values of the 
capital tax t. Therefore, like the Sheshinski cost curves, these curves correspond to 
points in the input space lying along the AJ path, which is now defined over all possible 
combinations of the fair rate and capital tax (i.e. AJP(\/f t)).
To analyse Figure 3.6.2, it is assumed that there is initially no capital tax in place, and 
that the regulator sets a fair rate of return f R, where/* > fR>r. At the resulting level of 
output qR and the per-unit price pR, the firm earns positive economic profit, and the 
marginal cost of production to society jqR exceeds the marginal benefit to consumers 
dqR. Compared to the outcome under the optimal fair rate /* , there is an overall 
inefficiency of area wjd. The introduction of a small capital tax here, transfers some of 
the economic rents of the regulated monopoly to the government, and increases welfare. 
This occurs because the marginal gain from the decreased over-capitalisation in 
production exceeds the marginal cost of the decreased level of output supplied.
Assuming the regulated firm has sufficient revenue, it will be possible to induce further 
gains in welfare by increasing the capital tax rate until level tR is reached. This is where 
the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of imposing the tax, and based on the 
results of YF, this tax tR will be equal to /*  minus f R (i.e. tR = f -  f R). Distributional 
outcomes aside, the combination of the capital tax tR and fair rate f R, will be equivalent 
to the regulator originally setting the optimal fair rate/*. Hence, the introduction of the 
capital tax tR yields the socially-optimal level of output under ROR regulation q*R , and 
increases welfare by the amount wjd.36
JO It is apparent that there will also be some levels o f  the capital tax above tR, which lead to a decrease in welfare. For example, a 
capital tax tz > tR, which in Figure 3.6.2 leads to qz units o f output being produced, decreases welfare if  area ewg exceeds area 
wjd. In this situation it would have been better for society if  the tax authority had not intervened, and the ROR-regulated 
monopoly had remained subject to the inefficient fair rate fR.
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3.6.4 Where the Introduction of a Capital Tax Decreases Welfare
3.6.4.1 An Interior Solution for the Optimal Fair Rate
From the analysis done in the previous sub-section it follows that; where there is an 
interior solution for the optimal fair rate and the regulator initially sets the fair rate /  
above the optimal fair rate /* , so that rm> f  > /*  > r, the introduction of a capital tax 
leads to an unambiguous welfare loss. Figure 3.6.2 can once again be used to illustrate 
this outcome.
If it is assumed that the regulator initially sets a fair rate of / ,  where rm > f z > / \  in 
Figure 3.6.2, the ROR-regulated monopoly produces the level of output qz. At qz, the 
marginal benefit eqz is greater than the marginal cost of production gqz. Compared to 
the optimal fair rate /*  there is now an inefficiency equal to area exvg. Therefore, the 
marginal cost from levying any capital tax will exceed the marginal benefit that is 
derived from the reduced level of over-capitalisation in production. In other words, the 
effect the capital tax has on decreasing activity in the industry is so overwhelming that it 
exceeds any gain in production efficiency, and induces an overall welfare loss. For 
welfare to increase here, the firm would instead need to be provided with a capital 
subsidy. The issue of providing a subsidy to the regulated firm is looked at in greater 
detail in the following sub-section, which examines the case where there is an end-point 
solution for the optimal fair rate.
3.6.4.2 An End-Point Solution for the Optimal Fair Rate
If ACrQJ/) is greater than or equal to MC/(V/) at the end point of the AJ path, then as 
highlighted by Bailey (1973), and outlined in Section 3.4, there will be an end-point 
solution for/*  (i.e./* = r). In this instance, if the regulator sets the fair rate/below the 
optimal fair rate /  , the firm will choose to leave the industry as it makes long-run 
losses, and the capital tax cannot be introduced. If instead the regulator sets / above the 
optimal fair rate/*, such that rm> f > r, then as was the case for the interior solution, the 
introduction of a capital tax leads to an unambiguous welfare loss. In terms of 
efficiency, introducing a capital tax where the fair rate has initially been set too high, is 
equivalent to allowing the regulator to further increase the allowed fair rate above/*.37
37 It follows trivially that for either an interior or end-point solution for/* , where the regulator accurately targets the optimal fair 
rate, the imposition o f a capital tax decreases welfare.
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To highlight the problems associated with imposing a capital tax when there is an end­
point solution for /*, the diagram in Figure 3.6.3 is used. As in Section 3.4.2, it is 
assumed here that the average cost curve faced by the ROR-regulated monopoly lies 
above the marginal cost curve.
FIGURE 3.6.3 THE CAPITAL TAX WITH DECREASING COSTS
Section 3.4.2 established that although the end-point solution maximises welfare subject 
to the constraint that the ROR-regulated monopoly must recover its costs, because it is 
higher than the unconstrained socially-optimal fair rate f*  < r, it leads to output being
under-supplied by the amount ( q*u -  q*R), and an inefficiency of area bwd. To improve
welfare in these circumstances, the ROR-regulated monopoly must be provided with an 
incentive to increase its production. As the introduction of a capital tax here decreases 
output, it leads to an unambiguous welfare loss. To induce the ROR-regulated firm to 
increase production, one solution is to provide it with a capital subsidy.
It is unlikely that the tax authority will have the jurisdiction to provide the ROR- 
regulated firm with a capital subsidy. Consequently, some other government 
department that deals with industry assistance will need to intervene — e.g. in Australia, 
the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources. If the appropriate capital subsidy 
is provided, then combined with /* , it will be equivalent to setting the unconstrained 
socially-optimal fair rate f *, with the added benefit that the ROR-regulated firm now
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recovers its long-run cost of production. Although the capital subsidy increases the 
level of over-capitalisation in production by the ROR-regulated monopoly, this 
inefficiency is outweighed by the efficiency gain from the additional units of output it 
supplies. The level of output q*u is produced, and assuming there is no marginal excess
burden associated with the subsidy payment, there is an overall welfare gain equal to 
area bwd.
A government department could achieve a higher level of welfare under the cost 
conditions outlined in Figure 3.6.3, if instead of providing a capital subsidy, it granted 
the ROR-regulated firm a production subsidy that induced exactly the increase in output 
from q*R to q*u. Assuming there is a zero marginal excess burden associated with the
production subsidy payment to the regulated monopoly, the welfare gain resulting from 
the production subsidy would exceed area bwd. The reason for this is that there is the 
same increase in output, but unlike the capital subsidy, there is now no corresponding 
increase in the level of inefficient over-capitalisation.
3.6.5 Revising and Clarifying the Capital Tax Results
YF provide a neat and mathematically rigorous exposition that highlights the impact of 
a capital tax on the ROR-regulated monopoly. They correctly identify that the 
introduction of a capital tax can improve welfare, and rely upon arguments about the 
relative changes that occur in the level of tax revenue and monopoly profit. Unlike the 
analysis done here though, they do not appear to appreciate the significance that the 
solution for the optimal fair rate has on whether the introduction of a capital tax will 
improve welfare.
The analysis here highlights that for introduction of the capital tax to increase welfare, 
two things are required:
■ there must be an interior solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e. rm> f*  > r). As
Bailey outlines, such an outcome occurs if the marginal cost curve faced by the 
ROR-regulated monopoly MCj?(V/) exceeds the average cost curve ACifflf)  at the 
end point on the AJ path; and
■ the regulator must initially have set the fair rate of return /below  the optimal 
fair rate/*  — i.e./* > />  r.
Alternatively, it can be stated that the introduction of a capital tax decreases welfare if 
there is either:
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■ an interior solution for the optimal fair rate and/is set so that/  > /  > r; or
■ an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e ./ = r).
To increase welfare in these situations, rather than imposing a capital tax, it maybe more 
appropriate to provide the ROR-regulated monopoly with a capital subsidy.
Aside from reassessing the results of YF, in light of the analysis done in this Section, a 
number of statements and claims made by YF about the properties of the welfare­
improving capital tax should be clarified.
3.6.5.1 Introducing a Capital Tax when the Fair Rate is Too High
In the final sentence of footnote 1 at page 60, YF thank “an anonymous referee for 
pointing out that the property tax will not be beneficial unless the allowed rate of return 
is inefficiently large.” The analysis done in this Section though illustrates that this 
statement is incorrect. The introduction of a capital tax will only ever increase welfare 
if there is an interior solution for the optimal fair rate, and the regulator has initially set 
the fair rate /below  the welfare-maximising fair rate /  . That is, compared to /*, the 
regulator has set a fair rate/ that is inefficiently low, i.e./* > /
3.6.5.2 The Capital Tax Offsetting Inefficient Over-Capitalisation
YF clearly understand that the capital tax they propose reverses the inefficient over- 
capitalisation created by the AJ effect. Their statement (at page 65) though that, “the 
property tax mitigates the overcapitalisation induced by the A-J effect”, appears slightly 
ambiguous. It may lead some readers to believe that the capital tax increases welfare, 
because it completely offsets the inefficient over-capitalisation arising under ROR 
regulation. However, such a tax will never be optimal, as in terms of the level of output 
and welfare, it leads to the unregulated monopoly outcome. Consequently, to avoid any 
potential for ambiguity, it would have been better if the authors had stated that the 
optimal capital tax partially mitigates the inefficient over-capitalisation originally 
induced by the AJ effect.
3.6.5.3 The Capital Tax —  A Pigouvian Tax?
The capital tax used in the YF model is referred to as being an example of a Pigouvian 
tax on capital. This is an inappropriate description for the capital tax that is imposed. A 
Pigouvian tax generally refers to a tax that increases welfare, by completely offsetting 
the inefficiency created by a negative externality. However, it is probably also
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acceptable to describe it as a tax that leads to a welfare improvement, by completely 
removing an existing distortion in the market. The capital tax fails to satisfy either of 
these definitions of a Pigouvian tax.38
As the ROR-regulated monopoly clearly internalises the cost of the inefficient over- 
capitalisation, the capital tax does not offset the effects of any negative externality. 
Further, in all circumstances where the capital tax does increase welfare, it only 
partially mitigates the existing input distortion that arises from the AJ effect. Finally, 
while the capital tax does always decrease the existing input distortion, as outlined in 
this Section, it only results in an increase in welfare under certain conditions.
3. 6. 5.4 Do the Results Contradict Long-Established Beliefs about Taxation?
YF maintain that the welfare-improving capital tax “contradicts the long-established 
belief that a lower (or no) tax is preferred to a higher tax rate in maximising welfare”. 
This assertion however appears to be over-stating the importance of the capital tax. It is 
well known that if a good is inefficiently subsidised, a tax can be used to remove this 
inefficiency. As constraining the ROR-regulated monopoly to earning too low a fair 
rate of return (i.e./* > />  r) is equivalent to providing the firm with an excessive capital 
subsidy (i.e. s > s*), it follows that the introduction of a capital tax can improve welfare, 
and that this does not contradict any well-established beliefs.
*  m
It should also be noted here that when there is an interior solution for /  , and the fair 
rate /  has been set so that /*  > /  > r, the capital tax that subsequently maximises welfare, 
can be described as an example of a second-best efficient tax. That is, it maximises 
welfare given the existing production efficiency distortion that arises from ROR 
regulation. Such a capital tax results in price being set equal to the distorted marginal 
cost MCr, as opposed to the efficient marginal cost MCe.
' lO
YF like many authors use the spelling Pigovian tax. While this spelling appears to be widely accepted by many academic 
journals and economists, particularly in the US, strictly speaking the correct spelling is Pigouvian tax. The reason is that only 
this spelling gives the appropriate recognition to the original exponent o f  this tax, the eminent economist A.C. Pigou.
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3.7 Conclusion
The analysis in this Chapter examined the issue of welfare in the AJ model of ROR 
regulation. The work focused upon the allocative and production efficiency trade-off 
associated with the optimal fair rate/*, and by using the equivalence result from Chapter 
2, was able to build upon existing welfare results in the literature.
In Section 3.2, the equivalence result from Chapter 2 was used to establish a two-sector- 
two-period-single-person-general-equilibrium (GE) model of ROR regulation. By 
doing this the partial-equilibrium welfare results of Sheshinski were examined. It was 
shown that the interior solution for the optimal fair rate prescribed by Sheshinski only 
maximises welfare in general equilibrium if there are either, no cross-price effects or no 
efficiency distortions in the related market. As there does appear to be some 
substitutability in products provided across certain utility industries, and it is often 
necessary to allow price to be set above marginal cost to recover shared and common 
costs; the GE model appears to provide a useful insight into the adjustment required to 
the optimal fair rate of Sheshinski when there are related markets and irremovable 
efficiency distortions. The impact of ROR regulation on the monopoly, where there is 
an existing distortion in a related market, does not appear to have been considered in the 
previous GE analysis of ROR regulation.
Section 3.3 employed the methodology of Carlton (1979) to reconcile the alternative 
techniques used by Sheshinski (1971) and Waterson (1989), for depicting the impact of 
ROR regulation in the price-quantity space. It was shown that unlike the analysis of 
Sheshinski, which used a social marginal cost defined over all levels of the fair rate, 
Waterson implicitly used a “Carlton” social marginal cost curve, which was only drawn 
for a given fair rate of return. While the two marginal cost curves captured the same 
overall increase in the cost to society, and subsequently the same increase in welfare, 
they led to very different areas being used to depict these changes in the price-quantity 
space. Further, from applying the diagrammatic approach of Carlton, it was found that 
the production inefficiency arising from the AJ effect could be captured in the price- 
quantity space by a Carlton production-deadweight-loss “banana”. Consequently, the 
optimal fair rate /*, can be characterised as requiring that the marginal increase in the 
production-deadweight-loss banana, be equal to the marginal gain in allocative 
efficiency.
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In Section 3.5 the alternative model of ROR regulation established in Section 2.6, was 
modified to solve for an optimal fair rate and the corresponding optimal capital subsidy. 
By using the same parameter values and assumptions about production technology and 
demand as in Section 2.6, numerical results were derived. From this, the ROR- 
regulated monopoly outcome was compared with:
■ an unregulated monopoly outcome; and
■ a production-subsidised monopoly. It was assumed the production subsidy induced 
the monopoly to produce the same level of output as the ROR-regulated firm, and 
that there was a positive marginal excess burden associated with the subsidy 
payment.
The numerical results for the alternative model were shown to be consistent with the 
theoretical results of the AJ model, reinforcing the equivalence result established 
between the ROR-regulated and capital-subsidised monopoly.
Section 3.6 used the analysis and price-quantity diagrams outlined in Section 3.4, to 
assess the results of Yang and Fox (1994). This showed that although the introduction 
of a capital tax may improve welfare in the AJ model, this only occurs if:
■ there is an interior solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e. rm>f*> r); and
■ the regulator initially sets the fair rate/below the optimal fair rate/* (i.e./* >f>r).  
Conversely, the capital tax unambiguously decreases welfare if there is either:
■ an interior solution for the optimal fair rate and the regulator sets/ so that/  >/* > r;
or
■ an end-point solution for the optimal fair rate (i.e./* = r).
From the analysis, a number of the statements and conclusions made by Yang and Fox 
about the properties of welfare-improving capital tax were also assessed, and shown to 
be slightly ambiguous and misleading.
Although this concludes the analysis of the AJ model of ROR regulation, the impact 
that the regulated fair rate has upon investment and the overall level of efficiency, 
remains a common theme of the work that is done throughout the remaining Chapters.
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A.3 Chapter 3 Appendix
A.3.1 Deriving the Welfare Equation in (3.2.7)
The steps used by Sieper (1981) and outlined by Jones (2001, 2003), are employed here 
to derive the welfare equation in (3.2.7). The methodology involves:
■ totally differentiating the constrained maximisation problem faced by the consumer;
■ applying the FOCs for the firm; and
■ using the expression for the change in the lump-sum payment that is required to 
balance the government budget.
A.3.1.1 The Consumer Maximisation
Taking the total differential o f the utility function for the consumer in equation (3.2.1),
dU
dU  , dU „  dU . dU . 
-----dxn + —— dh 4------ dx{ H-------a x
dx„ dxx dx.
(A3.1.1)
To find each o f the partial derivative terms (i.e. dU/dxi, i — 0, 1, 2.), the following 
Lagrangian is set up using the maximisation problem set out in equation (3.2.3)
^  = U(x0,h,xx,x2) - A + z{x{ + z2x2 — x0 —
w( T -  h) 
1 + r
\
7Tj 712 L (A3.1.2)
Taking the FOCs with respect to jcq, h, x\ and X2, and solving, yields
dx0
(A3.1.3a)
dU Aw . ..........
dh 1 + r
(A3.1.3b)
= A z . , i=  1,2 
dxt
(A3.1.3c)
Substituting equations (A3.1.3a), (A3.1.3b) and (A3.1.3c) into equation (A3.1.1), and 
simplifying yields,
du . . . w „
-----= dxQ + z xdxx+ z 2dx2-1--------dh (A3.1.4)
A 1 + r
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As the Lagrange multiplier A is the marginal utility of income to the consumer, the 
expression in equation (A3.1.4), represents the dollar change in utility that is 
experienced by a consumer as a result of any change in government policy.
Assuming the government does not change the production tax (i.e. dt\ = dt2 = 0), the 
expression for the total differential of the budget constraint in equation (3.2.2) is,
dx0 + zxdx j + z2dx2 +
1 + r
dpi - ( P i + O *  i 
(1  + r )2
d r - (Pl + h )X2
(1 + r)2
dr
w
1 + r
dh +
( T - h )  
1 + r
d w - w (T -h )--------- —dr + d7r, + dn, + dL
(1 + r)2
(A3.1.5)
Using this, equation (A3.1.4) can be rewritten as,
dU
2
*i
1 + r
dpt + (Pi + 1 + 1
+
(1 + r )2 
( T - h )
1 + r
d w -
(1 + r )2 
w ( T - h )
--------- —dr + dn, + dn. + dL
(1 + r)2 1 2
(A3.1.6)
This can be further simplified by finding the expression for the change in profit for 
firms 1 and 2 (i.e. dn\ and dni).
A.3.1.2 Maximisation Problem for the Monopolist and Competitive Industry 
Taking the total differential of the profit functions in the two markets gives,
d n x = - ^ —dq, + - ^ —dpx — ^ p - d r — — dnx — dw -  -  s)dkx + kxds (A3.1.7)
1 1 + r  1 1 + r  1 (1 + r)2 1 + r  1 1 + r  1 1
dn2 -  - - 1-dq1 -E2*h— ^ + d r — — dn2 — î2—d w -d k 2 
2 1 + r  2 (1 + r)2 1 + r  2 1 + r  2
(A3.1.8)
As the FOCs for the capital-subsidised monopoly and the competitive market are,
dqx + ■ dpx — — dnx - (1  -  s)dkx = 0
1 + r 1 + r 1 + r
(A3.1.9)
dq2 — — dn0 -  dk\ = 0
1 + r ^  1 + r
it follows that (A3.2.9) and (A3.2.10) simplify to the expressions,
(A3.1.10)
(1 + r)2 1 + r  '
d P ^ ^ h dr_ J ^ dw
(1 + + 1 + r
(A3.1.11) 
(A3.1.12)
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Substituting equation (A3.1.11) and (A3.1.12) into the expression for the dollar change 
in utility given by equation (A3.1.4), and using the market clearing conditions for the 
labour market (i.e. T -  h + n\ + ni) and the goods market (i.e. x\ = q\ and xi = qi), yields
—— = — —  dp, h— dr+ *2̂ 2 . dr + k,ds + dL (A3.1.13) 
A 1 + r (1 + r)2 (1 + r)2
A.3.1.3 The Change in the Government Budget
Taking the total differential of the expression for the government budget in equation 
(3.2.6), and using the assumption that production taxes remain unchanged (i.e. dt\= dt2 
= 0), yields
dG = -^—dq, + -^ -d q 2---- —* ■ dr -------- *2̂ 2 - dr -  sdk, -k,ds~dL  (A3.1.14)
1 + r 1 l + r (l + r)2 (l + r)2 1 1
Setting equation (A3.1.14) equal to zero, the expression for the change in the lump-sum 
transfers that balance the government budget is,
dL = — dq, + 2̂-  -dq1---- ^- '—d r---- t̂ - Tdr -  sdk, -k,ds (A3.1.15)
l + r 1 l + r 2 (l + r)2 (l + r)2 1 1
Therefore, in accordance with the conventional Harberger (1971) analysis, by 
substituting the equation (A3.1.15) into equation (A3.1.13), it is possible to evaluate the 
welfare effects of the lump-sum transfer used by the government to balance the budget. 
The resulting expression for the dollar change in utility simplifies to the conventional 
welfare equation,
^LL = — —  dp{ -  sdk{ + ■t] - dqx + dq2 (A3.1.16)
A l+ r  l+ r  l+ r
As the consumer is not compensated for the change in government policy that occurs 
here, (i.e. dL has not been set so that the government ensures the consumer achieves 
their initial level of utility and dU = 0), the expression in equation (A3.1.16) captures 
the uncompensated welfare change, as opposed to the compensated welfare change.
Assuming there is no production tax on the output supplied by the ROR-regulated or 
capital-subsidised monopoly, (i.e. t\ = 0), the expression in equation (A3.1.16) can be 
further simplified for the outcome in equation (3.2.7).
dU
A
- ^ — dpi -  sd k \  +  
1 + r 1 + r
dq2
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CHAPTER 4: FORWARD-LOOKING COST-BASED
ACCESS PRICES IN US AND AUSTRALIAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Over recent years regulators across a range of countries have sought to introduce 
competition in previously state- or privately-owned monopolised gas, electricity, 
telecommunications and rail services. Due to persisting economies of scale and scope 
and the significant sunk costs associated with reconstructing certain portions of the 
network, regulators have sought to introduce competition by setting regulated terms on 
which entrants can access parts of an incumbent’s network. In telecommunications, 
Noam (2002) states (at page 387) that the regulation of wholesale interconnection has:
.. .emerged as the paramount tool of regulation and is likely to remain so 
into the reasonably foreseeable future, replacing the regulation of 
telecommunications retail pricing of network operators, or of the entry 
of competitors.
A “fair” access price balances the need to create competition in downstream markets, 
while still ensuring the incumbent is adequately compensated for use of its asset.
In designing access regimes, concerns were raised over the use of the actual backward­
looking (BL)/historical/embedded cost to value the asset. Noam defines BL or historic 
costs (at page 408) as being, “the actual cost incurred to build the network.” While 
regulators traditionally employed BL costs to value the capital assets of the firm, due to 
the ease with which this data could be obtained, there was a growing recognition of the 
weaknesses associated with using such costs. In particular, concerns were raised that 
BL or historic costs:
■ reflected accounting rather than economic costs. Hence, BL cost-based prices are 
unlikely to reflect the true opportunity costs to society of the resources being used, 
and do not provide the correct market signals about the value of additional 
production and investment; and
■ created incentives for cost inefficiency, such as capital waste and cost padding.
It did this by linking the access price directly to the costs originally incurred by the
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firm. Laffont and Tirole (2000) outline (at page 144) that BL-fully-distributed-cost- 
based prices are cumbersome, fail to encourage cost-minimisation, and yield 
improper and inefficient pricing structures.1
The inadequacies of BL cost regulation has led to a recent trend amongst regulators to 
adopt a forward-looking (FL)/replacement cost standard. Noam notes (at page 408) in 
telecommunications that
. . .future forward looking cost methodologies do not involve the use of 
an embedded rate base, but rather postulates a hypothetical network 
based on near-term best-practice technology and efficient engineering.
In telecommunications, FL cost estimates of the long-run incremental cost have become 
“the dominant paradigm worldwide”,2 and variations of the methodology are employed 
in the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Europe, to price access to network 
services. By approximating the long-run marginal cost of production, the access prices 
are designed to mimic the outcome in a competitive access market. This in theory will 
create incentives for efficiency, while still providing the investor with recovery on all 
prudently-incurred costs — including a fair rate of return on capital. However, since its 
inception, the FL cost-based access prices have been the subject of controversy. 
Industry commentators and prominent academics have criticised the charges, accusing it 
of being a cost calculation that systematically under-prices access to elements or 
services.
This Chapter provides an overview of the experiences in the US and Australian 
telecommunications industry with FL cost-based access regimes. It specifically looks at 
the introduction of the FL cost-based method known as:
■ the total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC), which has been used in the 
US by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the price for 
accessing the network of the incumbent local-exchange carriers (ILECs); and
■ the total service long-run incremental cost (TSLRIC), which has been used in 
Australia by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), to
1 Kahn, Tardiff and Weisman (1999), highlight (at page 325, footnote 11) that the use o f historical accounting costs by the FCC 
before 1990, led to prices in an increasing number o f companies being “simply frozen”.
7
Productivity Commission (PC, 2001a) at page 407.
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regulate the price for access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) of 
the vertically-integrated service provider, Telstra.
The analysis outlines the major criticisms of TELRIC and TSLRIC, and assesses these 
in light of recent trends in both the US local and Australian PSTN services markets.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief history of the US and 
Australian telecommunications markets, highlighting how the FL cost-based access 
regimes have emerged. Section 4.3 outlines some of the theory and practice underlying 
the calculation of the TELRIC and TSLRIC access charges, and outlines an explanation 
given by Pelcovits (1999) about the origins of the engineering-cost models used to 
calculate prices. Criticisms of the access regime in Australia and the US are outlined in 
Section 4.4, noting that similar arguments have been raised in both countries opposing 
the use of TELRIC or TSLRIC. Section 4.5 assesses the criticisms, and highlights 
limitations of certain arguments that been raised. Section 4.6 presents empirical 
evidence of trends in the US local telecommunications industry and the Australian 
PSTN services, since the introduction of TELRIC and TSLRIC. From this it appears 
that claims made about the adverse impact of FL cost regulation have been over-stated. 
Section 4.7 concludes the analysis.
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4.2 An Overview of US and Australian Telecommunications
This Section provides a brief history of the telecommunications markets in the US and 
Australia. It outlines the early periods where there were monopoly providers in the US 
and Australia, and the substantial changes in the two markets in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. The analysis of the recent reforms examines how the current 
regulatory framework for network access has evolved in each country. In particular, it 
illustrates that the Federal Commerce Commission (FCC) and the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) have both adopted FL cost-based 
charges, designed to approximate long-run marginal cost, in pricing access to the 
network.
4.2.1 A Brief History of US Telecommunications
The analysis of telecommunications regulation in the US here is divided into three 
periods:
■ the period before 1984, where a privately-owned monopoly served the majority of 
the US market;
■ the period between 1984-1996, where the private monopoly was forced to separate 
structurally; and
■ the period after the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
4.2.1.1 The Market before 1984
Unlike many developed nations that provided telecommunications services using state- 
owned monopolies, the US adopted a regime where from the early part of the twentieth 
century, a well-established-privately-owned-vertically- and horizontally-integrated 
monopolist, AT&T (the Bell System), provided the majority of the services throughout 
the country, subject to regulation. At a Federal level, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was initially responsible for the regulation of telecommunications. This 
role was eventually transferred to a new body created by the Communications Act of 
1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
Brock (2002) outlines that in its operations throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the FCC 
significantly restricted entry to the telecommunications industry and there was no 
formal regulation of telephone rates of AT&T until the mid 1960s. According to Brock 
(at page 53), the “early FCC was an ideal regulatory agency from AT&T’s perspective”,
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and he concluded (at page 54) that its regulations, “allowed AT&T to utilise the 
regulatory process to enhance its market power”.
The assistance the FCC provided to AT&T’s domination of the US telecommunications 
market meant that it remained relatively unchallenged for a period of more than fifty 
years.3 Amongst other things, AT&T offered long-distance services, owned the 
equipment manufacturer Western Electric, the research and development arm Bell 
Laboratories, and the seven Local Bell Operating Companies — the “Baby Bells” — 
now referred to as Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).
Rapid technological progress in the industry meant that by the mid 1970s, doubts had 
begun to emerge over whether certain services should still be provided by only one 
firm. Combined with the Department of Justice’s belief that AT&T was abusing its 
market power, an investigation was launched into its failure to comply with antitrust 
laws. The litigation was settled in 1982, resulting in what has become known as the 
Modified Final Judgement (MFJ).
4.2.1.2 The Market from 1984 to 1996
The MFJ led to the break-up of AT&T in 1984. It represented a significant 
restructuring of the telecommunications industry, separating the market into legally- 
defined segments. AT&T retained its long-distance service, manufacturing subsidiary 
and R&D facilities, but was forced to divest itself of the seven RBOCs.4 To achieve 
divestiture, the MFJ divided the parts of the countiy served by the Bells into 162 local 
access and transport areas (L AT As).5 These geographical boundaries defined the 
regions within which each of the local exchange carriers (LECs) could operate. LECs 
were allowed to carry calls that originated and terminated within the same region
3 The first real challenge to AT&T’s market dominance was the entry o f  Microwave Communications Inc (MCI) into the long­
distance market in the mid 1960s and early 1970s.
4 After a series o f  mergers, four o f the seven original RBOCs now remain. These are Verizon Communications Inc., BellSouth 
Corp., SBC Communications Inc., and Qwest Communications International Inc.
3 This figure is from Woroch (2002) at page 653. He also points out that the number o f  LATAs has since grown to 193, as non- 
RBOC areas have been added. Curiously, Harris and Kraft (1997), Kahn, Weisman and Tardiff (Kahn et al., 1999) and Laffont 
and Tirole (2000) provide slightly different figures. According to Harris and Kraft (at page 96) and Kahn et al. (at page 320, 
footnote 2), divestiture was accomplished by creating 161 LATAs. According to Laffont and Tirole (at page 19), the MFJ 
divided those parts o f  the country served by the Bell system into 192 LATAs. Regardless o f the actual number, it is clear that 
the total provided by Laffont and Tirole is incorrect, as they are obviously including non-RBOC areas into their final figure.
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(IntraLATA services), but were prevented from offering the long-distances services that 
went across these boundaries (InterLATA services).
An almost immediate result of the separation was that, post-divestiture, there was an 
increased level of competition in the long-distance market. Concerns though were still 
raised over the monopoly power of local-exchange carriers — the “bottleneck” or 
essential component of the network — and there were ongoing complaints by the 
RBOCs about the line-of-business restrictions imposed. Consequently, in February 
1996 Congress signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law. This constituted 
the first comprehensive telecommunications legislation since the Communications Act 
of 1934. More significantly, according to Brock (at page 71), the Act “was a direct 
repudiation of the MFJ itself, and of the theory behind the MFJ” as it “assumed that 
competition was possible in all parts of the market.”
4.2.1.3 The US Telecommunications Act 1996
The intention of the Telecommunications Act was to reform the telecommunications 
industry by opening it up to competition. It envisaged what has been described as a 
“competitive free-for-all” in the provision of services,6 where the market promoted the 
innovation and the level of investment necessary to modernise telecommunications 
infrastructure. The Act lifted the line-of-business restrictions that had previously kept 
the RBOCs out of the long-distance market, and in return required these incumbent 
local exchange carriers (ILECs) to open up their markets to competition.
The Telecommunications Act contemplated and purported to promote local-exchange 
competition through:
■ facilities-based competition;
■ resale of the ILECs’ retail services; and
■ unbundling network elements of the ILECs.
Facilities-based competition occurs if a competing firm in the local 
telecommunications market builds its own local-exchange network. As the competing 
local-exchange carrier (CLEC) still requires interconnection to the ILECs’ networks, the 
Act prescribed that this should be done in a non-discriminatory manner and at a cost- 
based price.
6 Kahn, Weisman and Tardiff (Kahn et al., 1999) at page 320, and Weisman (2000) at page 196.
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Laffont and Tirole (2000) maintain that, although Congress did not explicitly express 
any preference for the way in which local exchange competition should evolve, they 
appeared to favour facilities-based entry.7 The FCC Chairman Michael Powell has also 
been a strong advocate of facilities-based entry by CLECs. He has indicated that the 
lease of network elements was designed to be a temporary measure to assist CLECs, 
while these firms constructed their own facilities. According to Chairman Powell, 
facilities-based competition represents the only viable long-term model for sustaining 
CLECs and competition in the local telecommunications market.8
Resale by the competitors of an incumbent’s retail services is, according to Laffont and 
Tirole (at page 23), “generally considered to be an easy way of creating ‘entry’” in a 
monopolised market where there are large sunk costs. In the case of the local 
telecommunications market the Act outlined that a CLEC could obtain an ILEC’s retail 
services at a discounted wholesale access rate equal to retail price of the service minus 
the avoided costs of retailing the service — generally made up of marketing and billing 
costs that the ILEC no longer incurred.9 The methodology represents a “top-down” cost 
model of pricing, as it sets the access price by subtracting the incremental costs 
associated with avoiding the retail market from the price of supplying the service.
Entry to the local telecommunications market by leasing the unbundled network 
elements (UNEs) of the incumbent — sometimes referred to as the unbundled network 
element platform (UNE-P) — has been described as a hybrid of facilities-based and 
resale entry.10 Under this form of interconnection to the local network, the entrant 
provides some of its own equipment (e.g. switches) and leases other facilities from the 
incumbent (e.g. local loop or transport), so that it can ultimately supply a competing 
service in a downstream market.
7 Laffont and Tirole (2000) at page 22.
8 For example see the articles, “Powell says States won’t be stripped o f  UNE Power” appearing in the Local Competition Report, 
27 January 2003, and “FCC’s Powell Plans to Meet Deadline on New Phone Policy” by Mark Wigfield appearing on the Dow 
Jones News Service, 29 January 2003.
9 Laffont and Tirole (2000) claim that this method o f pricing is just an application o f the efficient component-pricing rule 
(ECPR). However, this overlooks the well-established controversy surrounding the practical application o f the ECPR, which 
was highlighted by Tye (1994). This ultimately led to its rejection by legislators in several countries including the US, New  
Zealand, UK and Australia. The ECPR is briefly dealt with in Section 4.5.4.
10 Laffont and Tirole (2000) at page 24.
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The Telecommunications Act prescribed minimum points of interconnection and 
provided a list of UNEs that the ILEC had to make available for competitors at a cost- 
based price. Originally the list consisted of seven elements, but over time the FCC has 
made numerous revisions. This has been due to advances in technology, the new 
preferences of consumers, and the increasing number of entrants choosing to supply or 
build their own facilities. An example of a change to the list was the FCC’s decision in 
1999 to unbundle the high-frequency range of the copper loop so that it could be made 
available to competing digital subscriber loop (DSL) providers as a network element.11
4.2.1.4 ‘‘Cost-Based’’ Prices
Kahn, Weisman and Tardiff (Kahn et al., 1999) suggest that the Act provided minimal 
guidance on how the cost-based price for resale, UNEs and interconnection to the 
incumbent’s local network should be set. They outline (at page 324-5) that amongst 
economists, there was:
...widespread agreement in principle that (1) the costs that would be the 
basis for efficient prices would be forward-looking, rather than 
historical and (2) the prices set on that basis should emulate the ones 
that would emerge from local exchange competition, if it were feasible.
Kahn et al., Weisman (2000) and Noam (2002), all note that there has disagreement 
over the appropriate FL cost standard to use. The incumbent carriers have argued that 
prices should reflect “actual” FL costs faced in providing inputs, while access seekers 
— the potential CLECs —maintained prices should be based on the “hypothetical 
efficient” FL cost of a firm entering the industry and constructing the network afresh, 
using the latest equipment and technology. Noam reflects the opposing sides taken in 
the debate, stating (at page 408) that:
Incumbent LECs generally argue that future costs should be based on 
each incumbent’s existing network technology, not on some idealised 
least-cost, most efficient network that may bear no relationship to 
existing operations...Entrants, on the other hand, prefer forward-looking 
prices at least as long as costs are declining over time.
11 Noam (2002) at page 396.
119
To provide an illustration of the different asset valuations that can arise under BL, 
actual FL and hypothetical efficient FL cost regulation, a simple example is highlighted 
in Box 4.2.1.
BOX 4.2.1 BL, ACTUAL FL AND HYPOTHETICAL EFFICIENT FL COST REGULATION
To highlight the different valuations that can arise under BL, actual FL cost and hypothetical efficient FL 
cost, it is assumed for simplicity here that the incumbent undertakes an investment in a T-period lived 
asset at time 0, at a cost of C0. For simplicity there is neither any physical deterioration on the asset, nor 
any inflation, but there is a known constant rate of cost-decreasing technological progress of 0 > 0. This 
implies that at any time t, the cost of replacing the asset using the existing technology of the incumbent 
will be C, = C0(l -  9)1, where t = 1, 2,...T. At time t\ < T, however, a new technology is discovered. If 
this were used to replace the incumbent’s asset at time t\, the investor would face a cost of 
C„ < C0(l-# ) '' . As it is also assumed the new technology experiences the same constant rate of cost- 
decreasing technological progress 6 > 0, then at any time t, where t = t\,...T; the cost of replacing the 
incumbent’s asset using the new technology is C, = C„(1 -  0)'-'1 . Subsequently, at any time t = t\...T, the 
different types of regulations will lead to the incumbent being subject to the following asset values:
BL cost regulation: C0
Actual FL cost regulation: C, = C0(l - 0 ) ', where t =
Hypothetical efficient FL cost regulation: C, = , where t =
In August 1996 the Interconnection Order issued by the FCC outlined that the regulator 
had chosen to interpret the legislative requirement for cost-based prices, as meaning that 
the firm would be allowed to recover the costs associated with reconstructing a network 
using the ILEC’s existing wire centres and “the most efficient technology” available.12 
In accordance with this, the FCC prescribed that the forward-looking-cost-based charge 
approximating the long-run marginal cost — the total-element-long-run-incremental- 
cost (TELRIC) method — should be used for regulating access to UNEs. TELRIC 
represents, the additional or incremental cost to the firm of providing a network element 
in the long run, assuming that all other production activities remain unchanged. Kahn et 
al. and Weisman (2000) considered the decision by the FCC to adopt TELRIC to be an 
endorsement of the hypothetically-efficient FL costs proposed by access seekers.
19
See Sidak and Spulber (1997a) at page 420, which cites a passage from the First Report and Order on interconnection issued by 
the FCC.
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4.2.2 A Brief History of Australian Telecommunications
Unlike the US, for the majority of the twentieth century, State-owned monopoly 
providers were responsible for supplying telecommunications services in Australia. For 
the purposes of the analysis, the changes in the telecommunications market are divided 
into three periods:
■ prior to 1988, where state-owned monopolies provided telecommunications services;
■ between 1988 and 1997, where there was a transition from having only state-owned 
monopolies, to having a limited amount of managed competition; and
■ 1997 reforms, which have led to an increased level of competition in the market.
Much of the information provided here is taken from Chapter 9 of King and Maddock 
(1996), Chapter 6 of Albon, Hardin and Dee (1997), and Appendix A of the 
Productivity Commission (PC, 2001a) inquiry report into Telecommunications 
Competition Regulation.
4.2.2.1 The Market Prior to 1988
From 1901 to 1975 the provision of Australian domestic telecommunications by the 
Government was combined with the provision of mail sendees, and the responsibility of 
the Postmaster-General’s (PMG) Department. The Australian Telecommunications 
Commission (Telecom) was established in 1975, and resulted from the Government 
separating the telecommunications and postal parts of the PMG Department. It had a 
monopoly or exclusive right to provide, operate and invest in the telecommunications 
infrastructure servicing land-based domestic telephony.
The Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC) was established by the 
Commonwealth in 1946, and was responsible for international telecommunications 
services. It had an exclusive right to provide and operate all services over the 
international network, but was prohibited from using the domestic infrastructure, and 
paid Telecom for carrying its calls over the domestic network. The Australian domestic 
communications satellite system (AUSSAT) was formed in 1981, and this owned and 
operated Australia’s communication satellite. While it provided services that 
interconnected with Telecom’s network, it was not permitted to compete with Telecom 
in supplying standard domestic phone services.
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4.2.2.2 Reforms from 1988-1997
The first of many of the major changes to the telecommunications market occurred in 
1988. The reforms included:
■ the regulation of telecommunications services, including the pricing of 
interconnection to the network, being transferred from Telecom to an industry- 
specific regulator for telecommunications — the Australian Telecommunications 
Authority (AUSTEL);
■ opening up customer premises equipment (CPE) and value added network services 
(VANS) to competition; and
■ changes being made to the corporate structures of Telecom, OTC and AUSSAT. In 
particular, the corporatisation of Telecom provided it with a more commercial focus, 
and clearer objectives to operate in a more business-like manner.
In 1990, further reforms led to the establishment of the Telecommunications Act 1991. 
The legislation was aimed at providing a platform from which sustainable competition 
would eventually evolve in the telecommunications market in Australia. Accordingly, a 
duopoly was introduced in fixed line carriage, which was shielded from competition and 
provided with certain exemptions from the anti-competitive conduct provisions in Part 
IV of the Trade Practices Act (TPA). The duopoly was allowed to operate until June 
1997 and consisted of:
■ the publicly-owned Australian Overseas Telecommunications Commission 
(AOTC) — which was later known as Telstra. This was formed by amalgamating 
Telecom with OTC in 1992, to create a vertically-integrated telecommunications 
service provider. According to King and Maddock (at page 137), by creating a 
vertically-integrated provider and introducing full network competition, Australia 
“followed the British example fairly closely”. The choice of market structure was 
however in direct contrast to the US model, which had chosen to pursue vertical 
separation, by implementing the break-up of AT&T in 1984. In 1997, Telstra was 
floated and one-third of its shares sold;13 and
■ the privately-owned Optus, which purchased a complete carrier licence along 
with the fully-privatised AUSSAT. It paid Telstra to carry calls on its behalf over 
the local network.
13 The Federal Government offered a further float o f Telstra in 1999. At present it is still the majority shareholder in Telstra.
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In addition to Telstra and Optus, a third mobile licence was allocated to Vodafone, 
which commenced its operations in 1993.
Although Optus initially established its own long-distance network, it relied on Telstra’s 
network to reticulate its long distance and international calls at a local level. As the 
carriers were unable to agree on the terms for interconnection to the local network, 
AUSTEL was required to act as an arbitrator. This led to a regulated access price 
loosely based on the long-run marginal cost of providing access to the network.14 Optus 
eventually offered local call services using Telstra’s network in 1996, and soon after 
established its own local network in certain urban areas.
4.2.2.3 The 1997 Reforms
To build on the 1991 reforms to the Australian telecommunications market, the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 was introduced, along with telecommunications-specific 
provisions to the TPA in Parts XIB and Parts XIC. This led to a number of important 
changes in the industry. Amongst the major reforms to the telecommunications market 
was that:
■ restrictions on carrier licences were removed;
■ new regulatory arrangements were introduced; and
■ a telecommunications-specific anti-competitive conduct code and access regime 
were incorporated into the TPA.
The Telecommunications Act 1991 allowed only two providers to offer fixed-line 
carriage, and three providers to offer mobile telephony services. The 1997 reforms 
ended this arrangement, removing and reducing the exclusive rights held by the three 
providers. Carriers were no longer exempt from general competition law, and 
regulatory barriers to becoming a carrier were removed. As the PC (2001a) highlights 
(at page 591), the impact of this lower barrier to entry was that “while there were only 
three licensed carriers between 1991 and 1997, there were 77 at the end of June 2001.”
The telecommunications-specific regulator AUSTEL ceased it operations in 1997. Its 
responsibilities were then transferred to the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) and the new body, the Australian Communications Authority 
(ACA). The ACCC undertook the responsibility for dealing with competition issues in
14 See PC (1997) at page 75, which also cites King and Maddock (1996) at page 139.
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telecommunications, which included administering the new access arrangements, while 
the ACA became responsible for consumer, technical and spectrum management issues. 
In accordance, with its new role, the ACCC issued an access pricing principles paper for 
telecommunications — ACCC (1997). This outlined that in general, the FL cost-based 
total-service-long-run-incremental-cost (TSLRIC) method should be used to price 
access to the network. Designed to approximate the long-run marginal cost, the ACCC 
(1997) defines TSLRIC (at page 28) as
.. .the incremental or additional costs the firm incurs in the long term in 
providing the service, assuming all of its other production activities 
remain unchanged. It is the cost the firm would avoid in the long term if 
it ceased to provide the service.
The regime is used to regulate interconnection prices to the public switched telephone 
network (PSTN) and is similar to the TELRIC access regime employed by the FCC.
The exemptions established in 1991 from Part IV of the TP A dealing with anti­
competitive conduct, were repealed in 1997. However, concerns about fne effectiveness 
of Part IV to constrain anti-competitive conduct in the gradually developing competitive 
market of telecommunications, where there was a vertically-integrated service provider 
Telstra, led to Part XIB — a telecommunications-specific regime for regulating anti­
competitive conduct — being added to the TPA.15 For similar reasons, although Part 
IIIA of the TPA already provided a national access regime for a range of infrastructure, 
a telecommunications-specific access regime was established in Part XIC of the TPA.16 
Part XIC requires that for access to be made available a service must first be “declared”. 
Generally, the ACCC undertakes an inquiry to determine whether declaration is in the 
public interest. If it is, then a service will be declared, and access to it must be 
provided.17 Although certain services have been declared and subject to regulated 
access by the ACCC — such as the unconditioned local loop (ULL) — others have not 
been declared — such as the domestic inter-carrier roaming on digital mobile networks.
16 This legislation was designed to operate in conjunction with Part IV of the TPA. While Part XIB is similar to Part IV of the 
TPA, it is easier show a breach of anti-competitive conduct under Part XIB than under Part IV. See Chapter 5 of PC (2001a) 
for further details.
16 Parts XIC and IIIA of the TPA are similar and both apply to telecommunications, although Part XIC has priority. See Chapter 7 
of PC (2001a) for further details.
17' One difference between Part XIC and Part IIIA of TPA outlined by the PC (2001a) at page 595 is that, once a service is 
declared, Part XIC gives greater rights to the access seeker.
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The 1997 reforms have played a crucial role in the development of competition in the 
Australian telecommunications market. Importantly, these reforms have formed the 
basis of the regulatory regime that is presently used in the industry today. The PC 
(2001a) highlights this point when it states (at page 590) that:
The current framework for regulating telecommunications was largely 
set in place in 1997, when further policy changes intended to enhance 
competition came into operation.
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4.3 The TELRIC/TSLRIC Prices
Section 4.2 notes that both the FCC and ACCC chose FL cost-based prices designed to 
approximate the long-run marginal cost, to regulate the access prices of interconnecting 
to the network. The FCC employs the total-element-long-run-incremental-cost 
(TELRIC) method, while the ACCC has adopted an access regime based on the total- 
service-long-run-incremental-cost (TSLRIC) method. While there are important 
differences between the two access regimes,18 many economists have chosen to use the 
terms interchangeably when criticising TELRIC and TSLRIC.19 For example, Sidak 
and Spulber (1997a) note (at page 404) that,
To avoid redundancy, and because the economic analysis is the same in
either case, we subsume our critique of TELRIC pricing within that of
TSLRIC pricing.20
As this Section only provides a brief overview of the cost concepts, and the majority of 
the Chapter is focused upon assessing the many criticisms of TELRIC and TSLRIC, the 
analysis here also uses the two terms interchangeably.21
This Section looks at the basic theory' underlying TELRIC/TSLRIC prices and examines 
the inputs that are used to calculate TELRIC/TSLRIC prices in practice. It outlines 
some of justifications for the use of the FL cost-based regime provided by regulators in 
the US and Australia, and recounts Pelcovits’s (1999) tracing, of the rise of the “bottom- 
up” engineering-cost models used to determine the TELRIC/TSLRIC prices.
1 o
Gans and King (2003b) have recently highlighted theoretical and practical differences in the calculation of TSLRIC and 
TELRIC. They outline that, in terms of the theory, TELRIC and TSLRIC appear to treat common costs differently. Gans and 
King maintain (in their Executive Summary) that as a result, TELRIC-based prices may lead to “some services...artificially 
cross subsidising other services.” They also raise concerns (at page 19) that in practice, the estimates of TELRIC obtained in 
Australia from using Telstra’s PIE II cost-model, “will systematically overstate” the true TSLRIC-based access charge.
19 Kahn, Weisman and Tardiff (Kahn et al. 1999) refer (at page 326, footnote 14) to TELRIC as “a variant of the more widely 
known ‘total-service long-run incremental cost’ — TSLRIC.”
20 Sidak and Spulber though, do go on to immediately state (at page 404) that, “there is an important difference between TSLRIC 
and TELRIC that should be noted”. They outline that while TSLRIC prices the outputs and services, TELRIC prices inputs of 
the firm. Therefore, according to Sidak and Spulber (at page 404), the choice of TELRIC by FCC “represents a significant 
increase in regulatory control” and “an additional level of regulator intrusiveness”.
21 The PC (2001a) notes (at page 622, footnote 1) that the TELRIC and TSLRIC “distinction is somewhat arbitrary”, and provide 
an example of the ACCC using TSLRIC, yet costing network elements such as the local loop.
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4.3.1 The Theory Behind TELRIC/TSLRIC Prices
4.3.1 A Long-Run Marginal Cost
The long-run marginal cost of service A (LRMCa) represents the increase in the costs of 
production as a result of a small increase in the level of output of service A. As it is the 
long run, all costs are variable and the long-run marginal cost will include compensation 
for the firm’s opportunity cost of capital. In a perfectly-competitive market, pricing 
service/element A at its long-run marginal cost induces the efficient outcome, as the 
price paid reflects the additional opportunity cost to society of the resources that are 
required to produce a small increase in output
4.3.1.2 Long-Run Incremental Cost
Linhart and Webber (1997) note (at page 8) that as technically long-run marginal cost is 
a derivative, in practice it is the long-run incremental cost that is used to measure 
changes in cost. Baumöl and Sidak (1994) outline (at page 57) that the long-run 
incremental cost of service A, is the change in the firm’s total costs when the output of 
service A is increased by some pre-selected increment. They note that the incremental 
cost will approximate the marginal cost for a small increment, but may differ 
substantially from marginal cost over a larger increment.
4.3.1.3 Total-Service/Element-Long-Run Incremental Cost
If the cost of the firm providing all services/elements A, B, C etc is C (^, qs, q c • • )> then 
the total-element/service-long-run increment cost of the firm providing the entire 
service/element A, can be expressed,
TELRIC/TSLRICA = C(qA,qB,qc,...) -  C(0,qB,qc,...) (4.3.1)
As the final TELRIC/TSLRIC-based price is often expressed on a per-unit basis (e.g. 
access to the PSTN is expressed in cents per minute), the expression in equation (4.3.1) 
is typically divided by quantity. This gives, an expression for the long-run average 
incremental cost of providing service/element A (i.e. LR(A)ICa) of,22
LR(A)ICa = t e l r ic /t s l r ic a
9 a
l r m c a (4.3.2)
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The concept o f  long-run average incremental cost has it origins in the contestable markets literature, and in the US has been 
used as the basis for determining the price floor in the regulation o f  both rail and long-distance telecommunications access.
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The long-run average incremental cost provides an approximation of the long-run 
marginal costs, and regulators sometimes refer to it as the TELRIC/TSLRIC-based 
price. From equation (4.3.2), it is apparent that the long-run average increment cost is 
marginal with respect to the service, but not with respect the units of output the service, 
and is equal to the long-run average cost of production if there is only one service or 
element.
Gans and King (2003b) make the important point (at pages 7-8) that in practice, the 
calculation of TELRIC/TSLRIC by regulators is “technology-dependent”. That is, the 
TELRIC/TSLRIC calculation could be based on either the old BL cost technology, or 
the new FL cost technology. As regulators across a number of countries have chosen to 
apply FL costs when using TELRIC/TSLRIC, there is now a general presumption that it 
refers to a FL cost-based access price.
4.3.2 Calculating TELRIC/TSLRIC Prices in Practice
The FL TELRIC/TSLRIC estimate assumes that as in a long-run competitive local 
exchange market — i.e. where there are many access providers each supplying 
interconnection services to their networks — all costs associated with the incremental 
element or service are variable and minimised. To calculate the TELRIC/TSLRIC price 
a “bottom-up” approach is used. That is, to determine the FL cost-based access price, 
an engineering-cost model is employed that estimates the cost of re-optimising or 
reconstructing the network.23 To do this, various simplifying assumptions are made 
about the location of the network and the technology it incorporates.
Generally, to calculate TELRIC/TSLRIC, regulators in the US and Australia adopt what 
the ACCC refer to as a combination of a “scorched-node” approach and “best-in-use” 
technology.24 The scorched-node approach means that the existing switch locations of 
the incumbent’s network are held fixed. This is in contrast to a “scorched earth” 
approach, where switch locations are variable, and the regulator is not constrained to
23 Engineering cost models such as those used in telecommunications are not new to regulated industries in the US. Since the 
Coal Rate Guidelines issued by the ICC in 1985, similar cost models have been adopted to assess access prices for rail 
transportation services.
24 The PC (2001a) at page 626-7 outlines that this is method used by the ACCC in estimating the efficient FL costs. It appears 
from Kahn et al. that the FCC has stipulated a similar method. They note (at page 326, footnote 14) that the FCC estimates the 
FL costs o f  the incumbent local network holding the location o f  existing wire centres o f  the incumbent local exchange carriers 
fixed.
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basing costs on the existing location of the incumbent’s network. The assumption of 
best-in-use technology means that the regulator will use the most efficient technology 
that is commercially available and compatible with the existing network design.25 This 
could just involve using the FL cost estimates of the technology that is presently 
incorporated into the incumbent’s network. In contrast, the assumption of “best- 
available” technology requires the regulator to optimise the network using the very 
latest telecommunications equipment, some of which may not have been deployed in 
any existing telephone network.26
To compute TELRIC/TSLRIC using the engineering-cost model, estimates are required 
for the current value of the capital equipment; the ongoing efficient FL operating and 
maintenance expenses; the likely pattern of future usage; and the opportunity cost of 
capital — which includes a market rate of return on an investment of commensurate risk 
and an allowed depreciation rate. In addition, there will be certain costs that cannot be 
directly attributed to any specific service or element of the network. As the standard 
TELRIC/TSLRIC calculation does not account for these FL joint and common costs, 
both the FCC and ACCC stipulate that the access price should include a mark-up above 
the basic TELRIC/TSLRIC price.27 The ACCC refers to the resulting price that takes 
into account this mark up as TSLRIC+. As the ACCC also provides a further mark-up 
on terminating and originating PSTN access charge to allow recovery for some portion 
of the access deficit — i.e. the loss from the below-cost regulated prices applying to 
local services — the resulting access charge to the PSTN is known as TSLRIC+ + .28
4.3.3 Justifications of the TELRIC/TSLRIC Model
Regulators have highlighted the benefits of TELRIC/TSLRIC, by emphasising that the 
scheme provides an estimate of the long-run marginal cost of supplying a service or
25 See the ACCC (1997) at page 30.
°  The ACCC (1997) makes it clear that it does not subscribe to the “best-available” technology approach. It states (at page 30) 
that, “in estimating TSLRIC the Commission will not use experimental prototypes as a benchmark for best-in-use technology.”
27 The PC (2001a) highlights these components o f TSLRIC at page 623 in Box D. 1.
28 The ACCC (2000a) outlines (at page 414) that the national weighted average TSLRIC++ estimate for 2000-01 was 1.53 cents 
per minute. The access deficit contribution (ADC) made up 0.69 cents per minute, or (as the PC (20001a) notes) 45 per cent o f  
this access charge. The recent ACCC (2003) document highlights that there is presently an ongoing debate about the 
appropriateness o f having an ADC in the access charge. It interesting to note that in the US, there is no such similar mark-up 
allowed in the access price to account for the equivalent deficit experienced in the local telecommunications market.
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element. TELRIC/TSLRIC through approximating the long-run marginal cost of 
production:
■ prevents the access provider from charging a monopoly rate for access to the 
network;
■ allows the firm to recover all relevant incremental costs associated with supplying 
the element or service — including a fair rate of return on its invested capital; and
■ roughly captures the efficiencies associated with pricing at the long-run marginal 
costs.
As the access regime balances the competing needs of maximising benefits to the 
consumer while still ensuring cost recovery on the investment for the regulated firm, 
regulators in the US and Australia assert that the TELRIC/TSLRIC price will be:29
■ allocatively efficient. By restricting the market power of the vertically-integrated 
monopoly and basing price on the cost to society from providing the investment, the 
regime induces the efficient use of the existing infrastructure;
■ production efficient. Through using the efficient FL cost technique combining a 
scorched node and best-in-use technology approach, the regime promotes incentives 
for the access provider to minimise the cost of providing access. It ensures the firm 
cannot expect to recover inefficiencies in production; and
■ dynamically efficient. By compensating the infrastructure for its opportunity cost 
of capital, it encourages the economically efficient future investment in infrastructure 
and promotes the efficient ‘buy or build’ decisions by entrants to the industry. 
Further, it rewards the firm for undertaking innovations or adopting technologies that 
are more efficient than those that are commercially available.
Pelcovits (1999) argues that a further advantage of the TELRIC/TSLRIC model is that, 
compared to the original “black box” models offered by incumbent local exchange 
carriers in the US, they are open, transparent, and easily tested for sensitivities to inputs 
and assumptions. By using FL costs, he claims TELRIC/TSLRIC models avoid many 
of the controversial cost allocations associated with compensating the incumbent for its 
embedded historical cost. Pelcovits provides a brief historical account tracing the rise
29 This summarises the six benefits of using TSLRIC outlined by the ACCC (1997) at pages 29-30.
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of engineering-cost models in telecommunications. This is outlined in the following 
sub-section.
4.3.4 The Rise of the Engineering Cost Model — Pelcovits (1999)
According to Pelcovits (1999), the development of engineering-cost models, and their 
eventual adoption in the telecommunications industry, arose from the regulator’s and 
potential entrants’ continuing frustrations with incumbent firms over-stating the costs 
that they should be allowed to recover. He highlights that one of the original forays into 
cost models came about as a response to the lack of transparency associated with the 
rates proposed for universal service obligations (USOs) by ILECs in a 1993 United 
States Telephone Association (USTA) report.30
FIGURE 4.3.1 A UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION
Market 1 Market 2
Pelcovits’s arguments can be highlighted with the assistance of a diagram. Figure 4.3.1, 
depicts a USO that requires a uniform price p across a low-cost market (market 1) and
higher-cost market (market 2). In market 1, the quantity q°x is demanded at price p ,
30 Noam (2002) also notes (at page 396) that the engineering cost models used for TELRIC calculations were “developed initially 
for the calculation of universal service cost allocations."
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and the firm makes a profit of epfg. Some portion of these profits is used to subsidise 
the consumers in market 2, so that the quantity q\ is demanded at price p .
In this USTA report, incumbent firms argued that to assess the USO contributions 
potential entrants should make, rather than measuring the size of the losses directly from 
subsidised groups (i.e. area abdp in Figure 4.3.1), the regulator should estimate the 
amount by which revenues exceed costs in profitable markets (i.e. area epfg in Figure 
4.3.1). Implicitly, this argument relies on the incumbent firm originally being on a 
financial “knife-edge”. That is, prior to entry being allowed, the incumbent is only 
making normal returns on the asset as all revenues from services where price exceeds 
cost are devoted to subsidising those services where rates are being held below cost (i.e. 
area epfg is equal to area abdp in Figure 4.3.1). This reasoning led the incumbent 
local network owners to conclude that compensation in the order of US$20 billion per 
year was required if competition were to be allowed in its profitable markets. In 
response to this claim a competing carrier, MCI, commissioned Hatfield Association 
Inc. to construct a stylised engineering-cost model. It estimated the losses actually 
incurred by the incumbent in the unprofitable market (i.e. area abdp). Instead of the 
US$20 billion figure, this model estimated that the entrants should pay a subsidy of 
US$3.7 billon per year.31
The discrepancy between the figures in the example offered by Pelcovits suggests that 
the incumbent was originally making above-normal returns, and that the 
TELRIC/TSLRIC cost models evolved as a regulatory and potential entrants’ response 
to attempts by incumbents to retain existing rents in the pricing of their services. While 
Hausman (1999b) does not dispute the facts raised by Pelcovits, he does respond to the 
overall tone of the article, which predominantly argues that incumbent local exchange 
carriers have systematically discredited FL cost models in an attempt to bring back 
historical cost-based prices. In relation to this claim, Hausman states (at page 250) that 
“conspiracy arguments are looked upon much more favourably within the Beltway than 
in academia.”
31 In Australia, estimation of the USO led to a similar discrepancy. The PC (2001a) outlines (at page 600, Box A.4) that in 1998 
Telstra estimated that the cost of providing universal services was $1.8 billion. The Government however capped the USO cost 
at $253 million.
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4.4 Criticisms of TELRIC/TSLRIC Prices
A recurring strategy of almost all critiques of TELRIC/TSLRIC in the US and Australia, 
is an attempt to explain why regulation leads to the under-pricing of access, and then to 
highlight the various inefficiencies associated with having such “below-cost” rates. 
Consequently, in this Section, after outlining the controversy that has surrounded 
TELRIC/TSLRIC-based prices in the US and Australia, the analysis examines the:
(1) reasons given for why TELRIC/TSLRIC under-prices access; and
(2) consequences of setting a TELRIC/TSLRIC-based access price.
The sub-division of categories used here to present the arguments made against 
TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation, is at times, very similar to the framework of Kahn et al. 
(1999). While there will be some overlap between the arguments contained in each of 
the sub-categories, this analysis aims to provide a clear overview for why the regulated 
access price is associated with below-cost rates and harm to efficiency. Further, 
although many of the criticisms outlined here are directed towards the US access 
regime, it is illustrated throughout that almost identical arguments have been raised in 
Australia.
4.4.1 The Controversial TELRIC/TSLRIC
In the US, the controversy surrounding the introduction of TELRIC/TSLRIC has been 
evident in the protracted series of regulatory disputes and legal challenges brought 
against the regime. A verdict delivered by the Eighth Circuit Court in 1999 initially 
rejected the TELRIC/TSLRIC approach to pricing. This held that rates for access 
should be based upon the directly-attributable actual incremental costs of production.32 
The US Supreme Court overturned this decision in the case of Verizon v FCC,33 
reaffirming the right of the FCC to set regulated access prices using TELRIC/TSLRIC, 
and to incorporate the FL costs of a hypothetically-efficient firm.
A number of prominent economists in the US have criticised the FL cost standard used 
to price access to local network elements. These critics have labelled TELRIC/TSLRIC
32 AT&T Corporation v Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
Verizon Communications Inc. v Federal Communications Commission, 122 S.Ct 1646 (2002).
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as: a political process wrapped in the guise of efficient regulation;34 a regime that 
recasts the regulator in the role of a central planner;35 an attempt by regulators to 
micromanage the process of telecommunications liberalisation;36 an act of astounding 
regulatory presumption;37 a “back-to-the-future” version of cost-based regulation;38 
confusing the mandating of the competitive outcome with fostering the competitive 
outcome;39 a scheme with a broad regulatory consensus that is supported by little 
economic argument;40 and an “anti-patent” system where the regulator speculates what 
the competitive market costs should be 41
The introduction of TSLRIC by the ACCC met with similar disapproval, and many of 
these criticisms have been repeated in Australia. This was evident in both the 
submissions to the Productivity Commission inquiries into Telecommunications 
Competition Regulation and the National Access Regime, and from the respective final 
reports issued by the Productivity Commission — PC (2001a) and PC (2001b).
4.4.2 Reasons why TELRIC/TSLRIC Under-prices Access
In both the US and Australia, access providers have consistently maintained that 
TELRIC/TSLRIC-based access prices are set below cost. For example, the PC (2001a) 
highlights (at page 622) that the “main concern” in Australia has been that “the ACCC’s 
application of TSLRIC under-estimates the access prices required to provide an 
adequate commercial return on investment.”42 The PC also notes (at page 393, Box 
11.3), Telstra’s claim that:
34 Crandall and Hausman (2000) at page 98.
35 Weisman (2000) at page 210.
36 Crandall and Hausman (2000) at page 109.
32 Kahn et al. (1999) at page 328 and Kahn (2001) at page 5.
38 Kahn et al. (1999) at page 331.
39 Weisman (2000) at page 197.
40 Laffont and Tirole (2000) at page 148.
4 ' Kahn et al. (1999) at page 349 and Weisman (2000) at page 209.
42 In Section 5.3 o f  Chapter 5, a formal model is used to show how FL cost regulation can potentially under-price access.
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After nearly 3 years of TSLRIC modelling, the ACCC has produced 
interconnect charges that are unreasonably low by any standard.
From examining a number of the early critiques, it appears that the main reasons offered 
for this under-pricing occurs, are that:
(1) there are prohibitive informational requirements for estimating TELRIC/TSLRIC. 
The detail and complexity of telecommunications networks means that regulators 
are forced to make arbitrary judgements about what constitutes efficient costs;
(2) it incorporates unrealistic assumptions in dealing with cost trade-offs, sunk costs, 
technological progress and demand for the industry;
(3) it is a form of asymmetric regulation and generates asymmetric risk; and
(4) the long-run competitive model is inappropriate as a benchmark to price access.
Each of the above reasons is outlined in detail in the following sub-sections.
4.4.2.1 Prohibitive Informational Requirements for Estimating TELRIC/TSLRIC 
The eminent economist Alfred Kahn has characterised the FCC’s approach to pricing as 
one of “TELRIC/TSLRIC-BS”,43 where the regulator determines the access price by 
rebuilding the network of the incumbent from the ground up. According to Kahn it is as 
if it the network were constructed on a blank slate (BS), with the one qualification that 
the regulator takes existing wire locations as given. Kahn et al. (1999) reflect the 
substantial amount of information and detail required in order to estimate 
TELRIC/TSLRIC at page 335.
Designed to produce the costs that a firm would experience over a 
period of time into the future, and especially as applied to complex 
telecommunications networks, the amount of detail they must 
incorporate — about the size and cost of central office switches, 
locations and cost of fiber optic electronics — are forbidding.
Along with the quantity of information, questions have been raised over the quality of 
the “efficient cost” information available to the regulator. Crandall and Hausman 
(2000) believe there are significant problems associated with the regulator mandating
43 For Kahn’s reference to the TELRIC/TSLRIC “blank-slate” see, Kahn et al. (1999) at page 326-327, Kahn (2001) at page 3-24, 
and Kahn (2002) at page 43.
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the efficient costs of provision. They query (at page 87) how the regulator will know if 
the arbitrated rates reflect BL or FL costs of network elements and services. Kahn et al. 
suggest that determining “efficient costs” could be more problematic for the regulator 
than the substantial amounts of information required. Following on directly from the 
passage cited above, they write (again at page 335) that:
The problem is not merely that their construction imposes tremendous 
information requirements. More fundamentally, they put the regulator 
in the position of having to decide what investments are prudent...
While the criticisms of Kahn et al. and Crandall and Hausman were directed towards the 
US regime, similar claims have been made in Australia. The PC (2001b) notes (at page 
91) that it has been emphasised that “the information required for effective intervention 
can be particularly daunting if access prices are based on the ‘efficient’ cost of supply”. 
It then goes onto cite a passage from a submission to the National Access Regime 
inquiry by NECG (2001a), which states (at page 17) that:
Cost estimation is a formidable problem for regulation even when the 
actual costs of the regulated firm are the focus. It is significantly more 
difficult to accurately estimate the capital cost of a hypothetical, 
efficiently configured, asset.
As outlined in Chapter 2, during the 1980s and early 1990s, regulators in the US, UK 
and Australia all moved towards adopting the more incentive-based and light-handed 
price-cap regulation for telecommunications. Aside from the purported production 
efficiency gains, according to Kahn et al. and Weisman, the adoption of price-cap 
regulation suggested that regulators had realised that they did not have the necessary 
information to anticipate, independently and accurately, the efficient operating and 
capital costs the firm should be allowed to recover. By applying the hypothetically- 
efficient cost standard, TELRIC/TSLRIC is associated with the reintroducing a major 
flaw of rate-of-retum (ROR) regulation, as it forces the regulator to determine what 
constitutes a prudent investment.44 The only difference to traditional ROR regulation is
44 It should be noted that although a rate of return is obviously required in the calculation of TELRIC/TSLRIC, in the US the 1996 
Telecommunications Act explicitly contemplated that traditional US-style ROR regulation, which had been phased out in the 
early 1990s, should not be used. In Section 252(d)(1)(A) of the Act, it was outlined that TELRIC-based access prices should be 
“determined without reference to a rate-of-retum or other rate-based proceeding.”
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that this decision must now be made prior to the investment actually being undertaken. 
According to Kahn et al. and Weisman, regulators are substituting their judgement for 
that of management, and relying upon the FL cost standard, to bring about the same 
efficiency gains that were originally achieved by providing market-based incentives 
under price-cap regulation. As the model uses information not appreciably different 
from that required under ROR regulation — i.e. estimates of the cost of capital, 
depreciation rate and economic life of the capital asset — TELRIC/TSLRIC has been 
described by Weisman (2000) as a “major retrogression” from price-cap regulation,45 
and by Kahn et al. as a “back-to-the-future” version of ROR regulation.46
4.4.2.2 Unrealistic Assumptions
TELRIC/TSLRIC has been criticised on the basis that it incorporates highly unrealistic 
assumptions in modelling and estimating the costs that an access provider should be 
allowed to recover. The use of hypothetically-efficient FL costs, combined with the 
assumption that the local exchange is characterised by a world of certainty, has led to 
TELRIC/TSLRIC being responsible for:
-  failure to take into account the important cost trade-offs within the firm; and
-  failing to capture the significant sunk costs of the network, the technological 
progress within the industry, and changes in demand and price.
In the US there has been criticism over the regulator’s decision to use the FL costs of a 
hypothetically-efficient firm rather than the actual FL costs of the incumbent network 
provider. For example, while the FCC examines all actual FL cost data provided by the 
incumbent and the competing local exchange carriers, it is alleged that it determines the 
costs of a hypothetically-efficient firm by simply selecting the lowest FL cost estimate 
associated with operating each component of the element or service being provided. 
Kahn et al. criticise this “pick and choose” approach to regulation on the basis that it 
ignores the ubiquitous interdependencies or cost trade-offs amongst the several FL cost 
components of an actual firm. By assuming that the “efficient firm” excels in all
45 See Weisman (2000) at page 200.
46 See Kahn et al. (1999) at page 331.
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aspects of its operations, TELRIC/TSLRIC fails to capture that a firm may have a low 
cost in one area, at the expense of having a higher cost in another.47
Kahn et al. claim that the combined effect of the Telecommunications Act and the 
TELRIC/TSLRIC-based access price is to create a regime where, the incumbent local 
network provider no longer receives the protection of being a monopoly, nor any 
assurance of cost recovery. The competitive framework means that the ILECs must 
now face the standard demand, price and technological uncertainty often associated with 
substantial sunk and irreversible investments.48 As the regulator does not take the 
changed circumstance of the access provider into account, TELRIC/TSLRIC fails to 
compensate the incumbent for sunk costs and changes in technology, demand and 
price. This view is reflected in the following passage from Hausman (1997, at page 31) 
and Hausman (1999a, at page 196), who states:
TSLRIC assumes that all capital invested now will be used over the 
entire economic life of the new investment and that prices for the capital 
goods or the service being offered will not decrease over time. With 
changing demand conditions, changing prices, or changing technology, 
these assumptions are not necessarily true.... Significant economic 
effects can arise from the effects that the sunk nature of investment has 
on the calculation of TSLRIC.
Hausman (1997, 1999a) claims that TELRIC/TSLRIC does not take into account the 
sunk and irreversible nature of telecommunications investments, because it is based 
on the assumptions of a perfectly constestable market — a market where there are no 
sunk costs of production, and the mere threat of entry induces a competitive market 
outcome. Consequently, the FCC’s standard assumes all network investments are made 
up of fixed not sunk costs, which are not subject to the same types of technological or 
economic uncertainty. Hausman maintains that these assumptions imposed by the 
regulator are clearly inconsistent with the economic reality of the local exchange 
market, and lead to the firm not being compensated adequately for its investment.
In a similar vein, Kahn et al. highlight that a problem of using the efficient costs of a 
hypothetical firm is that, in reality, to embody the most recent technology from the
47 See pages 332-334.
48 Kahn et al. (1999) at page 336.
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ground up, an incumbent provider must incur significant sunk costs. Unlike Hausman, 
they suggest these sunk costs could be compensated for in the TELRIC/TSLRIC prices. 
This can be done if the regulator allows the network access provider to recover a high 
enough rate of regulatory depreciation on the asset. However, Kahn et al. consider (at 
page 328-9) that such an outcome is unlikely to arise in practice, because there has been 
a tendency for TELRIC/TSLRIC models of the FCC to use traditionally-determined 
regulatory rates of depreciation and costs of capital, which are insufficient for achieving 
cost recovery.
Over the past few decades the telecommunications industry has been subject to a very 
rapid rate of technological progress. In addition to an increase in the variety and 
quality of telecommunications services, it has generally led to a decrease in the cost of 
providing existing elements or services. Hausman claims that the decrease in the price 
of the network components due to technological progress is not captured in the 
TELRIC/TSLRTC calculations. By doing this, the regulator effectively imposes a 
capital loss on the firm. As this loss is not compensated for in the access price the firm 
is allowed to charge by the FCC, the local exchange carrier is unable to recover costs 
associated with the investment.49
In experiencing a rapid rate of technological progress, Kahn et al. outline (at pages 336- 
7) that the telecommunications industry has followed a similar trend to the computer 
industry. Subsequently, they compare the monthly rental rate for hiring a personal 
computer with the monthly repayments required on a personal computer purchased 
outright on credit. This is done to highlight the perceived deficiency of the FL cost- 
based contracts at which the FCC has forced ILECs to offer their services and network 
elements.
In relation to the personal computer, Kahn et al. make the obvious point that the cost of 
leasing the computer on a short-term monthly contract will be higher than the monthly 
repayment required on a loan used to purchase the same computer outright. The reason 
for this is that under a short-term contract, the lessor — i.e. the party that loans the 
computer — must be compensated for bearing the cost of the depreciation of the asset 
or any risk of obsolescence, due to technological advancement. TELRIC/TSLRIC is
49 The model used in Chapter 5 captures this problem outlined by Hausman and that outlined by Kahn et al. in the preceding 
paragraph.
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claimed not to appreciate this phenomenon in its pricing of network elements. The FL 
cost model bases the access price on a long-term contract, which matches the life of the 
essential infrastructure. In terms of the computer analogy, this price is equivalent to the 
monthly repayment required on a loan used to purchase the computer outright. 
However, according to Kahn et al., the regulator allows the access seeker to enter into 
short-term monthly contracts for access. The inconsistency between the implicit long­
term contract underlying the access price, and the short-term contracts actually allowed 
for the lease of network elements, means that access is under-priced. The access 
provider here is not compensated for either the depreciation of the asset, or the risk of 
obsolescence that arises from technological progress.50
With respect to demand, the TELRIC/TSLRIC model typically assumes that the 
hypothetically-efficient firm just takes over the current volume and value of the ILEC’s 
sales. It then dimensions the hypothetical network so that it can instantaneously supply 
that level of demand for the element or service at a minimum cost. This ignores that, in 
reality, telecommunications assets are generally long-lived and their capacity is not 
deployed all at once. Rather, it is expanded incrementally to serve the growing and 
changing levels of demand.
Alleman (1999, 2001) claims that, by using the TELRIC/TSLRIC model, the regulator 
is implicitly assuming that the demand for access is perfectly inelastic or unresponsive 
to changes in the access price. This arises because the regulator uses the efficient cost 
estimates to determine the maximum revenue the firm is allowed to earn, and then 
determines the access price by simply dividing this amount by an estimate for the level 
of demand. Consequently, no matter what the access price is, there is now no change in 
the quantity of access demanded. Instead of having the normal price-based quantities 
that emerge in markets, the regulator sets a quantity-based price for access. The failure 
of demand to change in response to any parameter in the model also implies that 
TELRIC/TSLRIC cannot deal with any type of demand uncertainty.
50 In a letter titled, “Change is as Good as an Access Holiday” appearing in the Australian Financial Review, 21 August 2001, 
Dennis O’Neill, the CEO o f Australian Council for Infrastructure Development (AusCID), criticised the national access regime 
employed by the ACCC, using an analogous, yet much less eloquent argument. In relation to the current access-pricing regime 
used by the ACCC for telecommunications networks, gas pipelines, airport terminals and rail tracks, he stated:
It’s like buying a new car and then being forced to let anyone drive it without paying for all the petrol they 
use. If you were an investor, you wouldn’t buy the new car either.
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The inability of the regulatory regime to cope with uncertain demand has also been 
emphasised in the work of Hausman (1997, 1999a) and Crandall and Hausman (2000). 
Crandall and Hausman argue that with either demand or price uncertainty, the current 
access-pricing regime inappropriately apportions the risk associated with the network 
investment. For example, under a fair price for access, if the expected level of demand 
in the downstream market did not materialise, or alternatively the price of the element 
decreased, the access seeker would be forced to bear the risk. Under TELRIC/TSLRIC 
though, because new entrants can lease UNEs on a month-by-month basis, they have the 
option of temporarily leaving the market if the anticipated level of demand does not 
materialise or the price of the element decreases. Therefore, in addition to their own 
business risk, ILECs are now being forced to bear the risk for the business case of their 
potential competitors.
4.4.2.3 Asymmetric Regulation and Risk
While Harris and Kraft (1997) outline that because TELRIC/TSLRIC uses an efficient- 
firm standard, it represents an asymmetric form of regulation that is biased in favour of 
the new entrant. However, others claim that the hypothetically-efficient FL cost 
standard is not only an asymmetric form of regulation, but imposes what they describe 
as an “asymmetric risk” upon the incumbent.
Weisman (2000), for example, argues (at page 199) that “asymmetric risk-bearing” 
arises because the ILEC must base its access price on a network superior to the elements 
that it is being required to unbundle. Weisman claims that this forces the access 
provider to bear all the risk of realising efficiency gains, without there necessarily being 
any market validation for their existence.
Kahn et al. suggest (at pages 341-2) that “asymmetrical risks” arise because the 
efficient-firm standard assumes that the network is configured instantaneously to serve 
whatever level of demand is forecast to arise. In reality, lags exist between the timing 
of the construction of the facility and the demand for access. Therefore, in practice, the 
incumbent incurs the sunk costs associated with building the essential infrastructure, 
and then faces the risks associated with whether or not the forecast demand actually 
materialises. By simply assuming this issue away, the regulator creates asymmetric 
risk. That is, it does not compensate the incumbent for the risks it was subject to when 
the investment was being undertaken.
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In Australia, the Network Economic Consulting Group (NECG, 2001c) in its 
submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry report on Telecommunications 
Competition Regulation has even suggested that asymmetric risk will arise as a direct 
consequence of having a TELRIC/TSLRIC access price that fails to recover cost. It 
claims (at page 13) that because the “wide-ranging discretion” afforded to Australian 
regulators, there has been:
.. .a degree of regulatory bias, in which a majority of decisions are made 
in favour of lower prices. This skews the distribution of expected 
returns, limiting the upside earnings potential and increasing the 
probability that revenues will fail to cover efficiently-incurred costs.
It asserts that to take the skewed return resulting from this bias into account, there must
be a mark-up on the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) calculations.
The above approaches to regulatory or asymmetric risk should be contrasted with the 
argument of King (2000), outlined on pages 287-8 of PC (2001a). Unlike the previous 
arguments,51 King does not suggest that the regulator engages in any systematic bias or 
asymmetric treatment of the firm. Instead, King uses reasoning similar to that of Kolbe, 
Tye and Myers (1993) and Kolbe and Tye (1995).52 He demonstrates that the truncation 
of returns is endogenous to the process of having a regulator using an appropriately risk- 
adjusted expected rate of return to determine the maximum net cash flow the firm is 
allowed to earn in each period, when there is some form of uncertainty. The 
Productivity Commission notes that it may be necessary to provide the firm with a 
‘truncation premium’ in order to compensate the access provider for what Kolbe, Tye 
and Myers (1993) have labelled ‘regulatory risk’, and Hausman and Myers (2002) have 
more recently described as ‘asymmetric risk’.53 In practice this premium may be 
difficult to calculate, as the Productivity Commission notes that it requires a mark-up 
based on a probability-weighted allowed fair rate.54
51 NECG (2001c) also makes a case (at pages 9-10) that there will be regulatory risk even when the regulator is unbiased. Its 
arguments are summarised by the PC (2001a) at page 631 as saying that, under uncertainty and a concave profit function, 
unbiased price regulation will lead to systematic errors.
Although their analysis specifically looked at the issue of stranded cost risk, their reasoning when applied more generally leads 
to the outcomes described by King and outlined in the Productivity Commission report.
53 Small and Ergas (1999) outline that it is more appropriate to describe the problem of “truncation”, as a problem of the regulator 
“censoring” the returns of the access provider.
54 See PC (2001a) at page 288 and PC (2001b) at page 299.
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4.4.2.4 Inappropriateness of Long-Run Competitive Model as a Benchmark 
TELRIC/TSLRIC assumes that a long-run competitive market provides the appropriate 
benchmark for setting access prices in the local telecommunications market. However, 
this notion has been challenged by Kahn and Weisman, who maintain that the efficient- 
firm benchmark is inappropriate for regulating an industry, such as telecommunications, 
which experiences a rapid rate of technological progress. Citing passages from 
Schumpeter (1950), they argue that in an industry characterised by rapid technological 
progress, it is the prospect of the rewards of transient market dominance and monopoly 
pricing from successful innovation that provides the essential incentive for innovators 
and imitators alike. The FCC’s approach, which requires innovators immediately to 
share their creations at prices based upon a perfectly-competitive market, fails to 
provide the necessary incentives. The regulator has established a regime that is 
described as being akin to an “anti-patent” system, which rewards imitation and free 
riding. Unlike a patent, which gives successful innovators exclusive use of whatever 
they invent, TELRIC/TSRLIC pricing instead forces investors fully to absorb the costs 
of unsuccessful ventures, yet deprives them of the fruits of successful innovations.
Kahn et al. allude to the work of Fellner (1958), and point out that in the extreme 
situation where there is a world of continual technological progress, firms may 
systematically practice what is known as “anticipatory retardation”. That is, a firm only 
adopts the most modem technology when the progressively declining costs fall 
sufficiently below the currently prevailing prices, to offer an expectation of earning a 
return on the investment.
Schumpeter’s arguments have also been employed in Australia to highlight flaws in the 
national access regime, and the lack of incentives it provides for innovation. For 
example the PC (2001b) cites (at page 67) a passage from Energex, which states that:
The Schumpeterian argument is that it is only the opportunity of higher 
returns than the perfectly competitive rate which will induce firms to 
undertake risky and uncertain investment and innovational activities...
In Australia, critics of TELRIC/TSLRIC have drawn upon the patent analogy to assert
the need for an ‘access holiday’. This represents a period of time where the investor is
exempt from the service being declared, and the investment subject to any access
regulation for a specified period of time.
The Productivity Commission examines the proposal of an access holiday in Chapter 9 
of the Telecommunications Competition Regulation inquiry report, and Chapter 11 of 
the National Access Regime inquiry report. The PC (2001a) outlines (at page 287) that
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the major argument contained in submissions is that, “an access ‘holiday’, like a patent, 
protects entrepreneurial returns that justify the investment in the first place”. It 
contemplates at pages 282-3 of PC (2001b), that if an access holiday were granted, it 
should apply for a minimum period of 15 to 20 years. Gans and King (2003a) 
recommend the use of an access holiday as a means for offsetting the ‘truncation 
problem’ associated with regulation, maintaining (at page 169) that:
.. .access holidays play a similar role to a patent in innovative 
activities....Both patents and access holidays are second-best solutions 
in that they impose a temporary monopoly cost on society. Both an 
optimal patent and an optimal access holiday needs to be designed to 
trade-off this temporary loss with the increased incentive to invest.
To simulate the outcomes of a long-run-perfectly-competitive industry and ensure that 
the firm earns a commensurate rate of return on assets of equivalent risk, the 
TELRJC/TSLRIC model adopts a standard neoclassical net present value (NPV) 
approach to the investment. Hausman (1997, 1999a) and Alleman (1999, 2001) criticise 
neoclassical theory on the basis that it does not account for the interaction between sunk 
costs and uncertainty — key features of the local telecommunications network 
investments. It subsequently ignores the value of managerial flexibility to address and 
adapt to various uncertainties as they arise. In the telecommunications industry, they 
argue that uncertainty may occur due to underlying economic parameters — such as 
technology, demand, price or interest rate — or due to the sovereign risks associated 
with regulation — such as the regulator changing or imposing unfair constraints on the 
firm. Due to these factors, both Hausman and Alleman advocate the use of real option 
theory to determine the appropriate regulated access price.
Real option theory contends that the ability of the investor to defer an irreversible and 
uncertain investment is something of significant value. It allows the investor to receive 
new information as time passes, which assists it in resolving some of the uncertainty 
that surrounds the investment. In effect the investor now has an option to delay the 
investment, similar to a financial option, known as an American call option.55 The 
reason is it provides the firm with the opportunity, but not obligation, to undertake the 
investment at some future point in time. In these circumstances if the firm were to
55 Unlike financial options, real options are generally not tradeable.
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invest, it would subject itself to an extra cost, as it destroys its option to wait. Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) show that by taking into account this additional cost or call option to 
invest, the investment should only occur if the net present value is greater than zero.
It appears real option theory was first applied in telecommunications by Hausman in a 
written testimony provided to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) in 
1996.56 Assuming uncertainty over revenue flows and basing his calculations largely 
upon the “reasonable parameters” of Dixit and Pindyck,57 Hausman found that there 
was a 3.2-3.4 times mark-up required on the access price. Applying this to the 
proportion of sunk assets estimated to be used by the Pacific Bell local exchange,58 he 
concluded a 135 per cent mark-up was required on the TELRIC-based access charge for 
use of links, and a 35 per cent mark-up was required on the TELRIC-based charge for 
use of ports.59 This argument was subsequently rejected by the CPUC, which instead 
decided that the appropriate access price to set for the UNEs was given by using 
TELRIC, plus 19 per cent to recover shared and common costs.60
In Australia, the real options approach does not appear to have been presented yet in any 
formal submissions or proceedings relating to telecommunication access regulation. 
However, it would come as no surprise if such arguments were raised in the near future. 
Clearly, the problems of asymmetric risk and truncation both lend themselves to the 
application of real option theory.61 For example, a paper by Ergas, Hornby, Little and 
Small (2001) presented at an ACCC Conference on Regulation and Investment, argues 
that a real options approach should be used to deal with the problem of regulatory risk. 
Further, the Commerce Commission (2001) in New Zealand has explicitly considered 
the potential for using real option theory, stating (at page 79, paragraph 357) that:
56 See Reply affadavit o f Jerry Hausman, In the Matter o f  Implementation o f  Local Competition Provision in the 
Telecommunications Act o f 1996, CC-Docket No.96-98, 30 May 1996.
57 Holm (2000) makes the point that as the Dixit and Pindyck parameters have nothing to do with telecommunication investments, 
it is rather tenuous to try and claim that the data are appropriate for application to Pacific Bell.
C O
° The estimates used by Hausman for the proportion o f sunk costs were, 0.59 on links and 0.10 on ports.
59 Alleman (1999) also established a significant mark-up in price is required. He outlines (at page 173) that if  real option theory is 
not taken into account, standard TELRIC/TSLRIC models may underestimate the access price by as much as 60 per cent.
60 The arguments put forward in his testimony were later more formally presented in Hausman (1999a).
61 See Hausman and Myers (2002) for a recent paper that uses the argument o f truncation for the application o f real options in rail.
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A second potential source of asymmetric risk is that the obligation to 
provide interconnection services removes the option for access 
providers to delay investment in their fixed PSTNs. If this option has a 
value, the costs of foregoing the option is a cost that should be reflected 
in interconnection prices.
4.4.3 The Consequences of Below-Cost Access Rates
The consequences of having a below-cost rate for access to the ILECs’ network 
elements and services are that there will be:
■ regulatory takings;
■ static allocative and production inefficiency; and
■ dynamic inefficiency.
4.4.3.1 Regulatory Takings
Sidak and Spulber have been leading proponents of the argument that the regulator, 
through its implementation of deregulation or unduly harsh regulations, can engage in 
some form of unconstitutional taking of property from the firm.62 Property in this 
context refers not only to the physical assets, but also such intangible pecuniary 
property rights as the ability of the firm to earn an adequate return on its investment.
In assessing TELRIC/TSLRIC, Sidak and Spulber (1997a) have argued that by forcing 
the firm to set a price that is below cost, the regulator violates Section 252(d)(1) of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. This permits the regulated firm to recover costs by 
setting an access price that may include a reasonable profit. By guaranteeing that the 
firm makes a loss, TELRIC/TSLRIC is considered inherently confiscatory, and to 
constitute a form of takings by the regulator that is in breach of the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution.
Although there is not the same protection afforded to intangible pecuniary property 
rights in the Australian Constitution, there does appear to be some concern about the 
issue of takings. For example, the PC (2001a) demonstrates its concern that FL costs 
may lead to ‘regulatory takings’ at pages 375-6, and outlines the arguments of Laffont 
and Tirole (2000) for dealing with the problem.
62 See Sidak and Spulber (1997a, b) for more detailed arguments about takings and the distinction between regulatory and
deregulatory takings.
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4.4.3.2 Static Allocative and Productive Efficiency
Kahn (2001) has emphasised that one consequence of using the efficient costs of a 
hypothetical entrant is that the access price lies below the actual FL long-run- 
incremental cost of production that is faced by the firm. This leads to both allocative 
and production inefficiency.63
The regime clearly results in allocative inefficiency, because it induces “buyers to 
demand (incremental) quantities of the service in question, the value of which to them is 
less than the (incremental) costs that society actually incurs in providing them”.64 
Further, it fails to realise production efficiency because the correct cost target for any 
potential entrant to aim for is always the actual FL long-run marginal cost of production 
faced by existing firms in the industry. It would be considered unusual in practice for a 
potential entrant to decide that it must satisfy some hypothetically-efficient FL cost 
standard, rather than an actual FL cost standard, before it could enter an industry. Kahn 
(2001) highlights the issue of production efficiency when he states (at page 6) that 
actual FL cost-based prices,
.. .give challengers the proper target at which to shoot — the proper 
standard to meet or beat and the proper reward if they succeed. If they 
can achieve costs lower than that, Finns will enter and in the process 
beat prices down to efficient levels. The FCC’s choice, o f— 
omnisciently — prescribing at once what it thinks would be the outcome 
of such a process, short-circuits it...
4.4.3.3 Dynamic Inefficiency
Most critics emphasise the potential for dynamic inefficiencies to arise as a result of the 
below-cost TELRIC/TSLRIC rates. There have been widespread predictions that the 
discounted prices will stifle future innovation and investment in the network, leading to 
socially-costly delays in the adoption of new technologies and services. For example in 
relation to setting substantially discounted prices for access Kahn et al. (at page 350) 
warn that:
The essential evil of such policies is that they discourage or delay the 
introduction of services that cannot be predicted beforehand. The cost 
to consumers can be enormous.
OJ For similar arguments about the failure of TELRIC/TSLRIC to achieve allocative or production efficiency see Kahn et al. 
(1999).
64 Kahn (2001) at page 4.
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Kahn (2002) suggests that the below-cost rates for access to services and network 
elements bias and distort the efficient “buy or build” decision of potential entrants to the 
local telecommunications market. Instead of building their own local network, 
competitors are encouraged to enter the industry by reselling or leasing the ILECs’ 
services or elements. Ironically, regulations effectively discourage CLECs from 
engaging in exactly the type of facilities-based entry that the Act was originally 
designed to produce. Kahn reflects this view when he writes (at page 43) that in 
relation to TELRIC/TSLRIC:
...it is difficult to conceive of a standard more inherently contradictory 
of the Act’s manifest and understandable desire to encourage 
competitive challenges by entrants constructing their own facilities than 
their ability to obtain such facilities instead from the incumbent at prices 
at the lowest level that they could conceivably achieve themselves.
Crandall and Hausman provide a similar viewpoint when they state (at page 98) that the 
disincentive for entrants to invest in their own networks “is directly contrary to the goals 
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act”. They also claim (at page 100) that if 
competitors in the US were not able to lease local networks and resell local services on 
such favourable terms, “new entrants would undoubtedly have moved more quickly to 
build their own networks, mobilizing even more capital and converting it into modem 
network facilities”.
Aside from the adverse impact upon the investment behaviour of entrants, below-cost 
prices have detrimental effects on the future investments made by the access provider. 
By failing to provide the incumbent with an adequate return on its assets, the regulation 
deters the access provider from undertaking innovation, and upgrading or enhancing its 
existing facilities. Crandall and Hausman highlight this disincentive in the following 
passage (at pages 86-7).
Incumbents are less likely to invest in innovative services or facilities if 
their future returns are truncated by the prospect of having to lease such 
facilities to their rivals at below-cost prices.
They then proceed to make the more extreme claim that the discounted rates set by the 
FCC could induce the incumbent simply to allow the existing network to atrophy, or not 
to invest at all.
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In Australia, the PC (2001a) and PC (2001b) have highlighted similar claims made by 
Telstra about the adverse impact TELRIC/TSLRIC has on investment. PC (2001a), 
cites (at page 399-400) a passage from Telstra where the firm claims that in relation to 
the PSTN:
By consistently enforcing access prices for declared services that are 
significantly below cost, the ACCC reduces the incentives that Telstra 
has to continue to invest in its network and that Telstra’s competitors 
have to invest in alternative network infrastructure.
PC (2001b) also cites a passage (at page 78) where Telstra suggests:
Unless the [telecommunications] regulatory environment is changed so 
as to significantly reduce its distorting impacts, it is difficult to see any 
commercial incentive for Telstra to incur the substantial outlays 
involved in upgrading the [Customer Access Network]
Forecasts of under-investment in the local network and imminent bankruptcy have 
become standard in the criticisms of the regulatory regime used by the FCC and ACCC. 
Kahn et al. (at page 349) perhaps best summarise the perceived inadequacies of 
TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation for stimulating investment when they state that:
It would be difficult to imagine an arrangement more hostile to the risky 
and costly investment in modem telecommunications infrastructure and 
the development of the new products and services that it makes possible.
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4.5 Assessing Criticisms and Myths of TELRIC/TSLRIC Access Prices
This Section questions some of the criticisms of TELRIC/TSLRIC-based access charges 
outlined in Section 4.4. In particular, it examines the:
■ first-mover advantage experienced by the investor;
■ similar information required for price-cap and TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation;
■ debate over costs used to estimate TELRIC/TSLRIC prices;
■ similarities that Schumpeterian, access holiday, takings and real option arguments 
have to the controversial Efficient Component-Pricing Rule (ECPR); and
■ applicability of real option theory, and the appropriate method that should be used to 
take real options into account in the telecommunications industry.
4.5.1 The First-Mover Advantage
While incumbent network access providers have readily complained about the level of 
regulated access price and need for some form of patent protection — e.g. the access 
holiday proposed in Australia — they have generally been reticent in acknowledging the 
significant advantage bestowed upon them from being an established firm in the market. 
The empirical evidence from the US outlined in Section 4.6 about the relative market 
shares of ILECs and competitors, suggests that there may be a significant first-mover 
advantage in the local exchange market. The impact of this is that it may outweigh any 
adverse impact that regulation is alleged to have. Noam (2002) highlights that a first- 
mover advantage may exist in telecommunications, when observing (at page 418) that:
In most countries, even after a number of years of competitive entry, the 
incumbent still is dominant in most traditional market segments.
ACCC (2001) has recognised this potential for a first-mover advantage in 
telecommunications, when responding to the Productivity Commission’s proposal for 
an access holiday. The ACCC outlines (at page 18) that it is concerned about the 
“significant market power derived from the first-mover advantages an incumbent enjoys 
when it is protected from competition in the early years of a new product.” The 
regulator maintains that the ability of the incumbent to establish a customer base means 
that the “access seekers can be at a competitive disadvantage, as it must be more
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efficient than the access provider by at least the chum transaction costs if it is to win a 
customer over to its business”.
Cave and Williamson (1996) highlight the problems entrants have in breaking into an 
established market in any industry. They point out that on average 75 per cent of new 
entrants in industries fail within the first two years, and only 15 per cent survive beyond 
five years. Generally speaking entrants suffer from the disadvantage that they do not 
have a well-established brand name, lack experience in the marketplace, and have a far 
smaller amount of capital assets than the incumbent. The initial success of an entrant 
relies upon it being able to offer a new service that uses assets embodying the latest 
technology, which cannot be easily replicated by the incumbent. By subjecting the 
incumbent to such an “innovation gap”, the entrant has a chance to make up ground on 
the “asset accumulation gap” it faces. Cave and Williamson refer to this attempt by 
entrants to establish a presence in the industry as a “race for survival”.
In relation to the telecommunications industry, Economides (1999) notes that there 
appears to be a first-mover advantage, as it has been established that many large 
commercial buyers are willing to pay more for services offered by an integrated 
operator than for resold services. According to Armstrong (1997), in addition to the 
barriers to entry created by sunk costs and capacity constraints, in the 
telecommunications industry a significant barrier is created by the prevalence of 
customer inertia. He suggests that this may be offset if the regulator allows for number 
portability and equal access. However, Holm (2000) observes that, even when 
switching costs are low — due to such regulations as local number portability — 
consumers are still reluctant to change operators, unless there are substantial discounts 
offered by the new entrants.
4.5.2 Similar Information Problems to Price-Cap Regulation
Critics have highlighted the problems of estimating efficient FL costs, yet they have 
been quick to extol the virtues of price-cap regulation. In practice, this ignores the fact 
that price-cap regulation encounters very similar information problems when it attempts 
to set an appropriate ‘X’ factor for a period of usually three or four years. As Laffont 
and Tirole (2000) point out, in the telecommunications industry one of the major 
considerations for determining the X factor in the price cap is the forecast rate of 
technological progress. Therefore, similar to TELRIC/TSLRIC, PC regulation requires 
the regulator to make some judgement about how costs will evolve in the future.
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However, the need for this sort of information under price-cap regulation has not 
received anywhere near the same level of scrutiny or criticism as it faced under 
TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation.
4.5.3 The Cost Debate
4.5.3.1 The Myth of a Hypothetical Efficient Local Network
A common criticism of TELRIC/TSLRIC has been that, because it assumes the market 
is perfectly contestable, the model simply estimates the costs of reconstructing a virtual 
or hypothetical local network embodying the best-available technology. Such an 
assessment and summary of the re-optimisation process is misleading and unfounded. 
In practice the re-optimisation that the regulator employs on the network is far from 
virtual or hypothetical. As Ergas (1998) and the PC (2001a) point out, key components 
of the incumbent’s existing network are held constant, by using:
■ a scorched-node approach to regulation, rather than a scorched-earth approach; and
■ the best-in-use technology, rather than the best-available technology.
As outlined earlier, the scorched-node approach estimates the efficient FL costs of the 
network by holding the location of the existing local switching nodes of a network 
fixed. This is in contrast to the scorched-earth approach to regulation, which allows the 
location of the nodes to vary, and be placed wherever the regulator deems to be most 
efficient. The scorched-earth approach provides the regulator with far more discretion 
than the scorched-node approach, as the network design under a scorched-earth 
approach may bear only a passing resemblance to the incumbent’s existing network. In 
comparing the two methods, the PC (2001a) notes (at page 398) that the “scorched node 
approach generates higher access prices than the alternative.”
The assumptions the regulator makes about technology are also essential for 
determining whether it is reasonable to label the network used for cost estimation as 
hypothetical. As outlined earlier, it appears there are two options the regulator can 
adopt — the “best-available” technology or the “best-in-use” technology.
The best-available technology requires the regulator to judge what, amongst a set of 
new technologies, would be best for an incumbent to deploy in its network. In the 
extreme case it makes it possible for the regulator to estimate the costs of the network 
using a completely new technology that has not actually been adopted by any access 
provider. Such a calculation would require an extraordinary level of detail, and the
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judgements about the best technology have the potential to be rather arbitrary. This is 
particularly the case for an industry like telecommunications where there is currently 
such a rapid rate of technological progress. The methodology implicitly relies on the 
regulator being able to “pick winners”, as there is potential for the technology chosen to 
have no long-term future in servicing the local market.
Best-in-use technology requires far less regulatory discretion, estimation and 
uncertainty. The calculations are less formidable, as it uses the most efficient 
technology that is commercially available and compatible with the existing network 
design. The price is generally estimated by using the replacement costs of the 
technology that has already been deployed in the network by the incumbent. The 
network closely resembles that of the incumbent, and any difference in the cost 
estimates between the regulator and incumbent could merely reflect cost inefficiencies 
or a deliberate over-statement of costs. Even though some assessments of 
TELRIC/TSLR1C describe it as incorporating “best-available” technology, in practice it 
appears regulators commonly assume the network employs best-in-use technology.
The combination of a scorched-node approach along with best-in-use technology means 
that, in practice, regulators attempt to estimate the actual FL costs of the firm, which 
Kahn et al. assess, provides the correct signals for overall market efficiency. In 
Australia, this is highlighted by the ACCC (2001) which outlines (at page 23) that when 
employing the best-in-use technology to calculate the FL costs of the PSTN access 
services provided by Telstra, its approach “incorporates a number of parameters based 
on actual costs (as provided by Telstra), rather than ‘efficient values’”. The PC (2001a) 
cites this passage at page 399, and further points out that estimates “of forward looking 
trench and cable lengths were largely based on Telstra’s estimates, while the...access 
deficit contribution made by PSTN access services were based on Telstra’s actual 
costs.” Hence, it could be argued that those who describe the regulated network as a 
fantasy, virtual, or hypothetical network, are criticising a regime that has little to do 
with the TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation that has been used in practice. Instead, they 
envisage the most extreme and unfavourable application of TELRIC/TSLRIC to the 
access provider, and by doing so evaluate what can only be described as a virtual, 
fantasy or hypothetical form of regulation.
4.5.3.2 Cost Confusion between the US and Australia  —  Actual BL or FL costs?
In evaluating TELRIC/TSLRIC, commentators such as Kahn et al. have recognised the 
incentive problems and inefficiencies associated with BL/historical/embedded cost 
regulation that led to its rejection in the US. As already outlined in Section 4.2, they 
state (at page 324) that there is “widespread agreement” amongst economists about the 
need for FL cost regulation in setting the access price. In opposing what they claim is 
the hypothetically-efficient FL cost standard used by the regulator, critics such as Kahn 
et al. and Weisman, have argued for prices based on the actual FL costs of the firm. 
Other critics of the hypothetical efficient FL cost standard have been less precise in 
describing the alternative regime that should be adopted, and have only advocated the 
use of actual costs by the regulator. The recent analysis by Noam (2002), that briefly 
summarises the cost debate in the US, suggests (at page 408) that these references to 
actual cost are intended to mean actual FL costs.
In Australia, when the Productivity Commission deals with the issue of regulatory asset 
valuation in PC (2001b) Chapter 13, it clearly characterises the debate as being between 
the use of the FL costs and BL costs, and unlike the US, does not draw any distinction 
between types of FL cost regulation. For example, it states (at page 356) that:
While there are a multitude of asset valuation methods, debate between 
access seekers, infrastructure owners and policy makers tends to focus 
on whether an historical cost approach (often termed depreciated actual 
cost — DAC), or a replacement cost methodology, is more appropriate.
The most common replacement cost methodology used in Australia is 
the depreciated optimised replacement cost (DORC or ORDC).
The analysis by the PC may either suggest that:
■ the Productivity Commission has misunderstood the cost debate. There is evidence 
of this, as when comparing utility regulation in the US and Australia, it claims (at 
page 357) that “in the USA, historical cost valuation methods are used almost 
exclusively”; or
■ in Australia, the DAC method, which has been labelled a BL cost method, is in 
practice what has been described in the US as a actual FL cost method, while DORC 
is an example of a hypothetical efficient FL cost estimate. This seems possible given 
that the DAC technique uses costs which have been depreciated, so that the asset 
reflects current values, and costs that are sometimes also optimised; or
■ as opposed to the US, there has not been quite the same “widespread agreement” in 
Australia about the use of FL costs, and the alternative regulatory regime advocated 
is based on actual BL/historical/embedded costs.
As criticisms of the Australian access regime often mimic those raised in the US, if the 
last outcome were true, it would imply that those parties advocating the use of “actual 
cost” regulation in Australian telecommunications, have simply repeated US arguments 
without closely scrutinising the context in which the term “actual cost” was used.65
While the case against BL cost regulation is well established, there has been some 
recent theoretical work by economists in New Zealand on access pricing and investment 
— Guthrie, Small and Wright (2001) and Evans and Guthrie (2002) — supporting the 
adoption of BL costs by the regulator. These papers compare investment timing and 
welfare under BL and FL cost-based access prices, using a model that assumes there is 
no incentive for the firm to cost pad. Both conclude that, in this setting, BL cost 
regulation leads to earlier investment and greater benefit to society in industries such as 
telecommunications, which experience rapidly decreasing costs over time. These 
papers are looked at in greater detail in Chapter 5.
4.5.3.3 FL Cost Regulation can Benefit the Incumbent
In contrast to arguments made about under-pricing of access, Holm (2000) asserts that 
access prices based upon FL costs of the local exchange markets may result in a higher 
access charge. Using empirical evidence provided by OVUM (1998) on the Danish 
telecommunications industry, Holm points out that, while the FL cost of constructing 
most parts of the telecommunications network have decreased, the FL cost of 
constructing the local access network has actually increased. The FL cost estimates 
provided by OVUM for the existing local access network of Tele Danmark in 1996, 
which appear to be based on a scorched-earth approach, were four to five times higher 
than the historical book value of the asset. Holm provides two reasons for this outcome:
65 There is evidence to suggest that criticisms from the US have been repeated in Australia, even though they may not be 
appropriate for the Australian market. For example, in claims made by Telstra and NECG about under-pricing, both parties 
treat Telstra as it if  is like the vertically-separated access provider in the US local telecommunications market. Their arguments 
ignore that in Australia, Telstra is in fact a vertically-integrated telecommunications service provider, which appears to have 
some level o f dominance in the downstream market. The PC (2001a) recognise this problem with the Telstra and NECG 
arguments, when it outlines (at page 396) that such claims about the adverse consequences o f  below-cost rates, “have been 
rooted in a world in which there is no downstream market power”.
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(1) the existing access network had already been substantially depreciated; and
(2) as opposed to the core network, the existing local access network had become more 
costly to build over time.
The first reason suggests that the incumbent will receive an unaccounted capital gain as 
the value of the existing asset is increasing, but this is not being adjusted for in the 
regulatory depreciation schedule.66 The second of the reasons suggests that at the time, 
the local market was still subject to strong natural monopoly conditions.
Based upon the OVUM data, the FL cost-based access price set by the Danish regulator 
would have been higher than BL cost-based access price, and this shows the potential 
for FL cost regulation to be beneficial to the network access provider. It has led Holm 
to query whether or not:
.. .politicians are fully aware of this fact when they argue so strongly in 
favour of using LR(A)IC [long run (average) incremental costs] for 
determining the price of ULLs (unbundled local loops) as well.67
4.5.4 Schumpeterian Arguments, Access Holidays, Takings and Real Option Theory 
— Parallels with the Efficient Component-Pricing Rule (ECPR)
The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule (ECPR), also known as the Baumol-Willig
(BW) Rule — in recognition of those responsible for its formulation — has been
recommended as an efficient means for pricing access to an upstream facility of a
vertically-integrated monopoly. Baumöl and Sidak (1994) summarise (at page 178) that
the ECPR involves an access price where:
optimal input price = the input's direct per-unit incremental cost +
the opportunity cost to the input supplier of (4.5.1) 
the sale of a unit of input
Baumöl and Sidak (1994, 1995) highlight that this access-pricing rule is production 
efficient as an entrant only seeks access to the network if its long-run marginal cost of 
supplying the downstream market is lower than that of the vertically-integrated 
incumbent. Further, if prior to entry occurring, the vertically-integrated monopoly sets 
the retail price above long-run marginal cost to cover some existing shared or common
66 The model used in Chapter 5 capture this type of outcome in Section 5.3.
67 Holm (2000) at page 98.
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cost or universal service obligation, then as Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) and 
Armstrong (2002) show, the ECPR yields a second-best efficient or Ramsey-Boiteux 
access-pricing regime. However, the problem with ECPR is that, as critics such as Tye 
(1994) note, it has the potential to sustain significant levels of allocative inefficiency. 
The reason for this is that in the extreme case where the vertically-integrated monopoly 
originally earns monopoly profits, the second part of the pricing rule will reclassify the 
lost monopoly profits as an opportunity cost associated with deregulation and entry.68 
This potential for the ECPR to embed the monopoly profits of the incumbent by 
categorising them as a cost of production has led regulators in various countries — 
including Australia, New Zealand, the UK and US — explicitly to reject the ECPR.
4.5.4.1 Schumpeterian and Access Holiday Arguments
Schumpeterian and access holiday arguments make explicit that, by not allowing the 
firm the reward of monopoly profits when socially-beneficial innovations are made, the 
regulator fails to take into account dynamic efficiency and the social opportunity cost of 
R&D. There may be some legitimacy to the Schumpeterian and access holiday 
arguments, however it is apparent that they explicitly advocate the need for the 
incumbent to maintain the type of rents that the ECPR has been criticised by Tye for 
attempting to retain.
4.5.4.2 Stranded Costs and Takings
Stranded costs first became a topical issue in the US in the early 1990s. While there is 
no precise definition for the term stranded cost, it appears to have been loosely defined 
as those losses or costs incurred by the regulated firm as a result of the increased 
competition arising from deregulation. The issue appears to have been most prominent 
in the US electricity industry, where the value of many vertically-integrated generator 
firms was adversely affected by deregulation. Numerous academics such as Baumöl, 
Sidak and Spulber,69 argued that the stranded cost, or decrease in firm value,
68 It is interesting to note that this is not the first time Baumöl has been responsible for redefining cost concepts. For example 
Baumöl and Willig (1981) (at page 406) redefine the term “fixed costs” to mean “costs that are fixed in the long run as well as 
in the short”. Consequently, according to the authors, such things as large-scale plant and equipment, no longer qualifies as a 
fixed cost o f production. This has led to some confused discussions in utility pricing, where authors use the term fixed cost, yet 
interchange its meaning between the conventional short-run fixed cost and the long-run “Baumöl” fixed cost.
69 For example see Sidak and Spulber (1997) and Baumöl (2000).
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represented a ‘takings’ by the regulator.70 They asserted that, prior to deregulation, an 
implicit ‘regulatory contract’ — a regulatory compact — existed between the regulator 
and firm. That is, in return for forcing the utility to bear certain costs, the regulator 
guaranteed the firm it would be able to earn a given rate of return. By allowing 
competition, the regulator breached this regulatory compact, and the resulting decrease 
in value constituted a taking that should be compensated by the regulator.71
The issue of takings may be a legitimate problem in regulated industries. This is the 
case for instance if the regulator acts opportunistically and sets a price that jeopardises 
the long-term future of an efficient firm.72 However, a problem with the takings 
arguments is that, as with the ECPR, it can be manipulated to reclassify lost rents as an 
opportunity cost. For example, if prior to deregulation and entry occurring the 
incumbent earned monopoly profits, following the takings argument through logically, 
these profits would now be considered a “stranded cost”.
4.5.4.3 The Real Option to Wait
The argument that was originally made by Hausman for the introduction of real option 
theory in telecommunications was that, TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation destroyed the 
opportunity for the incumbent to delay the uncertain and sunk investment in the 
network.73 This imposed an additional opportunity cost upon the firm which advocates 
of the real options approach suggested should be compensated for by providing a mark­
up on the allowed access price. The problem with this argument is that it relies on the 
firm being able to choose when the most appropriate time is to invest in the future. This 
ability only arises if originally the firm has some market power. Therefore, the claim 
that regulation destroys an “option to wait” effectively requires the incumbent to be 
compensated for the lost rents that accompany deregulation and competitive entry. Like
70 The example here is o f  a deregulatory taking, as opposed to a regulatory taking.
7 1
For analysis that highlights the problem o f  compensation in the presence o f  stranded costs without using any takings argument, 
see Kolbe, Tye and Myers (1992) and Kolbe and Tye (1995).
77 An example o f  this type o f  regulator taking is highlighted in the model used in Chapter 5.
There appears to have been three arguments used for incorporating real options in the access price. That is: (a) regulation has 
destroyed the investor’s option to wait; (b) TELRIC/TSLRIC is based on a perfectly-contestable market outcome; and (c) 
asymmetric risk arises from regulation due to the truncation problem. It is argument (a) that is shown here to be subject to the 
same flaws as the ECPR. In fact, o f  these arguments, only argument (c) appears to have any merit, and it appears to have 
recently been used by Hausman and Myers (2002).
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the ECPR, real option theory has the potential to redefine lost rents as a cost of 
regulation and competition. Jamison (1999) uses a simple model to provide a formal 
proof highlighting the link between the ECPR and real options approach
4.5.5 Real Option Theory and Telecommunications Regulation 
Aside from the problem that real option theory may be used in the same way as the 
ECPR, there are also questions about whether real option theory should be applied to 
the regulation of telecommunications? And if it is applicable, how it should be applied?
4.5.5.1 The Applicability of Real Option Theory to Telecommunications 
Economides (1999) questions the applicability of real option theory to 
telecommunications by arguing that there may no longer be the requisite degree of 
uncertainty and irreversibility to justify adopting such an approach. He claims that:
■ most investments that are uncertain now have significant resale value, and
■ many of the investments considered sunk, were generally not the subject of any great 
deal of uncertainty.
For example, Economides points out that:
■ switches in networks can now be moved to new locations and used elsewhere;
■ the local loop may be used to provide alternative services such as xDSL;
■ end-office real estate can be sold; and
■ there is no significant uncertainty in relation to the local loop, because competing 
local exchange carriers (CLECs) will purchase it.
Further, Economides suggests (at pages 211-2) that, even if there was the necessary 
level of uncertainty and sunk costs for real option theory to be applied, in the 
oligopolistic environment of the local US telecommunications market, the incumbent 
would no longer be able to afford to wait. Hence, the value to an incumbent local 
exchange carrier of waiting to invest when it anticipates there is likely to be strong 
competition in the future could well be negative.
Mason and Weeds (2001) have established a model that explores this idea that there is a 
trade-off between the strategic incentive to pre-empt the investment, and the impact of 
uncertainty and irreversibility. They find that the incentive pre-empt has the potential to 
decrease or even eliminate the option that arises due to uncertainty and irreversibility.
4.5.5.2 Taking into Account the Call and Put Option in Telecommunications 
Aside from the call option to delay the investment, there has been a growing recognition 
in real option theory that investors have an option that will arise after the investment has 
occurred, similar to an American put option. Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (ADEP, 
1996) adopt this approach, arguing that, by making the initial investment, the firm is 
able to provide itself with increased future flexibility and additional investment 
opportunities. This provides the firm with a benefit that has the potential to offset any 
increase in cost arising from removing the call option to delay the investment. If this 
put option has significant value relative to the call option, a real option approach may 
then conclude that the investment should occur even though the standard neoclassical 
investment net present value is less than zero.
Hubbard and Lehr (1999), apply the ADEP model to the telecommunications industry, 
and argue that:
a the call option to delay the investment is less valuable in the current environment of 
the telecommunications industry; and
9 put options arise due to the additional growth opportunities and strategic flexibility 
once the initial investment is made.
Hubbard and Lehr outline that the Internet, rapid technological advancement and the 
changes in industry structure have complicated the issue of how to account for real 
options in telecommunications. They argue that it is possible for the value of the call 
option to defer the investment to increase or decrease taking into account these 
considerations. Further, there is the emergence of a significant put option, which arises 
from the increased growth opportunities and strategic flexibility the firm now has, once 
the investment has been made. This means that any new investment undertaken by the 
firm may be considered as providing it with a crucial starting point from which it can 
make a far more complex sequence or chain of investments. Consequently, contrary to 
the arguments of Hausman (1999a), the original investment may not actually narrow the 
opportunities available to the firm, but increase them. For example, the development of 
xDSL technology has meant that the value of the original investment — the copper wire 
infrastructure — has increased, and this has had the effect of enhancing the reversibility 
of this asset and increasing the size of the put option. If the size of the put option were
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large relative to the size of the call option, then the application of real option theory 
would require an access price set lower than the TELRIC/TSLRIC-based charge.74
74 For further details on the applicability of real option theory to telecommunications and how real option theory should be 
applied, see the book titled The New Investment Theory o f  Real Options and its Implications fo r  Telecommunications 
Economics or Funston (2001).
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4.6 Evidence of Trends in US and Australian Telecommunications
This Section looks at whether there is any substance in criticisms of the 
TELRIC/TSLRIC access-pricing regime, and claims that it under-prices access and has 
an adverse impact upon investment. To do this, trends are assessed in the access price 
and level of investment for the US local telecommunications market and Australian 
PSTN services.
4.6.1 Evidence from the US Local Telecommunications Market
To evaluate the success of the TELRIC-based charges used to price access to the local- 
exchange market in the US, it is necessary to examine pricing (both access and 
downstream retail), competitive entry and investment outcomes in the local 
telecommunications market, since the introduction of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act. The data presented here have been selected from numerous papers, most of which 
use information that was originally provided by the FCC in 2000 and 2001.
4.6.1.1 Telecommunications Pricing
Critics of the TELRIC/TSLRIC model highlight the wide divergence in the FL cost- 
based access prices estimated across different states. Crandall and Hausman (2000) 
outline that, in downtown Chicago an entrant could lease a line for less than US$5 per 
month, while in Denver, a similar line with almost identical technology, costs more than 
US$25 per month. Although some price variation would be anticipated due to the 
different market conditions across the various states, they assert (at page 97) that “no 
‘cost model’, however imprecise, guides these results.” Similarly, Noam (2002) 
outlines that access prices for the local loop ranged from US$3 in one state, to almost 
US$30 in another. Crandall and Hausman (2000) and Crandall and Hazlett (2001), both 
attribute this inconsistency in the application of the FCC methodology to the political 
process of rate setting. Crandall and Hausman describe TELRIC/TSLRIC (at page 98) 
as being “a political process wrapped in the guise of efficient regulation”.
The arguments raised by incumbent firms only appear to consider consumers to the 
extent that they incur welfare losses if the regulator fails to provide proper incentives for 
socially-beneficial investments in new technology. The benefits derived by consumers 
due to the increased retail-market competition resulting from the FCC’s regulation are 
often ignored. In some areas where long-distance companies have entered the local
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market, the price decreases and increases in services have been significant. For 
example, just four months after AT&T entered the Michigan market, the incumbent 
local carrier SBC cut retail prices on many of its local packages to customers by as 
much as 30 per cent.75
4.6.1.2 Competitive Entry to the Local Market
Even with the advent of competition in the local telecommunication market, Woroch 
(2002) outlines that by the end of 1999 the four RBOCs together owned 88 per cent of 
U.S. end-user lines, with Verizon and SBC accounting for nearly two-thirds of this 
ownership. In addition, RBOCs still collected 94 per cent of the ILEC end-user 
revenues. The President of MCI Mass Markets, Wayne E. Huyard, has suggested that 
even where the RBOCs have lost local lines, this is largely due to customers dropping 
their landline services altogether and moving to wireless companies still owned by the 
incumbent.76
The data suggests that RBOCs have not been adversely affected by the use of FL cost 
regulation. Although these firms appear to still dominate the industry, CLECs have 
made gradual inroads into the local market.77 Since the introduction of the 
Telecommunications Act, 165 new phone companies have emerged, and the combined 
market share of competitors has increased strongly in terms of access lines and 
revenues.78 In the last quarter of 1997, CLECs provided just above 1 per cent of the 
nation’s fixed access lines. By the close of 2000, Woroch (2002) shows that this figure 
had increased to 8.5 per cent, as CLECs provided 16.4 million of the nation’s 193.8 
million fixed lines. Of these, 7.75 million lines were owned by CLECs, the remaining 
two-thirds obtained from ILECs as UNEs or resold loops. Woroch also points out that, 
in 1999, CLECs had US$6.5 billion of sales, and had a cumulative average growth rate 
exceeding 87 per cent over the proceeding 8-year period.
75 “FCC Plans to Erase a Key Rule Aiding Local Phone Competition” by Yochi J. Dreazan and Shawn Young, The Wall Street 
Journal, 6 January 2003.
76 “Letters to the Editor: The Bells are Clamoring ‘Crisis’ —  But Don’t Listen” by Wayne E. Huyard, The Wall Street Journal, 30 
December 2002.
77 Spulber (2002) outlines (at page 497) that although the market share o f  CLECs remains small, their geographical reach has 
widened to such an extent that CLECS are almost ubiquitous.
78 Crandall and Hazlett (2001) at page 25.
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Even with the recent evidence that competition is gradually increasing in the local 
market, detractors have been quick to point out that the growth in competition pales in 
comparison with the levels experienced in the long-distance market. In particular they 
point to the slow growth in facilities-based entry. Such assessments though appear to be 
unduly harsh.
Comparing the growth of competition in long-distance and local markets is similar to 
comparing “apples with oranges”. The long-distance market has been subject to 
competition for around 30 years, with the successful entry of MCI in the 1970s. 
Competition has since evolved rapidly, aided by advances in technology and the 
handing down of the MFJ. In contrast, competition was only allowed in the core areas 
of the local telecommunications market after the introduction of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. Further, the costs of entry into the local telecommunications 
markets have not decreased in the same manner as they did in the long-distance 
markets. As Woroch (2002) points out, the scale and scope economies of the local 
network have not vanished. A study by the Chicago research company New Paradigm 
Resources Group Inc established that it could cost as much as US$100 million to outfit 
a large city with voice switches for a new local network.79
Using FCC data on facilities-based entry from the middle of 1999, Crandall and 
Hausman estimate that of the total lines in the US local telecommunications market, 
only 1.1 per cent were being provided by the entrants’ own facilities. They comment (at 
page 93) that:
Surely this is a paltry result more than three years after the opening of 
the market to competitive entry, particularly when the competitive 
access providers had already built a substantial share of these lines 
before the passage of the 1996 law.
The authors though neglect that, as a percentage of the total number of lines actually 
being provided by competitors in mid-1999, facilities-based services constituted 
approximately 30.6 per cent of the lines provided by competitors. Alternatively, this 
can be restated as saying that in mid-1999 just under one-in-three entrants to the local 
telecommunications industry chose to enter by constructing their own facilities. From 
the more recent FCC data outlined above, it is also evident that this number has steadily
79y “The Economy: Shine May Return to Bells —  FCC Could Heed Clamor Over Competitors’ Access to Networks” by Shawn 
Young and Dennis K. Berman, The Wall Street Journal, 7 January 2003.
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increased. In this light, the level of facilities-based entry does not appear quite so 
insignificant.
Crandall and Hausman admit that there has been a slow take-up in leasing UNEs. In 
1999 in all but five states of the US leased local loops comprised less than 1 per cent of 
switched access lines. Combined with the data on facilities-based entry, this appears to 
contradict claims that the FCC’s FL cost regulation leads to network elements being 
under-priced and to a substantial bias in the “buy or build” decision towards entry by 
the lease of UNEs. However, Crandall and Hausman write (at page 93) that, while the 
result is “surprising in view of the low wholesale rates established”, the reason for this 
lack of interest is,
... undoubtedly that the entrants have been waiting for an even more 
attractive regulatory option — the entire bundle of network facilities in a 
(reconstituted) bundled network facilities at regulated prices that are 
well below the resale rate.
To support this they provide evidence that, after Bell Atlantic offered the entire 
wholesale platform in New York, the number of leased local loops rose from 49 000 at 
the end of 1998 to 138 000 in June 1999. More recently, Woroch (2002) has noted that 
during 2000, the use of leased UNE loops nearly doubled. However, before reaching 
any conclusions based on these figures, it is important to recognise that there have been 
similar trends with resold lines, and as an overall percentage of competitive entry, 
facilities-based competition is still increasing.
Using more recent FCC data than Crandall and Hausman, Crandall and Hazlett (2001) 
are more reserved in their criticism of the access-pricing regime. They still claim 
TELRIC/TSLRIC is an asymmetric form of regulation favouring entrants, but concede 
that it has been successful in increasing competition in the local market. As with the 
analysis of Crandall and Hausman though, they suggest that there is still a lack of 
facilities-based competition. Examining a sample of CLEC stocks in 2000, they note (at 
page 27) that:
It is also of interest that the star performer in the CLEC group was 
Winstar, a wireless firm able to offer facilities-based competition as 
opposed to service over leased portions of incumbent’s networks.
Ironically, Winstar Communications Inc. has since failed, and is now being used by
CLECs as an example that highlights the difficulties of successfully engaging in
facilities-based entry and competition in the local market. As an AT&T representative 
recently noted:80
The CLECs tried the ‘build it and they will come’ approach, and those 
companies are now bankrupt.
4.6.1.3 Investment in the US Local Telecommunications Market
In assessing investment, like many others, Crandall and Hausman recognise (at page
108) that it is
.. .too early to estimate the effects of the regulatory climate on 
investment strategies in any detail.
This does not stop them in the very next sentence from stating that,
A brief look at recent investment trends suggests, however, that 
regulation may be a substantial drag on investment in the traditional 
telephone industry.
Crandall and Hausman substantiate this claim by showing that, amongst other things:
■ investment levels have been higher in the totally-deregulated wireless market and the 
partially-deregulated long-distance market, than in the fully-regulated local 
telecommunications market;
■ that, despite the large potential market for new broadband services, there has only 
been a modest increase in capital spending; and
■ that in 1998 ILECs’ investment in the deployment of DSL technology increased only 
very marginally.
Although Crandall and Hausman attribute the above results to over-regulation and the 
under-pricing of access, each of these outcomes is also symptomatic of the ILECs still 
having some type of market power.
As it has already been shown, there appear to be significant barriers to entry in the local 
telecommunications market due to sunk costs,81 scale and scope economies and 
substantial customer inertia. Even with the successful entry of CLECs it has been
80 “FCC Plans to Erase a Key Rule Aiding Local Phone Competition” by Yochi J. Dreazan and Shawn Young, The Wall Street 
Journal, 6 January 2003.
0  1
01 Spulber (2002) suggests (at page 497) that the argument that sunk costs create a significant barrier to entry into the local 
exchange are “rendered moot by the substantial entry into local telecommunications that began before the 1996 Act and has 
continued afterwards.”
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evident that incumbent firms have maintained large shares of the market. RBOCs end­
line user revenues have only been modestly affected by entry, and despite claims of 
imminent bankruptcy due to the FCC’s FL cost regulation, in 2002 the former Regional 
Bell, SBC, still made an operating profit of more than US$2 billion.82
Rather than indicating under-pricing and over-regulation in the local-exchange market, 
the higher levels of investment in the wireless and long-distance markets may be 
attributed to greater competition arising in these industries. It is well established that 
there is less competition in the local telecommunications market than both the long­
distance and wireless markets. This is evidenced by Crandall and Hausman, who, when 
comparing the regulated local telecommunications market with other deregulated 
markets, state (at page 110) that:
By contrast, competition in the totally deregulated wireless market is 
flourishing, and competition in the partially deregulated long-distance 
market has increased...
Aside from the quantity of investment being less, when a firm has market power, the 
investment-timing model used in Chapter 6, shows that there is also an incentive to 
delay the investment relative to a competitive investor. Hence, the failure of an ILEC to 
undertake socially-beneficial investments in new technology — such as broadband or 
DSL — appears consistent with it still having some market power.
The idea that increased competition in the local-exchange market should stimulate more 
investment than it deters is indicated by the results of an econometric study undertaken 
by Woroch in 2000, summarised in Woroch (2002). Examining 1984-1992 data, when 
there was only limited competition in local telecommunications, he finds that “entry 
triggers ILEC investment”.83
4.6.2 Evidence from the Australian PSTN Services
A BIS Shrapnel (2001) report highlights (at page 28) that the copper PSTN network of 
the vertically-integrated telecommunications provider Telstra, covered “more than 
99.75% of the Australian population in the six states and two territories”. To examine
O T
“Companies and Finance the Americas —  Untangling the wires for Baby Bells” by Peter Thai Larsen, Financial Times, 1 
January 2003.
83 Woroch (2002) at page 698.
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the impact TSLRIC-based access prices have had on the levels of investment in the 
PSTN copper network by the vertically-integrated service provider Telstra, data and 
assessments of the access regime provided by the Productivity Commission — in 
Chapter 11 of PC (2001a) — are outlined here.
4.6.2.1 Access Prices for PSTN services
In 2000-2001, the ACCC (2000a) estimate (at page 24, Table 7.5) that the national 
(weighted average) TSLRIC++ access price for PSTN services is 1.53 cents per minute, 
of which the access deficit contribution (ADC) comprises 0.69 cents per minute of the 
charge. The Productivity Commission recognise the potential for the TSLRIC-based 
access price to affect the level of investment when in PC (2001a) it states (at page 364) 
that:
High access prices will entrench the incumbent, frustrate investment in 
downstream facilities, encourage inefficient bypass and raise consumer 
prices. Low access prices will bias the build-buy decisions of 
competitors, encourage too much downstream investment and frustrate 
investment in the core infrastructure...
In assessing TSLRIC, PC (2001a) outlines (at page 363, Box 11.1) that it “considers 
there are some problems in the ACCC’s methodology for calculating TSLRIC prices for 
PSTN services. It highlights the uncertainty associated with TSLRIC estimates and the 
risk of regulatory error and notes its concern (at page 398) that “some cost components 
of the TSLRIC for the domestic PSTN may be underestimated”. While it suggests this 
may be offset by other cost factors that are over-estimated, it concludes that, in the long 
run “it is sceptical that...underestimated cost elements...are offset by overestimated 
cost elements”.
Although the Productivity Commission indicates that the ACCC may under-estimate 
access prices, it does not make any conclusive remarks that it is occurring. The problem 
with making any definitive judgements is that, unlike access providers in the US local 
telecommunications market, Telstra is vertically-integrated service provider that appears 
to dominate the downstream market. Consequently, the Productivity Commission 
observes that, any adverse consequences from having an access price set too low, are at 
present, likely to be offset by the downstream market power held by Telstra. The PC 
(2001a) states (at page 396):
To the extent that the incumbent can still earn monopoly rents on the
regulated services — through its downstream market power — this
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suggests that the regulated TSLRIC access price is not too low (in the 
sense of distorting the incumbent’s investment incentives in the 
bottleneck facilities).
and acknowledges (at page 398) that a downstream monopoly “provides a buffer for the 
effects of access pricing on investment”.
In highlighting the downstream market power of the incumbent, the Productivity 
Commission outlines (at page 396), “Telstra notes that fixed line telephony has been 
more profitable than its non-telephony services”, and that the ACCC (2001) has 
estimated (at page 29, Box 3.1) that the PSTN provides Telstra with economic rent (i.e. 
above normal returns) of $1800 million.84 While the Productivity Commission queries 
the assumptions that the ACCC used to estimate this surplus, it concedes (at page 397) 
that, “a significant error — of more than 30 per cent — would be required for the 
measured surplus to vanish.” The PC (2001a) observes (at page 397) that, “access 
pricing is only one factor that shapes the returns to the investments made by access 
providers”, and later comments (at page 402) that the revenue from interconnection 
made up for less than two per cent of PSTN revenues in 1999-00.
Although the Productivity Commission maintains that presently the access is not set too 
low for the purposes of investment, it warns that in the future — i.e. what it describes as 
the long run — the emergence of downstream market competition will mean that it is 
less likely that TSLRIC will provide the incumbent with cost recovery. This is evident 
from its concluding remark (at page 404) that:
...the ACCC might sometimes set access prices that are not sufficient to 
ensure efficient long run investment in essential telecommunications 
facilities.
Representatives of Telstra have interpreted the Productivity Commission’s findings as 
being favourable to their claims that the ACCC sets below-cost access prices.85 
However, closer inspection of the statements made by the PC (2001a) outlined above, 
do not appear to support such inferences. The commentary by the Productivity
84° The ACCC (2001) also points to evidence that recent PSTN access undertakings by Telstra were well above charges in other 
benchmarked countries. However, the Productivity Commission dismisses this evidence and considers (at page 395) that 
international benchmark data provide “thin evidence” about the appropriate level o f  the access price.
Q C
OJ This claim is made in “Anderson's view lacks appeal”, by Henry Ergas, Australian Financial Review, 23 April 2002, and “Off 
with Their Heads”, by Henry Egas, Business Review Weekly, 15 August 2003.
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Commission does not at any stage definitively conclude that access to PSTN services 
has been under-priced. All conclusions from the report use qualifying language such as 
“may”, “might” or “is likely”. Finally, the timeframe of the long run, when the PC 
(2001a) suggests under-pricing problems “may” occur, is never defined and could be 
many years in the future.
4.6.2.2 The Investment in the PSTN
PC (2001a) outlines (at page 399) that, “Telstra has claimed that the access regime 
reduced its incentives to invest in the PSTN telecommunications network”. In assessing 
this claim, the Productivity Commission highlights that there has not yet been any 
evidence of a negative effect upon investment in Telstra’s PSTN services. This is 
illustrated by a number of separate statements:
.. .investment in the PSTN has probably not — to date — been 
adversely affected by regulated access pricing.. .(at page 399);
.. .investment has been very substantial in the last few years.. .(at page 
400);
...concern about an imminent crisis in PSTN investment is misplaced.
(at page 402); and
Investment has been substantial in recent years, (at page 403)
Evidence that there has not been deterioration in the level of investment in the PSTN 
network is found from:
■ the nominal value of network components having grown by a trend rate of 6.4 per 
cent per anum from 1994-95 to 1999-00;86
■ growth in PSTN components comparing favourably with the mobile network;87 and
■ services dependent on Telstra’s network quality — aside from those in rural and 
remote areas — having “improved over time” and being “high by world 
standards”.88
In making its findings, the Productivity Commission does not however go as far as the 
ACCC (2001), which claims that investment has not been damaged by access pricing. 
The Productivity Commission maintains that such conclusions should not be drawn. It
86 PC (2001a) at page 400.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid at page 402.
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States (at page 400) that the empirical evidence does not show what would happen to 
investment if prices were higher, it “only indicates that catastrophic investment effects 
have been avoided”. While the Productivity Commission later remarks (at page 401) 
that “investment effects are not likely to be large”, it warns (at page 404) that 
“uncertainty over regulated prices is likely to be a barrier” to new investments being 
undertaken.
Although the Productivity Commission does not find there has been a decrease in 
investment in the PSTN, as was the case for the access price, it makes a qualified 
conclusion about whether the TSLRIC regime has been harmful for investment.
For the core PSTN, the risk of adverse investment effects from the 
ACCC’s regulated access prices are not likely to be currently 
significant, although they may become more pronounced over the 
medium run as competition further develops in downstream markets.
Recent evidence does indicate that over the past two years there has been a decrease in 
Telstra’s operating capital expenditure.89 However, given that there was a strong 
increase in operating capital expenditure from 1995 to 2000, it appears that these 
decreases can be explained by factors other than the impact of the access regime.90
on
Telstra’s 2001-02 Annual Report, available at http://www.telstra.com.au/investor/docs/comoanv overview.pdf. outlines at page 
100 that between 2000-01, operating capital expenditure fell by 12.4 per cent from $4.73 billion to $4.14 billion, and from 
2001-02 dropped a further 13 per cent to $3.6 billion.
90 For example, amongst other things, this decrease in capital expenditure may reflect the stated objective of Telstra to engage in 
“cost reduction efforts”, and the global and domestic downturn in the telecommunications market.
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4.7 Conclusion
In both the US and Australia there has been a major upheaval in the telecommunications 
industry over the last twenty years. Although different market structures have been 
implemented in undertaking these reforms, regulators in both countries have chosen to 
adopt the FL cost-based access regime known as TELRIC/TSLRIC, to price access to 
the network. Designed to approximate the long-run marginal or incremental cost of 
production and mimic the price arising in a competitive access market, the 
TELRIC/TSLRIC model has been the subject of much criticism. The FL cost standard 
chosen by the FCC and ACCC has been considered inappropriate, as it calculates the 
costs of a hypothetically-efficient network. According to critics this estimate has 
imposed additional uncertainty upon the access provider, as the prohibitive 
informational requirements forces regulators to incorporate unrealistic and arbitrary 
assumptions in its calculations. Ultimately, it has led to claims that TELRIC/TSLRIC 
systematically under-prices access, and results in undesirable efficiency outcomes for 
society.
The analysis here suggests that critics have over-stated the adverse impact of the FL 
cost regulation employed in the US and Australian telecommunications. Claims about 
the problems associated with hypothetical efficient costs appear to overlook that 
TELRIC/TSLRIC calculations combine a scorched-node approach, with best-in-use 
technology. By doing this, regulators limit the amount of arbitrariness and uncertainty 
associated with the estimation of the FL costs of the network, and in practice estimate 
something that is closer to the actual efficient FL costs of the network. However, even 
if there is some uncertainty, certain arguments relating to the price mark-ups to account 
for this appear to suffer from the same practical flaws as the ECPR, as they can 
potentially reclassify rents as a cost. Further, arguments about the problems of 
uncertainty consistently ignore the first-mover advantage experienced by an incumbent, 
and the offsetting strategic incentive to invest. If the strategic flexibility associated with 
earlier investment is taken into account in the application of a real options approach, it 
has been suggested that the access price may even decrease below the 
TELRIC/TSLRIC-based price.
In the US, the introduction of TELRIC has stimulated an increase in the number of 
competitors in the local-exchange market, but had little or no impact upon the revenue 
shares and profitability of incumbent local exchange carriers. The ability of ILECs to
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maintain such large market shares may indicate that these firms have managed to retain 
some market power in the industry. It was suggested that this could be due to barriers to 
entry arising from scale and scope economies, large sunk costs, or strong customer 
inertia. The sustained dominance of ILECs appears to provide an alternative 
explanation for why compared with other deregulated telecommunications markets, 
there has been less investment observed in US local telecommunication market.
The analysis of the Productivity Commission suggests that presently, claims about the 
under-pricing or over-pricing of access to the PSTN are difficult to assess in Australia. 
The problem is that, unlike the access providers in the US local telecommunications 
market, Telstra is a vertically-integrated access provider that has downstream market 
power. Therefore, regardless of the level of the access charge, Telstra will still receive a 
high overall price for its final product. For this reason, although the PC (2001a) 
maintains investment in the PSTN has been substantial over recent periods, it is not 
willing to make a judgement about whether access is below cost. Its conclusion on the 
access price really only goes so far as to warn that if there is eventually downstream 
market competition in the future, a below-cost access price at that time is likely to have 
an adverse effect upon investment.
It is probably still too early to draw any strong conclusions about the long-term effects 
upon innovation and investment. However, the early signs in both the US and 
Australian telecommunications market suggests that the predictions and forecasts of 
under-investment and network atrophy resulting from the FL cost-based prices have 
been exaggerated.
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CHAPTER 5: BACKWARD-LOOKING AND FORWARD- 
LOOKING COST REGULATION ON AN 
EXISTING INVESTMENT
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter uses a simple model where there is a constant cost-decreasing rate of 
technological progress in the industry, to examine the impact that the method of asset 
valuation used by the regulation has on efficiency. It compares the outcomes when 
backward-looking (BL)/original/historical/embedded and forward-looking 
(FL)/current/replacement cost regulation are applied to value an existing investment.
5.1.1 The Existing Literature on FL Cost Regulation
As outlined in Chapter 4, the potential for inefficiency under BL cost regulation has 
been well documented, and recognition of its inadequacies has led many regulatory 
authorities to recently adopt FL cost regulation. Australian regulators have followed 
this trend, and FL costs are now used to determine the regulated access price in a 
number of public utility industries. The ACCC (1997) provides an example of the 
advantages regulators normally associate with the use of FL costs, when it states (at 
page 29, footnote 36) that, “forward looking rather than historic costs will result in the 
more efficient use of, and investment in, infrastructure.”
Despite the purported efficiency gains and the widespread acceptance of FL cost 
regulation, until recently, there have been few attempts to analyse the regime formally. 
Further, some of the findings of these papers have not been particularly favourable 
towards adopting FL cost regulation. Such outcomes are reflected by Laffont and Tirole 
(2000), who state (at page 148) that the broad regulatory consensus favouring FL costs 
is “unfortunately supported by little economic argument”; and Guthrie, Small and 
Wright (2001), (hereafter GSW (2001)), who remark (at page 1) that although “widely 
regarded as being efficient, this practice [of FL cost regulation] has not been formally 
analyzed”. A summary of some the recent works formally assessing FL costs is 
provided here.
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Salinger (1998) and Laffont and Tirole (2000) (in Section 4.4, pages 148-61), examine 
the impact of FL cost regulation. They establish a number of different models to 
summarise and capture the relevant issues the regulator should consider when adopting 
FL costs. In particular, they explore how the FL cost-based access price should be 
adjusted to ensure the firm is adequately compensated for such things as: technological 
progress, economic stranding, common costs and deregulatory takings.
Hausman (1997, 1999a) and Mandy (2002a, 2002b) use models to critically assess the 
FL TELRIC/TSLRIC regime employed by the FCC. Both allege that TELRIC under­
prices access. Hausman claims that the FCC fails to account for the decrease in 
construction costs due to productivity improvements in the industry, while Mandy 
illustrates that TELRIC understates costs by comparing the FL cost model with a 
competitive-equilibrium-pricing rule. Papers using real option theory also reach a 
similar conclusion about the under-pricing of access, although as outlined in Chapter 4, 
their results typically suggest that much larger mark-ups are required in the access 
charge.1
GSW (2001) compare investment timing and welfare under BL and FL cost regulation.2 
They establish a model where a regulated monopoly must decide when to undertake an 
irreversible investment that is subject to stochastic costs following geometric Brownian 
motion. In their framework, BL cost regulation yields a constant access price, while FL 
cost regulation yields an uncertain access price that follows the pattern of the stochastic 
costs over time. The combination of irreversibility and uncertainty leads to real option 
theory being used to assess the constant BL and uncertain FL cost-based access price. 
Under both regimes, the regulated monopoly undertakes the investment in the essential 
infrastructure at a time where it is fully compensated for its expected costs.
From their analysis, GSW find that a higher rate of return is required under FL cost 
regulation to account for the additional uncertainty associated with the regime. More 
significantly though, with the aid of numerical simulations, they show that the constant 
BL cost-based access price, generally induces earlier investment and higher welfare
1 Hausman (1997, 1999a) initially illustrates that TELRIC/TSLRIC under-prices access because it does not account for cost- 
decreasing technological progress. Later in each o f  these papers, he establishes that it is under-priced because the FCC fails to 
use real option theory to account for the uncertainty and irreversibility associated with local telecommunication investments.
9
They also compare BL and FL cost-based access prices with some arbitrarily determined constant access price that is unrelated 
to costs. It is found that in general some form o f cost regulation is desirable for earlier investment and efficiency.
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than the uncertain FL cost-based access price. Where there is medium-to-high volatility 
in cost, the BL rule always dominates the FL rule. When there is low volatility, FL cost 
regulation may induce earlier investment timing and higher welfare than BL cost 
regulation. However, this outcome is only possible if the cost of the investment drifts 
upwards over time. Table 5.1.1 summarises the outcomes of GSW in relation to timing 
and welfare.
TABLE 5.1.1 COMPARING BL AND FL COST RULES IN THE GSW (20011 MODEL
V o la tility  in C ost Drift in C ost Investm ent T im ing W elfare
High Upward
D ow nw ard
BL earlier 
BL earlier
BL higher 
BL higher
M edium Upward BL earlier BL higher
Downward BL earlier BL higher
Low
U pward S tronger d rift => FL earlie r S tronger d rift => FL higher
W eake r drift =>  BL/FL W eake r d rift => BL/FL
Downward BL earlie r
BL higher
The outcome achieved by GSW has significant policy implications as it suggests that 
FL cost regulation should only be applied in the unusual circumstances where costs in 
the regulated industry are increasing over time. This leads GSW to conclude (at page 
20) that, “except in the special situation...backward looking rules should be adopted.” 
Their result may obviously be of particular relevance to the telecommunications 
industry, which uses FL cost regulation, yet experiences a rapid rate of cost-decreasing 
technological progress.
Evans and Guthrie (2002) also compare investment timing and welfare under BL and 
FL cost regulation in a model of uncertain costs, where there are no incentives to cost- 
pad. Similar to GSW, they conclude that BL cost regulation is preferable in industries 
where there are higher levels of cost-decreasing technological progress. In particular, 
Evans and Guthrie conjecture (at page 5) that because of its rapid cost-decreasing 
technological progress and future cost uncertainty, the telecommunications industry “is 
more a candidate for historical-cost regulation than are more technologically stable 
industries such as gas and electricity transmission”.
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5.1.2 The BL and FL Cost Regulation Debate
The debate over whether the regulator should value the capital assets of the firm using 
the higher original/historical/embedded/backward-looking costs, or the lower 
replacement/current/forward-looking costs, has been around for a number of decades. 
For example, Bonbright (1961) reviewed the merits of using BL and FL costs in 
designing public utility rates,3 while Westfield (1965) examined the impact BL and FL 
costs had on the incentives for a ROR-regulated firm to engage in a price conspiracy 
with the input seller. Temin (1997) notes that in regulatory proceedings, AT&T argued 
for the use of FL costs to justify lower rates in the 1960s, yet advocated the use of BL 
costs to justify higher rates in the late 1970s.4
In terms of public policy, the analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that while there has been 
some ambiguity over the nature of the cost debate in Australian utility industries, in US 
local telecommunications, the BL versus FL cost debate is no longer a major 
consideration. The problems associated with traditional BL costs has led to the 
strongest critics of the FL TELRIC regime, such as Kahn et al. (1999), to state (at page 
324) that there is “widespread agreement” amongst economists that BL cost regulation 
should not be used. Kahn et al., Weisman (2000) and Noam (2002) outline that in US 
local telecommunications, the cost debate has instead been over the type of FL cost 
regulation the regulator should employ as the basis for pricing. Kahn et al. and 
Weisman claim that presently the regulator uses the FL costs of a hypothetical efficient 
entrant, when it should instead use the actual FL costs of the network of the incumbent.
The recent theoretical work by GSW and Evans and Guthrie not only outlines the 
adjustment that needs to be made to the fair rate to account for the use of FL costs under 
uncertainty, they also suggest that the BL versus FL cost debate may need to be 
reconsidered by regulators. Both papers highlight that if the typical incentive problems 
associated with the use of actual cost regulation are ignored, there will be instances 
where the adoption of BL costs leads to a higher level of welfare than the use of FL cost 
regulation.
3 See Bonbright (1961) Chapters XI-XIV.
4 AT&T used these contrasting arguments strategically, in an attempt to prevent entry to the industry. This is reflected by 
Temin’s comment (at page 16) that, “AT&T acted consistently in seeking to limit entry, but inconsistently in terms o f pricing 
rules”.
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5.1.3 The Results and Contributions of this Chapter
This Chapter examines the impact BL and FL cost regulation has on an existing 
investment, by establishing a model where there is a constant exogenous rate of cost- 
decreasing technological progress, no uncertainty, and no incentive to cost-pad. The 
basic framework is similar to that used by Hausman (1997, 1999a) and Laffont and 
Tirole (2000) in Section 4.4.1.3. Further, as it is assumed there is no cost padding, only 
one type of technology is used in the industry, and the rate of technological progress on 
this asset is known, there is no need to distinguish between actual and hypothetical 
efficient FL cost regulation in the work done here.
The analysis illustrates that where there are decreasing costs over time and no 
uncertainty, in order to achieve cost recovery on an existing investment under FL cost 
regulation, the firm must be allowed to earn a higher depreciation rate than under BL 
cost regulation. The appropriate increase in the depreciation rate ensures that the firm is 
indifferent between the constant net cash flow and price schedule under BL cost 
regulation, and the decreasing net cash flow and price schedule that arises over time 
under FL cost regulation. The required adjustment in the depreciation rate is shown to 
be a specific application of the “Invariance Proposition” of Schmalensee (1989).
While the different depreciated schedules are irrelevant for the firm, there will be some 
impact upon society. It is illustrated that there is a greater benefit to society from 
having a constant BL cost-based price charged over time, rather than a FL cost-based 
price that decreases over time. As the basic assumptions used here are similar to those 
of GSW (2001), it suggests that their findings in favour of a BL cost-based price, can be 
achieved even when abstracting from the issues of uncertainty or investment timing. It 
is however shown that FL cost regulation may be preferable to a BL cost rule in a 
deregulated market.
The structure of the Chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 establishes the model, and 
derives the fair rate of return required on the existing investment in order to achieve cost 
recovery under both BL and FL cost regulation. The following Section examines the 
different net cash flow and price schedules generated under the different depreciations 
rates allowed under BL and FL cost regulation. These outcomes are then used to 
capture some criticisms of the FL TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation outlined in Chapter 4. 
Section 5.4 explores welfare under BL and FL cost regulation, while Section 5.5 details 
that the appropriately adjusted fair rate under FL cost regulation, may be beneficial for a 
firm that is subject to deregulation. Section 5.6 concludes the analysis.
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5.2 The Fair Rate for Cost Recovery under BL and FL Cost Regulation
This Section establishes the model used to compare BL and FL cost regulation of an 
existing investment. Assuming there is an existing essential infrastructure, no 
uncertainty, no competition to provide access, and a constant rate of cost-decreasing 
technological progress; the fair rates of return required to achieve cost recovery under 
BL and FL cost regulation are found. The basic framework adopted here is similar to 
that used by Hausman (1997, 1999a) and Laffont and Tirole (2000).5
5.2.1 Assumptions of the Model
For simplicity, the model here assumes that:
■ there is continuous time t\
■ the firm makes the investment in the infinitely-lived essential infrastructure during 
the initial time period t = 0,6 at a cost to the firm and society of Q ;7
■ once the investment is undertaken, a fixed amount of the infrastructure is provided 
instantaneously. The facility has the capacity to supply any level of access that is 
demanded without the need for additional investment;8
■ no other firms supply the essential infrastructure, and the access provider does not 
compete in any related downstream market;
■ at each instance, the firm faces a constant operating cost in each period of O;
■ the industry is subject to some known constant rate of technological progress 0 > 0.9 
The efficient FL cost of a hypothetical entrant replacing the infrastructure at any
f i tfuture instant in time t is then Ct, where Ct = Coe , V t\
See Section 4.4.1.3 o f  Laffont and Tirole (2000) at pages 151-4. Neither Laffont and Tirole or Hausman however, use the 
model to undertake the type o f  comparisons between BL and FL cost regulation that are made in this Chapter.
 ̂ The investment timing is exogenously given in this model. A model where investment timing is endogenously determined is 
established in the analysis done in Chapters 6 and 7.
n
The assumption o f  an infinitely-lived investment is used by Gans and Williams (1999a), Gans (2001) and GSW (2001). It also 
seems reasonable in light o f  the fact that many capital assets o f  public utilities are generally long-lived.
O
This is a “super” natural monopoly assumption, as it implies that the access provider can service whatever level o f  demand 
arises in the industry, and that no additional investments in capacity are required. The assumption here o f a natural monopoly 
with infinite capacity is consistent with that adopted by Gans and Williams (1999a) and Gans (2001).
179
■ the normal market rate of return is r > 0. As there is no uncertainty associated with 
the net cash flows derived by the firm under either BL or FL costs, the appropriate 
choice for r is the risk-free rate of return;
■ there is no physical deterioration of the asset,10 nor any inflation in the industry;
■ the demand curve for access is fixed over time, and the demand for access is own- 
price inelastic;* 11
■ either BL or FL cost regulation are applied to the asset at time 0;
■ regardless of whether the regulator values the capital assets using BL or FL costs, the 
fair rate f  is set to ensure that the net present value derived by the firm from the 
investment is always zero (i.e. NPVf= 0);
■ under both BL and FL cost regulation, the firm is only allowed to charge a linear 
price for access p. No multi-part tariffs are used;12 and
■ from charging the access price p and supplying q units of access, the infrastructure 
provider earns revenue in each period of R. The net cash flow or operating profit that 
is derived by the firm in each period tz, is equal to total revenue R minus the 
operating costs of the firm O (i.e. n= R -O ).
5.2.2 The Fair Rate of Return with BL Cost Regulation
The subscript B is used to denote outcomes under BL cost regulation. Subsequently, 
when the firm is allowed to earn a regulated rate of return on the historical cost Co, the 
access provider will receive a constant net cash flow in each period of kb, from charging 
the constant access price ps on each of the qs units of access it supplies. To derive the
0 Laffont and Tirole (2000) note (at page 153) that although the assumption of an exogenous rate of technological progress limits 
the scope of the model, it may be acceptable in certain circumstances. They provide the example of the technological progress 
on the microprocessors used in switches, which have largely been driven by factors outside the telecommunications industry.
10 This assumption is made to avoid the complication associated with having to constantly replace the deteriorating portions of the 
asset with new capital that has a lower cost. Such a process would lead to the initial value of the investment increasing and 
create the scope for capital gains. The assumption of no physical deterioration is consistent with the analysis done by Gans and 
Williams (1999a) and Gans (2001).
11 The assumption of demand being own price inelastic ensures that, the net cash flow of the firm decreases when there is a fall in 
the linear access price charged. This is not only consistent with the analysis of GSW (2001), but also the arguments raised in 
practice by regulated firms, which often automatically associate a decrease in the regulated price with a fall in allowed earnings.
1 9 .While two-part access tariffs are common in rail track and natural gas transportation, they do not appear to be used for pricing 
interconnection to telecommunications networks. For a discussion of this see Biggar (2001) and Chapter 6, Section 6.6.
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allowed fair rate of return under BL cost regulation, the discounted net present value 
earned by the access provider is set equal to zero (i.e. NPVß = 0).
oo
NPVß  = fx Be-"dt- = 0 (5.2.1)
0
Solving this, the period-to-period allowed net cash flow or operating profit under BL 
costs will be,
nB- r C o (5.2.2)
and the allowed fair rate of return on capital under BL cost regulation fß is,
f B= r (5.2.3)
In equation (5.2.3) r represents the opportunity cost of capital associated with not 
investing in a similar risk-free asset. As there is no physical deterioration or capital gain 
on the asset, the allowed rate of economic depreciation, or allowed the rate of return 
“o f’ the asset under BL cost regulation dß, is set equal to zero (i.e. dß = 0).
From equation (5.2.2), the regulated BL cost-based linear access price pb can be 
derived. As by assumption, the net cash flow is equal to Kß = RB-  O, where Rß = pßqß, 
the expression for the access price will be,
rC0 + O
Pb = — ------
Qb
(5.2.4)
Having a constant BL cost-based net cash flow and access price is consistent with the 
analysis of GSW (2001).
5.2.3 The Fair Rate of Return with FL Cost Regulation
If the regulator uses FL costs in this framework, then at any time t, the net cash flow the 
firm is allowed to earn will be directly related to the hypothetical efficient cost of 
replacing the asset at that instant. Subsequently, with decreasing costs over time, the 
allowed net cash flow at each instant under FL cost regulation will also be decreasing. 
Using subscript t to denote some arbitrary point in time and subscript F to denote the 
outcomes under FL cost regulation, with an allowed fair rate of return under FL costs of 
fp, the allowed net cash flow over time follows the pattern:
nF, = f FC, = f FC y , \ / t  > 0 (5.2.5)
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Therefore, where kfq is the allowed net cash flow under FL cost regulation during the 
initial time period, it follows that the net cash at any time t will be
nFt -  7iFQe~°\ \/t>  0 (5.2.6)
To find the expression for the net cash flow at any time t and the fair rate of return fp, 
the net present value derived by the firm subject to FL costs, is set equal to zero (i.e. 
NPVjf = 0).
oo
NPVf  = \nFfi-ndt -  C0 = 0 (5.2.7)
0
Substituting equation (5.2.6) into (5.2.7) yields,
NPVf = \KFOe-{e*r),dt -  C0 = 0 (5.2.8)
0
This can be solved for an allowed net cash flow at time 0 of,
Xfo ={0 + r)C0 (5.2.9)
or alternatively, an allowed net cash flow at any time t of,
nFl = (0 + r)C0c~*' ,t>  0 (5.2.10)
This implies that, in order to adequately compensate the firm under a FL cost regime, 
the regulator must provide the investor with the regulated fair rate,
f F ={0 + r) (5.2.11)
From equation (5.2.10), at any given time t, the regulated linear access price from FL 
cost regulation is,
(0 + r) C„e_<" + O 
Pf, = -------  - ,1 ^ 0
QFt
(5.2.12)
As the demand for access is assumed to be own-price inelastic, this FL cost-based 
access price will decrease over time in a similar manner to the net cash flows or 
operating profit. This is similar to the outcome in GSW (2001) when there is a 
downward drift in cost.
As in this framework the constant positive operating costs merely have an additive 
effect on the level of the price and net cash flow, it makes no difference to the overall 
outcome. Consequently, throughout the remainder of this Chapter the operating costs
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are set equal to zero (i.e. O = 0), and the terms revenue, net cash flow or operating profit 
are used interchangeably.
A comparison of the fair rates under BL and FL cost regulation, and the resulting net 
cash flow and price schedules is done in the following Section.
5.3 Comparing BL and FL Cost Regulation
This Section uses the model from Section 5.2 to compare the outcomes under BL and 
FL cost regulation. To ensure the firm recovers the cost of the investment, the fair rate 
under FL cost regulation must be set higher than the fair rate allowed under BL cost 
regulation. As there is no uncertainty and the regulator imposes a capital loss on the 
firm by valuing the asset at the FL cost that is decreasing over time, the most 
appropriate way to increase the fair rate is through an increase in the allowed regulatory 
depreciation rate. This leads to the simple principle that, to achieve cost recovery with a 
constant cost-decreasing rate of technological progress and FL cost regulation, the rate 
of decrease in the asset value by the regulator must be met by a corresponding increase 
in the allowed depreciation rate. It is outlined that the required adjustment to the 
depreciation rate to account for FL costs, is just a specific application of the “Invariance 
Proposition” highlighted by Schmalensee (1989).
The framework from Section 5.2 is also used to illustrate the differing net cash flow and 
price schedules under BL and FL cost regulation, and to assess the contrasting criticisms 
outlined in Chapter 4, that FL TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation can under- or over­
compensate the firm. The analysis here highlights that the opposing claims appear to 
identify the same problem. The regulator uses FL costs, yet only allows the firm to earn 
a depreciation rate based on the BL cost of the asset. The difference in the analysis of 
Holm (2000), who argues that FL cost-based access prices can over-compensate the 
firm, is that in his example the cost of the asset is actually increasing over time.
5.3.1 The Allowed Fair Rate under BL and FL Cost Regulation 
From equations (5.2.3) and (5.2.11), it is apparent that in order for the access provider to 
recover the cost of investment, the allowed fair rate under FL cost regulation must 
exceed the allowed fair rate under BL cost regulation by the amount 0(\.e.fF >fBorfF = 
f B + 9). This outcome arises because the regulator must compensate the firm for the 
capital loss it imposes when it values the existing assets using FL costs that are 
decreasing over time by the known rate of technological progress 6. As there is no 
uncertainty associated with the net cash flows earned under FL cost regulation here, 
there is no adjustment made to the market rate of return on the asset, and it remains at 
the risk-free rate r. To account for FL costs, the regulator should instead adjust the fair
184
rate of return, by allowing the firm a higher depreciation rate on the asset.13 That is, the 
regulator sets the allowed rate of depreciation at dp, where,
dF= 0 > d B= 0 (5.3.1)
The allowed fair rate of return under FL cost regulation in equation (5.2.11), can then be 
alternatively expressed as the sum of the allowed return on the asset r, and the allowed 
return of the asset dp.
f F = (r + dF), where dp= 6 (5.3.2)
The adjustment to the fair rate under FL costs illustrates that the methodology used by 
the regulator to value the asset, must be directly reflected in the fair rate of return that 
the firm is allowed to earn. This leads to the simple principle being established that in 
order to achieve cost recovery, the rate of decrease in the asset value by the regulator in 
each period must be met by an identical increase in the allowed depreciation rate. 
Provided this occurs, the difference between the depreciation schedules under BL and 
FL cost regulation will be irrelevant to the regulated investor. It turns out this simple 
principle, and the subsequent irrelevance of the depreciation schedules, is a specific 
application of the “Invariance Proposition” highlighted by Schmalensee (1989).
5.3.2 The Invariance Proposition
The economic value of an asset at any instant is equal to the present value of the future 
cash flows it generates. Hotelling (1925) was the first to propose a concept of 
depreciation that was based on the change in the economic value of the asset during 
each period. Referred to now as economic or Hotelling depreciation, it only 
corresponds to the standard accounting concepts of depreciation under very special 
circumstances. Schmalensee (1989) however illustrates that for a ROR-regulated firm, 
it is possible that any accounting depreciation schedule will be an economic schedule.
The framework used by Schmalensee assumes there is discrete time t, no competition or 
taxes, and that the actual earnings of the ROR-regulated firm are equal to the allowed 
earnings. He then shows that the regulated firm will be fully compensated for
i 'l
GSW (2001) also outlines (at page 20) that there should be an increase in the allowed fair rate to account for the use o f FL 
costs. However, in contrast to the analysis here, in their framework the regulator must set a higher fair rate o f return, to 
compensate the incumbent for the increased risk associated that is associated with having uncertain FL costs.
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undertaking the investment if the cash flow is adjusted with depreciation at the end of 
each period t, so that it is equal to,
rCt-i + (C t-i-C t) (5.3.3)
where: r, is the rate of return the regulator allows on the asset;
Ct _ i ,  is the value of the asset in the previous year and is sometimes 
referred to as the “ratebase”; and
(Ct -i -  Ct), is the amount of depreciation that the regulator allows the 
investor to claim on the asset.
The accounting depreciation schedule chosen by the regulator is now irrelevant. Every 
accounting depreciation schedule is now also an economic depreciation schedule, and 
the accounting rate of return will be equal to the economic rate of return earned on the 
asset. Schmalensee refers to this outcome as the “Invariance Proposition”.14 To 
highlight the intuitive properties of the Invariance Proposition, fne following bank 
account analogy is used.15
5.3.2.1 The Bank Account Analogy
Suppose that a deposit of 100 dollars is placed in a bank account at time 0 (i.e. Bo = 
$100) and the bank pays an interest rate of 10 per cent (i.e. r = 0.1). The depositor will 
then be fully compensated if the bank pays either:
■ a cash flow of $10 at the end of each future year; or
■ $110 at the end of year one, and nothing in any future year; or
■ $60 at the end of year one, $55 at the end of year two, and nothing in future years; or
■ $50 at the end of year one, $66 at the end of year two, and nothing in future years; or
■ $70 at the end of year one, $44 at the end of year two, and nothing in future years.
More generally it can be stated that the depositor will be fully compensated by the bank,
if at the end of each time t, it is payed a stream of cash flows satisfying the expression,
14 Although Schmalensee was the first to refer to the irrelevance o f the accounting depreciation schedule for the regulated firm as 
an Invariance Proposition, Awerbuch (1992) points out that he was not the first to identify the result. Awerbuch outlines (in 
footnote 1 at page 68) that, this Proposition was also shown by Kay (1976), Fisher and McGowan (1983), and Edwards, Kay, 
and Mayer (1987). Boadway and Bruce (1984) derive a similar result in the public economics literature on taxation.
15 Awerbuch (1992) uses a similar analogy (at page 63) involving a bank loan.
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rBt - 1  + (5.3.4)
where: rBt~\, is the interest payment on the balance in the previous year; and
(Bt _i -  Bt), is the level of the withdrawal required from the account in 
order to compensate the depositor for the decline in the bank balance.
This outcome corresponds to equation (5.3.3) for the ROR-regulated firm, and to 
highlight that the depositor is fully compensated, the present value of bank payments 
following equation (5.3.4) is calculated for a deposit held over T + 1 periods.
p y  _ rB0 + B0 — Bl  ̂ rBx + B{— B2  ̂ | v̂ t-\ ^ t-i
1 + r (1 + r)2 (1 + r)T
= B0— + -------^  +
1 + r 1 + r (1 + r)2 (1 + r)2
' '  m ) '
5.3.2.2 BL and FL Cost Regulation — An Application of the Invariance Proposition 
The allowed fair rates under BL and FL cost regulation both generate cash flows that 
satisfy the outcome described in equation (5.3.3).16 For example, under BL costs, as 
there is no depreciation of the asset, it follows from equation (5.3.3) that to fully 
compensate the investor, the allowed cash flow at each instant must yield the rate of 
return r. In contrast, under FL costs, as the value of the asset depreciates by the 
constant rate of technological progress 6, it follows from equation (5.3.3) that the 
allowed cash flow at each instant must be adjusted with depreciation, and yield the rate 
of return 6 + r. This demonstrates that the allowed fair rate under BL costs, and the 
principle for adjusting the fair rate to take into account FL costs and ensure the different 
cash flow schedules under two schemes are irrelevant; both just represent a specific 
application of the Invariance Proposition outlined by Schmalensee.17 Consequently, the 
different depreciation schedules will both be economic schedules, and the fair rate the 
regulator allows on the asset will be equal to the economic rate of return that is earned 
by the investor.
*  ̂ The only difference is that continuous time was used in Section 5.2.
17
Awerbuch (1992) queries how useful the Invariance Proposition is in practice. By using a simple numerical example, he shows 
that under more realistic circumstances —  where the economic and accounting life o f  the asset differ and there are inter-period 
tax allocations or a regulatory lag —  the Invariance Proposition does not hold.
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5.3.3 The Dynamics of Net Cash Flow and Price under BL and FL Cost Regulation 
The higher fair rate required under FL cost regulation implies that during the earlier 
time periods, the allowed net cash flow under FL costs exceeds the allowed net cash 
flow under BL costs. For example, at time 0 the net cash flow under FL cost regulation 
will be,
7rFo = (& + r)Co>7rB =rC0 (5.3.5)
This is done to make up for the allowed net cash flow decreasing over time at the same 
rate as the hypothetical efficient cost of replacing the asset
The net cash flows under FL cost regulation will exceed the net cash flows allowed 
under BL cost regulation until some time t is reached, where the net cash flows are 
equal. Beyond the time t , the net cash flow allowed under BL cost regulation will be 
higher. To derive an expression for t , equation (5.2.2) is equated with equation 
(5.2.10), and solved to give
1 f  0 + vr* = - lo g  ------ (5.3.6)
Q \  r )
The outcome described here is illustrated in Figure 5.3.1.
FIGURE 5.3.1 COMPARING BL AND FL REVENUE FLOWS
As the demand for access is own-price inelastic, the FL access price follows a similar 
trajectory over time to the revenue path. This implies pn  exceeds the constant BL
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access price pb until time t , after which time pFt is below pb. The difference between 
the linear BL and FL cost-based access price is illustrated in Figure 5.3.2.
FIGURE 5.3.2 THE BL AND FL COST-BASED ACCESS PRICE
5.3.4 Assessing Contrasting Criticisms of TELRIC/TSLRIC 
5.3.4.1 Under-Compensation under TELRIC/TSLRIC
A common theme of many criticisms of FL TELRIC/TSLRIC regulation is that it fails 
to fully compensate the infrastructure provider for cost of its investment. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, amongst other things, Hausman (1997, 1999a) claims that under-pricing 
occurs because the FCC ignores the impact of cost-decreasing technological progress; 
while Kahn et al. (1999) argue that TELRIC models under-price access by employing 
traditionally determined regulatory rates of depreciation.
In terms of the model established in Section 5.2, the claims made by Hausman and 
Kahn et al., amount to the FCC TELRIC models using FL costs to the value the asset 
(i.e. C,), yet only allowing a depreciation rate based on the BL cost of the asset (i.e. dß = 
0). That is, the FCC ignores the constant rate of technological progress in the industry 
6, and sets the fair rate so that,
f Fcc = r (5-3-7)
Therefore, the regulator subjects the efficient access provider to a capital loss that it is 
not compensated for.
As it is assumed for simplicity that there are no operating costs, when the regulator sets 
the fair rate/ fcc, it follows that the allowed FL cost-based linear access price will be,
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,V/>0 (5.3.8)P FCC ~
r C ,e et 
kh
As there is cost-decreasing technological progress (i.e. 6 > 0), the regulated price 
Hausman and Kahn et al. claim that the FCC sets, pfcc, decreases over time. By 
comparing the outcome in equation (5.3.8), with the outcome in equation (5.2.12) when 
O = 0, it is clear that the access charge pfcc will be less than the linear price that is 
required to recover the cost of the investment ppt. Figure 5.3.3 illustrates this outcome.
FIGURE 5.3.3 THE CRITIQUE OF TELRIC/TSLRIC IN THE SIMPLE MODEL
Further, the failure to recover costs is also apparent from the negative net present value 
that is now derived from the investment.
NPVfFCC= \ { f FCCC,)e
6 + r
-1 lc<0 (5.3.9)
If the claims of Hausman and Kahn et al. are correct, then the pricing regime used by 
the FCC would constitute an example of a regulatory taking.
5.3.4.2 Over-Compensation under TELRIC/TSLRIC
Holm (2000) expresses reservations about the use of a FL cost-based access price. 
However, unlike Hausman and Kahn, he suggests FL costs can potentially lead to the 
regulated firm being over-compensated. For evidence, Holm points to cost estimates 
provided by OVUM (1998), which established that although the FL cost of the core 
network had decreased, the local access network had become more costly to build.
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At first glance, the critique of the FL cost-based access price by Holm appears very 
different to that of Kahn et al. and Hausman. However, using the framework from 
Section 5.2, it is possible to show that he appears to identify a similar problem with FL 
cost regulation. That is, the regulator applies FL cost regulation to value the asset (i.e. 
Ct), yet only allows a depreciation rate based on the BL cost of the asset (i.e. dß). The 
implicit difference in the analysis of Holm is that in order to reflect the increased cost of 
investing in the future, the term #must now be assumed to be less than zero (i.e. 6 < 0).
FIGURE 5.3.4 FL COST-BASED ACCESS PRICES LEADING TO HIGHER PRICES
Subsequently, the expressions in equation (5.3.7), (5.3.8) and (5.3.9), can also be used 
to capture the outcome described by Holm. As Figure 5.3.4 shows, when 0 < 0, the 
regulated linear access price preg will now increase over time, and the expression for 
the net present value in equation (5.3.9) will be greater than zero. The positive net 
present value demonstrates that the regulated firm derives economic profit or rents from 
the investment. This arises because the regulator provides the firm with the benefit of a 
capital gain that is not accounted for — i.e. taken away — through any adjustment in 
the allowed depreciation rate. The outcome illustrates that if economies of scale and 
scope cause increasing costs over time, it is possible for traditionally-determined 
regulatory rates of depreciation to actually over-compensate the FL cost-regulated firm.
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5.4 Comparing Welfare under BL and FL Cost Regulation
GSW (2001) found that with stochastic costs that drift downward over time, a constant 
BL cost-based price induces earlier investment timing and greater benefit to society, 
than an uncertain FL cost-based price that is decreasing over time. They attribute this 
outcome to the greater uncertainty associated with FL cost regulation, and conclude that 
in most realistic cases, BL cost regulation should be adopted by the regulator. This 
Section employs basic assumptions similar to those used by GSW to show that even 
without considering the issues of uncertainty or investment timing, a constant BL cost- 
based price will be better for society than a FL cost-based price that is decreasing over 
time. The result suggests that it is not necessary to appeal to uncertainty to argue that 
BL costs are preferable to FL costs.
The impact of BL and FL regulation on society is compared using a model similar to 
that outlined in Section 5.2. The main difference here is that it is assumed there is 
discrete time and that the investment lives for a finite time period. From this, it is 
established that for an existing asset subject to decreasing costs over time and no 
uncertainty, a constant BL cost-based access price is better for society than a FL cost- 
based access price that also recovers the cost of the investment. This demonstrates FL 
rules achieve worse outcomes for society even when the standard concerns outlined in 
Chapter 4 are ignored. That is, FL cost regulation:
■ fails to allow full cost recovery on the investment;
■ creates additional uncertainty; and
■ delays future investment in new technology.
It is shown here that the welfare dominance of a constant BL cost-based access price 
over time will arise if there is a demand curve for access that meets standard regularity 
conditions. Although GSW do not make any explicit assumptions about the demand for 
access, their assumptions are consistent with having such a well-behaved demand curve.
5.4.1 Assumptions of The Model
To compare welfare under BL and FL cost regulation of an existing investment, when 
there is technological progress in the industry, it is assumed for simplicity here that:
■ there is discrete time t\
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■ the investment in essential infrastructure occurs at time t = 0 at a cost to the firm and 
society of Co. The asset is immediately subject to cost-based regulation;
■ only one firm supplies the essential infrastructure, and the essential infrastructure 
supplier cannot enter the downstream retail market;
■ the essential infrastructure has sufficient capacity to serve any level of demand for 
access that arises in the industry;
■ the industry is subject to a constant rate of cost-decreasing technological progress 6. 
Subsequently, the FL cost — i.e. the costs faced by a hypothetical entrant to the 
industry at any time t — is, Ct = Co(l - 0) \  0 < # < 1;
■ there is no inflation, no physical depreciation of the infrastructure, and originally no 
discount rate or opportunity cost of funds (i.e. r = 0);
■ the investor supplies access to a single firm at time t — 1, and the essential facility 
continues to operate for T periods, i.e. t — 1, 2 . . . T\
m the access seeker uses access as an input to provide a final product to a single 
customer in a downstream retail market;
■ the inverse demand curve for access p{q) is downward sloping i.e., p'(q) < 0 and 
does not shift over time. The meaning of “demand for access” where there is both a 
retailer and downstream customer, is explored in greater detail in Section 5.4.2.1;18
■ there is no ongoing expense associated with providing access to the essential facility 
in each time period t = 1, 2...71. Hence, the short-run marginal cost of production is 
zero (i.e. SRMC = 0);
■ the firm charges a linear access price p, and use of the infrastructure generates 
revenue or net cash flow during each time period of 7t(p(q));
■ where qmax and qm are the levels of usage of the facility in each period at a zero and 
an unregulated monopoly price, the revenue or net cash flow function 7i(q), has the 
properties:
- 7l{0) = 0, %max) = 0;
- n \q )  = MR(q) = p \q).q + p(q)\
1 o
Although GSW (2001) do not specify an underlying demand curve for access, the assumption of some fixed yet downward- 
sloping demand for access is consistent with the assumptions in their analysis.
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7i(qm) = /rmax, as at qm the marginal revenue of production is equal to the zero 
short-run marginal cost of production (i.e. 7r'(qm) = SRMC = 0);
- n \q )  > 0, if 0 < q < qm\
- n'(q) < 0, if qm<q<  gmax; and
- + 2p'fa).
■ from accessing the essential infrastructure, the “consumer” derives a level of surplus 
in each period of CS(q). The meaning of the term “consumer”, where there is a 
retailer and a customer in the downstream market is examined in greater detail in 
Section 5.4.2.1. Consumer surplus derived in each period has the properties:
- CS{q) = V(q) -p{q).q, where V(q)= J p(q)dq ;
o
GS(0) = 0, CS(qmax) = CSmax > ^max, where CiSmax denotes the maximum 
consumer surplus derived from having access to the facility;
CS'(g) = -p \q ).q  < 0; and
- CS"(q) =  - {p"(q).q + p'(q)).
■ the measure of welfare to society, or the total surplus derived from using the 
infrastructure during each period is S(q). S(q) is the sum of the consumer surplus 
and the revenue to the access provider (i.e., S(q) = CS(q) + 7̂ q))-,
■ S(q) has the properties:
(̂O) 0, iS(̂ max) — CiŜ niax) *5max ^ r̂nax? and
- S\q)= p(q) > 0 and S"(q)= p'(q) < 0.
■ under BL and FL cost regulation, the regulator allows the firm to generate a net cash 
flow in each period that recovers all costs associated with the investment. Adopting 
the same subscripts used in Section 5.2 for BL and FL cost regulation, implies that:
T
^ j ^ F t  = T-7zb = C0 ;
/= i
■ the regulator always sets an access price p > 0 that is below the unregulated 
monopoly price pm. Hence, the level of access supplied in each period lies 
somewhere in the range </max > q > qm, and the demand for access is always own 
price inelastic, as x'{q) < 0. The revenue flow in each period now decreases as the
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access price falls, or alternatively decreases as the amount of access supplied rises;19 
and
■ under FL cost regulation, the allowed revenue or net cash flow decreases at the same 
rate as the investment cost for a hypothetical efficient entrant to the industry at any 
given time t. This means, that the regulator allows the firm to earn a net cash flow 
7TFt, where:
7TFt =  0)tA, t=
5.4.2 Implications of The Model
Before proceeding to compare welfare under BL and FL cost regulation, it is necessary 
to establish two important implications that arise from the assumptions of the model. 
That is:
(1) what does “consumer surplus” (i.e. CS(q)) capture? and
(2) how is welfare or efficiency in each period measured?
5.4.2.1 The Meaning of “Consumer Surplus” in this Model
From the assumptions of the model, the investor supplies access to a single firm, which 
uses this access to produce a final product that it supplies to a single customer in the 
downstream retail market. Subsequently, what is referred to as the “demand curve for 
access” really represents a “derived demand curve”, which sums together the marginal 
value derived by the retailer and the customer on each unit of access that is supplied. 
Hence, what is referred to as “consumer surplus” here, will generally represent some 
combination of the profit to the retailer and the surplus derived by the downstream 
customer. However, there are specific instances when the demand curve for access may 
only capture either, the retailer’s profit, or the customer’s surplus.20 For example:
(1) where there is perfectly elastic demand in the retail market, the surplus derived 
by customers in the retail market is zero. What is referred to as “consumer 
surplus”, just measures the profit of the firm seeking access in the wholesale 
market; and
19 This is consistent with GSW, as in Assumption 3 (at page 6) they assume the net cash flow o f  the firm is increasing in price.
20 It is well known that consumer surplus only provides a true measure o f the welfare change if  the income elasticity o f  demand 
for the good is zero. In such circumstances, there is no difference between the Marshallian and Hicksian demand curves.
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(2) if the firm makes zero profit, then “consumer surplus” in the demand curve only 
reflects the surplus that the downstream retail market customer derives a result of 
the units of access supplied in the wholesale access market.
5.4.2.2 Measuring Welfare
In the multi-period framework presented here, to maximise the total benefit derived by 
society from using the essential infrastructure over the T time periods, the level of social 
surplus in each period t = 1,2 .. .T must be maximised.
The social surplus in each period (i.e. short-run social surplus) is maximised, if short- 
run static allocative efficiency is achieved. This involves setting a price in each period, 
where the value to the consumer from the marginal unit of access — the marginal value 
— is equal to the cost to society of supplying the marginal unit — the marginal cost. As 
the short-run marginal cost of supplying access is by assumption zero (i.e. SRMC = 0), a 
zero price, where qmax units of access are supplied and consumed, maximises the level 
of social surplus in each period. Subsequently, the zero short-run-marginal-cost-based 
price forms the benchmark that must be used to assess the level of welfare that is 
derived in each period.21 This is highlighted in Figure 5.4.1, where the zero short-run 
marginal cost is used to compare the level of welfare achieved in each period.22
Figure 5.4.1 depicts an outcome where price is decreased during a period from p0 — 
where qo units of access are demanded — to p\ — where q\ units of access demanded. 
The difference in welfare between the two prices involves comparing S(qo) = 7i{qo) + 
CS(qo), with S(qi) = 7i(qi) + CS(qi). In the diagram S(qo) is equal to area pmaxapo plus 
areapoaqoO, while S(qi) is equal to areapmaxbp\ plus area p\bq\0. Based upon these two 
areas, it is evident that the pricing regime p\ leads to a higher level of welfare, by an 
amount equal to the shaded area abq\qo. With the zero short-run marginal cost, this area 
represents the amount by which the total value derived by consumers on the units of 
access demanded qo to q\t exceeds the cost to society of supplying these additional units 
of access.
9 1 .
Using short-run marginal costs as the basis for measuring welfare or undertaking static allocative efficiency analysis in each 
period, appears consistent with other work that uses multi-period models to assess optimal price regulation. For example, see 
Evans, Quigley and Zhang (2003).
22 The reason why long-run marginal costs are not efficient in the framework used here, is that there is no long run in this model. 
Overall time is made up o f a series o f short-run time periods.
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FIGURE 5.4.1 COMPARING WELFARE OUTCOMES OF DIFFERENT REGIMES
SRMC =  0
The increase in welfare from 
charging a lower price p\.
Understanding this simple example is important, as the comparison of BL and FL cost 
regulation done throughout this Section consistently involves using price-quantity 
diagrams and assessing areas such as abq\qo in Figure 5.4.1.
5.4.3 A Simple Welfare Comparison of BL and FL Cost Regulation 
To conduct a simple welfare comparison between the constant BL cost-based and the 
decreasing FL cost-based price, it is initially assumed there are only three time periods 
— i.e. t = 0, 1, 2 or T= 2 — and there is a linear demand curve for access. While these 
appear to be restrictive assumptions, it is shown in Section 5.4.4, that the underlying 
results derived here, hold in a more general setting where T > 2, and there is a non­
linear demand curve for access.
As it is assumed under both regimes the regulator allows the firm to earn a fair rate that 
generates a stream of net cash flows that recovers the original cost associated with the 
investment Co, when 7=2,
nF\ TCp2  2 T Tß —  C q
Equation (5.4.1) can be rearranged to give,
(5.4.1)
(5.4.2)
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This expression shows the familiar idea from Section 5.3, that in order to recover the 
cost associated with the investment, the FL cost-based net cash flow must initially be set 
higher and then below the constant BL cost-based net cash flow.
FIGURE 5.4.2 REVENUE AND WELFARE WITH LINEAR DEMAND FOR ACCESS
Loss in
period 1
Gain in
period 2
With a linear demand curve, as p " (q ) is equal to 0, the second derivative for the net 
cash flow will be less than zero (i.e. n"(q) = 2p'(q) < 0). Further, as regulation only 
takes place where the demand for access is own-price inelastic, as shown in Figure
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5.4.2, the relevant region of the revenue function is characterised by a downward- 
sloping and strictly concave-shaped curve. Hence, the level of demand for access 
corresponding to the outcome in equation (5.4.2), has the property that,
Qb ~~ Qf \  ̂Qf2 ~ ffg (5.4.3)
>0 >0
The price-quantity diagram shows the result of adopting FL rather than BL cost 
regulation. The dark-shaded area corresponds to the welfare loss at time 1 — abqßqFi 
— while a light-shaded area corresponds to the welfare gain at time 2 — bcq^qB- 
Simple geometry can be used to establish that the size of this welfare loss, from using 
FL rather than BL cost regulation, exceeds the size of the welfare gain. That is, not only 
does the height of the area depicting the loss exceed the height of the area depicting the 
gain, but here, because of the condition satisfied in equation (5.4.3), the base of the area 
depicting the loss, also exceeds the base of the area depicting the welfare gain.
The difference between the two areas depicting the welfare loss and gain from using FL 
rather than BL costs, is also affected by the level of the cost-decreasing rate of 
technological progress 0. The higher the rate of technological progress is here, the 
greater the amount by which welfare under BL cost regulation exceeds welfare under 
FL cost regulation. The reason for this is that with an increased rate of technological 
progress, the allowed level of revenue at time 1 — tzf\ — will need to be set higher, 
while the allowed level of revenue at time 2 — npi — will need to be set lower. With a 
concave revenue function it follows that, when comparing FL cost regulation to BL cost 
regulation, the increase in the size of the welfare loss will be greater than the increase in 
the size of the welfare gain.
Therefore, in this simple example where T — 2 and net cash flows are decreasing in the 
access price, BL cost regulation leads to a higher level of welfare than FL cost 
regulation, and this welfare superiority is greater, the higher the rate of technological 
progress is.
5.4.4 A Welfare Comparison of BL and FL Cost Regulation
The previous sub-section established that BL cost regulation resulted in a higher level of 
welfare than FL cost regulation, when 7 = 2  and there was a linear demand for access. 
This sub-section explores whether this outcome holds in a more general framework 
where T > 2, and where the demand for access is still own-price inelastic, but can be 
non-linear.
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With T time periods both regimes lead to fully recovery of the costs associated with the 
investment,
Y JXFI=T.7UB=C0 (5.4.4)
M
As in Section 5.4.2, this equation can be rearranged to give,
( ^ V l  _  *•* ( j l  F k-\ ~  ^  B )  — B ~  ^  Fk )  B ~  ^  Ft )  (5.4.5)
>0 >0 >0 >0
The LHS and RHS of Equation (5.4.5), separates the outcomes over the T periods, into 
two more general time periods. The first period, which is given by the expression on 
the LHS, denotes all those times t=  1, when the FL cost-based net cash flow
exceeds the constant BL cost-based net cash flow. The second period, which is given 
by the expression on the RHS, denotes all those times t = k, k + \...T, where the net cash 
flow under BL cost regulation is higher than the net cash flow earned under FL cost 
regulation.
5.4.4.1 The Linear Net Cash Flow Function
As in Section 5.4.3, the regulator restricts the firm to operating in the inelastic portion of 
the demand curve. This implies n f (q) < 0, and that the net cash flow or revenue 
function is downward sloping. If it is initially assumed that the revenue function is also 
linear in quantity, the second derivative will be equal to zero (i.e. n" (q) = 0). The 
difference between the net cash flows derived under BL and FL cost regulation in each 
period will then just be equal to some constant multiplied by the difference in quantity. 
Using a to denote some constant that is less than zero (i.e. a < 0),
a {Vf, ~ Vb ) = {^Ft -  71 b) > *= 1 > 2• • • T (5.4.6)
and it follows from equation (5.4.5) that,
a  ( ^ F l  _  Q b  )  +  ••• +  &  { ^ F k - 1 _  Q b  )  =  a  ~  Fk )  +  ••• +  OC — q FT )
Dividing through by a and rearranging the above expression yields
( Q b ~  #Fl) + ••• + ( Q b ~  F k-\ ) =  { ^ Fk  _ #ß) + ••• + ( Q f T _ Q b )  (5.4.7)
V----------------V--------------- '  V------------------ v------------------ '  V----------------V----------------'  ' ---------------- V----------------'
>0 >0 >0 >0
As it is possible to conduct welfare comparisons over changes in the level of output, 
equation (5.4.7) provides some insight into the welfare results during each period. The 
LHS of equation (5.4.7) shows all those times — time 1 to time k -  1 — where FL cost
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regulation leads to a lower level of welfare than BL cost regulation. The RHS of 
equation (5.4.7) depicts all those times — time k to time T — where FL cost regulation 
leads to a higher level of welfare than BL cost regulation.
FIGURE 5.4.3 WELFARE WITH A LINEAR REVENUE FUNCTION
Underestimation 
o f  the welfare 
loss at time 1
Overestimation o f  
the welfare gain at 
time T
<7«-l <7« <jFk
To examine whether the welfare gain from the increased supply of access in the later 
periods is sufficient to offset the size of the welfare loss that arises due to the under­
supply of access in the earlier periods, equation (5.4.7) is multiplied through by the 
constant access price arising under BL cost regulation, pß.
Pß [{Qb ~ Q f \ )  •••"*" {Qb ~ QFk-\ )] =  Pb \_ {^F k  ~ Qb )"*"••• + { Q f t  ~ Qb)] (5.4.8)
The outcome in equation (5.4.8) is illustrated using the price-quantity space diagram of 
Figure 5.4.3.
From Figure 5.4.3, the LHS of equation (5.4.8) involves summing a sequence of areas 
that decreases over time, beginning at time t = 1 with the area dbqsqFu and ending at 
time t = k -  1 with the area ebqsqFk- \- The RHS of equation (5.4.8) involves summing a 
sequence of areas that increases over time, beginning at time k with the area bfqFkqß, 
and ending at time T with the area bgqnqß-
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The diagram shows that the areas depicted by the LHS of equation (5.4.8), consistently 
under-estimate the welfare losses that arise in each period from using FL rather than BL 
cost regulation. For example, the first term in equation (5.4.8) — Pb(qb ~ qf\) — 
under-estimates the welfare loss at time 1 by the dark-shaded area abd. In contrast, the 
areas depicted by the RHS of equation (5.4.8), consistently over-estimate the welfare 
gains resulting from using FL rather than BL cost regulation. The final term in equation 
(5.4.8) — Pß{qFT -  qB) — over-estimates the welfare gain at time T by the lightly- 
shaded area bgc. Consequently, the sum of the welfare losses in each period (Sb -  Sft), 
where t = 1, 2...k -  1, exceeds the sum of the welfare gains in each period (Sfi -  Sb), 
where t = k, k +1... T, and the following condition is satisfied.
(S„ - S n ) +... + (S, - SFk_,) > (SFk - S , )  + ... + {SFT -  S .) (5.4.9)
V--------------- v K------------------v  J v V  J  v V  J
>0 >0 >0 >0
Alternatively, equation (5.4.9) can be rearranged to give,
T.SB> j^ S Fl(5.4.10)
M
This expression indicates that with a linear downward-sloping revenue curve 7i(q), BL 
cost regulation results in a greater benefit to society than FL cost regulation.
5.4.4.2 Welfare with a Linear or Concave Demand Curve
The additional assumption made here is that the inverse demand curve for access p(q) 
has the property that p "(q) < 0. With a linear or concave demand curve, the sign of the 
second derivative of the revenue or net cash flow function will be less than zero (i.e. 
7i"{q) < 0). The resulting concavity of the revenue or net cash flow function means that 
here, the expression corresponding to equation (5.4.7), will now satisfy the condition,
î q b ~ ^fi) t • • • + ~ q Fk-\) ^ (qpk ~ qß) ^ ••• ^ {.qpr — qß) (5.4.11)
V---------------v -------------- J v------------------v ----------------- J v---------------v ---------------J  v--------------- V ---------------J
>0 >0 >0 >0
Based on the analysis in Section 5.4.4.1, the result in equation (5.4.11) implies that 
compared to the outcome with a linear revenue curve, the size of the welfare losses from 
time 1 to k -  1, now increase relative to the size of the welfare gains from time k to T. 
Therefore, the welfare superiority of constant BL cost-based price over the FL cost- 
based price that decreases over time will be greater with a linear or concave demand 
curve for access, and the inequality in equation (5.4.10) is once again satisfied here.
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5.4.4.3 A Positive Discount Rate and Technological Progress
With a positive constant discount rate or cost of capital r > 0, the regulator must ensure 
that under both regimes, the sum of the discounted net cash flows over the T time 
periods is equal to the original cost of the investment Co-
T 1y — L _
S ( 1  + r)'
= Cn (5.4.12)
This translates to the condition,
7Z »71 7ZB _ j_  I n Fk-\ 71B _  71B 71 Fk I
(l + 7*) (l + r)* * (l + f)
+ (i+,y (5.4.13)
By following the same methodology from the proofs done in the previous parts of this 
Section, it is also possible to establish here that with a positive discount rate,
I (l + r)'
T 9
> y —
M (l + r)
(5.4.14)
Therefore, BL regulation leads to a higher level of welfare than FL cost regulation for 
any given discount rate r > 0.
Similar to the outcome observed in Section 5.4.3, a higher rate of technological progress 
here, results in the net cash flow allowed under FL cost regulation in period 1 
increasing, and the net cash flow in the final period T decreasing. With a linear or 
concave revenue function, this increases the size of the welfare losses relative to the size 
of the welfare gains from using FL rather than BL cost regulation. All other things 
being equal, this increases the welfare superiority of the constant BL cost-based price 
over the FL cost-based price that decreases over time. Further, even if the rate of 
technological progress were uncertain, provided that it remains positive, it will result 
here in a monotonically-decreasing revenue or net cash flow function over time, which 
ensures BL cost regulation retains its superiority over FL cost regulation.23
23 Thank you to Vladimir Smirnov for pointing out this outcome.
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5.4.5 Can a Decreasing Price Over Time Increase Welfare?
The previous sub-sections illustrate cases where FL cost-based access prices that 
decrease over time, lead to lower levels of welfare than constant BL cost-based access 
prices that recover the same cost. The questions examined here are:
■ will there be any situation when a decreasing price over time leads to a greater 
benefit to society than a constant price recovering the same cost? and
■ if there is such a situation, does this indicate that with decreasing costs, when 
uncertainty and timing are ignored in the GSW model, it is possible for FL cost 
regulation to induce a better outcome for society?
For simplicity, to answer these questions, the assumptions about the own-price 
inelasticity of the demand for access are relaxed, and as in Section 5.4.3, it is assumed 
here that there is no discount rate and T = 2. As in all the previous analysis, the 
decreasing price over time is denoted here by the subscript Ft, t = 0, 1, 2 and the 
constant price charged is denoted by the subscript B.
From the earlier examples, it was evident that when comparing a decreasing price over 
time with a constant price, the height of the area for the welfare loss exceeded the height 
of the area for the welfare gain. Consequently, a decreasing price over time that 
recovers the same cost as a constant price over time, only induces a higher level of 
welfare if the difference in quantity in the second period (■qn -  qß), exceeds the 
difference in quantity in the first period (qß- qFi)- To achieve such an outcome there 
must be a convex demand curve, which generates a net cash flow function that is either:
■ decreasing and convex in quantity (i.e. n \q )  < 0 and n '\q )  > 0);
■ constant in quantity (i.e. n \q )  = 0); or
■ increasing in quantity (i.e. n \q )  > 0).24
Figure 5.4.4 provides an example where a convex demand curve, \.Q.p"(q) > 0, leads to 
a decreasing price over time that welfare dominates a constant access price. The 
diagram illustrates that when the slope of the demand curve changes rapidly from being 
very steep to very flat around the region of the relevant price change, the welfare loss in 
time 1 — abqsqFx — is clearly less than the welfare gain arising in time 2 — bcqFiqß-
24 A convex demand curve may o f course yield a decreasing and non-strictly convex revenue function. However, this will lead to 
outcomes that have been already been dealt with during the course o f  this Section.
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This outcome suggests that, the more extreme the change in the slope of the demand 
curve, the greater the likelihood that a decreasing price leads to a higher level of welfare 
than a constant price that recovers cost.
The problem with having a convex demand curve that generates such net cash flow 
functions is that all are inconsistent with the net cash flow function used by GSW to 
compare BL and FL cost regulation.25 Although GSW make no explicit assumptions 
about the demand for access, at Assumption 3 (at page 6) they do assume that the net 
cash flow of the firm is increasing and concave in the access price. In terms of the 
analysis here, this translates into a revenue function that is both decreasing and concave 
in the quantity of the access demanded i.e. n \q )  < 0 and 7i'\q) < 0.
FIGURE 5.4.4 A DECREASING PRICE RESULTING IN HIGHER WELFARE
Welfare Gain 
in Period 2
Welfare Loss 
in Period 1
0 qF\ <7s qn Q
An additional problem with having a convex demand curve for access is that it can 
potentially lead to outcomes that contradict standard arguments made in access pricing
o c
J GSW use the term “profit” to refer to the net cash flow. Their reference is slightly ambiguous, as they do not make it explicit 
that by profit they clearly mean the operating profit, rather than the economic profit o f the firm.
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disputes. Access providers have tended to automatically associate a decrease in the 
regulated access price with a decrease in the revenues they are allowed to earn. 
However, with a convex demand curve for access it is possible that the resulting net 
cash flow function may be increasing (or constant) in quantity. That is, a decrease in 
the price for access results in an increased (or unchanged) net cash flow. The reason for 
this is that around the region of the relevant price change, the demand for access is no 
longer always own-price inelastic, and the marginal revenue of production is now 
greater than (or equal to) zero. The access demand curve in Figure 5.4.4 illustrates such 
an outcome, as it is apparent that the revenue from charging the higher price pf\ — 
PF\aqF\0 — is less than revenue from charging the lower price ppi — pncqFi0. 
Consequently, when there is a downward drift in costs, to generate a stream of net cash 
flows that decreases at the same rate, the regulator must now allow the firm to charge a 
FL access price that is increasing over time (i.e. p n  at time 1 and pfi at time 2).
Therefore, even though it is possible for a decreasing price over time to induce greater 
benefit to society than a constant price recovering the same cost, it does not provide a 
justification for FL cost regulation when uncertainty and investment timing are ignored 
in the GSW model. The type of convex demand curve for access required to achieve 
such an outcome, violates the assumptions made by GSW about the net cash flow 
function. Further, a convex demand curve for access may yield outcomes that are 
inconsistent with the standard arguments raised in utility pricing disputes.
5.4.6 Interpreting the Welfare Results of GSW
As outlined in the introduction of this Chapter in Section 5.1, GSW find that in their 
model, where both regimes recover the expected cost of the investment, the uncertain 
FL cost-based price that decreases over time, induces later investment in the essential 
infrastructure than the constant BL cost-based price. More significantly though, for the 
purposes of the analysis in this Section, their numerical examples highlight that with a 
downward drift in costs, BL rules also provide greater benefit to society. GSW attribute 
the welfare dominance of the constant BL cost-based access price to the later 
investment timing and the greater uncertainty that surrounds the downward-drifting FL 
cost-base price. However, the results established in this Section suggest that it is not 
necessary to appeal to uncertainty or investment timing to achieve such an outcome. 
Where there are decreasing costs over time and both schemes recover the cost of the 
investment, it is shown that a sufficient condition for the constant BL cost-based access
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price to induce a greater benefit for society is that, the downward-sloping demand curve 
for access yields a non-convex net cash flow function that is decreasing in quantity.26 
The assumptions made by GSW about the net cash flow and total surplus to society, are 
consistent with having such an underlying demand curve for access.27
5.4.7 Comparing Welfare using a Numerical Example
A numerical example is provided here to reinforce the welfare results that have been 
established during in the course of the Section. The expressions for net present value 
that is derived by society from having BL and FL cost regulation on the existing 
investment is,
n p vsB = Z
(1 + r)'
CS,
o+'-y (5.4.15a)
< 5 A ,5 b )
Assuming there is a linear demand curve for access p(q) = a -  b.q, where a, b > 0, the 
above equations are solved in the Appendix of the Chapter in Section A.5.1 and A.5.2, 
to yield the outcomes:
n p v ,b =
8 b
a + 1
(i+'-y
(5.4.16a)
a+ la
NPVsF= —  
sF 8 b I -
2 4b(Q+r)C0( \-e ) ‘
H&)a+'-y (5.4.16b)
Assigning the values: T= 5, 15 and 25; a = 10 and b = 0.01; Co = 1000 and r = 0.05; 
Figure 5.4.5 graphs the net present value to society for values of # between 0 and 1.
26 As this is only a sufficient condition, there will be some class o f  convex demand curves that generates strictly convex revenue 
functions that also lead to the constant BL cost-based price inducing a higher welfare than the decreasing FL cost-based price.
' At Assumption 3 on page 6, it is assumed that the net cash flow is increasing and concave in the access price. Meanwhile, at 
Assumption 4 on page 6, it is assumed that the flow o f total surplus to society is increasing in the access price. This implies 
society is better o ff if  the access price is decreased, or conversely, the supply o f access increased. Figure 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 
illustrate that both these outcomes are satisfied with a linear demand curve for access.
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FIGURE 5.4.5 GRAPHING NPVs’s WITH T = 5,15 and 25
m
2 0 6 3 0
2 0 6 2 0
2 0 6 1 0
2 0 6 0 0
2 0 5 9 0
2 0 5 8 0
N P V
5 0 8 9 0
5 0 8 8 0
5 0 8 7 0
5 0 8 6 0
5 0 8 5 0
5 0 8 4 0
N P V5 0 8 3 0
0 . 4
ff4 2 5 |
6 9 4 5 0
6 9 4 4 0
6 9 4 3 0
6 9 4 2 0
6 9 4 1 0
6 9 4 0 0
The results of the graphs are summarised in Table 5.4.1.
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TABLE 5.4.1 COMPARING THE NPVs’s FROM BL AND FL COST REGULATION
7=5
0.025 0.25 0.5 0.75
N P V sb 20 635.27
N P V sf 20 635.25 20 633.2 20 625.3 20 608.7
7=15
0.025 0.25 0.5 0.75
N P V sb 50 893.37
N P V sf 50 893.32 50 888.5 50 877.3 50 859.7
7=25
0.025 0.25 0.5 0.75
N P V sb 69 466.12
N P V sf
i____
69 466.02
I___
69 460
_____
69 448.7 69 431.1
The diagrams and tables confirm the results from this Section.28 That is:
■ a constant BL cost-based price cost leads to a greater benefit to society than a 
decreasing FL-cost based price when there is a positive discount rate;
■ the higher the rate of technological progress is, the worse the outcome for society 
achieved by FL cost regulation. For very low levels of the rate of technological 
progress, the difference between the benefit to society from applying BL and FL cost 
regulation is minimal; and
■ the longer the time period T is, the greater the amount by which welfare under BL 
exceeds the level of welfare achieved under FL cost regulation.
j o
The results in the graph and tables were also found to hold for a number o f  different values o f r, a, b and C0.
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5.5 An Argument for Using FL Costs
While regulators have seen FL cost-based access prices as a means of supporting entry 
and investment by new competitors in recently deregulated markets, it has been 
highlighted that there appears to be little theoretical support for this view. This outcome 
appears to be reinforced by the result from Section 5.4. The analysis in this Section 
however, provides a theoretical justification for adopting FL costs. By using analysis 
similar to that of Crew and Kleindorfer (1992), it is shown that where a regulated firm is 
subject to competition at some future time period, FL cost regulation may provide the 
firm with compensation in instances where BL cost regulation fails to do so.
5.5.1 Crew and Kleindorfer (1992) — The Benefits of Accelerated Depreciation 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1992) examines the problem of cost recovery when a rate-of- 
retum (ROR) and price-cap (PC) regulated firm are subject to competition, in an 
industry experiencing a constant rate of cost-decreasing technological progress. They 
show that if competitive entry is allowed at some future time period, the regulator may 
only have a limited amount of time to increase the allowed cash flows to ensure that the 
incumbent can recover its costs. Crew and Kleindorfer refer to this limited time period 
as a “window of opportunity” (WOO). To increase the allowed cash flows in the initial 
periods, they suggest that the regulation should either increase the allowed market rate 
of return, or the allowed rate of capital recovery through accelerated or front-loaded 
depreciation. Accelerated depreciation works, by ensuring that the value of the asset is 
written down to a level that reflects its market value, at the time when the regulated firm 
is exposed to competitive market forces.
Crew and Kleindorfer outline that the higher the rate of technological progress is, and 
the greater the level of competition is, the smaller is the time period of the WOO. 
Consequently, to recover the cost of the investment in such circumstances, the regulator 
should employ a more accelerated depreciation schedule. This implies the choice of the 
depreciation pattern over time is now crucial for the regulated firm, and the invariance 
principle outlined by Schmalensee no longer holds. The authors though suggest that 
there will be some restricted class of depreciation schedules under the conditions of 
competition and technological progress that still allow the firm to recover its cost. They
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refer to this as the “constrained invariance principle”, but maintain that these schedules 
must be significantly more accelerated than traditional straight-line methods.29
5.5.2 FL Cost Regulation and Competitive Entry
Section 5.3 illustrates that provided the depreciation rate is adjusted appropriately to 
account for the use of FL costs, then the firm earns a higher net cash flow in the earlier 
time periods. From the analysis of Crew and Kleindorfer it follows that, where the 
regulated industry is subject to future deregulation and entry, FL costs may provide the 
firm with cost recovery in instances where BL cost regulation does not. To highlight 
this advantage of FL cost regulation, the following example is outlined.
Adopting the framework outlined in Section 5.2, it is assumed here that the regulator 
initially employs either BL or FL cost regulation on the existing investment until some 
future period t\. At this time, cost regulation of the firm ceases, and entry is allowed. If 
it assumed that there are many potential entrants with identical technology to the 
incumbent, then there will be a perfectly contestable market in the supply of the 
essential infrastructure. The access provider is subsequently restricted to earning a rate 
of return on cost Ct, where t > t\, that is equal to the normal rate of return on capital r, 
plus the rate of economic depreciation on the asset 6. This yields a net cash flow in 
each period of,
7T, =(6> + r)C, = (0 + r)Coe '* , t> t, (5.5.1)
If the incumbent is initially subject to BL cost regulation prior to deregulation 
occurring, then over time the net cash flow will be,
I  rC0 , t< t {
\(e + r)Coe-0t, t> t , (5.5.2)
This pattern of cash flow follows the path AB-CD in Figure 5.5.1, and does not allow 
the firm to recover the cost of its investment as,
NPVß  = f rC0e-r,dt + f(0 + r)C0<T V " A  -  C0
0  I,
C0e'"‘ [e*'1 - 1] < 0 (5.5.3)30
> 0  '  < o  *
9Q In contrast to Crew and Kleindorfer, Bumess and Patrick (1992) finds that when there is no entry allowed in the industry, an 
accelerated depreciation rate leads to a lower level of welfare than a back-loaded depreciation schedule. For a good summary 
of the literature on depreciation for a regulated firm, see Hardin, Ergas and Small (1999).
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FIGURE 5.5.1 NET CASH FLOWS BEFORE AND AFTER ENTRY
If the firm were instead subject to FL cost regulation prior to deregulation, then
Kt ={d + r)C,eGt,\ft>  0 (5.5.4)
/Tu
In Figure 5.5.1, this net cash flow is illustrated by the curve (0 + r)Coe . Unlike the 
BL cost regulation, the firm is able to cover its cost of capital as,
oo
NPVj f = J(0 + r) C0e~(e*r)'dt-  C0 = C0 -  C0 = 0 (5.5.5)
0
In practice, unlike the situation described here, deregulation does often lead to entry 
taking place and a decrease in the level of demand that is served by the incumbent. In
n *
such circumstances, the post-deregulation earnings are less than (0 + r)Coe , and the 
firm will incur a loss regardless of whether BL or FL costs is initially used by the 
regulator. However, as there is a smaller loss associated with the use of FL costs, it 
implies that compared to BL cost regulation, there will be less need to accelerate the 
depreciation schedule by as much to ensure that the incumbent access provider is fully 
compensated.
i n  . . . . . .  . .
The model used here also captures the outcomes that will arise if  there is a transition from BL to FL cost regulation at time t\. 
The outcome in equation (5.5.3) highlights the problem noted by Noam (2002) and Kahn et al. that in a transition from BL to 
FL cost regulation, the asset tends to be under-depreciated. In the example here, to recover the costs o f the existing asset when 
there is a change in asset valuation at time t\, the regulator would need to allow the previously BL cost-regulated firm to earn
the higher fair rate o f return (6 + r)e6>' > (0  + r) , or equivalently, the higher depreciation rate o f  (9 + r)(ee'' - 1 )  + 6 > 6 .
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5.6 Conclusion
This Chapter examined the impact of BL and FL cost regulation on an existing 
investment, in a model where it was assumed there was a constant exogenous rate of 
cost-decreasing technological progress, no uncertainty, and no incentive to pad costs. 
The work here highlights that:
■ to recover the cost of an existing investment where there are decreasing costs over 
time, a firm subject to FL cost regulation must be allowed to earn a higher fair rate of 
return than a firm subject to BL cost regulation. With no uncertainty, the most 
appropriate way to adjust the fair rate is to increase the allowed depreciation rate. 
This leads to the simple principle being established that in order to be fully 
compensated for the use of FL costs, the rate of decrease in the asset value by the 
regulator must be met by a corresponding increase in the allowed depreciation rate. 
The adjustment to the depreciation rate is a specific application of the “Invariance 
Proposition” highlighted by Schmalensee (1989).
■ contrasting criticisms outlined in Chapter 4 that TELRIC/TSLRIC can under- or 
over-compensate the firm, both appear to rely upon the regulator failing to adjust the 
depreciation rate appropriately in the transition from BL to FL cost regulation. The 
only difference in the analysis of Holm (2000) — who argues that FL cost regulation 
can potentially over-compensate the firm — is that he examined a case where the FL 
costs of constructing the network had increased over time;
■ it is not necessary to appeal to uncertainty or investment timing to generate findings 
in favour of BL cost regulation. By adopting basic assumptions similar to those used 
by GSW (2001), it is shown that a constant BL cost-based price will yield greater 
benefit to society than a FL cost-based price that is decreasing over time;
■ the adoption of FL costs may be beneficial if the regulated firm is subject to 
competition in some future time period. Using analysis similar to that of Crew and 
Kleindorfer (1992), it is illustrated that provided the depreciation rate is 
appropriately adjusted to account for technological progress, then FL cost regulation 
may allow the investor to recover costs, in instances BL cost regulation fails to do so.
The basic framework used here is extended in the next two Chapters, which explores the 
impact of access regulation on investment timing. A comparison of investment timing 
under BL and FL costs is briefly considered in Chapter 7.
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A.5 Chapter 5 Appendix
A.5.1 Deriving the Net Present Values to Society under BL in Equation (5.4.16a) 
With discrete time under BL cost regulation, it is known that for an asset living T 
periods, the firm is allowed to earn a constant net cash flow of ub that ensures,
NPVß = L
(i+d*
- C 0= 0 (A5.1.1)
Solving this for jta yields
1-
rCt 
f  1 
U  + r
V
y
(A5.1.2)
With a linear demand curve for access p(q) = a -  b.q, where a, b>  0, equation (A5.1.2) 
can be simplified for an expression that is quadratic in the constant BL cost-based 
access price pb.
Pb -  aPB +
brCQ
U  + r )
0
Applying the quadratic formula yields,
( \
brCrva + a2- 4
ll-(Tfc)rJ
As the price must be the below the monopoly price pm = all, only the minimum solution 
applies. The above expression can then be simplified to give a BL cost-based access 
price of
f \
(A5.1.3)
As the consumer surplus CSb as a function of pb is,
cs3 ={a-Pef  
2b
71d
by substituting in for p B, CSB can be solved to give,
csB =_ 1_  
8b
f
a + k -  ;t >\ i-[—Iv  V ll+rj )
(A5.1.4)
As in equation (5.4.15a) the expression for the net present value to society under BL 
cost regulation is,
CS, 
(! + /■)'
by substituting in the expression for CSB in equation (A5.1.4), the following expression 
is derived.
NPVsB = —  
8 b
a + _1___
(1+r)'
This is outcome in equation (5.4. i6a).
A.5.2 Deriving the NPV to Society under FL Cost Regulation in Equation (5.4.16b)
Under FL cost regulation, the net cash flow of the firm will decrease at the same rate as 
the FL costs. Therefore, where the net cash flow in the first period is some constant 
amount kf\, the net cash flow at any time t, xfu will be equal to,
71 Ft ~ 71 f\ 1» where t -  1, 2 . . .T (A5.2.1)
Now for an asset living T periods, the firm is allowed to earn a FL cost-based net cash 
flow in each period t, that ensures,
m  (1 + r)
Solving this for tzf\ yields,
(g + r)C„
v l  + r )
or more generally, an expression for kfi of,
(A5.2.2)
(A5.2.3)
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, where t = 1, 2...T (A5.2.4)(fl + r)C „(l-fl)
■ M
With a linear demand curve for access p(q) = a -  b.q, where a, b>  0, equation (A5.2.4) 
can be simplified for an expression that is quadratic in the FL cost-based access price
pFt-
Pn apFt +
b{Q + r)C0{ \ - 6 ) ‘~1
1- 1 - 0 \
=  0
1 + r )
Applying the quadratic formula yields,
PFt
a + a2 4 f 6(0 + r)C0(l -  0)1-1)
k 1 ll+J Ji
2 where t = 1,2 ...T
As the FL cost-based price must be below the monopoly price pm = a ll, as with the BL 
cost-based price, only the minimum solution is taken. This yields a FL cost-based 
access price at any time t of
(
1 a - l„2 4b(d+r)Co(l-0)'-'JV V Vl+rJ ) , where t = 1, 2...T  (A5.2.5)
As the consumer surplus CSFt as a function of pFt is,
(a-pF,ycs<
CSFt can be solved to give,
Cl +
cst
2 4ft(fl+r)Co(l—0)'
1 - Kl+rj
8 b
, where t = 1, 2...T  (A5.2.6)
As in equation (5.4.15b) the expression for the net present value to society under FL 
cost regulation is,
n p vsF = 2  
/=1
CSj, 
(1 + r)'
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by substituting in for GS>? in equation (A5.2.6), the following expression is derived,
MPV  — ^
- V 1 ”1
Äa + \ / 2 4 b (0 + r )C o( \ - 0 ) ' - '  1' - ( K ) r  J
l y - T   F 
sF 8 b t r  (l + r) '
This is the outcome in equation (5.4.16b).
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CHAPTER 6: ACCESS PRICING, INVESTMENT TIMING
AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 examined production efficiency under ROR regulation, while Chapter 3 
assessed the allocative and production efficiency trade-off associated with the optimal 
fair rate. Chapter 5 compared the flows of short-run allocative efficiency derived over 
time, when the regulator applied different methods of asset valuation on an existing 
investment. This Chapter continues to analyse efficiency. It establishes a model that 
looks at impact regulation has on the investment timing or dynamic efficiency, and 
explores the potential for a static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off to arise.
6.1.1 The Importance of Dynamic Efficiency in Access Regulation 
Traditionally, a great deal of commentary and formal analysis on public utility 
regulation has focused upon the effect regulation has on static allocative and production 
efficiency. While the concern over static efficiency outcomes remains, over the past 
decade there appears to have been increased emphasis placed on the impact regulation 
has on existing and future innovation and investment in infrastructure, or what has 
otherwise been referred to as “dynamic efficiency.” In Australia, this was reflected in 
the Hilmer Report (Independent Committee of Inquiry, 1993), which noted (at page 
248) that if access regimes did not afford owners of essential infrastructure with 
“appropriate protection”, there was “the potential to undermine incentives for 
investment”.1 More recently, the importance of dynamic efficiency has been 
highlighted in the separate Production Commission (PC) Inquiry Reports into the 
Telecommunications Competition Regulation (PC, 2001a) and the National Access 
Regime (PC, 2001b).
These reports outline the arguments raised by access providers, access seekers and 
regulators, in relation to the impact regulations have on current and future investment.
1 This is taken from PC (2001b) at page 66. It cites two passages from the Hilmer Report to emphasise what it describes as the 
“potential ‘chilling’ effect” access regulation can have on investment in essential facilities.
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From this it appears that typically access providers assert that access regimes have been 
detrimental to investment, while access seekers and regulators maintain that there has 
been little, if any, adverse impact. In telecommunications, PC (2001a) shows (at pages 
399-400) that Telstra has claimed that the access regime has reduced incentives to 
invest in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and in the future could 
increase the risk associated with investment in digital technology. In contrast, the 
ACCC has argued that investment has not been damaged, and cites evidence that the 
nominal value of the network components associated with the PSTN has grown in 
aggregate by a trend rate of 6.4 per cent per annum from 1994-5 to 1999-00. In gas, PC 
(2001b) highlights (between pages 75-79) that access providers warned that as 
regulation offered no incentive to build pipelines with spare capacity, it had the 
potential to create a network of ‘spaghetti pipelines’, where pipelines were only built on 
the basis of what the market was contracted for at the time. ACCC and BHP Billiton 
concluded that there was no evidence of access regulation inhibiting investment, and the 
ACCC provided the example of the $8 billion worth of new pipeline investments.
While the Productivity Commission appears to question the severity of the claims made 
by access providers, it does recognise that the access regime has the potential to have a 
significant impact upon current and future innovation and investment, or dynamic 
efficiency. For example, PC (2001a) outlines (at page 363, Box 11.1) that:
Excessively low access pricing reduces investment in bottleneck 
facilities. If uncorrected, this can lead to even more costly outcomes 
than higher prices because the infrastructure on which consumers 
depend may be sub-standard, delayed or not constructed at all.
and PC (2001b) takes the view (at page 67) that:
.. .the concerns about the potential for access regulation to deter 
investment appear to be well-founded. This in turn means that 
minimising the potential for such effects should be an important 
consideration in the design of access regimes.
In New Zealand, the importance of dynamic efficiency appears to have been even more 
strongly emphasised than in Australia. In a Commerce Commission (2001) discussion 
paper on access issues in telecommunications, it was held (at page 15, paragraph 70):
Where there are tensions between short term allocative efficiency and 
long term dynamic efficiency, the Commission takes the preliminary 
view that the later will generally better promote competition for the long 
term benefit of end user.
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6.1.2 The Existing Literature on Investment Timing under Regulation 
There has been a great deal of theoretical literature examining the static inefficiencies of 
rate-of-retum (ROR) regulation and price-cap (PC) regulation of public utilities in both 
the wholesale access and the retail markets.2 However, until recently, there appears to 
have been very little theoretical literature examining the impact access regimes have on 
investment timing in essential infrastmcture and welfare. Gans has been involved in the 
majority of the recent work that has been done in this area. Examples of his work, 
includes, Gans and Williams (1999a), Gans (2001) and Gans and King (2002).3
Gans and Williams (GW, 1999a) examines access pricing and investment timing, where 
there are two firms competing to provide the infinitely-lived essential infrastructure, in 
an industry characterised by exponential decreasing costs over time, due to a constant 
rate of technological progress. Each firm decides if and when it should invest in 
infrastructure, in a situation where the investing firm becomes the access provider, 
while the other firm — provided it does not bypass the essential facility — becomes the 
access seeker. Further, it is assumed that the firms competing to undertake the 
investment do not engage in competition in the downstream market — i.e. the 
downstream market is non-rivalrous; and that there is no consumer surplus derived in 
the downstream market. In this framework it is shown that the firm has two motives for 
undertaking the investment. The first is based upon the firm’s own willingness to pay 
for the infrastructure, while the other motive is based upon the firm’s incentive to pre­
empt the investment strategically. Examining the outcomes for a large and small firm, 
GW find that regulation of the fixed or lump sum access fee payed by the access 
provider, can induce the socially-optimal investment timing, and this result is generally 
independent of whether BL or FL costs are used to value the asset. The fixed fee for 
access they prescribe to achieve the socially-optimal timing of the investment, is a fully- 
distributed-cost-based (FDC) price, which is consistent with Lindahl pricing used in 
order to fund the provision of a public good.
Example o f  papers examining ROR regulation and price regulation in the retail market include Averch and Johnson (1962), 
Baumöl and Klevorick (1970) and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) Chapter 4. Examples o f  papers examining price and 
ROR regulation in the wholesale access market include Baumöl and Sidak (1994), Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1996) and 
King (1997).
J Gans and Williams (1998) and Gans and Williams (1999b) also provide useful “primers” on the issue o f the access charge and 
the timing o f  investment. These articles can be found at http://www.mbs.unimelb.edu.au/jgans/research.htm
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Gans (2001) uses a certainty model similar to that of GW. Once again, there are two 
firms competing to undertake the investment, and there are the two motives for 
undertaking the investment — the firm’s own willingness to pay and the incentive to 
pre-empt strategically. Significantly, the additional assumptions included are that the 
two firms now not only compete to undertake the investment, but also compete in the 
downstream retail market — i.e. the downstream retail market is rivalrous; and there is 
consumer surplus derived from consumption in the downstream retail market. Gans 
establishes that the optimal access pricing formula involves using a two-part tariff, 
where the usage price is set at the short-run marginal cost of providing access, and the 
fixed fee is based on a FDC-based price. While the majority of the analysis takes the 
usage charge as given and looks at the optimal fixed fee the regulator should set, 
Section 6 does consider the issue of the optimal usage price, and how the fixed charge 
should be adjusted to induce the socially-optimal investment timing.
Unlike the analysis of Gans and Williams (1999a), and Gans (2001), Gans and King 
(2002) examine investment timing where there is the issue of ex ante uncertainty over 
the value of the infrastructure. In particular, they examine the issue of truncation that 
may occur under regulation, and the impact this has on the investment timing of the 
firm. Gans and King conclude from their analysis that to avoid the problem of 
truncation, or what is sometimes referred to as the “asymmetric risk” arising from 
regulation, there may be scope for providing an investor with an “access holiday” — i.e. 
a period of time where it is not subject to any form of price regulation.
The papers by Guthrie, Small and Wright (GSW, 2001) and Evans and Guthrie (2002), 
use a real options approach to assess the issue of investment timing, and compare the 
impact BL and FL cost-based prices have upon welfare. They find that valuation of the 
asset does affect welfare, and both reach the general conclusion that, in industries 
experiencing more rapid rates of cost-decreasing technological progress, such as 
telecommunications, BL cost regulation should be employed, as it leads to a higher 
level of welfare.
In contrast to much of work done by Gans, GSW and Evans and Guthrie both examine 
the impact of a linear access price on investment timing. Their analysis subsequently 
captures some sort of short- and long-term efficiency trade-off. That is, as GSW note 
(at page 3), a “preferred access pricing scheme will match the marginal cost of bringing 
investment further forward in time (the lower total surplus resulting from raising access
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charges) and the marginal benefit (earlier investment raises the present value of any 
given cash flow).”
Evans, Quigley and Zhang (EQZ, 2003), refers to the short- and long-term efficiency 
trade-off, as being between static allocative and dynamic efficiency. By adopting an 
endogenous growth model, their paper explores the optimal linear price monopolistic 
innovators should charge for the intermediate goods that are used to produce the final 
output in the economy. The model captures arguments raised by Schumpeter (1942) in 
relation to the need for transitory monopoly power, and establishes that; the optimal 
linear price that maximises the inter-temporal utility of consumers and recovers cost, 
lies above the short-run marginal cost of production and below the monopoly price. As 
the short-run marginal cost forms the basis for static allocative efficiency in their model, 
they refer to the resulting wholesale market price as a “second-best” price.
6.1.3 The Results and Contributions of this Chapter
This Chapter examines dynamic efficiency by establishing a model that looks at the 
investment timing when there is no uncertainty, a two-part access tariff, and a constant 
cost-decreasing rate of technological progress. Unlike the work of Gans, it is assumed 
potential investors can only invest in the infinitely-lived essential infrastructure, and 
cannot participate in any downstream retail market. Subsequently, there is no incentive 
strategically to pre-empt the investment. However, as the demand curve for access is 
responsive to changes in the usage price, as in GSW, Evans and Guthrie and EQZ, the 
model captures a static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off.
The model used in this and the following Chapter examines the two extreme market 
conditions of a:
■ monopoly investor — a firm that has no competition to undertake the investment 
and therefore has an exclusive right to invest; and
■ competitive investor — a firm that is subject to a perfectly-competitive market to 
provide the essential infrastructure, i.e. ‘competition to construct’.
In both situations it is assumed that after the investment has occurred, there is no 
additional entry to the access market.
By finding the properties of the dynamically-efficient time for any given access charge, 
the investment timing and benefits to society derived under the two extreme outcomes, 
is compared and assessed. Amongst other things; conditions are established when a 
competitive and monopoly investor is more likely to generate higher social benefits;
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circumstances are outlined where there is a static and dynamic efficiency trade-off for 
an investor; it is found that ROR regulation of the monopoly investor has the same 
effect as having perfect competition to undertake the investment; and that as in Gans 
(2001), the socially-optimal outcome arises if the investor can charge a two-part access 
tariff. Further, throughout this Chapter, various concerns raised about access pricing 
and investment in the Productivity Commission reports — PC (2001 a,b) — are 
incorporated into the analysis. In particular, it is shown that the work done here, and in 
following Chapter, is closely related to issues highlighted in Chapter 4 of PC (2001b), 
where the Commission considers the impact of access regulation on incentives to invest.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 establishes the model and contrasts 
investment timing by the monopoly and competitive investor. Section 6.3 defines 
dynamic efficiency, and uses this definition to show how at any given access charge, the 
net present value to society achieved by the monopoly and competitive investor, can be 
compared by examining investment timing. Section 6.4 outlines and then assesses 
claims made by academic and industry commentators, that the regulated access price 
involves a static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off. Section 6.5 explores the 
impact ROR regulation has on the monopoly investor, and highlights some equivalence 
results. Section 6.6 looks at the socially-optimal investment, and how the access charge 
must be set so that a competitive, ROR-regulated monopoly, and unregulated monopoly 
investor, will achieve this outcome. Section 6.7 concludes the analysis.
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6.2 A Model of Investment Timing
This Section sets up the model that is used throughout the course of Chapter 6 and 7 to 
examine the issue of investment timing, and the benefit to society derived under various 
types of access regimes. The framework is used here to establish basic results for an 
investor that has an exclusive right to invest — a monopoly investor — and an investor 
that is subject to a perfectly-competitive market to provide the essential infrastructure 
— a competitive investor. It is shown that while a monopoly investor is able to achieve 
economic rents from providing the essential facility, a competitive investor invests 
earlier, and only earns a normal rate of return on the investment. Circumstances where 
an investor will hold a monopoly right to invest are also briefly considered.
6.2.1 Establishing the Model
6.2.1.1 Assumptions of the Model
The framework employed to examine the issue of investment timing here, adopts a 
combination of the assumptions similar to those used in Section 5.2 and Section 5.4. 
The major difference is that, unlike Chapter 5, terms are now expressed as a function of 
the access price p, rather than the quantity of access demanded q, and the possibility of 
having a two-part access tariff is explored. To set up this model of investment timing, it 
is initially assumed for simplicity here that:
■ there is continuous time t;
■ the cost to the firm and society of making the one-off-infinitely-lived investment at 
some time t is Ct\
■ the cost of undertaking the investment at time 0 is Co;
■ there is some continuous exogenous rate of technological progress, so that the cost of 
undertaking the investment at any time /, is Ct = Coe9*;4
■ the opportunity cost of capital r > 0. As in Chapter 5 there is no uncertainty 
associated with the net cash flows, so this is equal to the risk-free rate;
■ the asset does not physically deteriorate and there is no inflation in the industry;
4 Gans and Williams (1999a), Gans (2001), and Gans and King (2002), also adopt this assumption o f a constant rate o f  
technological progress.
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■ once the investment has been undertaken at some time t, a fixed amount of 
infrastructure is provided instantaneously;
■ the facility has the capacity to supply the level of access demanded without the need 
for any additional investment;5
■ no other firms supply the essential infrastructure, and the access provider does not 
compete in any related downstream market;6
■ when the infrastructure is constructed there is instantaneous demand for access by a 
single firm. The access seeker uses access as an input and instantaneously provides 
a final product to a single customer in a downstream retail market;
■ the demand curve for access is downward sloping (i.e. q '(p) < 0, V p > 0), concave 
(i.e. q "(p) < 0, V p > 0), and does not shift over time.7 As in Chapter 5, the meaning 
of the “demand for access” where there is both a single retailer and downstream 
customer is explored in greater detail after all the assumptions have been made;
■ there are no costs associated with the continued operations of the access provider 
after the investment in the infinitely-lived essential infrastructure has been made at 
time t. That is, the short-run marginal cost of supplying access at each instant is zero 
(i.e. SRMC = 0);
■ if the investor charges a constant per-unit usage price p  and fixed charge A for 
continued access, it would earn a constant net cash flow at each instant of nip) + A;
■ where pmax is the per-unit usage price when there is no demand for the essential 
facility (i.e. the “choke price”) and p m is the monopoly price, revenue function 7i(p) 
has the following standard neo-classical properties:8
- 4 0 )  = 0, 4 / w )  = 0;
- x'(p)=p.q'(p) + q(p), where q '{p) < 0;
5 This is the same as an assumption made by Gans (2001) that the natural monopoly has infinite capacity to supply access.
6 This is different from the assumptions made in the work by Gans. His investment-timing models assume that firms compete to 
undertake the investment, and the ultimate investor becomes the access provider, while the firm that does not invest, becomes 
the access seeker. This allows him to assess strategic incentives to invest.
7
Such an unchanged demand curve for access over time is implicitly used by GS W (2001).
O
As there are no period-to-period operating costs, as in Chapter 5 the terms revenue, operating profit and net cash flow, can all 
be used interchangeably throughout the analysis in this and the following Chapter.
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7t(pm) = 7rmax, as at pm the marginal revenue is equal to the short-run marginal cost 
of production (i.e. n'(pm) = SRMC = 0);
- 7T'(p) < 0 if Pmax > P> Pm\ 
n'{p) > 0 i fpm > p > 0; and
n"{p) = 2q "(p) + q '(p) < 0 as q '(p) < 0 and q "{p) < 0;
■ for any combination (p, A), the total benefit to the “consumer” from using the 
infrastructure at each instant is equal to the consumer surplus at the per-unit price 
CS(p), minus the fixed fee A it is required to pay. That is, the total benefit is CS(p) -  
A, where the fixed fee is such that CS(p) > A. As in Chapter 5, the meaning of the 
term “consumer” is explored after all the assumptions of the model have been made;
■ where CSmax represents the maximum consumer surplus derived from the facility, 
CS(p) has the following properties:
/''max
- CS(p0)= \q(p)dp;
Po
- CSOmax) = o, CS(0) = CSmax > 71max,
CS'(p) = -q (p)< 0, \ /p> 0;  and
- CS"(p) = - q ' ( p ) > 0 ,V p > 0 ;
■ at each instant in time, the measure of the total welfare to society derived from the 
infrastructure S(p), is equal to the sum of the total benefit to the user and the revenue 
to the access provider. That is, S(p) = CS(p) + 7t(p); and
■ S(p) has the properties:
- *S(pmax) = 0, S(0) = GS(0) = iSmax > m̂axi 
S'(p)-p .q  '(p)< 0, V p > 0; and
- S"(p) = p.q "(p) + q '(p) < 0, V p > 0.
Although the framework established here appears to capture a retail-pricing problem, it 
can also be used to analyse the issue of access pricing.9 As Chapter 5 illustrates, this 
can be done if the demand curve is interpreted as being a derived demand curve for
9 Analysing the access-pricing problem using a retail-pricing framework appears consistent with work done in various 
submissions to the PC inquiries, and the PC (2001 a,b) reports. This particularly appears to be the case when the work focuses 
upon the impact that changes in the wholesale market access price will have on the level of welfare.
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access. The term “consumer surplus” then represents some amalgam of the profit 
derived by the access seeker, and the benefit derived by the customer in the downstream 
retail market. Alternatively, to simplify the analysis further, similar assumptions to 
Section 5.4 can be adopted so that what is referred to as “consumer surplus” consists 
here of either, only the profit of the access seeker, or only the benefit derived by the 
retail market customer. For example, if:
(1) there is perfectly elastic demand in the retail market, then regardless of the 
access price charged, consumer surplus in the retail market is zero. In that case the 
term “consumer surplus” measures the profits of the firm in the wholesale access 
market.
(2) the retail market firm earns zero profit, then what is referred to as consumer 
surplus, actually represents the level of surplus derived by the customer in the 
downstream retail market.
6.2.7.2 The Value to the Firm of Undertaking the Investment
The firm has an incentive to undertake the investment, as the earlier it invests, the 
earlier it realises the stream of revenue flows from its operations. As the essential 
infrastructure is infinitely lived, the stream of net cash flows goes on forever, and the 
payment derived from continually supplying access, is just equivalent to the payment 
received if the firm held a financial perpetuity. Thus, for the constant rate of return on 
similar risk-free assets r, and any per-unit usage price p and fixed fee A, the present 
value of the revenue flows derived by the firm investing at any time t is,
oo oo i
Vj-(t,p,A) = ^n(p)e~rT dz + j* Ae~rxdz -  — (x(p)  + A)e~rt (6.2.1)
T=t T=t ^
6.2.1.3 The Value to Society of Undertaking the Investment
The value of the investment to society is made up of; the present value derived by the 
access provider, and the present value of the benefits derived by the consumer. As with 
the access provider, the consumer benefits from the earlier provision of the facility. 
That is, the earlier the essential infrastructure is provided, the earlier the stream of 
benefits flow to the user. For any combination of the usage price p and fixed fee A, the 
discounted present value of total benefit to the consumer is,
oo oo ^
Vc(t,p,A) = j CS(p]e~" dv -  (6.2.2)
T=l T—t ^
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Adding together equation (6.2.1) and (6.2.2), the present value of the investment to 
society is,
Vs(t,p) = - (S(p) ) e~rl, where S(p) = CS(p) + nip) (6.2.3)
6.2.1.4 The Value to Society of Deferring the Investment
Although deferring the investment has the negative effect of delaying the realisation of 
the consumer surplus and operating profit, due to the cost-decreasing rate of 
technological progress 6, it has the beneficial effect of decreasing the cost faced by the 
investor. As there are no external costs arising from the one-off investment, this is also 
the cost faced by society.
As the current cost of undertaking the one-off investment in infrastructure at any time / 
is just,
C, = C0e~e' (6.2.4)
the present value of the discounted cost of the investment to society and the firm is,
C(0 = C,en = ( ) e *  = C0e‘(e+r)' (6.2.5)
6.2.1.5 The Net Present Value of the Investment to Society and the Firm
For the given usage price p and fixed fee A, the net present value of the investment to 
the firm, NPVp is found by subtracting the expression in equation (6.2.5) from the 
expression in equation (6.2.1) to give,
NPVf (t, p, A) = Vf (t,p, A) -  C(t) = ~(n(p)  + A ) e n -  C0e"<9+r)' (6.2.6)
The overall level of welfare achieved from undertaking the investment, is given by the 
net present value to society, NPVS. This is found by subtracting the expression in 
equation (6.2.5) from the expression in equation (6.2.3) to yield,
NPVs(t,p) = V£t, p ) -  C(0 = -S{p)e~" -  C0e - ^ r>- (6.2.7)
r
6.2.2 Investment Timing of a Monopoly Investor
A firm with an exclusive right to invest will provide the essential infrastructure at a time 
in the future that is most profitable for it. The firm is effectively a monopoly investor,
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and for any given usage price p and fixed fee A, will invest at a time tx, which 
maximises its net present value, NPVf . That is,
max NPVf(t,p,A) = Vf ( t ,p,A)-C(t) ( 6.2 .8)
This yields the first-order condition (FOC), 
dNPVf  _= -  (n(p)  + A) e "  + (e + r) C0<f (e" )' = 0
(6.2.9)
which can be solved for,
(tt(p ) + A) = {6 + r)CQe'K (6.2.10)
This describes an outcome where the marginal benefit for the monopoly undertaking the 
investment, is equal to the marginal cost from investing at time tx. The left-hand side of 
equation (6.2.10) denotes the marginal benefit, and is made up of the net cash flow 
earned by the firm at each instant once the investment is made. The right-hand side of 
equation (6.2.10) denotes the marginal cost to the firm at time tx. This consists of the 
sum of the opportunity cost of capital r and capital loss from not deferring the 
investment 9, multiplied by the cost of investing at time tx. Another interpretation of 
equation (6.2.10) is found by dividing through by the cost of the investment at time tx,
(x(p) + A) 
C 0 e - e '■
= 9 + r
This shows that a monopoly investor, charging any usage price p and fixed fee A, will 
maximise its net present value by investing in the facility at a time where it is able to 
earn a rate of return on the investment of 6+ r. Equation (6.2.10) can also be rearranged 
to provide an expression for the investment timing by the monopoly tx(p, A),
‘AP’A) = 0 l° §
' {0 + r)Ct '  
K X(p) + A ,
(6 .2 . 11)
For any given usage price-fixed fee combination, the net present value to the firm and 
society is then found by substituting the expression for the investment time tx(p, A) into 
equations (6.2.6) and (6.2.7).
NPVUp,A) =
1 0( tt(p ) + Ä) Y  k {P) + a \
0 + r H (Q + r)C{oy
(6 .2 .12)
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NPVHp,A) =
1 eS(p) + r (CS(p)-Ä) V
6 + r y \
7r(p) + A
{e+r)ct
\ e
0 J
(6.2.13)
The derivation for these expressions is found in the Appendix of Chapter 6 in Section 
A.6.1.
Assuming that the access charge consists of some usage price p° and fixed fee A0, the 
timing of the investment by a firm with a monopoly or exclusive right to invest, is 
illustrated in Figure 6.2.1.
FIGURE 6.2.1 INVESTMENT TIMING WITH AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT
7i(p) + A
6.2.3 The Exclusive Right to Invest in Practice
In practice, an exclusive right to invest can arise either due to underlying market 
conditions in an industry, or restrictions placed on an industry by the government or 
regulator.
If in a market there is only one firm capable of undertaking the investment, it will hold 
an exclusive right to invest. This occurs if an industry is served by a monopoly. 
Alternatively where there are a number of potential investors, one firm can still 
effectively hold an exclusive right to invest, if it has a significant cost advantage over its 
rivals. For example, such an advantage could arise if, as the PC (2001a) states (at page 
290), “the capacity to undertake the investment depends on some capability peculiar to a 
particular carrier”.
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The government can create a monopoly investor by either passing legislation that 
prohibits entry and allows only one firm to service the entire industry, or as Dwyer and 
Lim (2001b) outline, by granting one firm an exclusive right to use easements. They 
suggest (at page 11) that:
Where by Crown grant of State action, a utility has privileged rights, 
such as easements or rights of way over the property others and any 
other would-be service provider does not enjoy similar rights, questions 
naturally arise about the lack of equality of access and lack of 
competition, inevitably raising in turn the questions of monopoly rents 
being charged to the public.10
If the government wishes to grant such a right yet also raise revenue, it may want to 
auction-off or tender-out the exclusive right to provide the essential facility.* 11 In an 
extreme case where there is perfect competition to undertake the investment, tendering 
or auctioning-off the right to invest results in the entire present value of the economic 
rents derived by the monopoly investor being transferred lump-sum to the government. 
Therefore, although the monopoly investor earns a rate of return 6 + r in each period, 
after taking into account the amount that it pays the government to win this exclusive 
right, the net present value it derives from the investment will be equal to zero.
6.2.4 Investment Timing with Competition
Where no firm is granted an exclusive right to invest, and there is perfect competition to 
undertake the investment, all potential rents are competed away. This type of outcome 
can arise when there are potential investors of identical cost competing to construct the 
essential infrastructure. It implies that, at any given usage price p and fixed fee A, the 
essential infrastructure will be provided at time t0(p, A), where the firm derives a net 
present value NPV°f  of zero.
NPV°Ap,Ä) = - (n (p )  + A)e"°(-P-A) - C s e ^ ' ^  =0 (6.2.14)
r
111 The PC (2001b) at pages 85-8, summarise the analysis o f Dwyer and Lim (2001 a,b), and recognise that an exclusive right to use 
easements may create monopoly rents. It also cites the above passage from Dwyer and Lim (2001b) in Box 4.3 at page 86.
11 Chapter 5 and Chapter 11 (at pages 316-7) o f  PC (2001b) provide greater detail about the issue o f the government tendering out 
services, franchising services, or auctioning off exclusive rights.
231
By rearranging the expression in equation (6.2.14), the condition can be restated in 
terms of the rate of return achieved by the investor. As opposed to a monopoly investor, 
who only invests when the rate of return 0 + r is achieved, a competitive investor, 
invests as soon as the given access charge allows it to earn the normal rate of return r.
(n(p) + A) 
C ,e eto
(6.2.15)
This implies that, on the original cost of the investment, the term 6 captures the 
economic rent derived in each period by the monopoly. Further, for the same access 
charge it implies that, where there is the potential for competition to arise in providing 
the essential infrastructure, earlier investment timing is achieved by allowing 
competition to construct, rather than by granting one firm an exclusive right to invest 
(i.e. t0(p, A) < tx(p, A)).
‘o(P’A) = ^ l°g
Ö
rCn
7r(p) + A J 0 i 7i(p) + A
(6.2.16)
Assuming some given usage price p° and fixed fee A0 is charged, the earlier investment 
timing by a firm subject to perfect competition is illustrated in Figure 6.2.2.
FIGURE 6.2.2 INVESTMENT TIMING WITH COMPETITION
The PC (2001b) recognises the potential for the outcome shown in Figure 6.2.2, when it 
suggests (at page 73, Box 4.2) that competition at the construction phase can lead to rent
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dissipation “through bringing forward the timing of investment.” Further, in 
summarising the arguments of Dwyer and Lim (2001 a,b), the PC outlines (at pages 85- 
6) that, where easements are free of charge and the project is competitive, other things 
being equal, it will bring forward the time at which the investment is undertaken.
When there is perfect competition to undertake the investment, the net present value 
derived by society when some usage price p  and fixed fee A is charged, is found by 
substituting the expression for time t0(p, A) into equation (6.2.7). This yields,
NPV:{p,A) = h c S { p ) -  A) r 7l(p) + A
K r ^ 0
\ ö
{62.11)
The derivation of the outcome in equation (6.2.17) is outlined in the Appendix of this 
Chapter in Section A.6.2.
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6.3 Dynamic Efficiency in the Model
As outlined in Chapter 4 and Section 6.1, dynamic efficiency has become a key issue in 
the debate over the appropriate regulated access charge. This Section analyses this issue 
of dynamic efficiency formally, by adopting a definition for the socially-optimal time, 
that is consistent with that used by the PC (2001b) and a number of analysts. By 
deriving an expression for the socially-optimal time tw, properties of the socially- 
optimal time are examined. An important finding is that tw changes in response to a 
change in the usage price p. In particular, the lower the usage price for access, the 
earlier is the dynamically-efficient time tw for the investment. This subtlety appears to 
have been overlooked in the public policy analysis done in Australia. The definition for 
the socially-optimal time is also used to explore when a monopoly and competitive 
investor will be dynamically-efficient and inefficient at any given usage price p and 
fixed fee A. From this, a general conclusion is drawn as to when a competitive and 
monopoly investor will induce a better outcome for society.
6.3.1 Defining the Dynamically-Efficient or Socially-Optimal Time 
For a given usage price p and fixed fee A, in order to use the timing of an investment to 
assess whether one regime generates a higher net present value to society than another, 
it is necessary to have some notion of dynamic efficiency, or the socially-optimal time 
for the investment. The PC (2001b) outlines (at page 72) that it is reasonable to view it 
as “the time at which the net present value of an investment to the community — 
measured by the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus — is maximised.” This 
definition of the socially-optimal time is consistent with that used by Gans (2001) and 
Evans and Guthrie (2002), and is adopted as the standard for dynamic efficiency 
throughout the course of this and the following Chapter.12
As from equation (6.2.7), the net present value to society at given the usage price p is,
NPVs(t,p ) = S(p)e~r‘ -  C0e~{0+r)t, where S(p) = CS(p) + Tip)
12 For a slight variation on this definition for dynamic efficiency, see Evans, Quigley and Zhang (2003). As they adopt a 
framework traditionally used in endogenous growth models to assess the issue o f optimal regulated access price, their definition 
involves maximising the inter-temporal utility o f households.
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the dynamically-efficient time for the investment to occur is found by taking the 
derivative with respect to time t, and setting the resulting expression equal to zero,
= -S (p )e-rl +(e + C0 -  0 (6.3.1)
dt
Solving this, indicates that the essential infrastructure should be provided at a time tw, 
where the social rate of return on the investment is 6 + r.
S(p) = (ö + r)C0e-“" (6.3.2)
Rearranging equation (6.3.2), the expression for the dynamically-efficient or socially- 
optimal time tw associated with the given usage price p is,
U p )=  ^ lQg
r(g + r)C0)
S(P)
(633)
By assuming that the access tariff consists of some given usage price p°, the 
dynamically-efficient time for the investment to occur at this price, is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3.1.
FIGURE 6.3.1 THE DYNAMICALLY-EFFICIENT TIME
Where, S(p°) = n{py) + CS(p°)
Substituting the expression for tw(p) into equation (6.2.7), the maximum net present 
value to society at any given usage price p is NPVsw, where
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, where S(p) =n(p) + CS(p) (6.3.4)n p v : ( p ) = - { ^ ±
r \  0+r
S(P)
\ e
(d + r)C,«)
The derivation of the outcome in equation (6.3.4) is provided in the Appendix of this 
Chapter in Section A.6.3.
Dynamic inefficiency arises if the investment occurs at a time before or after tw(p). 
Investing too early is dynamically inefficient because, although the social surplus flows 
occur earlier, the cost to society of the investment is too high. Investing too late is 
dynamically inefficient because, although there is a benefit associated with having a 
lower cost of undertaking the investment, there is now too high a cost associated with 
foregoing social surplus for a number of periods.
As the important results for the monopoly investor, competitive investor and the social 
optimum at any given access charge (p, A) have now been established, for convenience, 
the respective outcomes are summarised in Table 6.3.1. These tabulated results are 
consistently referred to and used throughout the course of the Chapter to compare and 
assess the impact of various types of regulation.
TABLE 6.3.1 KEY RESULTS AT ANY GIVEN ACCESS CHARGE (p. A)
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6.3.2 Properties of the Dynamically-Efficient or Socially-Optimal Time 
An implication of the definition for the socially-optimal time that does not appear to 
have been recognised in any of the submissions to, or final reports by the Productivity
236
Commission, is that it is non-unique and changes in response to a change in the usage 
price for access p . 13,14
dtw_ 1 s ' ( P h 0 
dp 6 S(p )
(6.3.5)
The sign of equation (6.3.5) indicates that a decrease in the usage price for access p, 
leads to the dynamically-efflcient time of the investment occurring earlier. The reason 
for this relationship between timing and the usage price is that, a decrease in the usage 
price increases the social surplus S(p) that flows in each period after the essential 
infrastructure has been provided. This increases the benefit relative to cost derived by 
society from undertaking the investment, and implies that the dynamically-efficient time 
associated with the lower price will be earlier. Assuming that the access tariff falls due 
to a decrease in the usage price from p° to p \  such a change in the socially-optimal 
time, can be illustrated in Figure 6.3.2.
FIGURE 6.3.2 DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY WITH A CHANGE IN THE USAGE PRICE
W here, p° > p l >  0
1 T A justification for the submissions and final reports ignoring this issue is that, all parties treated the demand curve as being 
perfectly inelastic. However, as all the analysis and diagrams in submissions and reports indicates that the quantity is 
responsive to the usage price p, it follows that this type o f change in the socially-optimal time should have been considered.
Gans (2001) assumes for the majority o f his analysis that the usage price is given and set equal to the marginal cost o f providing 
access. When Gans does adjust the usage price in Section 6, he looks at the effect this has on the strategic incentive to pre­
empt, and analyses the impact this has on the level o f the socially-optimal fixed fee that should be charged for access.
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As a higher level of surplus is associated with the lower usage price, there must be a 
higher net present value to society associated with the earlier dynamically-efficient time 
tw. To confirm this, the derivative of equation (6.3.4) is taken with respect to the usage 
price p, and the resulting expression is shown to be less than zero.
dNPVs' 
dp
'  S(p) ^
(0 + r)C,
s\p) <0 , V p  > 0  (6.3.6)
o 7
Therefore in Figure 6.3.2, the level of welfare achieved by investing at time tw(p]) will 
be higher than that achieved by investing at time tw(p°).
6.3.3 Dynamic Efficiency with a Monopoly and Competitive Investor 
Section 6.2 showed that for a given usage price p and fixed fee A, an investor subject to 
perfect competition, provided the essential infrastructure earlier than a monopoly 
investor (i.e. t0(p, A) < tx(p, A)). The analysis in Section 6.3.1 suggests that, whether or 
not the earlier investment timing arising under competition will be beneficial, depends 
upon how close t0(p, A) and tx(p, A) are to the dynamically-efficient time tw(p).
6.3.3.1 Achieving Dynamic Efficiency with a Monopoly Investor
Equating the expression for tx(p, A) in equation (6.2.11), with the expression for tx{p) in 
equation (6.3.3), a monopoly investor earning a rate of return on capital 6 + r, is 
dynamically efficient if at usage price p, it is allowed to charge a fixed fee A of,
A = CS(p) (6.3.7)
This implies the monopoly investor achieves dynamic efficiency and maximises the net 
present value to society if it is able to internalise all the benefits to society derived from 
the investment, and earn a revenue flow in each period of S(p).15 In contrast, the earlier 
investment timing by the competitive investor is now dynamically inefficient.
<„(/>,CS(p)) = i l o g f ^ -e ) <k (p ) = -  i°g
(fl + r)C0
S{p)
(6.3.8)
By investing too early, the competitive investor incurs a cost to society that is too high, 
which leads to a net present value to society of zero. Assuming that the access tariff
^  The PC (2001b) and Gans (2001) make a similar point.
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consists of the given usage price p and fixed fee A0 = CS(p°), and denoting the resulting 
monopoly, competitive and optimal investment timing with superscript 0, the outcome 
described here can be illustrated in Figure 6.3.3. The notation adopted for investment 
timing in this diagram is used throughout the remainder of this Chapter.
FIGURE 6.3.3 ACHIEVING DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY WITH A MONOPOLY INVESTOR
S(p), nip) +A
Where, A0 = CS(p°)
6.3.3.2 Achieving Dynamic Efficiency with a Competitive Investor 
Equating the expression for tQ(p, A) in equation (6.2.16) with the expression for tx(p) in 
equation (6.3.3), an investor subject to perfect competition to provide the essential 
infrastructure will be dynamically efficient, and maximise the net present value to 
society at any given usage price p, if the fixed fee charged satisfies the condition,
(6.3.9)
7r(p) + A r
Substituting in for S{p) and simplifying, the above equation can also be expressed as,
CS(p)-  A _ 6 
7r(p) + A r
(6.3.10)
Rearranging, the expression derived for the dynamically-efficient fixed fee at the usage 
price p  is,
rCS(p) -  6n{p) 
6 + r
(6.3.11)
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This fixed fee induces the monopoly investor earning the return 6+ r, to inefficiently 
delay the investment, as it provides the essential infrastructure after the dynamically- 
efficient time tw(p). That is,
r C S M - W p )  +
6 + r 6 V rS(p)
> tw(p) (6.3.12)
The outcome described here is illustrated in Figure 6.3.4, where the access tariff
consists of the given usage price p° and fixed fee A0 = r^ —P— - — — — —  -
6 + r
FIGURE 6.3.4 ACHIEVING DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY UNDER COMPETITION
Where, A0 =
(9+r)C(
From equation (6.3.11) it also apparent that the fixed fee that must be charged by the 
competitive investor to achieve dynamic efficiency, may either be greater than, less 
than, or equal to zero. More specifically, the dynamically-efficient fixed fee will be,
7r(p) r
= 0, if CS(p)  _  9
7r(p) r
<o, if
7r(p) r
(6.3.13)
The intuition underlying these solutions is that, in the absence of a fixed fee, at the 
given usage price p:
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■ if CS{p)l7ip ) > 6!r, the competitive investor will inefficiently delay the investment. 
To ensure that the investment is undertaken earlier, and at the dynamically-efficient 
time tw(p), the fixed fee must be set greater than zero;
■ if CS(p)/7t(p) = 0lr, the competitive investor will invest at the dynamically-efficient 
time, and no fixed access fee is required; and
■ if CS(p)/7i(p) < 0/r, the competitive investor will undertake the investment too early. 
To ensure that the investment is deferred until the dynamically-efficient time tw(p), 
the fixed fee must be less than zero. That is, the competitive investor should be 
subject to some form of lump-sum tax.
6.3.3.3 The Dynamic Inefficiency of a Monopoly and Competitive Investor
The results of the previous two sub-sections imply that for any access charge (p, A), if
the fixed fee A is not set equal to CS{p) or , then neither the monopoly
0 + r
or competitive investor will be dynamically efficient. For such a dynamically- 
inefficient access charge, the monopoly investor always inefficiently delays the 
investment, while the competitive investor may either engage in inefficient delay or 
undertake the investment too early.
If the access charge (p, A) is such that,
rCS(p)-07r(p) >A 
0 + r
(6.3.14)
then both the monopoly and competitive investor inefficiently delay the investment. As 
the competitive investor always provides the essential infrastructure earlier than the 
monopoly investor, it follows that where both firms are engaging in inefficient delay, 
the competitive investor will be more dynamically efficient, and generate a higher net 
present value to society. To illustrate the outcome diagrammatically, it is assumed here 
that the access tariff consists of the given usage price p° and fixed fee A0, and that A0* 
denotes the fixed fee that induces the competitive investor to provide the infrastructure
at the dynamically-efficient time tw (i.e. A =o* rCS(p°) -  07r(p°)
0 + r
). All other things
being equal, the result captured in Figure 6.3.5, is more likely to arise when there is a 
lower rate of technological progress and lower fixed fee for access.
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FIGURE 6.3.5 DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTING FROM DELAY
S(p), n{p) +A
Where, CS(p°)> A0' > A0 &
A0‘ _ rCS(p°)-0x(p°)
If the access charge ip, A) is such that,
CS(p)>A>r-CS(p)~ d7l(p) (6.3.15)
6 + r
then the monopoly investor will inefficiently delay the investment, while the 
competitive investor undertakes the investment too early. Figure 6.3.6 illustrates such 
an outcome.
FIGURE 6.3.6 DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTING FROM DELAY
S(p), Tip) +A 
{9+r)Co Where, CS(p°)> A0 > A0’ &
i0. _rCS(p*)-97i(p°)
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In the circumstances described by equation (6.3.15) and illustrated in Figure 6.3.6, the 
monopoly investor may be more dynamically efficient, and generate a better outcome 
for society than the competitive investor. All other things being equal the condition in 
equation (6.3.15) is more likely to be met when there is a higher rate of technological 
progress and higher fixed fee.
From the results obtained in this Section the more general conclusion is reached that for 
any given access charge (p, A), the competitive investor may only generate a worse 
outcome for society than the monopoly investor, if the competitive investor provides the 
essential infrastructure prior to the dynamically-efflcient time tw(p).
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6.4 The Static Allocative and Dynamic Efficiency Trade-Off
This Section initially establishes that in the framework used here, static allocative 
efficiency is achieved by setting the usage price equal to the short-run marginal cost of 
supplying access. It then outlines various claims made that the regulator faces a static 
allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off when choosing the appropriate access price 
to set. That is, a lower access price leads to a higher level of static allocative efficiency, 
but decreases dynamic efficiency by reducing the incentive to invest. These claims are 
assessed in the model, by decreasing the access charge through a decrease in the fixed 
fee A and a decrease in the usage price p.
A decrease in the fixed fee A is found to only have an impact upon dynamic efficiency. 
Following on from Section 6.3, it is shown that it will decrease the dynamic efficiency 
of a monopoly investor, and can either increase or decrease the dynamic efficiency of a 
competitive investor. A decrease in the usage price though is shown to affect both 
investment timing and static allocative efficiency for the monopoly and competitive 
investor. Using the analysis from Section 6.3, it is illustrated that while there is a 
dynamic and allocative efficiency trade-off for the monopoly investor, a decrease in the 
usage price for access can potentially increase both dynamic and static allocative 
efficiency for the competitive investor. Regardless of whether there is an efficiency 
trade-off though, it is shown that for both investors, a decrease in the usage price will 
always generate a trade-off between:
■ the additional benefit from the lower cost and higher social surplus that arises once 
the investment is made; and
■ the additional cost from deferring the investment and delaying the flow of social 
surplus until a later time.
6.4.1 Static Allocative Efficiency in the Model
Allocative efficiency is achieved in a market where the price reaches a level where the 
value derived by the consumer from the additional unit of output — the marginal value 
— is equal to the cost to society of supplying that extra unit — the marginal cost. In the 
framework used here, the level of demand and welfare are being assessed at each instant 
in time after the investment occurs. Hence, as in the model used in Section 5.4 of 
Chapter 5, the relevant timeframe for analysing allocative efficiency is the short run. 
Subsequently, static allocative efficiency is achieved by setting the usage price for
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access equal to the short-run marginal cost of production, which by assumption from 
Section 6.2, is equal to zero (i.e. SRMC = 0). The resulting surplus that flows to society 
at each instant from charging the static-allocatively-efficient-zero usage price once the 
investment has been made, is captured in Figure 6.4.1 by the shaded area/w gw O .
FIGURE 6.4.1 SHORT-RUN STATIC ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
Using short-run marginal cost as the benchmark for static allocative efficiency is 
consistent with the work done by Evans, Quigley and Zhang (EQZ, 2003), which 
examines the optimal regulated price in a model where there is a static and dynamic 
efficiency trade-off.
6.4.2 Claims of an Efficiency Trade-Off
Although concerns over static allocative efficiency remain central to the debates over 
the appropriateness of the regulated access price, as alluded to in the introduction of this 
Chapter, there has gradually been a greater emphasis placed on the incentives such 
prices create for future investment and innovation i.e. “dynamic efficiency”. In 
particular, certain regulatory authorities, and academic and industry commentators, have 
highlighted that the regulated access price may involve a static allocative and dynamic 
efficiency trade-off. Various references that have been made to this trade-off are 
summarised in the analysis that follows.
King and Maddock (1996) note (at page 106) that, “the pursuit of short-term efficiency 
may become detrimental if it results in long-term inefficiencies.” In the following
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sentence they warn if, “regulations designed to promote the ‘correct’ prices today 
dissuade investors from building new infrastructure tomorrow, then the long-term 
dynamic costs of the regulation can easily outweigh the transitory benefits.” Therefore 
in setting the optimal regulated access price, King and Maddock maintain (at page 107):
The regulatory authorities will inevitably find themselves trading off 
short- and long-term goals. At best, a balance will be struck between 
those goals which provides reasonable benefits to both present and 
future consumers.
However, the authors also recognise the difficulty faced by the regulator in setting the 
optimal regulated access price, as they conclude (at page 122), “the trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency allows for few simple answers.”
In submissions to the Productivity Commission inquiry into the National Access 
Regime, Network Economic Consultancy Group (NECG) has consistently argued that 
the regulator should consider the static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off, 
when setting the regulated access price.16 NECG (2001a) states (at page 16) that:
.. .regulators effectively face a choice between (i) erring on the side of 
lower access prices and seeking to ensure they remove any potential for 
monopoly rents and the consequent allocative inefficiencies from the 
system; or (ii) allowing higher access prices so as to ensure that 
sufficient incentives for efficient investment are retained, with the 
consequent productive and dynamic efficiencies such investment 
engenders.17
In a later submission NECG (2001b) repeats the same line of reasoning, when it 
suggests (at page 13) that the Productivity Commission:
...needs to undertake a careful cost-benefit analysis to ensure that their 
final recommendations maximise dynamic efficiency gains, with the 
minimum possible costs in terms of allocative efficiency.
The PC (2001b) cites the passage from NECG (2001a) at page 83, yet appears to reject 
the notion that there exists such a simple efficiency trade-off. It states that it:
16 For an opposing view, see the passage from the submission by BHP Billiton that is cited by the PC (2001b) at page 127, which 
states that:
It is not established that there is an inherent conflict between static and dynamic efficiency or that monopoly 
pricing is necessary to induce investment in infrastructure.
17' NECG (2001a) go on to analyse allocative efficiency in the short- and long-run at pages 21 and 23. However, its analysis of 
allocative efficiency is incorrect, as it does not assume constant-retums-to-scale technology, yet uses short-run and long-run 
average cost curves, rather than the appropriate short- and long-run marginal cost curves to assess welfare in the industry. It 
also does not use a model to address the issue of investment timing formally in its submission.
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...does not subscribe to the view that, in a regulated environment, the 
community faces a choice between incurring the allocative efficiency 
costs of over-compensation and (more serious) dynamic costs of under­
compensation. Both types of error are likely to influence investment 
outcomes and therefore have dynamic efficiency implications.
However, the PC(2001a) does seem to recognise that there is some form of efficiency
trade-off, when it remarks (at page 4) that:
.. .it is important to encourage efficiency in the use of 
telecommunications infrastructure while also recognising that incentives 
for investment in telecommunications infrastructure need to be 
maintained. Investment in core infrastructure can be frustrated by 
unduly low access prices and excessive regulatory scope, while demand 
for services and investment in facilities dependent on the core 
infrastructure can be frustrated by unduly high access prices...
The Commerce Commission in New Zealand has explicitly recognised the potential for 
the type of static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off alluded to by NECG. The 
Commerce Commission (2001) outlines (at page 15, paragraph 70) that:
Where there are tensions between short-term allocative and long-term 
dynamic efficiency, the Commission takes the preliminary view that the 
latter will generally better promote the long term benefit of end users.
Guthrie, Small and Wright (GSW, 2001) and Evans and Guthrie (2002), investigate the 
impact backward-looking and forward-looking cost regulation have on the investment 
timing of a firm. Although neither paper explicitly refers to a static allocative efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency trade-off, both capture this type of trade-off. For example GSW 
outline (at page 3) that:
High access charges lead to a flow of surplus that is low but starts 
sooner, while low access charges lead to a flow of surplus that is high 
but starts later.
EQZ (2003) do explicitly refer to a static and dynamic efficiency trade-off. They 
outline that the potential for this type of trade-off is well established in the literature, 
citing the arguments made by Schumpeter (1942) that were outlined in Chapter 4. They 
capture the trade-off by investigating the optimal price monopolistic innovators should 
charge for the intermediate goods that are being provided for final production. EQZ 
find that this price, which they refer to as a “second-best price”, is higher than the 
monopoly price, yet lower than the allocatively-efficient-short-run marginal cost.
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6.4.3 Changing the Fixed Fee for Access
Although it has been established in Section 6.3 that in some circumstances the 
dynamically-efficient fixed access fee for the competitive investor can be less than zero, 
it is assumed for the remainder of the analysis in this Chapter that the fixed access fee is 
set so that CS(p) >A>  0. As is the standard case for a two-part tariff, any adjustment to 
the access charge here via a change in the fixed fee, will have no impact upon static 
allocative efficiency. The result arises because the fixed fee represents a lump-sum 
transfer from the consumer to the access provider, which by definition, does not distort 
the quantity of access demanded by consumers at the given usage price p.
Assuming the access provider initially bases its access charge on the usage price-fixed 
fee combination (p°, A0), where CS(p°) >A°> 0, the non-distortionary nature of changes 
in the fixed fee can be illustrated in Figure 6.4.2. This diagram indicates that if the 
access provider only decreases the access charge via a decrease in the fixed fee from A0 
— shaded areas B + C — to A 1 — shaded area C — the consumption of access remains 
unchanged at quantity q°.
FIGURE 6.4.2 DECREASES IN THE ACCESS CHARGE AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
Where, A°= B + C, 
A '=C
A decrease in the access charge via a change in the fixed fee also means that there is no 
effect on the dynamically-efficient time tw. However, as a change in the fixed fee 
changes the level of operating profit anticipated by the firm in any period after the
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investment has occurred, it does have an impact upon the timing decision by the 
competitive and monopoly investor.
For both the competitive and monopoly investor, a decrease in the fixed fee A, decreases 
the revenue flow that the access provider can earn in any given period once the 
investment has been undertaken. Therefore, it provides the incentive to invest at a later 
time, when the costs of the investment have decreased sufficiently for the required rate 
of return to be earned. This outcome is confirmed by taking the derivative of the 
expressions for investment timing by a monopoly and competitive investor with respect 
to the fixed fee A. Using equations (6.2.11) and (6.2.16), it is found that,
~~  — ~ ~  — ~ ~ 7" A — 7 7  < 0 , Where CS(p)>A> 0 (6.4.1)
dA dA 0(7r(p) + A)
As it is assumed the access charge is set so that A < CS(p), it follows from Section 6.3 
that the monopoly investor either invests at the dynamically-efficient time or 
inefficiently delays the investment. Consequently, a decrease in the fixed fee will 
always decrease dynamic efficiency.
For the competitive investor, a decrease in the fixed fee may either lead to an increase
or decrease in dynamic efficiency. From Section 6.3, if > A , then the
6 + r
competitive investor either invests at the dynamically-efficient time or inefficiently 
delays the investment. A decrease in the fixed fee subsequently decreases the level of 
dynamic efficiency. If however, the access charge is set so that it initially satisfies the
condition CS(p) > A > —^ ( p )  ̂ then competitive investor would have
6 + r
undertaken the investment too early, and a decrease in the fixed fee can potentially 
increase dynamic efficiency. An example where a decrease in the fixed fee results in 
the competitive investor increasing dynamic efficiency is provided in Figure 6.4.3.
In Figure 6.4.3 it is assumed that the access provider initially sets the access charge 
based on the usage price-fixed fee combination (p°, A0), where
CS(p°) > A0 > ^  —̂0n(p ) ^ q The diagram shows that at the usage price p°,
6 + r
dynamic efficiency is achieved by investing at time t°w. At the initial access charge 
though, it is apparent that the monopoly is inefficiently delaying the investment (i.e. 
t°x > ), while the firm facing competition to provide the essential facility, invests too
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Decreasing the fixed fee to A1, whereearly (i.e. t°0 <t°w).
rCS(p0) -  07r(p°)AU>A‘ >
6 + r
> 0, decreases the level of dynamic efficiency achieved by
the monopoly investor. Using superscript A to denote the investment timing under the 
lower fixed fee, the monopoly now invests at the later time tA , where tAx > t°x > t°w. For 
the competitive investor though, this decrease in the fixed fee leads to an increase in 
dynamic efficiency, as the investment occurs at the later time , where t°w > tA > f0. In 
these circumstances the dynamically-efficient outcome would have been achieved if the
fixed fee were initially decreased by the amount A0 -  1 e
6 + r
FIGURE 6.4.3 THE EFFECT OF CHANGING THE FIXED ACCESS CHARGE
Where, CS(p°) > A0 > Ä  >
6.4.4 Changing the Usage Price for Access
A decrease in the access charge through a decrease in the usage price p, will affect the 
level of allocative efficiency, as the quantity of access demanded by the consumer rises. 
Assuming the usage price falls from p° to p x — because the short-run marginal cost of 
providing access by assumption is zero — the increase in short-run allocative efficiency 
is captured by the increase in social surplus, which in Figure 6.4.2 is depicted by area 
abqxq \  From Section 6.3, the decrease in the usage price p also leads to the 
dynamically-efficient time occurring earlier, and the new dynamically-efficient time 
generating a higher net present value to society.
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Where pm > p > O,18 a decrease in the usage price p, leads to a fall in the revenue flows 
earned in each period by a monopoly and competitive investor. This induces both firms 
to provide the essential infrastructure at a later time, as the benefit relative to the cost of 
investing decreases. The outcome is confirmed by using the investment-timing 
expressions in equations (6.2.11) and (6.2.16), and taking the derivative of tx and tQ with 
respect to p. This yields,
dtr dtn 1 n'(p) _ .  ̂  ̂ „ /£ . -v-7i  = —£- = - ——t t < 0, wherepm> p> 0  (6.4.2)
dp dp 0 n(p)
6.4.4.1 Decreasing the Usage Price for a Monopoly Investor
For a monopoly investor, where pm> p>  0, a decrease in the usage price p  increases 
allocative efficiency and the level of social surplus, as the value to the consumer on the 
additional units of access supplied when the investment is undertaken exceeds the short- 
run cost to society of supplying those units. It does however lead to a decrease in 
dynamic efficiency, as the dynamically-efficient time to undertake the investment is 
earlier, yet the firm chooses to delay the investment further. This defers the realisation 
of the higher social surplus derived from using the infrastructure, but decreases the cost 
of undertaking the investment. The static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off 
here is characterised by a trade-off between:
■ the additional benefit from the lower cost of undertaking the investment and the 
higher social surplus generated once the infrastructure is provided; and
■ the additional cost of foregoing the flow of social surplus until a later time.
Therefore, a decrease in the usage price for access charged by a monopoly investor 
generates a higher (lower) net present value to society, when this additional benefit 
outlined above is greater (less) than the additional cost.19 The issue is examined in more 
detail in Chapter 7, which looks at linear access pricing. In particular, it assesses 
whether linear price regulation of the monopoly investor is beneficial, and if it is, how 
the optimal linear price should be set.
Assuming there is a usage price of p°, where pm > p° > 0, and no fixed fee (i.e. A = 0), 
the impact a decrease in the usage price to p x has on the dynamically-efficient time tw,
i o
° Only considering prices where revenues are increasing in prices and concave, is consistent with the analysis o f GSW (2001). 
19 This is the type o f trade-off GSW (2001) outline will occur, when there is a downward drift in costs, and a lower access price.
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and the investment timing of a monopoly investor tx, is illustrated in Figure 6.4.4. The 
investment timing associated with the respective usage prices is denoted here using the 
superscript 0 and 1.
FIGURE 6.4.4 THE USAGE PRICE AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY FOR A MONOPOLY
Where, p m> p° > p' > 0
6.4.4.2 Decreasing the Usage Price for a Competitive Investor
For the competitive investor, as was the case with a decrease in the fixed fee A, a 
decrease in the usage price p, where pm> p > 0, may either result in an increase or 
decrease in dynamic efficiency.
A decrease in dynamic efficiency, and subsequently a static allocative and dynamic 
efficiency trade-off arises, if prior to the price decrease occurring, the competitive firm 
would have invested at the dynamically-efficient time or inefficiently delayed the 
investment. From equation (6.3.10) and (6.3.14), this outcome requires that the initial
CS( ) ^ 0
usage price-fixed fee combination (p, A) satisfy the condition -------------> —. As was
7r(p) + A r
the case for the monopoly investor, a decrease in the usage price increases (decreases) 
the net present value to society if the additional benefit from the later investment is 
greater (less) than the additional cost.
An increase in both allocative and dynamic efficiency may arise if prior to the decrease 
in price occurring, the competitive firm would have invested too early. Rearranging the 
expression in equation (6.3.15), this outcome requires that the initial usage price-fixed
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C S  (  ) 0
fee combination (p, Ä) satisfy the condition ----- -------< —. Figure 6.4.5 provides an
7r(p) + A r
illustration of where such a condition is met. In the diagram, a decrease in the usage 
price from p° to p x leads to the competitive investor deferring the provision of the 
essential infrastructure, yet increasing the level of dynamic efficiency. For simplicity it 
is assumed in the diagram that there is no fixed fee (i.e. A =  0).
FIGURE 6.4.5 THE USAGE PRICE AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY UNDER COMPETITION
4p), S{p) a
Where, pm> p° > p' > 0
Figure 6.4.5 illustrates that the decrease in the usage price leads to the investment 
timing by the competitive investor being deferred from time to t \ , while the socially-
optimal time decreases from t°w to t\ .  Although there is an increase in dynamic 
efficiency, there still exists some level of dynamic inefficiency, which implies that at p \
CS{p ) < # As shown jn equation (6.3.11), to induce the dynamically-efficient 
7i(p ) r
outcome in the absence of a fixed fee, the usage price for access must be reduced until,
CS(p) _  0
7i(p) r
(6.4.3)
It is important to recognise that even though it is possible for a decrease in the usage 
price to increase both static allocative and dynamic efficiency, the same trade-off will 
still exist between:
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■ the additional benefit from the lower cost of the investment and the higher social 
surplus generated once the infrastructure is provided; and
■ the additional cost of foregoing the flow of social surplus until a later time.20
A decrease in the usage price charged by the competitive investor once more only 
increases the net present value to society where this additional benefit is greater than the 
additional cost. The issue of the usage price that maximises the net present value to 
society achieved by the competitive investor, and its relationship with the usage price 
associated with the dynamically-efficient time in equation (6.4.3), is addressed in 
Chapter 7, Section 7.4.
6.4.5 Assessing the Efficiency Trade-Off Claim
The analysis of this model demonstrates that a simple decrease in the access charge will 
not necessarily generate the trade-off claimed to arise between static allocative and 
dynamic efficiency. It is shown here that while a decrease in the fixed fee A effects the 
level of dynamic efficiency, an efficiency trade-off will only occur if the access charge 
is decreased through a decrease in the usage price p.2X Therefore, it appears that those 
analysts claiming there is a static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off resulting 
from some change in the access charge, must either be dealing with industries where the 
regulator is considering whether to adjust the usage price for access, or industries where 
there is only a linear price for access.
90 • . . . .  . . .GSW,  Evans and Guthrie, and EQZ, all outline a similar type o f trade-off occurring in their models, which examine the impact
access pricing has on investment timing.
? 1 Gans and Williams (1999a) and the majority o f the work done by Gans (2001), examines the impact a change in the fixed fee 
for access has upon investment timing and welfare. In Section 6, Gans does consider the optimal usage price, although he does 
not seem to refer to any dynamic and static allocative efficiency trade-off.
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6.5 Rate-of-Return (ROR) Regulation of a Monopoly Investor
In this Section it is assumed the regulator can control the rate of return that the firm is 
allowed to earn on the backward-looking (BL) or original cost of its investment. That 
is, for any given linear access price p  and fixed fee A, the regulator sets an allowed fair 
rate of return/  on the original cost of the investment, which is less than the unregulated 
rate of return 6 + r a monopoly investor is able to earn. By doing this, the regulator 
induces the monopoly investor to undertake the investment at an earlier time. Where 
the regulator restricts the allowed rate of return to the normal rate of return r, the results 
are equivalent to the outcomes derived for the competitive investor in Section 6.2. In 
addition, it is illustrated that in relation to investment timing, an equivalence result once 
again exists between ROR regulation of the monopoly investor and a capital subsidy. 
These results are shown to have potential policy implications for the regulation of 
investors.
6.5.1 Investment Timing under ROR Regulation on BL Costs
For any given linear price p  and fixed fee A, the constraint imposed by using ROR 
regulation and only allowing the firm to earn the fair rate/  on the original or BL cost of 
the investment, is captured in the following equation.
7r(p) + A
C , e ei"
= f < e + r (6.5.1)
In equation (6.5.1), txr represents the investment timing by the ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor for any given linear price p  and fixed fee A. It is equal to,
— log 
0
( /C 0
7r(p) + A
< t. '(ß+pq?yx(p) + Aj , where f  < 6 + r (6.5.2)
This outcome reflects that ROR regulation induces earlier investment timing by the 
monopolist, as it restricts the rents the investor can achieve. If the assumption is also 
made that the fair rate /  is higher than the normal rate of return r, then the net present 
value that is derived by the ROR-regulated monopoly investor from investing at the 
earlier time txr, will be equal to,
A rPV"(p ,A)  1 f ( / - r ) r iV 7> + / 0 Y  *(P) + A
1 ’ r i  /
\ e
y v /C„
, where 6 + r > f  > r (6.5.3)
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The derivation of the expression in equation (6.5.3) is outlined in the Appendix to this 
Chapter in Section A.6.4.
The earlier investment timing by the monopoly investor under ROR regulation can be 
illustrated in Figure 6.5.1. In this diagram it is assumed that the firm charges some 
access fee consisting of a usage price p° and fixed fee A0, and the resulting investment 
times are denoted by superscript 0.
FIGURE 6.5.1 THE IMPACT OF ROR REGULATION ON THE MONOPOLY INVESTOR
The impact of ROR regulation where/ >  r.
As outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.7, the regulator is often under a statutory duty to 
establish a framework that simulates the effects of a competitive market. If reproducing 
the competitive market effect is interpreted by the regulator as requiring that the firm 
earns a fair rate equal to normal rate of return (i.e. /  = r), ROR regulation of the 
monopoly investor has the same effect as having a perfect competition to undertake 
investment. For example, at any given linear price p and fixed fee A, the ROR- 
regulated monopoly invests at time,
‘„(P,A) = ‘o(P’A) = p °  gu
rC
x(p)+A
(6.5.4)
and the firm derives a net present of zero from undertaking the investment. As the 
results for the ROR-regulated monopoly investor are identical to those achieved by a 
competitive investor, throughout the remainder of Chapters 6 and 7, the outcomes under 
ROR regulation are denoted using the notation adopted for the competitive investor.
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Like the competitive investor, the monopoly investor subject to ROR regulation, may 
either invest prior to, at, or after the dynamically-efficient time tw(p). From the analysis 
in Section 6.3.3, for the given access charge (p, A), ROR-regulation leads to the 
monopoly investor:
■ continuing to inefficiently delay the investment if > ^  .
0 + r
■ investing at the dynamically-efficient time if A -  • an(j
6 + r
■ providing the essential infrastructure too early if CS(p) > A > rCS(p) -  6 k ( p )  
6 + r
An example of where ROR regulation induces the monopoly investor to provide the 
essential infrastructure too early is illustrated in Figure 6.5.2.
FIGURE 6.5.2 INVESTMENT TIMING OF THE ROR-REGULATED MONOPOLY INVESTOR
The earlier investment timing by a 
monopoly investor due to ROR regulation, 
when/ =  r.
In this diagram it is once more assumed that the access charge consists of the given 
usage price-fixed fee combination (p°, A0). The monopoly investor not subject to any 
fair rate and facing this access charge invests at time t°x. The ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor facing the fair rate f  = r, provides the essential infrastructure at the earlier time 
tQo, but invests prior to the dynamically-efficient time associated with usage price p°, tQ0.
This implies that the access charge is such that,
6 + r
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6.5.2 The Higher Investment Cost under ROR Regulation
The earlier provision of the essential infrastructure by a monopoly investor subject to 
ROR regulation means that, compared to the unregulated outcome, there is a higher cost 
to the firm and society of undertaking the investment. Further, this cost is higher the 
closer the fair rate /  is set to the normal rate of return on capital r. This result appears 
consistent with findings in static models, which suggest that the ROR-regulated 
monopoly has an incentive to incur a higher cost of production to society. However, 
unlike these models, the increased cost of production here does not actually reflect any 
cost inefficiency from an input distortion, capital waste or padding of costs. The higher 
cost from undertaking the investment earlier arises in this framework, because of the 
cost-decreasing rate of technological progress 6.
6.5.3 The Benefit to Society of ROR Regulation
If the monopoly investor is restricted to earning the same normal rate of return r as the 
competitive investor, then from equation (6.2.17), the net present value derived by 
society will be,
NPV;(p,A) = - (C S ( p ) - A )  
r
f 7z(p) + A
v. rCo
\ e
(6.5.5)
As ROR regulation of the monopoly investor may either increase or decrease dynamic 
efficiency, it can also increase or decrease the net present value derived by society. 
ROR regulation will unambiguously increase dynamic efficiency and the net present 
value to society, if it leads to the monopoly investor being dynamically efficient or still 
engaging in inefficient delay. This occurs if at any given access charge (p, A),
/ ^ r t /  \  / j  /  \
-----—-------- — > A . ROR regulation of the monopoly investor may only decrease
6 + r
dynamic efficiency and the net present value to society, if it induces the monopoly 
investor to provide the essential infrastructure before the socially-optimal time tw(p). 
Such an outcome is possible if at any given usage price p and fixed fee A,
CS ( p ) > A> rCS{p)- en{p) P  
6 + r
79^ If at the given access charge CS(p) = A, then the monopoly investor would have originally invested at the dynamically-efficient 
time, and the introduction of ROR regulation will unambiguously decrease dynamic efficiency and the benefit to society.
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6.5.4 Equivalence of ROR Regulation and the Capital Subsidy 
Chapter 2 and 3 establish an equivalence result between the capital subsidy and ROR 
regulation in the Averch and Johnson (1962) model. In relation to the monopoly 
investor, it appears that a similar equivalence result exists in this framework with 
respect to investment timing. ROR regulation and the capital subsidy both induce 
earlier investment, and a lower fair rate has the same effect upon investment timing as 
providing the monopoly investor with a higher capital subsidy at time 0.
It is assumed that at time 0, the monopoly investor is provided with a capital subsidy s, 
such that the original cost of the investment is Cz, where Cz = (1 -  s)Co. With this 
subsidy provided on each unit of the original cost of the investment Co, for a given 
linear access price p  and fixed fee A, the firm achieves the required rate of return 0 + r 
at the earlier time of tz{p, A).
tz(p,A) = -  log
C7
(fl + r)C,
7t{p)+ A
<tx(p,A) = ~  log | (g + Qc„x(p) + A (6.5.6)
Therefore, although the capital-subsidised investor achieves a higher rate of return than 
the ROR-regulated monopoly investor, both schemes induce earlier investment timing. 
Equating the timing of the ROR-regulated monopoly investor subject to some fair rate/  
— where 0 + r> f  >r  — with the timing of the capital-subsidised monopoly investor, it 
is possible to derive an expression for the equivalent capital subsidy 5 at any given fair 
rate f  That is, equating the expression for tz(p, A) in equation (6.5.6), with the 
expression for txr(p, A) in equation (6.5.2), and solving yields,
S(f)  = 0 + r )
where (0 + r) >f>  r (6.5.7)
Taking the first derivative of equation (6.5.7), confirms that, for a monopoly investor as 
the fair rate of return /  converges towards the normal rate of return r, it has the same 
effect on timing as providing the firm with a higher capital subsidy 5.
ds
~df
-1
0 + r
< 0 (6.5.8)
From equation (6.5.8), in terms of timing, the capital subsidy that is equivalent to 
restricting the monopoly investor to earning the normal rate of return on capital r is,
s(r) = (6.5.9)
259
Therefore, as was the case with ROR-regulated monopoly subject to the normal rate of 
return, the earlier investment timing due to the capital subsidy can either lead to the 
monopoly investor:
■ continuing to inefficiently delay the investment;
■ undertaking the investment at the dynamically-efficient time tw(pm)', or
■ providing the essential infrastructure too early.
Similarly, the capital subsidy may only decrease the net present value to society if it 
induces the investment to occur prior to the dynamically-efficient time. An outcome 
where the capital subsidy s{r) leads to the monopoly investor providing the essential 
infrastructure inefficiently early is illustrated in Figure 6.5.3. In the diagram it is once 
again assumed that there is a given access charge (p°, A0).
FIGURE 6.5.3 THE EQUIVALENCE OF ROR REGULATION AND A CAPITAL SUBSIDY
The earlier investment timing due to ROR 
regulation or the equivalent capital subsidy s(r).
From Section 6.4.1, it appears that providing the monopoly investor with a higher 
capital subsidy has the same impact upon timing as providing the monopoly investor, 
allowed to charge a two-part tariff, with a higher fixed fee.23 Hence, from the 
equivalence between ROR regulation and the capital subsidy, it also follows that in
Gans (2001) makes the point that the socially-optimal outcome can be achieved using a fixed access charge, despite the absence 
of a government subsidy.
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terms of investment timing, ROR regulation of the monopoly investor is equivalent to 
increasing the fixed fee A.
Although ROR regulation has the same impact upon timing as providing the monopoly 
investor with either a capital subsidy or a higher fixed fee, the same equivalence does 
not apply for the competitive investor. While a capital subsidy and an increase in the 
allowed fixed fee induce earlier investment timing by a competitive investor, ROR 
regulation has no impact. The reason for this is that ROR regulation merely simulates 
the effects of having a perfectly-competitive market to provide the essential 
infrastructure, something that a competitive investor by definition, is already subject to.
6.5.5 Policy Implications of the Equivalence Results from ROR Regulation 
The analysis here shows that, with investment costs in an industry decreasing over time 
due to technological progress, ROR regulation of the monopoly investor can be used to 
simulate the effects of a competitive market to undertake the investment. For a given 
access charge, by restricting the rate of return the monopoly investor is allowed to earn, 
the regulator induces the firm to invest earlier. This can potentially decrease the 
dynamic inefficiency that arises from having a monopoly investor. As earlier 
investment is achieved without allowing the investor any economic rent, it may be 
considered more publicly acceptable than inducing the same earlier investment timing 
by means of a capital subsidy or a higher fixed fee.
The equivalence the outcomes for the ROR-regulated monopoly investor and the 
competitive investor also highlights the obvious point that, where there is a competitive 
market to undertake the investment, the regulator need not bother applying ROR 
regulation. If there were some cost associated with using regulatory instruments, the 
application of ROR regulation would just represent a waste of society’s resources.
Finally, the equivalence established between ROR regulation of the monopoly investor 
and the unregulated competitive investor suggests that, in an industry subject to rapid 
cost-decreasing technological progress over time, ROR regulation will not provide the 
necessary market discipline after the essential infrastructure has been built. ROR 
regulation here, only simulates the effect of competition for the market, and does not 
simulate the effect of competition in the market. Therefore, if the regulator wants to 
discipline a competitive or monopoly investor’s pricing behaviour after the 
infrastructure has been built, it needs to consider using an additional regulatory 
instrument on the firm. The PC (2001b) appears to recognise a similar problem when it
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highlights the potential for monopoly pricing to occur after an investment has been 
undertaken. It states (at page 71) that:
Competition at the construction phase will sometimes occur against a 
back-drop of the potential for the successful investor to charge 
monopoly prices once it has become established as the incumbent 
provider.
The addition of price regulation to simulate the effects of competition within the market 
is considered in greater detail in Chapter 7.
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6.6 The Socially-Optimal Investment
This Section highlights the usage price and investment timing that maximises the net 
present value to society. As in Gans (2001), it is found here that it is possible for an 
investor to achieve the welfare-maximising outcome if it can charge a two-part access 
tariff. The monopoly investor can achieve the welfare-maximising outcome if it is left 
unregulated and allowed to charge a two-part tariff that maximises it profit. In contrast, 
a competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor charging the same two-part access 
tariff undertakes the investment too early. To maximise the net present value to society, 
the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor must charge the same allocatively 
efficient usage charge as the unregulated monopoly investor, but a lower fixed fee, the 
level of which is decreasing in the rate of technological progress. This result suggests 
that an access holiday may not be necessary to induce the efficient investment outcome, 
and a lower access charge may be appropriate in industries experiencing a higher rate of 
technological progress. The final sub-section outlines industries where two-part tariffs 
are used, and briefly considers why such access prices have not been adopted in 
telecommunications.
6.6.1 The Socially-Optimal Outcome
As the socially-optimal time at any given usage price p has already been found in 
Section 6.3, in order to find an outcome that maximises the net present value to society, 
the benevolent social planner must choose the optimal per-unit access price p. This is 
done by,
(6.6. 1)
which yields the FOC,
(6.6.2)
Solving equation (6.6.2), the optimal usage price set by the benevolent social planner is 
p* = 0. As the social surplus will be equal to its maximum possible value (i.e. 5(0) = 
5max), the dynamically-efficient time in equation (6.3.3), tw will now be,
(6.6.3)<„(/>'=») = h o g
{e+r)c0
V ^max J
The intuition for why price p* = 0, and the corresponding investment timing tw(p* = 0), 
maximises the overall net present value to society, is that it is both allocatively and 
dynamically efficient. Allocative efficiency is achieved because the usage price here is 
being set equal to the zero short-run marginal cost of production. This price maximises 
the total benefits to society that can be achieved at each instant in time after the 
investment in the essential infrastructure has been provided.
Substituting p* = 0 into the expression for the maximum net present value for society, 
yields,
n p v ; ( p = o) = -
6 + r (o+r)cto y
(6.6.4)
The socially-optimal outcome described here is depicted in Figure 6.6.1. For 
convenience in this diagram, the socially-optimal timing for the investment tw(p* = 0) is 
denoted by .
FIGURE 6.6.1 THE SOCIALLY-OPTIMA!. INVESTMENT
S(P)
6.6.2 Achieving the Socially-Optimal Outcome with a Monopoly Investor 
The analysis in Section 6.3.3 established that the dynamically-efficient investment time 
at any given usage price p  — tw{p) — will be achieved if the monopoly investor charges 
a two-part tariff, where the fixed fee is set equal to the consumer surplus derived at
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usage price p  (i.e. A = CS(p)). Therefore, an identical outcome to the social planner is 
obtained if the monopoly investor is left unregulated and allowed to perfectly-price 
discriminate, or equivalently in this model, set a two-part access tariff that consists of an 
allocatively-efficient zero usage price p* = 0 and a fixed fee of A* = CS(0) = Smax24
Such a result has been recognised by the PC (2001b), which notes (at page 72, Box 4.2) 
that Gans (2001) has outlined that:
.. .if the incumbent provider had the capacity to set charges that 
discriminated perfectly between service users on the basis of their 
willingness to pay, it would (re)invest at the socially optimal time. This 
outcome is analogous to the outcome in the static model where perfect 
price discrimination eliminates the allocative efficiency costs of 
monopoly.
The timing of the monopoly investor allowed to charge the fixed fee A*x = Smax is,
<J(0,Sma,) = ̂ l° g [ ^ ^ )C0 =  t . (6.6.5)
The investment timing under such a two-part access tariff is depicted in Figure 6.6.2, 
where the investment timing of the monopoly tx(p =0, A* = 5'max) is denoted by t*.
FIGURE 6.6.2 THE SOCIALLY-OPTIMAL OUTCOME WITH A MONOPOLY INVESTOR
Mp )+A, S(p)
24 The result is similar to an outcome in the optimal patent literature highlighted by Tirole (1989) in Chapter 10, pages 390-1.
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The two-part access tariff here maximises the net present value of the firm and achieves 
the socially-optimal outcome by internalising all the benefits to society derived from the 
investment. Subsequently, the expression for the maximum net present value to the 
firm is identical to the expression for the net present value to society in equation (6.6.4), 
and is equal to,
NPVU0,S ) - i ff  ] f  S  Vmax[ 0  +  r  J v(0  + r )C oJ NPV“(p' = 0) (6.6.6)
6.6.3 The Social Optimum with a Competitive or ROR-Regulated Monopoly Investor 
Where there is a competitive market for providing infrastructure, or ROR regulation of 
the monopoly investor, the two-part access tariff, p  = 0 and A = Smax, induces premature 
investment in the essential facility. That is, the firm invests at time,
tA°>Snm)=gloS
rC \
c
V max
< t (6.6.7)
The outcome from charging the dynamically-inefficient-two-part access tariff for the 
competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor, p* = 0 and A = Smax, is depicted in 
Figure 6.6.3. The inefficient investment timing by such firms, t0{p*= 0, A = Smax), is
denoted in the diagram by .
FIGURE 6.6.3 THE SOCIALLY-OPTIMAL OUTCOME WITH COMPETITION
n(p)+A, S(p)
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The timing of the investment described by equation (6.6.7) and illustrated in Figure 
6.6.3, leads to the ROR-regulated monopoly or competitive investor generating a net 
present value to the firm and society of zero (i.e. NPVj((), *Smax) = NPVs(0, Smâ ) = 0).
The reason for the dynamic inefficiency and failure to achieve the socially-optimal 
outcome with a competitive investor is that a problem arises similar to the “tragedy of 
the commons”. Unlike the unregulated monopoly investor who has an exclusive right to 
invest, in a competitive market, potential investors vie for the right to provide the 
essential infrastructure. At the access charge p* = 0 and A = Smax, because the property 
right to invest is initially undefined and is obtained on a “first-come first-serve basis”, 
competition for the investment destroys social surplus. The PC (2001b) alludes to this 
type of problem when it recognises (at page 72) that, while the impact of the 
“competition to construct” reduces economic rents, it could lead to premature 
investment in capacity.
From analysis in Section 6.3, at the allocatively-efficient usage price p* = 0, to induce 
the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor to undertake the investment at the 
dynamically-efficient time, the fixed fee must be set so that A* = rSmM/0  + r . Such an 
access charge yields,
The timing of the investment by a dynamically-efficient competitive or ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor — i.e. t0(p*= 0, A* = rSmaJO+r) — is denoted in Figure 6.6.3 by t0.
The net present value to society derived by the competitive and ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor from charging this two-part access tariff, p* = 0 and A* = rSmax/6+r, 
is now identical to the net present value to society achieved by the social planner.
Unlike the socially-optimal fixed fee for the unregulated monopoly investor A*, the 
socially-optimal fixed fee Ao does not extract the entire surplus from the consumer, and 
its level depends upon the rate of technological progress. By taking the derivative of 
A* with respect to the rate of technological progress 0, it is shown that the higher the
(6 .6 .8)
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rate of technological progress is, the lower the optimal fixed fee that should be charged 
by the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor.25 That is,
rlA* r<\--- iemax_<0 (6.6.10)
d6 (0 + r f
In terms of public policy, the results suggest that in order to achieve the socially-optimal 
outcome, it may not be necessary to provide the monopoly investor with a period of no 
regulation — i.e. an access holiday. Instead of leaving the monopoly investor 
unregulated, the socially-optimal investment outcome can be achieved by restricting the 
fair rate of return the monopoly investor is allowed to earn, and requiring the firm to 
charge a lower fixed fee for access.
6.6.4 Two-Part Access Tariffs in Practice
Although two-part access tariffs can potentially induce the socially-optimal investment, 
it is prudent to recognise that they are not always used in particular industries.
Biggar (2001) outlines that two-part tariffs are used to price access in the natural gas 
transmission and distribution sector, and in the rail-track sector. In these sectors, the 
fixed charge is typically set quite high, and only a small element of total costs depends 
upon the volume of gas, or the number of trains transported over the network. In the 
telecommunications industry, Biggar notes that while two-part access tariffs are 
employed to price services in the retail sector, they are rarely used to price access to the 
network.26 Citing a report by the OECD from 2001, he highlights that, at the time, no 
member country adopted two-part tariffs for pricing interconnection, and access charges 
were typically based on a simple linear per-minute charge. Biggar does however 
suggest that there is scope for moving towards greater use of two-part tariff in 
telecommunications.
The ACCC has consistently queried the feasibility of adopting a two-part access charge 
in telecommunications access pricing in Australia. For example, ACCC (2000b)
o c  . . . . .
While the PC (2001a) appears to recognise there is less need for prolonged periods of high access charges in industries
experiencing rapid technological progress (at page 289), it appears more concerned with the potentially adverse impact that an
“access holiday” (i.e. no regulation) may have on additional investment and competition in downstream markets.
9 AZD Biggar does mention that two-part access tariffs were proposed by Mercury for the UK in 1995, and led to undesirable 
outcomes when briefly used to price access to the unbundled network elements in Finland.
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remarks (at Attachment 3, page 6) that “it is difficult to conceive of multi-part pricing 
being used for access”, while ACCC (2001) states that “the calculation of an efficient 
two-part access price is extremely difficult both in principle and in practice.” The 
ACCC appears particularly concerned with the potential for a multi-part access tariff to 
deter entry into the downstream markets. ACCC (2001) notes (at page 22) that because 
a two-part access tariff imposes a fixed cost upon the access seeker, it can create a 
natural monopoly effect in the downstream markets, and decrease competition.27 The 
PC (2001a) however, believes that the dismissal of multi-part tariffs by the ACCC is 
premature, and considers there is some scope for such pricing arrangements. It 
proposes the pricing principle (at page 384) that:
Access prices should allow multi-part tariffs and price discrimination 
when it aids efficiency.
Woodbridge (2001) suggests that multi-part tariffs are not more readily observed in- 
pricing access because of the prohibitive cost associated with gathering information 
about the access seeker’s marginal valuations. This is evident from his statement (at 
page 14) that:
Multi-part pricing rules are not common in access pricing however, 
mainly because of the informational requirements necessary for the 
regulator to set efficient up-front fees.
and his conclusion (at page 15) that:
Although this approach has merit, in practice it may be difficult to 
ascertain the value that each party is likely to derive from the use of the 
asset.
However, this explanation appears slightly unsatisfactory given that two-part tariffs are 
used to price access in some network industries, and to price services in 
telecommunication retail markets.
The prevalence of two-part access tariffs in markets such as gas and rail track, and 
linear access prices in telecommunications, may be explained by the different market 
structures that have emerged post-deregulation in these industries. The deregulation of 
rail, electricity and gas, has generally led to the vertically-integrated incumbent being 
structurally separated. For example, in gas and electricity, the assets of the incumbent
?7 Biggar (2001) also outlines (at page 15) that a multi-part access tariff may turn a competitive downstream market into a natural 
monopoly activity. He claims that such an outcome occurred in the telecommunications market in Finland.
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were separated, sold-off and placed into generation, transmission, distribution and retail 
markets. In contrast, across many countries, the deregulation of telecommunications 
has generally involved introducing competition in the wholesale and retail market, but 
preserving the vertically-integrated incumbent in some shape or form.
Under the different market structures, if a two-part tariff for access were set too high in 
the structurally-separated gas, electricity or rail track markets, the access providers 
would earn no income. The access provider therefore has an incentive to decrease the 
tariff eventually until some positive quantity of access is demanded. In contrast, if the 
vertically-integrated telecommunications incumbent were to set a two-part access tariff 
that was too high, it would still earn positive profit, as it preserves its status as a 
monopoly, and just eliminates any competition in the downstream retail market. The 
ability of the vertically-integrated monopoly to use two-part access tariffs in such a way 
as to eliminate or threaten the level of downstream competition may go some way 
towards explaining why regulators have been reluctant to allow two-part tariffs in 
pricing access in telecommunications.
As there is a linear access price used in telecommunications, and in this framework only 
an adjustment in the linear price brings about the type of static and dynamic efficiency 
trade-off that has been claimed arises in these industries; the following Chapter ignores 
the fixed fee A , and focuses upon the regulation of the linear access price p for a 
monopoly and competitive investor. Although the model outlined here does not capture 
the behaviour of a vertically-integrated monopoly, it can still be used to highlight a 
number of relevant issues that a regulator might want take into account when setting a 
linear access prices in industries experiencing rapid technological progress.
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6.7 Conclusion
This Chapter examined the investment timing and social surplus for a monopoly and 
competitive investor, charging a two-part access tariff, in an industry experiencing a 
constant rate of cost-decreasing technological progress. While the model adopted in 
here involved many simplifying assumptions, (e.g. guaranteeing the regulated firm 
recovers the cost of the investment), it was established that many of the results could be 
used to assess and capture various issues and ideas raised in the PC (2001a) and PC 
(2001b) reports.
Throughout the course of the Chapter it was shown that:
■ a competitive investor always invests earlier than a monopoly investor;
■ the dynamically-efficient or socially-optimal time is dependent on the level of usage 
price;
■ at a given access charge, the monopoly investor may only induce a better outcome 
for society than the competitive investor, in instances where the competitive investor 
provides the essential infrastructure before the socially-optimal time;
■ a change in the access charge via a change in the fixed fee only affects dynamic 
efficiency;
■ the static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off only arises if the change in the 
access charge is brought about by a change in the usage price for access;
■ although there may be an increase in both static allocative and dynamic efficiency for 
the competitive investor, a lower usage price still always generates a trade-off 
between the:
-  additional benefit to society from the higher social surplus and lower 
investment cost when the investment occurs; and
-  additional cost to society from deferring the investment and delaying the flow 
of social surplus until a later time.
■ under ROR regulation of the monopoly investor, when the fair rate/is set equal to r, 
it is equivalent to having perfect competition to undertake the investment. 
Subsequently, the outcomes for the ROR-regulated monopoly investor are identical 
to those achieved by a competitive investor;
■ ROR regulation of the monopoly investor and the capital subsidy have an equivalent 
impact upon investment timing;
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■ ROR regulation does not affect the behaviour of the competitive investor and the 
same capital subsidy equivalence derived for the monopoly investor does not hold;
■ as in Gans (2001), the socially-optimal outcome arises if the investor can charge a 
two-part access tariff;
■ the unregulated monopoly induces the social optimum if it is allowed to charge the 
two-part access tariff that maximise its profits. However, a competitive or ROR- 
regulated monopoly investor using the same access charge invests too early;
■ for the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor to achieve the social 
optimum, a fixed fee must be charged that is:
-  less than that required by the unregulated monopoly investor; and
-  lower, the higher the rate of technological progress is.
The results suggest that access holidays may not be required to induce the optimal 
investment.
As Section 6.6 indicates that two-part access tariffs are not always used to regulate 
certain industries (e.g. telecommunications), the next Chapter employs the model 
outlined here to assess and compare the optimal linear price for access with a monopoly 
and competitive investor.
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A.6 Chapter 6 Appendix
A.6.1 The Net Present Values to the Firm and Society with a Monopoly Investor 
By substituting the expression for the investment timing in equation (6.2.11) into 
equation (6.2.6), the net present value derived by the firm when it is a monopoly 
investor is,
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This is the outcome for the net present value to the firm  given by equation (6.2.12).
By substituting the expression for the investment timing in equation (6.2.11) into 
equation (6.2.7), the net present value derived by society under a monopoly investor 
is,
\  — L  I g o r  ( g + r ) CP 1 A B " * ,  ,
NPVsx(p,A) = ~S(p)e e gK(p)+A- C 0e 6 gUp)+J
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As S(p) = 7i{p) + CS(p), it follows that,
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This is the outcome for the net present value to society given by equation (6.2.13).
A.6.2 The Net Present Values Society with a Competitive Investor
By substituting the expression for the investment timing in equation (6.2.15) into 
equation (6.2.7), the net present value derived by society when there is a competitive 
market for the investment is,
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As S(p) = 7i{p) + CS(p), it follows that,
NPK;(p , A) = -r {n(p) + CS{p) -  -
This is the outcome for the net present value to society given by equation (6.2.17).
A.6.3 The Maximum Net Present Value to Society
By substituting the expression for the dynamically-efficient time in equation (6.3.3) into 
equation (6.2.7), the maximum net present value derived by society at any given 
usage charge for access p is,
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This is the outcome for the net present value to society given by equation (6.3.4).
A.6.4 The Net Present Value to the Firm with a ROR-Regulated Monopoly Investor 
Substituting the expression for investment timing by the ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor in equation (6.5.2) into equation (6.2.6), and assuming that the fair rate is such 
that 0+ r > f  > r, then at any given access charge (p, A), the net present value derived 
by the ROR-regulated monopoly investor will be,
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This is the expression for the net present value outlined in equation (6.5.3).
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CHAPTER 7: LINEAR ACCESS PRICING, INVESTMENT
TIMING AND EFFICIENCY
7.1 Introduction
This Chapter uses the model established in Chapter 6 to analyse the impact that linear 
price regulation of the investor has on investment timing, dynamic efficiency and the 
net present value to society.
7.1.1 The Problem with a Short-Run-Marginal-Cost-Based Price
As shown in Section 6.4 and 6.6, the allocatively-efficient outcome in the framework 
adopted here, requires the usage price to be set equal to the short-run marginal cost of 
production. With no fixed fee, the problem with such a linear price is that, while it 
covers the ongoing period-to-period expenses, (which for simplicity were assumed to be 
equal to zero in the model); it fails to provide the firm with an adequate level of 
compensation to ever undertake the investment in the first place.
This type of problem is highlighted in an ACCC (2001) submission to the Productivity 
Commission inquiry report on Telecommunications Competition Regulation, when it 
states (at page 22) that, while “SRMC [short-run marginal cost] may appear to be 
‘efficient’ in the short run as it appears to equate the marginal value of the use to the 
value given up in supplying that unit...this make no allowance for what is given up in 
‘keeping the productive capacity alive’”. The PC (2001a) outlines (at page 383) that it 
“agrees with the ACCC” in relation to the shortcomings of short-run-marginal-cost 
pricing and this “is precisely why the [Productivity] Commission does not endorse 
SRMC as a pricing methodology”.
7.1.2 Existing Literature on Linear Price Regulation
There has been extensive literature examining the issue of efficient cost recovery using 
linear prices, in circumstances where marginal-cost pricing (short-run or long-run) fails
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to recover cost of the investment.1 Much of the work in this area, examining the 
required mark-up of price above marginal cost, has been done in a static framework, and 
is based on the analysis of Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956).2
Ramsey (1927) looked at the most efficient method of raising a given amount of tax 
revenue across a number markets using distortionary taxes. He found that with no 
cross-price effects, the most efficient way to raise revenues across markets was by 
setting a tax that distorted price away from marginal cost, in accordance with the 
inverse elasticity of demand for the good. That is, the lower (higher) the elasticity of 
demand is, the greater (lower) the proportionate mark-up that is required in price from 
the marginal cost in that market. Boiteux (1956) independently derived an identical 
outcome to Ramsey, but formulated the problem in the terms of public utility retail 
pricing and the natural monopoly problem.3 He examined the optimal linear retail price 
that should be charged when marginal cost-based pricing fails to recover costs.4
For some market i, where e# denotes the price elasticity of demand and A the Ramsey 
number, the linear pricing rule established by Ramsey and Boiteux — Ramsey-Boiteux 
pricing — can formally be written,
1 / y O  Q
—--------  = — , where 0 < / l < l ,  eta> 0 (7.1.1)5
Pi £di
As the socially-optimal method for recovering costs for the sustainable natural 
monopoly involves a two-part tariff — where price is set equal to marginal cost and the 
remaining costs covered using a fixed fee — this optimal linear Ramsey-Boiteux price 
in equation (7.1.1), has often been classified as second-best efficient.
1 In the short-run, pricing at marginal cost fails to recover the fixed cost associated with the investment. In the long run setting 
price equal to the marginal cost does not recover all costs, if  there are joint or common costs associated with the network.
Berg and Tschirhart (1988) provide a good summary o f efficient regulatory linear pricing in Chapter 3.
3 The original article is in French, and a translated version is found in Boiteux (1971). Rees (1968) derives a similar solution to 
Boiteux, by examining the natural monopoly problem in a general-equilibrium framework.
4 Baumöl and Bradford (1970) were the first to highlight the link between the articles by Ramsey and Boiteux.
Dreze (1964) shows that if  the assumption o f no cross-price effects is relaxed, a similar rule applies with a super-elasticity 
formula for the Ramsey-Boiteux price.
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The basic Ramsey-Boiteux pricing formula has been extended to incorporate more 
complex retail pricing problems. For example, Braeutigam (1979) examines the 
optimal linear price for a natural monopoly given there exists a competitive fringe, 
while Brock and Dechert (1985) looks at the optimal linear Ramsey-Boiteux price in an 
intertemporal setting. Further, Laffont and Tirole (1994) and Armstrong, Doyle and 
Vickers (1996), have also established that the optimal linear access price for a network 
with joint, common or unattributable costs, should be based on Ramsey-Boiteux 
principles.
The optimal linear price and its impact on investment timing, dynamic efficiency and 
the net present value to society, has only been dealt with very recently. As mentioned in 
the previous Chapter, Guthrie, Small and Wright (GSW, 2001), Evans and Guthrie 
(2002) and Evans, Quigley and Zhang (EQZ, 2003) all appear to examine the impact 
that a linear price has on investment timing.6 As the analysis of GSW and Evans and 
Guthrie use a real options approach, they rely on numerical outcomes and do not derive 
an analytical solution for the optimal linear price. EQZ though, do derive an optimal 
linear price for the intermediate goods used to produce the final output in the economy. 
This price is found to be higher than the allocatively-efficient-short-run marginal cost, 
but lower than the unregulated monopoly price.
7.1.3 Results and Contributions of this Chapter
This Chapter uses the framework from Chapter 6 to examine the impact that a linear 
access price has on the net present value to society, given that the allocatively-efficient- 
short-run-marginal-cost-based price in this model, fails to provide the firm with 
adequate compensation for the cost of its investment. The analysis here looks at the 
monopoly and competitive (or ROR-regulated monopoly) investors’ behaviour when 
they are allowed to charge an unregulated price, and then examines the impact of price 
regulation on the firm. From this, an optimal linear price is derived for the monopoly 
and competitive investor, and is found to have similar properties to the second-best 
price derived by EQZ. A linear demand curve and numerical example is used to 
compare the outcomes under the respective regimes. The issue of forward-looking cost
6 Gans (2001) also considers the issue o f  the optimal usage price for access in Section 6. However, while his analysis examines 
the impact a linear access price has on the strategic incentive to pre-empt the investment, it still uses a two-part tariff for access, 
as it looks at the implications this has for the level o f  the socially-optimal fixed fee.
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regulation is also briefly dealt with, and this appears to reinforce the outcomes from 
Chapter 5. As in Chapter 6, throughout the course of this Chapter, the issues raised 
about access pricing and investment in the Productivity Commission reports — PC 
(2001 a,b) — are incorporated into the analysis. This allows any potential policy 
implications of the results established here to be highlighted.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 examines the outcome where the 
monopoly and competitive investor are allowed to charge an unregulated linear price. 
Section 7.3 examines the investment timing of a monopoly investor under price 
regulation, and establishes the condition that the optimal linear price must satisfy. This 
analysis is repeated in Section 7.4 for a competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor. Using a linear demand curve a numerical example is provided in Section 7.5, 
which compares price, investment timing, and the net present value to society, under 
each of the different access regimes that have been considered. The same linear 
demand curve and parameters are used in Section 7.6 to assess FL cost regulation. 
Section 7.7 concludes the analysis in the Chapter.
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7.2 The Investor Charging an Unregulated Linear Price
This Section examines the outcome when an investor is allowed to charge an 
unregulated linear price for access once the essential infrastructure has been provided. 
It is found that the monopoly and competitive (or ROR-regulated monopoly) investor 
generate the same level of allocative inefficiency — by pricing at the unregulated linear 
monopoly price pm — but different levels of dynamic efficiency. While the monopoly 
investor is dynamically inefficient, as it invests later than the socially-optimal time 
tw(Pm), the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor may either invest before, 
at, or after tw(pm). The competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor may only be 
more dynamically inefficient, and yield a lower net present value to society than the 
monopoly investor, if the investment occurs prior to time tw(pm).
7.2.1 The Monopoly Investor
A monopoly investor, charging an unregulated linear price for access, aims to maximise 
the expression for the net present value for the firm, given by equation (6.2.12). That is, 
where A = 0, the monopoly chooses p to,
ma xNPVUp) = -
p
1(mp)\ x(p)  Y
r v & + r > v(<9 + r)C0>
(7.2.1)
The first-order condition (FOC) is,
dNPVj
dp
tt(p) A*
[6 + r)C (
7r\p) = 0
o y
(7.2.2)
The outcome in equation (7.2.2) implies that, to maximise the payoff to the firm, an 
unregulated monopoly investor must charge a linear access price at each instant in time, 
where the marginal revenue (MR) from supplying access — n'(p) — is equal to zero. 
As the short-run marginal cost (SRMC) is also zero, the access price in each period is 
effectively being set at a level where, the marginal revenue from production is equal to 
the short-run marginal cost of supplying access (i.e. MR = SRMC). The unregulated 
monopoly investor achieves this outcome by restricting the amount of access it supplies 
to qm, and setting the linear access price pm.
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As the monopoly investor charges a per-unit price p m that exceeds the SRMC of zero, at 
each instant in time after the essential infrastructure is provided there is some level of 
allocative inefficiency. This leads to a deadweight loss (.DWL) at each instant of,
DWL(Pm) = S (0 ) -S (p m) (7.2.3)
In Figure 7.2.1, the inefficiency at each instant in time is highlighted by the shaded area 
abqm, while the total revenue at each instant 7im, is equal to area p maqm0.
FIGURE 7.2.1 ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY FROM THE UNREGULATED PRICE
The allocative inefficiency 
from charging price p m.
Substituting price p m into the equation for the investment timing by a monopoly investor 
given by Table 6.3.1 or equation (6.2.11), implies that
tÄ P j  = -  log
70 + r)Cy
V <Pm),
(7.2.4)
This is later than the dynamically-efficient time at price p„„ which is given by Table 
6.3.1 or equation (6.3.3), and is equal to,
L ( p J  = ~  log
S (P J
, where S(pm) = 7t(pm) +CS(pm) (7.2.5)
The dynamic inefficiency from the firm inefficiently delaying the investment, so that 
the flows of social surplus are realised too late, is shown in Figure 7.2.2.
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FIGURE 7.2.2 DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY OF A MONOPOLY INVESTOR
rip), S(p) a
( 0 + - ^
(6+r)C0e e‘
0 t\v (P m ) txiPm)
From equation (6.2.12) or Table 6.3.1, the net present value to the monopoly investor 
charging the linear price pm is,
Further, equation (6.2.13) or Table 6.3.1 indicates that the net present value to society
is,
The outcome in equation (7.2.7) is lower than the optimal outcome in equation (6.6.4). 
7.2.2 The Competitive or ROR-Regulated Monopoly Investor
With a perfect competition to provide the essential infrastructure, or ROR regulation of 
the monopoly investor where the fair rate /  set equal to r, regardless of the linear access 
price that is charged, the investor earns a net present value of zero. To avoid having a 
non-unique linear access price, it is initially assumed here that either: the investing firm 
subject to competition to construct has a slight cost advantage over the other potential 
investors; or that the fair rate /  is being set slightly above the normal rate of return r. 
This implies the investor earns a slightly above normal rate of return r + s, where £ > 0. 
Setting the fixed fee equal to zero (i.e. A = Q) and substituting r + e in for the term / in
(7.2.6)
(7.2.7)
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equation (6.5.3), at any given linear price access p, the net present value derived by the 
firm will be,
NPVUP) = H E++> 
r \  r + s
\ r 7r(p) \£
(r + s)  C,o J
(7.2.8)
To find the linear price that this investor charges to maximise its net present value, the 
derivative of equation (7.2.8) is taken with respect to p, and the resulting expression set 
equal to zero.
dNPV°f  _ 1
dp \ r  + s j
( 6 + r 7T(p)
\  °  A ( r + ^ ) c oy
tt'(p ) = 0 (7.2.9)
The result implies that as with the unregulated monopoly investor, a ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor and competitive investor, earning the slightly above normal rate of 
return r + s, will also charge the linear access price pm.
From equation (6.2.16), the competitive investor or ROR-regulated monopoly investor 
earning the return r + s, will invest at time
UpJ  = q 1os
"(r + g)C0^
v + P J  ,
Assuming s —» 0, the above equation simplifies to,
‘o(pJ  = + ° g
rCn
mJJ
(7.2.10)
This investment timing t0(pm) is earlier than that of the monopoly investor, and may 
now occur before, at, or after the dynamically-efficient time tw(pm). From the analysis 
in Section 6.3:
CS(  ̂ Q
■ i f ------ — > —, the investment is inefficiently delayed (i.e. t0(pm)>tw(pm)y,
n (Pm)r
CS (  ̂ 0
■ i f ------ — = — , the investment is undertaken at the dynamically-efficient time; and
n(pm) r
■ if < —, there is premature investment in infrastructure (i.e. t0(Pm)<tw(Pm))-
n(Pm) r
Figure 7.2.3 illustrates an instance where the essential infrastructure is provided too 
early at the linear access price pm.
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FIGURE 7.2.3 TIMING OF A COMPETITIVE OR ROR-REGULATED MONOPOLY INVESTOR
(0+r)Q
As the net present value to the firm is zero, the positive net benefits of the investment 
are derived entirely by the consumer. Substituting price pm into the expression for the 
net present to society given by Table 6.3.1, or in equation (6.2.17), yields
NPV:{pm) = -r (CS(pJ)
V r C 0)
\«
(7.2.11)
The PC (2001b) highlights the potential for a similar type of outcome to that outlined 
here in Section 7.2.2, when it states (at page 71):
Competition at the construction phase will sometimes occur against a 
back-drop of the potential for the successful investor to charge 
monopoly prices once it has become established as the incumbent 
provider.
Further, the PC recognises that perfect competition to construct to investment:
...might sometimes lead to premature investment in capacity, but still 
with some degree of monopoly pricing of the services concerned.
However, unlike the framework used here, it appears that in considering investment 
timing, the Productivity Commission linked a unique price with a specific rate of return 
that was allowed on the investment.
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7.2.3 Comparing Benefits to Society Derived by the Investors
When allowed to a charge a linear access price, the unregulated monopoly and 
unregulated competitive (or ROR-regulated monopoly) investor, both create the same 
level of allocative inefficiency. Therefore, the overall net present value derived by 
society will depend upon the level of dynamic efficiency achieved by each investor.
Using the work done in Section 6.3, the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor achieves a higher level of dynamic efficiency and net present value to society 
than the unregulated monopoly investor, if there is either:
■ inefficient delay of the investment (i.e. tx(pm) > tQ(pm) > tw(pm)); or
■ the investment occurs at the socially-optimal time (i.e. t0{pm)= tw(pm)).
Such outcomes will arise when
<p„) r '
The net present value to society generated by the competitive or ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor may only be less than or equal to that generated by the monopoly 
investor, if the investment is undertaken prior to the socially-optimal time (i.e. t0(pm) <
tw(Pm))• This occurs if — < —.
<Pm) r
A comparison of the net present value to society achieved by the competitive, ROR- 
regulated and unregulated monopoly investor, and its dependence upon the rate of cost- 
decreasing technological progress 6, is explored more thoroughly in the numerical 
calculations and graphs done in Section 7.5.
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7.3 Linear Access Price Regulation of a Monopoly Investor
This Section examines the outcome to society when the regulator can only set the 
maximum usage price for the monopoly investor earning the rate of return 6 + r. By 
establishing that some price regulation of the monopoly investor does increase welfare, 
a condition is found that the optimal linear access price p*x must satisfy. This price
maximises the net present value to society achieved by the monopoly investor, by 
maximising the trade-off outlined to occur between allocative and dynamic efficiency in 
Section 6.4.2. It also established that the optimal price p *x, will be lower, the higher
rate of technological progress 6 is. Finally, some policy implications of the results 
established here are outlined.
7.3.1 Does Price Regulation of A Monopoly investor increase Welfare?
To assess whether linear price regulation of the monopoly investor earning the rate of 
return 6+r is beneficial, it is necessary to examine if a small decrease in the usage price 
from pm, increases the net present value to society.
From Table 6.3.1 or equation (6.2.13), the net present value to society derived by a 
monopoly investor given a zero fixed fee, is
NPVsx(p )= - (  0
r I 6 + r
x(p)  
(0 + r)C(
\ 0
o y
(7.3.1)
Taking the first derivative of equation (7.3.1) yields,
dNPV* _ 1 ( 1
dp r \ 0  + r
6S'(p) + rCS'(p) +
(0S(p) + rCS(p))r7r'(p) 
Ott(p) s \
fr(p)
( e + r )c {
\ e
(7.3.2)
o J
There is an increase in the net present value to society from a small amount of price 
regulation, if equation (7.3.2) evaluated at price p m is less than zero. As by assumption 
ft'ipm) = 0 and CS' (pm), S'(pm) < 0, the resulting expression and sign for the derivative 
evaluated at price pm is,
dNPV* 1f  1 ^( ( \ x (p m)
dp r
P = P m
v# + r j U* + r)cJ {OSXpm) + rCSXpm))< 0 (7.3.3)
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The outcome in equation (7.3.3) highlights that a small amount o f price regulation of the 
monopoly investor will increase the benefit to society. Based on the analysis in Section 
6.4.2, it can be concluded here that for a small decrease in the price from p m, the 
additional benefit resulting from the lower cost and higher social surplus, exceeds the 
additional cost resulting from the increased inefficient delay.
7.3.2 The Linear Access Price that Maximises Benefits to Society
The result in Section 7.3.1 suggests that the optimal linear access price set by the
regulator p*x will:
■ lie below the unregulated monopoly price p m\ and
a equate the marginal cost associated with increased delay, with the marginal benefit 
resulting from the decrease in cost and increase in allocative efficiency.
To find the optimal usage price for access that should be set by a monopoly investor
earning the rate o f return 6 + r, the following maximisation is done.
ma xNPVsx(p) 1 f 0S(p) + rCS(p) 
r \  6 + r
7r(p) \ e
{ e + r ) c (0 J
, where p m> p >  0 (7.3.4)
Using the derivative in equation (7.3.2), the FOC is then
dNPV;
dp
_ 1 ( 1 1
. “ rl
P = P x
,0 + r)
6 S \ p )  + rCS'(p) +
(6S(p)  + rCS(p))rn '(p)  
Ott(p)
V
7 V
X(P)  
{0 + r)Ct
\«
(7.3.5)
= 0
o J
Solving this, the condition that must be satisfied at price p*x is,
CS{px) n \ p \ ) _ e
x(p*x) S\p*x) r
(7.3.6)7
The derivation o f the expression in equation (7.3.6) is outlined in the Appendix o f the 
Chapter, in Section A.7.1.
7 If sd denotes the price elasticity o f demand such that, ed = -p .q ' / q , it follows that, equation (7.3.6) can be expressed as, 
CS{px) (  l - g j O Q )  0
*(P\) I  ^ ( r i )  J r
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From equation (7.3.6) it appears that the optimal regulated price px, which maximises 
the net present value to society achieved by a monopoly investor, depends upon:
■ the relative value of the rate of cost-decreasing technological progress 0, to the 
normal rate of return on capital r (i.e. 6/r); and
■ the demand curve for access.
Given some specific functional form for the demand curve for access, it is possible to 
solve equation (7.3.6) for the optimal linear access price p *x. This is done in the 
numerical example outlined in Section 7.5.
7.3.3 A Simple Method for Deriving the Optimal Condition in Equation (7.3.6)
To provide a simple intuitive derivation for the optimal condition in equation (7.3.6), 
Figure 7.3.1 is used, along with the assumption of discrete time. The advantage of this 
method is that it does not involve the complex maximisation of Section 7.3.2.8
FIGURE 7.3.1 DERIVING THE OPTIMAL CONDITION IN EQUATION (7.3.6)
Where, D + E = 9C„ F = rC„
A = area p ^ a  p ‘ 
D = area p'adp' 
E = area p 'dee 
F =  area ecq 0 
G = area dbq 'q
By investing at some time t, it has been established that the monopoly investor earns a 
revenue flow in each period of {6 + r)Ct. In Figure 7.3.1 therefore,
o
° Thank you to Ben Smith and my Supervisor for outlining this simple method for deriving the optimal condition.
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(7.3.7)D + E + F -  (0 + r) Ct = p*q*
If the regulator decreases the price marginally so that the monopoly investor delays the 
investment for one period, the essential facility is provided at time t +1. In Figure 7.3.1, 
this small decrease in price from p* to p ' leads to the firm losing revenue equal to the 
horizontal sliver of area D, but gaining revenue equal to the vertical sliver of area G. 
Subsequently, the firm investing at time t +1 earns an amount of revenue in each period 
of(0+  r)Ct+1= p 'q', which is captured in the diagram by area D + E + F -D  + G. As with 
discrete time and the cost-decreasing rate of technological progress 6, Ct+\ is equal to 
C,( 1 -  0), the monopoly investor now earns revenue in each period of,
D + E + F - D  + G = (6 + r)Ct {1 -0 )  (7.3.8)
From equation (7.3.7) and (7.3.8), it follows that a decrease in the access price, which 
defers the investment by the firm for one period, yields an expression for the rate of 
technological progress of,
0 = - P ~ G
D + E + F
(7.3.9)
The net benefit to society from decreasing price p and deferring the investment until 
time t + 1, is comprised of:
■ the present value of the additional social benefit derived from delay; plus
■ the cost saving from delay; minus
■ the foregone social surplus from delay.
As the additional benefit to society from deferring the investment one period is captured 
in Figure 7.3.1 by area G, the present value of the social benefits from investing at time 
t + 1 will be equal to G/r. The cost saving from deferring the investment for one period 
consists of the decrease in cost due to technological progress (i.e. 6Ct), and the capital 
costs that are no longer foregone (i.e. rCt). The term (0 + r)Ct is depicted in Figure 
7.3.1 by the area D + E + F. Finally, the lost social surplus from delaying the 
investment until time t + 1 is illustrated in Figure 7.3.1 by the area A + D + E + F. 
Consequently, the net benefit to society (NBS) at time t + 1, from decreasing the price 
and delaying the investment is equal to,
NBS=P- + (D + E + F ) - ( A  + D + E + F)  = - - A  (7.3.10)
r r
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The value of the investment to society achieved by a monopoly investor is maximised, 
where the net benefit to society is equal to zero. Setting equation (7.3.10) equal to zero 
and solving, the expression derived for the rate of return r at the socially-optimal price
P\ is>
(7.3.11)
From equation (7.3.9) and equation (7.3.11), it follows that for the monopoly investor 
earning the rate of return 6 + r, the value of the investment to society is maximised, if 
price p*x is set so that it satisfies the condition,
0 _ ( D- G) / D + E + F _ A ( D - G '
r ~  G/A ~ D + E + f { G ,
(7.3.12)
By recognising here that:
■ A represents the level of consumer surplus at price p \ , i.e. CS(p*x) ;
■ G is the change in social surplus with respect to a change in the price evaluated at p *x, 
i.e. S'(p*x)dp;
■ G -  D is the change in revenue with respect to a change in price evaluated at px, 
\.Q.7i\p*x)dp\ and
■ D + E + F  represents the total revenue at p*x, i.e. n{p*x);
it follows that the expression in equation (7.3.12), is identical to the optimal condition 
given by equation (7.3.6). That is,
A ( D - G 'j CS(px)7t'(p\) 0
D + E + f { G J  )
7.3.4 Technological Progress, the Rate of Return and the Optimal Price
The optimal condition the access price must satisfy in equation (7.3.6), suggests that the 
value of p*x , depends upon the relative value of the rate of cost-decreasing technological 
progress 6, and the normal rate of return on capital r (i.e. 0/r). Although an expression 
for p*x cannot be derived without a specific demand curve, it is still possible to assess
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the relationship between p*x and Olr. To do this, the total differential of equation (7.3.6) 
is taken, and an expression is derived for dp*x/d(j:) . This yields,
_>o_
- < P ' x )
gs-o,;)+M &)+M&)
s\ pS
*Xp. ) ____________________,
>0 <0 <0 <0
x \p \ )S " (p \ ) -  S'{p’x)n ’(p’s)
APy
>0
<0 (7.3.13)9
The working to derive the expression in equation (7.3.13) is outlined in the Appendix of 
Chapter 7, in Section A.7.2.
As the expression in equation (7.3.13) is less than zero, the higher the rate of 
technological progress is relative to the rate of return, the lower is the optimal liner 
regulated price p*x that is charged by the monopoly investor. The outcome suggests
that, the higher the rate of technological progress is, the higher will be the marginal 
benefit relative to the marginal cost of any given decrease in the access price.
7.3.5 Policy Implications of the Results
7.3.5.1 Benefits from ‘Anticipatory Retardation’
As outlined in Chapter 4, Kahn et al. (1999) cited the work of Fellner (1958) to 
highlight the problem of “anticipatory retardation” in industries experiencing continual 
technological progress. This involves the firm only adopting the most modem 
technology when the progressively decreasing costs have fallen to a level where, the 
prevailing price allows the investor achieve a given rate of return on the asset. In this 
model though, it is shown that while price regulation will induce the monopoly investor 
to defer the investment — i.e. until the lower regulated price allows the firm to earn the 
monopoly rate of return 6 + r — this delay can be beneficial for society. This is the case 
if the cost of delaying the investment is offset by the gains from the lower price that is
 ̂ It should be noted that this outcome is true for a non-convex demand curve. It has not been shown here that this result will hold 
more generally.
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paid by the consumer when the access is provided. Kahn et al. do not appear to 
consider these potential benefits that may arise from delay or “anticipatory retardation”.
7.3.5.2 The Contrasting Impact of Price and ROR Regulation
As the price-regulated investor still earns the rate of return on the investment 0 + r, it 
must retain its market power in providing the essential infrastructure. Therefore, in this 
framework, where there is a constant rate of cost-decreasing technological progress, 
price and ROR regulation, which are sometimes argued to have similar impacts upon 
the firm in static models,10 yield very different outcomes for the monopoly investor.
As shown in Section 6.5, in this framework, ROR regulation of the monopoly investor 
simulates the effects of having competition to become the essential infrastructure 
provider i.e. “competition for the market”. In contrast, price regulation simulates the 
effects of “competition in the market”, once the essential infrastructure has been 
provided. Therefore, although the optimal usage price has some impact upon the 
investment timing by the monopoly investor, the regulator is effectively, only imposing 
market discipline upon the firm after the investment has been undertaken.
As ROR and price regulation simulate very different competitive effects, it is not 
surprising that the two forms of regulation have a very different impact upon investment 
timing. As Section 7.2 illustrates, merely restricting the rate of return decreases the 
delay of the investment by the monopoly investor, yet has no effect on allocative 
efficiency. In contrast, price regulation causes the monopoly investor to further delay 
the investment, but increases the level of allocative efficiency.
The issue of whether ROR or price regulation of the monopoly investor generates a 
better outcome for society is difficult to assess. However, it can be inferred that 
because price regulation of the monopoly investor induces greater benefits for society 
than no regulation, similar results will hold to those outlined in Section 6.5. That is, 
with a higher rate of technological progress, it more likely that a ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor will induce worse outcomes for society than a price-regulated 
monopoly investor that earns the rate of return 6+ r. The numerical example in Section 
7.5 highlights this result.
10 For example see Rees and Vickers (1995).
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7.3.5.3 The‘Access Holiday’
The result in equation (7.3.13) suggests that, where an industry is subject to rapid rate of 
technological progress, there is less scope for an investor to be granted an access 
holiday and allowed to charge price p m for some period of time. This point was also 
raised in Section 6.6, and was shown to be consistent with recommendations made by 
the Productivity Commission.
7.3.5.4 Difficulties of Setting the Optimal Price
The analysis here suggests that in order to set the optimal access price of p*x, the 
regulator must have information about:
■ the rate of technological progress fy and
■ the industry demand curve, so that it can estimate the consumer surplus and 
operating profit in each period.
In practice, in determining the appropriate access price, regulators use and have access 
to estimates of the levels of technological progress, demand and elasticity of demand. 
However, they do not appear to go further, and explicitly estimate a demand curve for 
the industry. Such information may be difficult to obtain, and to some extent may limit 
the ability to implement the type of access price that is recommended here. 
Nevertheless, the results here raise issues that regulators may need to be aware of, or 
take into account, when regulating linear prices in industries experiencing rapid rates of 
cost-decreasing technological progress.
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7.4 Linear Price Regulation of the Competitive Investor/Linear Price and 
ROR Regulation of the Monopoly Investor
This Section examines the effect of linear access price regulation on a competitive 
investor, or alternatively, based on the analysis in Section 6.5, the combination of price 
and ROR regulation on a monopoly investor. The analysis here is very similar to that 
done in the previous Section. Subsequently, it is initially established that some price 
regulation of the investor is optimal, before a condition is found that the optimal price 
pi must satisfy. It is shown that while this optimal price may increase both allocative 
and dynamic efficiency, it will never be dynamically efficient. This suggests that as in 
the analysis of Evans, Quigley and Zhang (EQZ, 2003), the optimal linear price p*0 can
be thought of as a “second-best” efficient price. It is also shown that as with the optimal 
price for the monopoly investor, the optimal price here will be lower, the higher rate of 
technological progress #is. Finally, policy implications of the results are examined.
7.4.1 Does Price Regulation Increase Welfare?
As in the previous Section, to establish whether price regulation of the competitive 
investor or ROR-regulated monopoly investor is beneficial, it is necessary to examine if 
a small decrease in price from pm, increases the net present value to society.
From Table 6.3.1 or equation (6.2.17), the net present value to society derived by a 
competitive investor given a zero fixed fee is,
NPv;(p) (̂cs(p)) ( x(p)
rC,
V
o /
(7.4.1)
Taking the derivative of equation (7.4.1) with respect to p,
dNPV[ 1 ( ejz(p)CS'(p) + rCS{p)nXpj\
dp rC 0n{p)
(7.4.2)
As by assumption 7t'{pm) = 0 and CS'(pm) < 0, evaluating equation (7.4.2) at price pm, 
yields the following expression and sign for the derivative.
dNPVf
dp
_1 *(pjY
r
P ~  Pm
rC\ J
C S\pm)< o (7.4.3)
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This indicates that some level of price regulation of the competitive investor is 
beneficial for society.
7.4.2 The Linear Access Price that Maximises Benefits to Society
With competition for the investment, the optimal usage price is found by undertaking
the following maximisation,
ma xNPV;(p)=-{CS(p))
P r
/ £ C P )V
vC'\  rx"0
, where pm > p > 0 (7.4.4)
Using the derivative in equation (7.4.2), the FOC is then,
dNPVs° 1 7 T ( p ) 6 f  6k {p ) C S \ p ) +  r C S { p ) n \ p ) N
dp
p =p '0 r
[(0  + r)Coj 1 O n(p)  ,
(7.4.5)
Solving this, the condition the optimal price p*0 must satisfy is,
CS(pl)  x Xp D j  
n(p0) 'c s ' ip ’j  r
(7.4.6)'1
Using Tjn to denote the price elasticity of revenue and r/cs to denote the price elasticity 
of consumer surplus, it follows that equation (7.4.6) can be simplified to give,
pA pI) _ e_
ncs(p'o) r ’
where r/f[(p) = x'(p)-P
7 T ( p )
and tfcsip) ~ ~
c s x p y p
CS(p)
(7.4.7)
Therefore, at the optimal price, the percentage change in revenue divided by the 
percentage change in consumer surplus must be equal to the rate of technological 
progress divided by the rate of return on capital. This implies that, as was the case for 
the price-regulated monopoly investor, the optimal price p*0 for a competitive investor 
or ROR-regulated monopoly investor, depends upon:
^  As in Section 7.3 the optimal condition in equation (7.4.6) can be expressed in terms o f  the price elasticity o f demand £ j , which 
yieids'
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■ the ratio of the rate of cost-decreasing technological progress to the rate of return on 
capital (i.e. 6!r)\ and
■ the demand curve for access.
Given some specific functional form for the demand curve for access, it would be 
possible to solve for the regulated linear price p*0 that maximises the net present value 
to society achieved by the competitive investor.
7.4.3 A Simple Method for Deriving the Optimal Condition in Equation (7.4.6)
As in Section 7.3.3, a simple intuitive derivation for the optimal condition given by 
equation (7.4.7) is outlined here. Once again the assumption of discrete time is used 
along with information from a price-quantity space diagram, which is illustrated in 
Figure 7.4.1.12
FIGURE 7.4.1 DERIVING THE OPTIMAL CONDITION IN EQUATION (7.4.6)
Where, D + B = rC„
A = area Pm,xa p' 
D = area p ’adp' 
B = area p 'dq'0 
G = area dbg ’q
By investing at time t, the ROR-regulated monopoly investor, or the competitive 
investor, generates a revenue flow in each period of rCt. From Figure 7.4.1 therefore,
D + B = rCt = p q  (7.4.8)
1 ? As with Section 7.3.3, Ben Smith and my Supervisor outlined this simple method for deriving the optimal condition.
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If the regulator decreases the price marginally so that the competitive investor delays 
the investment for one period, then the essential facility is provided at time t + 1. In 
Figure 7.4.1, the small decrease in price from p  to p '  that induces such a delay, leads to 
the firm losing revenue equal to the horizontal sliver of area D, but gaining revenue 
equal to the vertical sliver of area G. Subsequently, the firm investing at time t + 1 earns 
revenue of B -  D + G, which is equal to rCt+\. As with discrete time, Ct+\ is equal to 
Ct( 1 - 0), it follows that the ROR-regulated monopoly or competitive investor providing 
the infrastructure at time t+ 1, earns revenue in each period of,
Substituting equation (7.4.8) into (7.4.9), it follows that a decrease in the access price, 
which induces the firm to defer the investment for one period, yields an expression for 
the rate of technological progress of,
The net benefit to society of decreasing the usage price p and deferring the investment 
until time t+ 1, consists of:
■ the present value of the additional social benefit derived from delay, plus
■ the cost saving from delay; minus
■ the foregone social surplus from delay.
As the additional benefit to society from decreasing the price and deferring the 
investment until time / + 1 is captured in Figure 7.4.1 by area G, the present value of the 
benefits will be equal to G/r. The cost saving to society from deferring the investment 
for one period is (0 + r)Ct, which from equation (7.4.8) and equation (7.4.10) is equal to 
D + B + (D -G )/r . Meanwhile, the cost of foregoing surplus and delaying the investment 
for one period is illustrated in Figure 7.4.1 by area A + D + B. Consequently, the net 
benefit to society (NBS) at time / + 1 from decreasing the price and deferring the 
investment is,
The value of the investment to society achieved by the competitive, or ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor, is maximised if the net benefit to society resulting from the decrease 
in price and subsequent one period delay, is equal to zero. Therefore, setting equation
B - D  + G = rCt ( \ - 6 )  = p'q' (7.4.9)
(7.4.10)
D + B
(7.4.11)
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(7.4.11) equal to zero and solving, the expression derived for the rate of return r at the 
optimal linear access price p*Q is,
r = D
A
(7.4.12)
From equations (7.4.10) and (7.4.12), the value of the investment to society is 
maximised, if a price p*0 is set so that it satisfies the following condition,
6 _ ( D- G) / D + B _ A ( D - G > 
r D/A D + By  D ,
(7.4.13)
By recognising here that:
■ A represents the level of consumer surplus at price p *0, i.e. CS(p*a) ;
■ D is the change in consumer surplus with respect to a change in the price, evaluated 
at price p*, i.e. CS'(p*0)dp;
■ G—D is the change in revenue with respect to a change in price evaluated at price p *0, 
i.e. rf(p*0)dp\ and
■ D + B represents the total revenue flow to the firm at price p *a, i.e x(p*0) ;
it follows that the expression in equation (7.4.13), will be identical to the optimal 
condition of equation (7.4.7). That is,
A ( D ~ G^ = CS(P0) 7t\p0) = TJ„(p*o) ^ 0  
D + b { D J tt(pI) CS'(pI) r/csipl) r
7.4.4 Is the Optimal Linear Access Price Dynamically Efficient?
The analysis in Section 6.4.2 suggests that if the competitive investor at price pm is 
investing after the socially-optimal time (i.e. t0(pm) < tw(pm)), then there is a dynamic 
and static allocative efficiency trade-off associated with a decrease in the usage price. 
This implies that at p*Q, the investment always occurs at a later time than the
dynamically-efficient time associated with price p*0 (i.e. t0{p*0) < tw(p*0)). In contrast, if
the competitive investor at price pm invests after the socially-optimal time (i.e. t0{pm) > 
tw(Pm)), then a decrease in the usage price can potentially increase both dynamic and 
static allocative efficiency. As Section 6.4.2 shows, it is even possible that with an 
appropriate decrease in the usage price, a dynamically-efficient time can be achieved.
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The question here is, where it is possible for an increase in dynamic and static efficiency 
to occur, does the regulator maximise the net present value to society by setting an 
access price that is dynamically efficient? To answer this, the condition that the optimal 
regulated price must satisfy in equation (7.4.6), is compared with the condition that the 
access price associated with dynamically-efficient time must satisfy in equation (6.4.3).
With a zero fixed fee, the competitive investor is dynamically efficient if it charges the 
access price pd that satisfies the condition,
CS(pd) _ 0
x(Pd) r
(7.4.14)
As in equation (7.4.6),
cs\£)
*XpI) q(p'o) +pq'(p'o)
> 1, where pm> p*a> 0 (7.4.15)
it follows that the outcome in equation (7.4.14) is not the same as the optimal condition 
in equation (7.4.16). This implies that p*0 is not equal to pd . Consequently, even in
instances where there is the potential for an investor to experience a gain in both 
allocative and dynamic efficiency, the linear access price that maximises the net present 
value to society will always be dynamically inefficient. The dynamic inefficiency of the 
optimal price p*0 is depicted in Figure 7.4.2.
FIGURE 7.4.2 THE USAGE PRICE AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY UNDER COMPETITION
‘ApI) ‘SpI) L(pJ
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Therefore, given the existing distortion that arises from the allocative inefficiency 
generated by linear price regulation, it is not optimal to set a price that achieves the 
dynamically-efficient outcome. The idea that an efficient outcome does not maximise 
welfare given an existing distortion, is similar to the idea in the theory of second best. 
Subsequently, the regulated linear access price p*0 that maximises the net present value
to society can be thought of as either, a second-best-efficient price or a dynamic 
Ramsey-Boiteux price. Further, as the optimal linear price is above the allocatively- 
efficient-short-run marginal cost and below the monopoly price pm, it has similar 
properties to the optimal wholesale market price found in the analysis of EQZ (2003).
7.4.5 Technological Progress, the Rate of Return and the Optimal Price 
As in Section 7.3.4, it is possible to assess the relationship betweenp*0 and 6lr here, by 
taking the total differential of the equation for the optimal condition, and deriving an 
expression for dp'0/d(y). This yields,
> o
-<P*o)
CS\pa)
x'iPo)
cs'oof i 4 ) +^ ) «'(paCT’tpD -C S 'Q Q g 'U O
ft'(p'o)1
(7.4.16)
The working for this outcome is provided in the Appendix of Chapter Seven in Section 
A.7.3.
Here, the sign of dp*0/d( j)  depends upon the sign of,
x XpDCSXpD -  CS'(p0)7T\p0)
From the assumptions outlined in Section 6.2.1,
x ' (p l )C S " (p l ) -  CS'(p] )n"(p 'c) =q{p'0) q \ p l )  -  + p'0q ( p ‘0)q"(p'0) < 0
This implies the square-bracketed term in the denominator of equation (7.4.16) is less 
than zero, and that the expression for dp\/ d (7) is less than zero. This suggests, that as 
with the monopoly investor in Section 7.3.4, the higher the rate of technological
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progress is, the higher will be the marginal benefit relative to the marginal cost that 
results for any given decrease in the access price.13
7.4.6 Policy Implications of the Results
As the results here are similar to those found in the previous Section, there are similar 
policy implications. That is, with constantly decreasing costs over time: the
anticipatory retardation that results from a lower access may be beneficial to society; 
there is less of a case for an access holiday when there is a higher rate of technological 
progress; and there are obviously difficulties in setting the optimal price for the 
competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor due to the need to estimate the 
demand curve for access. The results here also provide some additional insights into the 
optimal regulated price for the competitive or ROR-regulated investor, which may need 
to be taken into account by the regulator.
7.4.6.1 Setting the Optimal Regulated Price
Regulatory authorities often place emphasis on setting an access price that is consistent 
with achieving an allowed rate of return on an investment of commensurate risk. The 
result here suggests that in an industry characterised by decreasing costs over time, the 
regulator must not just allow a firm to charge any access price that achieves the allowed 
rate of return. The regulator must choose a price, which equates the marginal benefit of 
a decrease in the price with the marginal cost of deferring the flow of social surplus. In 
practice, this outcome may be difficult to achieve, due to the information that is required 
to calculate such a pric.
7.4.6.2 Benefits to Society from “Hybrid” Regulation
Intuitively, price regulation of the competitive investor or ROR and price regulation of 
the monopoly investor, should yield the highest level of welfare when a linear access 
price is charged. The reason for this is that there is now effectively a combination of:
■ perfect competition to undertake the investment, i.e. ‘competition to construct’ or 
competition ‘for’ the market; and
■ competition ‘in’ the market, after the essential infrastructure has been provided.
I T .
As in Section 7.3, this result is true for a non-convex demand curve. It has not been shown that this outcome will hold more 
generally.
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For the monopoly investor, the this effect of competition for the market is simulated, by 
constraining the rate of return the firm is allowed to earn to r. Once the investment has 
been made, competition in the market for both the competitive and ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor is then simulated by the use of price regulation.
The combination of ROR and price regulation has sometimes been referred to as 
“hybrid” regulation. 14 Contrasting claims have been made that such regulation is 
ineffective, because:
■ price and ROR regulation produce identical results, so any combination of the two is 
unnecessary; or
■ it reintroduces the static inefficiencies of ROR regulation, such as, gold plating, 
accounting cost padding and the AJ effect.
Although the model here does not assess the impact of such static inefficiencies as the 
AJ effect or gold plating, it provides an alternative view of hybrid regulation. In this 
model, with decreasing costs over time, hybrid regulation appears to be effective. ROR 
regulation of the monopoly investor constrains the market power the firm has to delay 
the investment, while price regulation places an upper bound on the price the firm can 
charge once the infrastructure is provided. A comparison of the net present value to 
society that is generated by each outcome is illustrated using a numerical example in the 
following Section.
14 For example, see Brauetigam and Panzar (1993) and Small (1999) at page 19.
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7.5 Comparing the Regimes with a Linear Demand for Access
It is assumed here that there is a linear demand curve p{q) = a -  bq, where a, b>  0, or 
q(p) = {a — p)/b. This implies that the consumer surplus and revenue flow in each 
period is CS(p) = (a -  pf/2b  and 7i(p) =p(a -  p)/b. By solving for the price under each 
regime, and evaluating consumer surplus and revenue flow, it is possible to derive 
expressions for the investment timing, the net present value to the firm and the net 
present value to society, contained in Table 6.3.1. Assigning values to the parameters, 
calculations and graphs are done confirming the results established throughout the 
course of this and the previous Chapter. In particular it is shown that where two-part 
access tariffs cannot be charged, the highest net present value to society is achieved 
with price regulation of the competitive investor, or a combination of ROR and price 
regulation on the monopoly investor.
7.5.1 The Socially-Optimal Two-Part Access Tariff
From Section 6.6 the socially-optimal outcome is achieved by setting the usage price of 
p * = 0, and a fixed fee for the monopoly investor of,
<  = CS(p =0) = Smx = “~  (7.5.1)
and a fixed fee for the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor of,
A - _ rC5(p’ = 0 ) ^ r5’m„ aV ° e + r e + r 2b(e + r) (7.5.2)
Substituting these access fees into the expression for investment timing in equations 
(6.6.5) and (6.6.8), yields the dynamically-efficient time,
',(0 ,4 ) = '.(°. j j f e )  = <„(0) = ^loga2r \  _
1 (2 b(0 + r)Co
(7.5.3)
The respective access fees ensure that the net present value to society are maximised. 
From equation (6.6.4) and (6.6.6),
NPVsw(0) = NPVxf { 0 ,£) = - a20 1 a 2 TW+dJ(2 b(e + r)C(>/ (7.5.4)
303
7.5.2 An Unregulated Linear Access Price
From Section 7.2, as the marginal revenue is MR(q) = a -  2bq and the short-run 
marginal cost is zero, an investor not subject to any price regulation, sets the linear price 
of pm= all. The resulting consumer surplus, revenue flow and total surplus is then, 
CS{pm) = a2/86, n(pm) = a2/4b, S(pm) = 3a2/8b. Substituting these outcomes into the 
expression for the socially-optimal investment time in equation (7.2.5), yields
lJpJ = p°S
8 b(d + r)C0
(7.5.5)
From equations (7.2.4), (7.2.6) and (7.2.7), the investment timing, net present to the 
firm and society achieved by the monopoly investor will then be,
‘x ( p j = g  log
4 b(6 + r)C0
(7.5.6)
n p v ; ( p j  = -
r
a16 \#
4 b(6 + r) 4 b(0 + r)C{
(7.5.7)
o y
n p v ; ( p„) = -
r
V(36> + r n a2 V
8 6 ( 0 + r) J ^4 b(0 + r)Co> (7.5.8)
From equations (7.2.10) and (7.2.11), the investment timing and net present value to 
society achieved by the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor is,
( , ( / > j = - L °  ( 7 -5 -9 )
( „i \ (
n p v ; ( p j =-
r W J\ AbrC,o 7
(7.5.10)
7.5.3 Linear Price Regulation of the Monopoly Investor
In Section 7.3, it was illustrated that if the monopoly investor was allowed to earn the 
rate of return 6+ r, the regulator maximises the net present value to society by setting a 
linear access price that satisfies,
CS(p'x) 7i’(p ‘s) _ 9
x(pl) S'(p ’x) r
The expression for the derivative of consumer surplus and revenue at any given price p 
here is,
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(7.5.11a)CS'00 = - 4 ( a - p )0
n'(p) = \ { a - 2 p )  
b
(7.5.11b)
Evaluating consumer surplus, the revenue flows and the above derivatives at price p *x, 
the working outlined in the Appendix A.7.4, shows that the optimal condition yields,
o - f ) p ; 2- ( ^ ) p ; + 4 = o  (7.5.12)
Assuming 6/r* 1, the quadratic expression can be solved for,
. a (3 ± y i+ 8 f f l )
4 ( W )
, wherepm>p*x> 0 (7.5.13)
From equation (7.5.13) it is evident that the maximum solution forp*x fails to lie within 
the required bounds for the optimal price. When 6/r > 1, the maximum solution is less 
than zero, while when 9/r < 1 , the maximum solution is greater than the unregulated 
monopoly price. Consequently, the solution here is given by,
. a (3 ~ p +  8 (f))
— *(TTi}— >when? * 1
If 61 r = 1, then the quadratic expression in equation (7.5.12) can be solved for the 
optimal linear access price,
Px — , when 7  -  1 3
Therefore, where the regulator only controls the linear price the monopoly investor 
charges, the regulated access price that maximises the net present value to society is,
a ( W i + 8 oo)
4(1- f )
, when 7 ^ 1
a
J
, when 7  = 1
(7.5.14)
To confirm dp*x/d( 7 ) < 0 when 6/r^ 1, the derivative of equation (7.5.14) is taken.
^  a [ - 5 -  4(f) + 3^1 + 8(f)
<*(?)”  4 ^/l+ 8(7) ( f - l ) 2
(7.5.15)
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For dp*Jd(f )  < 0, the expression in the numerator of (7.5.15) must be less than zero,
i.e., -5  -  4 (f) + 3yJ\ + 8(f) < 0 . As this simplifies to the requirement that
16 ( f  - 1)2 > 0 , it implies thatdp*Jd(j)<  0, and the optimal regulated price p*x is:
> —, when -  < 1
3
= ^  w h e n f  = i
< —, when f  > 1 
3
(7.5.16)
This outcome is captured in the price-quantity space diagram of Figure 7.5.1.
FIGURE 7.5.1 THE OPTIMAL PRICE FOR A MONOPOLY INVESTOR
Evaluating consumer surplus and revenue at p*x and substituting the outcomes (given by 
Appendix A.7.5) into the expressions in Table 6.3.1, yields
( . . . ., A
K(P*X)
—log
e
166r(l + f ) ( f - l j  C0
<j2(3 -2 0 (f) + 8 (f)2 +3^1 + 8(f))
1, ( 9brC{ ';loghz
, when f  * 1
, when f  = 1
(7.5.17)
tx(p'x)
— log 
6
- lo g
r
a
V
f9brQ
2V a
16fr( l + f ) ( l - f ) 2C0 
( 3 - ^ l + 8 ( f ) ) ( l - 4 ( * )  + ^ l  + 8 ( f ) )
, when -  * 1
’  r
, when f  = 1
(7.5.18)
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NPVUpJ
ai (3 - ' / l  + 8 ( f ) ) ( l - 4 ( f )  + ,/l + 8( f ) )  
6rC0( f - l ) 2(l + f )
\ 1+f
, when 7 + 1
(7.5.19)
f 2 , 2 1{%) 19brC0)
, when y = 1
npv;<j >\)
a1 [4 - 8(f)+ ̂ (l +^1+8(7))]
I6fc(l-f)( l+f)
a!(3 -%/l + 8 ( f ) ) ( l -4 ( f )+N/l + 8(f))'
166rC0( l - 4 )  (1+4)
i f *r 3 b
a2
9 brC0
, when j  * 1
, when 7 = 1
(7.5.20)
7.5.4 Price Regulation of the Competitive Investor/Price and ROR Regulation of the 
Monopoly Investor
The analysis in Section 7.4 illustrates that for both a competitive investor and ROR- 
regulated monopoly investor, the optimal regulated price must satisfy,
CS(p '„) n'(p'0) 0
x ( p j  'CS'(pl) r
The working in Appendix A.7.6 shows that, by evaluating consumer surplus, revenue 
and its derivatives at price p *0, and substituting into the optimal condition,
A ( f )
2(1 + 5 )
(7.5.21)
Where the rate of technological progress is equal to the rate of return (i.e. 61r = 1), the 
optimal regulated price in equation (7.5.21) is,
Po 2(1 + 1) 4
(7.5.22)
Thus, the optimal price for a competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor is,
pl( 7) =■
2(1 + 5 )
, when 4 ^  1
a
Ä , when y = 1
As the derivative of equation (7.5.23) is,
(7.5.23)
dp’o
2 ( 5 + 1)2
<0
the optimal price p 0 will be,
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pie
> —, when 7 < 1 
4
= —, when -7 = 1 
4
< —, when 7 > 1 
4
The result is highlighted in Figure 7.5.2.
(7.5.24)
FIGURE 7.5.2 THE OPTIMAL PRICE FOR A COMPETITIVE INVESTOR
9/r< 1
0/r> 1
3a/46
Using equation (6.4.3), the price p*d that induces the competitive or ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor to provide the investment at the dynamically-efficient time here is,
Pd( 7 ) (7.5.25)
The result confirms that the optimal linear price p*0 is dynamically inefficient and a
type o f second-best efficient price. As by assumption a/2> p>  0, the result also shows 
that dynamic efficiency is not possible here if  0!r < 1/2 .
Substituting p \  into consumer surplus and revenue flow, gives the outcomes outlined in 
the Appendix in A.7.7. Using these expressions and the outcomes from Table 6.3.1,
*wOO =
— log
0
(
%brC0 (l + j ) 2
° 2 (3+8(?)+4(f)2)
- lo g
r
f  64brC0 
{ 15 a2
, when 7 ^  1 
, when 7 = 1
(7.5.26)
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(7.5.27)
(7.5.28)
r^32bJ^\6brC0J
, when 7 = 1
From inspection of the above equations, it is difficult to compare investment timing and 
the net present values to society when 6 / r 1. Hence, Section 7.5.5 uses a numerical 
example to compare investment timing and the net present value to society under the 
various regimes using different values of 6/r.
7.5.5 Comparing the Schemes using Numerical Examples
To compare access prices, investment timing, and the net present value to society using 
a numerical example, the following values are assigned to each of the parameters:15
■ for the linear demand curve, a = 10 and b = 0.01;
■ the cost of capital investment at time 0 is Co = 1 000 000; and
■ the constant risk-free interest rate is r — 0.05; and
■ the rate of technological progress can be 6 = 0.01, 0.025, 0.05 or 0.10.
7.5.5.1 Comparing the Access Prices
The outcomes for the respective access prices under the different regime are outlined in 
Table 7.5.1. To remind readers of the notation used in Table 7.5.1:
■ A*x,p* = 0 is the socially-optimal tariff for the monopoly investor;
■ A*0,p* = 0 is the socially-optimal tariff for the competitive or ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor;
■ pm is the unregulated monopoly price;
■ p*x is optimal linear price for a monopoly earning the rate of return 6+ r;
15 Other values were also adopted for a, b, C0and r, and similar basic results were established to those outlined in this Section.
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■ p d is the price that induces investment at the dynamically-efficient time; and
■ p0 is the optimal linear price for a competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly.
TABLE 7.5.1 THE PRICE FOR ACCESS
X \ 0 r  
(P,A) \
Ax ,p =0
■ . .
1/5
1 '
:
1/9■
5000
■
4166.67 3333.33 2500 1666.67
P m 5
».■ 4.34 3.82 3.33 2.81
p.' 5 3.33 2
n * 
H o 4.17 3.33 2.5 1.67
The results in the table confirm that:
■ as shown in equation (6.6.10), the fixed fee in the socially-optimal two-part tariff for 
a competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor will be lower, the higher the rate 
of technological progress is. For example, when 0= 0.025, the optimal fixed fee for 
the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor is 3333.33, while when 0 — 
0.05, the optimal fixed fee is only 2500;
■ the optimal linear price for the monopoly and competitive (or ROR-regulated 
monopoly) investor — p x and p *0 — will be lower, the higher the rate technological
progress is. For example, when 0 = 0.01, the optimal linear price for the monopoly 
investor is 4.34, and the optimal linear price for the competitive investor is 4.17. 
However, when 6 — 0.10, the optimal linear price for the monopoly investor is only 
2.81, while the optimal linear price for the competitive investor is 1.67; and
■ the optimal linear price p0 is not equal to the price that the induces the competitive 
or ROR-regulated monopoly investor to undertake the investment at the 
dynamically-efficient time, p d . Table 7.5.1 indicates that when 6 = 0.05, the
optimal linear price p o is 2.5, while the dynamically-efficient price is 3.3.
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7.5.5.2 Comparing Investment Timing
Table 7.5.2 illustrates the outcomes for the socially-optimal investment time, and the 
investment timing by a monopoly and competitive (or ROR-regulated monopoly) 
investor. The table adopts the notation used throughout the Chapter 6 and 7, that is:
■ tw(p) denotes the socially-optimal investment time at any given usage price p\
■ tx(p) denotes the investment timing by the monopoly investor at any given usage 
price p; and
■ t0(p) denotes the investment timing by the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor at any given usage price p.
TABLE 7.5.2 DYNAMICALLY-EFFICIENT. COMPETITIVE AND MONOPOLY INVESTMENT TIMING
\ f l f r
U p ) \
1/5 1/2
■ ’ ' -   ̂ *-»
1
'■y-
2
t w ( p  = 0) 248.49 108.32 59.92 34.01
'  . •
t w { P m ) 277.26 119.83 65.67 36.89
t w { p * ) 269.32 114.63 62.27 34.83
t ( P o ) 267.52 113.03 61.21 34.29
dir
tip )
. .
1 J ' l ■ "• -'V -
A  1 C1 /5
i
1 /2
W- 'V;■■
1
•
2
t(p4 317.81 136.05 73.78 40.94
tJpx') 319.58 138.34 76.13 43.08
x 6 T r
t i p )
1 / 5 1 / 2 i
?
$
2
to(pm) 299.57 119.83 59.92 29.92
UPo)
■
302.39 124.54 65.67 35.84
The results in the table confirm that:
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■ the lower the usage price, the earlier is the dynamically-efficient time tw. The lowest 
usage price of p -  0, yields the earliest dynamically-efficient time for any value of 6, 
while the highest possible usage price here pm, yields the latest dynamically-efficient 
time for any value of P,
u for any given usage price p, the monopoly invests at a time tx that is after the 
investment timing by the competitive investor t0, and the socially-optimal time tw;
■ the unregulated competitive and ROR-regulated monopoly investor may undertake 
the investment before, after or at the socially-optimal time tw. For example:
- if 0= 0.01, the unregulated competitive and ROR-regulated monopoly investor 
inefficiently delays the investment;
- if 6 = 0.25, the unregulated competitive and ROR-regulated monopoly investor 
provides the infrastructure at the socially-optimal time 119.83; and
- if 0 = 0.5, the unregulated competitive and ROR-regulated monopoly investor 
invests prematurely.
These outcomes also indicate that with a higher rate of technological progress 6, it is 
more likely the condition CS{pm)l7iipm) < Olr is met, and that the competitive investor 
provides the essential infrastructure too early; and
■ at the socially-optimal price, the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor is 
dynamically inefficient. For example, when 6=  0.1, the dynamically-efficient time 
is at 34.29, while the firm invests at time 35.84.
7.5.5.3 Comparing the Net Present Value to Society
Assuming the value of the rate of technological progress lies between 0 < 0 < 0.1, the 
respective net present values to society achieved under each regime, can be graphed and 
compared as a function of 6. This is shown in Figure 7.5.3. In this diagram and the 
table below, the following notation is once again used to denote the respective net 
present values to society achieved at the various prices is:
■ NPV"(p* = 0) is the socially-optimal net present value to society;
■ NPV*(p) is the net present value to society achieved by the monopoly investor at 
any given usage price p\ and
■ NPV°(p) is the net present value to society achieved by the competitive or ROR- 
regulated investor at any given usage price p.
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FIGURE 7.5.3 COMPARING THE NET PRESENT VALUE TO SOCIETY
1 4 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
6 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 8
Figure 7.5.3 illustrates that as anticipated from the analysis in Section 7.4, aside from 
the socially-optimal two-part access tariff, price regulation of the competitive or ROR- 
regulated monopoly investor yields the highest net present value to society for all 
relevant values of 6. Further, the diagram highlights that price regulation is better for 
society than no regulation of the monopoly investor and that the competitive or ROR- 
regulated monopoly investor is likely to yield worse outcomes for society the higher the 
rate of technological progress is. These results are summarised in Table 7.5.3 below, by 
calculating the net present value to society where #= 0.01, 0.025, 0.05 and 0.10.
TABLE 7.5.3 THE NET PRESENT VALUE TO SOCIETY UNDER EACH SCHEME
' ..'... - ..^ a r
N P V '
7  " ■ ,  -?■
I/O
.
1/2
■ ' ? • '  .•
2
•• V v  '
N P V “(p  = 0) 0.0670 148.15 2500 12171.61
mm 0.0042 46.30 1250 7530.80
N P V ° ( p m) 0.0078 62.50 1250 5590.17
-
. - '  ,v- •
NPV,*{pJ) 0.0046 53.43 1481.48 9126.12
N P V s°(p0 ) 0.0092 87.79 2109.38 11574.07
313
The above results highlight a number of important points:
■ where only one firm can undertake the investment, or one firm has a significant cost 
advantage over its rival, and there is a linear price for access, a combination of price 
and ROR regulation can be optimal. This suggests there may be some benefit from 
“hybrid” regulation;
■ where there is the potential for competition to arise providing the essential 
infrastructure, a better outcome for society is achieved by allowing competition to 
construct the linear price-regulated investment, rather than auctioning off the right; 
and
■ the higher the rate of technological progress is, all other things being equal, the 
greater the net present value to society that is achieved from the investment. 
However, rather than setting a higher linear price or allowing an access holiday, in 
order to maximise the benefit to society, the analysis here suggests that the regulator 
should set a lower access price.
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7.6 Forward-Looking Cost Regulation of A Monopoly Investor
In the analysis in Section 6.5 and 7.4, the allowed fair rate of return was based on 
historical or backward-looking (BL) cost of the investment. However, as Chapter 4 
outlines, a great deal of access-pricing regulation today is based on forward-looking 
(FL) cost regulation. This Section examines the impact that FL cost regulation has upon 
the investment timing and net present value to society, when the investor charges a 
linear price for access.
As in Chapter 5, it is illustrated that under FL cost regulation, the firm must be allowed 
to earn the higher rate of return on the investment 6 + r, and that the access price will be 
decreasing over time. Employing a linear demand curve for access, it is found that the 
FL cost-regulated monopoly investor invests later than a BL cost ROR-regulated 
monopoly investor subject to the optimal access pricep0. To induce the earliest
possible investment it appears the regulator must allow the firm to initially charge the 
unregulated monopoly price pm. The result however does not suggest that there is a case 
for an access holiday here, as the access charge is required to immediately decrease 
after the investment has been made. Finally, using the parameter values from the 
numerical example in Section 7.5, it is found that FL cost regulation of the monopoly 
investor leads to a lower net present value to society than the optimal combination of 
price and ROR regulation on the BL costs of the firm. This outcome appears consistent 
with results established in Chapter 5. It indicates that once again the higher benefit to 
society under BL cost regulation identified by GSW (2001), arises even in the absence 
of the uncertainty that was central to their analysis.
7.6.1 The Allowed Fair Rate under FL Cost Regulation
It is assumed initially that the firm subject to FL cost regulation, undertakes the 
investment at some given time r where it charges an access price p T, and earns revenue 
of 7i(p r). As the revenue the firm is allowed to earn at each instant after the investment 
has been made decreases over time at the same rate as the cost-decreasing rate of 
technological progress 6,
n(pt) = 7r(pT)e~0(t~T),\/t > r (7.6.1)
As in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5, in order for the investor to recover costs it must be 
allowed to earn the fair rate fpL= 6 + r. That is, under FL costs, the minimum rate of
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return required for the investment in infrastructure to be undertaken, must compensate 
the firm not only for the normal rate of return on capital r, but also the capital loss 6 
associated with the method used by the regulator to value the asset. To see this, it is 
assumed that upon investing at time r, the firm subject to FL cost regulation, earns
x (p r) = f FLC0e-e('-’)y t> T  (7.6.2)
This implies that the net present value derived by the firm that charges the decreasing 
price over time pt, will be,
oo
NPVf (p,) = \ -  C0e - ^ r)’ (7.6.3)
T
Setting equation (7.6.3) equal to zero and solving for fpi, yields
f FL = e + r (7.6.4)
The path followed by the decreasing net cash flow in each period after the investment 
has occurred at time r is mapped below in Figure 7.6.1.
FIGURE 7.6.1 THE NET CASH FLOW PATH UNDER FL COST REGULATION
7.6.2 Investment Timing under FL Cost Regulation
It is assumed here that the FL cost-regulated firm invests at the same time as the BL 
cost ROR-regulated monopoly investor subject to price regulation. This assumption is 
made to assess whether there exists an initial linear access price under FL cost 
regulation that will allow the firm to invest at the same time as the BL cost-regulated
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firm. If such a price does not exist, then it will imply the original assumption that both
types of regulation induce the firm to invest at time t0(p*0) is incorrect. As the firm
subject to FL cost regulation has a price that decreases over time with the allowed
revenue, to avoid any confusion, the investment time of t0(p*0) is just denoted here by 
♦
t .
As illustrated in Section 7.4, t is the investment time associated with the linear price, 
which maximises the net present value to society achieved by a BL cost-based-ROR- 
regulated monopoly investor. At this time, the firm earns revenue of,
#(/?*) = rCt* = rCQe~et* (7.6.5a)
As the firm facing FL cost regulation is allowed to earn the rate of return 6 + r, the 
revenue stream from investing at the same given time t is,
n  (/?,*) = (6» + r) Ct. = (0 + r) Coe~0t* (7.6.5b)
Although price p*0 is known, the initial price p t* charged by the firm facing FL cost
regulation for the investment undertaken at time t*, is not known. To derive this linear 
access price, equation (7.6.5b) is manipulated as follows,
. . (# + r)
r ~ rC‘*
By then substituting in equation (7.6.5a), a relationship is established between the net 
cash flow under each type of regulation at time t*.
x {p ,.) = ^0  + ̂ k {pI)
Using the linear demand curve and substituting in equation (7.5.23) for price/?*, the 
following quadratic expression for p t* is derived,
a2(l + 2 ( f ) ) _
Pt* - a p t. + -
4(1 + *)
= 0
Solving this, the initial price needed to induce the firm facing FL costs to invest at the 
same time t is,
_ a (  l + f ) ± 7 - a 2(f ) ( l  + a)
2(1+ f)
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However as, -a 2 ( f  )(l + a) < 0, all solutions for p t* will be imaginary. As price must be
a real number, the result implies that the initial assumption of identical timing is 
incorrect, and no initial access price under FL cost regulation exits that allows the firm 
to recover the cost of the investment at time t*. Therefore, the revenues required for 
investment at time t — — exceed the maximum possible net cash flow n(pm) that
can be earned with a linear price. This suggests that the investment timing under FL 
costs will occur later than the investment timing of a competitive or BL cost-based- 
ROR-regulated monopoly subject to optimal linear price regulation.
FIGURE 7.6.2 INVESTMENT TIMING UNDER FL COST REGULATION
To resolve the issue of when a firm subject to FL cost regulation will invest, it is 
assumed here that the regulator allows the investor to earn the rate of return (9 + r + s). 
As this return provides the firm with some economic rent, in order to maximise the net 
present value it receives, the firm has an incentive to invest at the earliest possible time. 
This involves charging the unregulated monopoly price pm, earning a net cash flow of 
T̂ pm), and investing at the given time r, where the following condition is satisfied,
tip) A
0 7  Un
Rearranging this expression, it implies that the investment occurs at time,
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Assuming that £ —> 0, the investor facing FL cost regulation invests at exactly the same 
time as the unregulated monopoly investor in Section 6.6. That is,
T = tÄ p J  = ^ °  g
' (g + r)C p
v *(Pm) ,
(7.6.6)
To simplify the notation for the remainder of the analysis in this Section, the investment 
time tx(pm) is denoted by the term tm.
As the regulator aims to generate the flow of social surplus at the earliest possible time 
under FL cost regulation, the unregulated linear access price pm also represents the 
initial price that the regulator will allow the firm to charge. However, this result does 
not indicate there is support for an access holiday. In this framework, once the 
investment has been made at time tm the regulator requires the price to immediately 
decrease from its initial level pm.16 The investment timing of the firm under FL cost 
regulation is shown in Figure 7.5.2.
7.6.3 The Net Present Value to Society under FL cost Regulation 
Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 established that for an existing investment, a constant BL cost- 
based price leads to a higher net present value to society than a FL cost-based price, 
which decreases over time. As in this framework with linear demand, FL cost 
regulation also induces later investment timing, it should follow that BL cost regulation 
still provides greater benefits to society. To confirm this outcome an expression for the 
net present value to society under FL costs is derived, and a numerical example used to 
compare the two types of cost regulation.
As the present value of the revenues to the firm is equal to the present value of the costs 
of the investment, the net present value to society under FL cost regulation is equal to 
the present value of the stream of consumer surplus. The problem here is that, whilst it 
is known how revenue evolves over time once the investment occurs, it is not 
immediately obvious from this how the consumer surplus at each instant changes over 
time. To derive the expression for the net present value to society from the investment, 
the price and consumer surplus must be found at some arbitrary time t > tm.
At some time t, the firm facing FL cost-based regulation will earn the net cash flow,
^  For a model where there is the need for an access holiday to induce earlier investment, see Gans and King (2002). They 
consider a world o f  uncertainty, where the truncation problem arises.
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n ( p t) = n(Pm)e~e{t~tn), where t > tm (7.6.7)
Using the linear demand curve from Section 7.5, i.e. q(p) = (a -p ) /b ,  equation (7.6.7) is 
simplified in Section A.7.8 of the Appendix, to give a quadratic expression in price p t,
2 , a  A Pt ~apt + — e m> =0 (7.6.8)
Solving this in Section A.7.9 of the Appendix yields,
Pt = 1 + V l - e -9'" 0 (7.6.9)
As the allowed price at time t must be less than the initial monopoly price a l l , the only 
solution for p t in equation (7.6.9) is the minimum solution,
Pt (7.6.10)
Given this expression for price, the consumer surplus at time t is,
(■a~p,ycs(Pt) a
8b
1 W l - e “0(,-'m) (7.6.11)
and net present value to society is then,
Solving this yields,17
NPVs(p,) = ^  ] [ l  + 2e ndr
NPVs(Pl)
a 2 e~r‘m
2 1 | T (^)y fn  ^
8 b
(7.6.12)
where, 7r= 3.14159, r  (■£■) = jV® 'e Tdr  and r ( |  + -̂ ) =
o
e Tdr
o
Substituting the expression for tm into equation (7.6.12),
NPVs{Pl) =
8 b
\e
b(6  + r)C (o J 6 + r +
(7.6.13)
17 This outcome was derived with the assistance o f the software package Mathematica Version 4.1.
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A numerical example that compares this net present value, with that achieved by a BL 
cost-based-ROR-regulated monopoly subject to optimal linear price regulation, is done 
by adopting the parameters values of Section 7.5 — i.e. a -  10,b  = 0.01, Co = 1 000 000 
and r = 0.05.18 From this, a graph is drawn that depicts the net present values to society 
under BL cost (i.e. NPV°{p*0)) and FL cost (i.e. NPVs(pt)) regulation as a function of 8,
where 0 < 6 < 0.1.
FIGURE 7.6.3 NET PRESENT VALUE TO SOCIETY UNDER BL AND FL COSTS
1 4 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
6 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
0 . 0 80 . 0 60 . 0 2 0 . 0 4
From the diagram in Figure 7.6.3, as anticipated, the net present value to society using a 
combination of price and ROR regulation of BL costs, will exceed the net present value 
to society achieved under FL cost regulation for all the relevant values of 6.
The outcome in the diagram are summarised in Table 7.6.1. This shows the net present 
values to society under both schemes using the given parameter values for a, b, r and 
C0, and the values for 8 of 0.01, 0.025, 0.05 and 0.1.
1 80 Similar basic results were found to hold when other values were adopted for a , b, r and Co-
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TABLE 7.6.1 THE NET PRESENT VALUE TO SOCIETY UNDER BL AND FL COSTS
Q lr
A/PV4 \
; . • •
1/5 1/2 1 - .• • ■ ■
.
»•
2
NPV°(p„*) 0.0092 87.79 2109.38 11574.07
' '
NPV,(p.) 0.0060 66.67 1770.83 10448.90
To confirm the outcome that FL cost regulation leads to later investment than BL cost 
regulation, numerical results for investment timing are also provided in Table 7.6.2.
TABLE 7.6.2 INVESTMENT TIMING UNDER BL AND FL COSTS
0 / r
1(P)
1/5 1/2 1 2
to(Po ) 302.39 124.54 65.67 35.84
tx(Pm) 317.81 136.05 73.78 40.94
With decreasing costs over time, the results here indicate that, FL cost regulation of the 
monopoly investor induces later investment, and a lower net present value to society, 
than BL cost regulation. This reinforces the idea from Chapter 5 that the key 
conclusions of GSW (2001) may arise without the uncertainty that was central to their 
analysis. The addition of the stochastic costs used in the GSW model is only likely to 
exacerbate the advantage of BL cost regulation to society identified here. The reason 
for this is that cost uncertainty leads to the fixed net cash flow in each period under BL 
cost regulation, being compared with the uncertain net cash flows earned in each period 
under FL cost regulation. As the concave net cash flow function of the firm effectively 
acts in the same manner as a utility function for a risk-averse investor, the additional 
uncertainty associated with FL costs makes the regime even less desirable to the firm 
and society than it was before.
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7.7 Conclusion
Using the framework established in Section 6.2, and setting the fixed fee for access A 
equal to zero, this Chapter examined the outcome for society when investors charged a 
linear price for access. In particular, it looked at the optimal linear price that should be 
charged, given that the allocatively-efficient-short-run-marginal-cost-based price failed 
to adequately compensate the investor.
In this Chapter it was established that:
■ when the linear price is left unregulated, the monopoly and competitive (or ROR- 
regulated monopoly) investor each charge the unregulated monopoly price pm and 
generate the same level of allocative efficiency. From the outcomes in Chapter 6, 
the monopoly investor is more likely to be dynamically efficient and induce greater 
benefit to society, with a higher rate of cost-decreasing technological progress;
■ society benefits from the introduction of a small degree of linear price regulation 
upon the investor;
■ the optimal linear access prices derived for the monopoly and competitive (or ROR- 
regulated monopoly) investor, are allocatively and dynamically inefficient. This 
implies that, given price must be set above the allocatively-efficient-short-run 
marginal cost, the optimal way to do this is not to set a price that is dynamically 
efficient. This idea that an efficient outcome does not maximise welfare given an 
existing distortion, is similar to the idea in the theory of second best;
■ as the optimal linear access price for the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly 
investor is above the allocatively-efficient-short-run marginal cost, yet below the 
monopoly price, it has similar properties to the price derived by EQZ (2003);
■ the optimal linear price the regulator should set for each investor is decreasing in the 
rate of technological progress. In terms of public policy, this suggests that even 
without the standard concerns about downstream market competition or future 
investment in infrastructure, there is less of a case for an access holiday — i.e. no 
regulation — where there is a higher rate of technological progress experienced in an 
industry;
■ anticipatory retardation may not necessarily be detrimental for society;
■ price and ROR regulation have different effects in the model. In an industry 
experiencing rapid technological progress, ROR regulation simulates the effect of
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competition to construct the investment — i.e. competition for the market — while 
price regulation simulates the effect of competition in the market after the investment 
has taken place;
■ the separate impact price and ROR regulation have on investment timing, suggests 
that the combination of the two forms of regulation, often referred to as hybrid 
regulation, may be beneficial for society;
■ where there are rapidly decreasing costs of investing in an industry over time, it may 
be inappropriate for the regulator to just set any price that achieves the regulated fair 
rate of return;
■ as the optimal access price requires both information about technological progress 
and underlying demand curve in an industry it may be difficult in practice to 
estimate. While regulators often use estimates of technological progress and levels 
of demand, they do not often have estimated demand schedules for an industry;
■ assuming linear demand, a numerical example confirms the outcomes found 
throughout the course of this and the previous Chapter. In particular, it is shown that 
based on the regimes analysed here, where two-part access tariffs cannot be charged, 
the best outcome is achieved by having linear price-regulation of a competitive or 
ROR-regulated monopoly investor;
■ using linear demand and a numerical example, FL cost regulation leads to later 
investment and induces a worse outcome for society than BL cost regulation. This 
appears to reinforce the results outlined in Chapter 5; and
■ where there is FL cost regulation in an industry experiencing rapidly decreasing 
costs, the regulator may need to allow the investor to initially charge the unregulated 
monopoly price pm. However, the certainty model used in this Section does not 
provide a case for an access holiday, as the access price must immediately decrease 
over time once the investment has been made.
As the framework used here assumes there is no uncertainty and that the investor is 
guaranteed the normal rate of return on the investment r, there are limits to the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Important issues, such as how the regulator should 
compensate the firm for the “truncation problem”, are not dealt with in the analysis 
here. However, it has been consistently demonstrated throughout the course of both 
Chapters that the results of the model, provide a simple formal way of capturing 
important ideas and concerns raised in the PC (2001a) and PC (2001b) reports on access 
regulation in Australia.
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A.7 Chapter 7 Appendix
A.7.1 Deriving the Condition in Equation (7.3.6)
To establish the optimal condition that the access price for the monopoly investor p\ 
must satisfy in equation (7.3.6), the expression in equation (7.3.5) is simplified to give,
f
es\p\)+rcs\px)+
\
=  0
Multiplying the above expression through by 6k (p *x), and substituting in for 
S(P*x) = CS(p*x) + 7r(p*x) and CS'(p*x) = S'(p*)-7i\p*x) yields,
en(px)9S\px) + en(p'x)r(S'(px) -  n '(p 'x) ) + (t9CS(px) + 6x(p\) + rCS(p’x) ) rn \p l)  = 0
{6 + r)( 0u( p ‘ )S"( p] ) + rCS( p] )n'(p'xj ) - d j i (  )m'( p \ ) + eii(px)rn'(p\) = 0
=> -rCS(p*x)n \p \ )=  07t{p*x)S\p*x) 
Rearranging the above expression,
This is the optimal condition that was given in equation (7.3.6).
A.7.2 Deriving the Outcome in Equation (7.3.13)
To establish the outcome in equation (7.3.13), the equation (7.3.6) is rearranged to give,
CS(p )=  -n (p ') S \p x)
» '(A )
and the total differential is then taken. This gives,
CS\px)dpx = - n ( p x) ' sup * \ pM p \
x ' (p 'x) ;
fa ( p ’x) I" x '(p ’ )S’ (p'x) -S '(p ') ! r ’ (p ')
K\py
dpi
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= J  C 5 V ,) + ̂ 2 + ̂ 1
K'(p:)S’(px) - S ' ( p x) n \ p x)
* xpS
dp’ =
~n{P,)
' Z i p , ?
<*(*)
Rearranging the above equation in terms of dp'Jd (7 ),
, . - x ( p ’, )
d p x
« '( A ) ]
d (? ) c «-(p . ) ,  » Z U )  ,
r r
yxpjsxpj-sxpMXp:)} 
*XpS  J
This is the expression given by equation (7.3.13).
A.7.3 Deriving the Outcome in Equation (7.4.16)
To establish the outcome in equation (7.4.16), similar working is done to that used to 
show the outcome in equation (7.3.13). Therefore, equation (7.4.6) is rearranged to 
give,
c s ( P; ) e cs\p’S
* X p I ) X(p"o)
Taking the total differential of this expression yields,
CS\p*0)dp*0 = -7i{p'0) c s XpS
n X p ’„)  .
Ok (p *0)
<*(*)-
e • \\c sXpJ
x X p ’o) x Xp 'oW o
x XpJCSX pJ - C S X pDttXp:)
x XpS
dpi
Rearranging the above equation in the same manner that was done in A.7.2, yields the 
following expression for dpl/d (f),
dPl
C
o
'
0
*
0
*
\ _
_✓
 
V.—
✓
1_
__
__
__
__
__
__
1
< p I )
d ( * )  c - X p ’ ) i 0 C S '( P : )  i 6 k { p : )
r r
x X p I ) S " ( p *0) -  S'(p*0) n \ p * 0)
* X p I ?  J
This is the outcome in equation (7.4.16).
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A.7.4 Deriving the Outcome in Equation (7.5.12)
By evaluating the equations for consumer surplus, revenue and the derivatives at the 
optimal price p *x, and substituting the expressions into the optimal condition in equation 
(7.3.6), yields
This is the outcome in equation (7.5.12).
A.7.5 The Revenue and Consumer Surplus at p\
Substituting the solution for the optimal access price p* in equation (7.5.14), into the 
expressions for revenue and consumer surplus, yields the following outcomes for ;r(p*) 
and CS(px), given by equation (A.7.1) and (A.7.2).
= >  -
2 {<t-p' , ){a-2Px) e
Rearranging this,
1 6 ( l - f )2
, when j  * 1
(A.7.1)y
I 9b
, when 7  = 1
CS(px) = <
l a 2
, when y ^ l
(A.7.2)
L 9b
, when 7  = 1
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A.7.6 Deriving the Outcome in Equation (7.5.21)
By evaluating the equations for consumer surplus, revenue and the derivatives at the 
optimal price p *0, and substituting the expressions into the optimal condition in equation 
(7.4.6), yields
Rearranging this, the expression for an optimal price for the competitive or ROR- 
regulated monopoly investor is,
This is the outcome for the optimal price in equation (7.5.21).
A.7.7 Revenue and Consumer Surplus at pa
Substituting the solution for the optimal access price pQ into the expression for the 
revenue and consumer surplus, yields the following outcomes yields the following 
outcomes for /r(p*) and CS(p*Q), given by equation (A.7.3) and (A.7.4).
bP',{a ~pl )  ~b{a ~ p l ) r
a
2(1 + *)
(A.7.3)
, when 7  * 1
(A.7.4)
9a2 , when 7  = 1
I 32b
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A.7.8 Deriving the Outcome in Equation (7.6.8)
Substituting the linear demand of q(p) = (a - p)/b into equation (7.6.7) yields,
n(pt) = x (pm)e~9(,~,m) = > ^ ( a - p t) = ^T e~0(,~‘m), t > tm
p] -apt +~^e 00 'n,) = 0
This is the outcome in equation (7.6.8).
A.7.9 Deriving the Outcome in Equation (7.6.9)
Applying the quadratic formula to solve equation (7.6.8),
a ±  \la 2 - a 2e /m'pt =----------------------- , where t > tm
a ±  ayl 1 -  e ^  ‘m>
P, = \ ± ^ \ - e 6{t~,m)
This is the outcome in equation (7.6.9).
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
This thesis has employed a number of economic models to address important issues that 
have been highlighted in the access regulation of utility industries in several countries, 
including Australia. The analysis conducted throughout has examined the allowed fair 
rate of return and the method of asset valuation used by the regulator, and emphasised 
the impact these regulatory tools have had on investment and efficiency. In addressing 
efficiency, each of the three types — allocative, production and dynamic — identified 
by regulators, commentators, access seekers and access providers, has been considered.
Chapters 2 and 3 used the Averch and Johnson (1962) model to examine the efficiency 
of a monopoly subject to rate-of-retum (ROR) regulation. Chapter 2 illustrated that a 
ROR-regulated and capital-subsidised monopoly generated similar outcomes, where the 
firm inefficiently over-capitalised in production. This equivalence was used to highlight 
a number of theoretical and potential policy implications in relation to production 
efficiency and investment. For example, it was shown that a monopoly subject to a 
lower fair rate of return, behaved in the same manner as a monopoly receiving a higher 
capital subsidy. This relationship between the fair rate and capital subsidy was 
explicitly derived in the alternative model of ROR regulation with shareholders.
Chapter 3 used the equivalence results to establish a formal general-equilibrium (GE) 
framework. This confirmed and extended existing welfare results on ROR regulation 
and the optimal fair rate. By focusing upon the production and allocative efficiency 
trade-off associated with ROR regulation, the Chapter also reconciled the different 
approaches used to illustrate the efficiency outcomes under ROR regulation; showed 
that the production inefficiency under ROR regulation could be illustrated by a Carlton 
(1979) production-deadweight-loss “banana”; and found the precise conditions where 
the introduction of the Yang and Fox (1994) property tax — a capital tax — could 
increase welfare.
Chapters 4 and 5 looked at the issue of forward-looking (FL) cost regulation. Chapter 4 
provided an overview of FL cost regulation known as total element/service long-run 
incremental cost (TELRIC/TSLRIC), which was used to price access in the US and 
Australian telecommunications industry. This concluded that, while there had been 
consistent claims made that TELRIC/TSLRIC under-priced and over-regulated the 
industry, the predictions and forecasts of under-investment and network atrophy appear 
to be exaggerated. It highlighted limitations of certain criticisms of TELRIC/TSLRIC,
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and suggested that, due to the different market structures in the telecommunications 
industries of the two countries, arguments from the US were not necessarily applicable 
in an Australian context.
Chapter 5 formally compared backward-looking (BL) and FL cost regulation on an 
existing investment, using a model which assumed there was a constant rate of 
technological progress. This found that the investor required a higher fair rate of return 
to be fully-compensated for the use of FL costs, and that the constant BL cost-based 
price generated a better outcome for society. The superiority of BL cost regulation 
suggested that the results highlighted by Guthrie, Small and Wright (2001) could be 
achieved without appealing to investment timing or uncertainty. There did appear, 
though, to be a case for adopting FL cost regulation in an industry subject to future 
deregulation.
Chapters 6 and 7 established a model that examined the effect of access regulation on 
the investment timing and efficiency of a competitive and monopoly investor. The 
analysis throughout both Chapters was conducted with reference to issues highlighted in 
two Productivity Commission reports on access regulation — PC (2001a) and PC 
(2001b). Chapter 6 formalised a definition of dynamic efficiency. It used this to show 
how inferences could be drawn about the benefits to society based on investment 
timing, and illustrated that a static allocative and dynamic efficiency trade-off could 
occur with a change in the usage price of a two-part access tariff. The Chapter also 
highlighted that the outcomes for the ROR-regulated monopoly investor were identical 
to those of the competitive investor, and that, similar to Gans (2001), the socially- 
optimal outcome could be achieved with a two-part access tariff. This socially-optimal 
two-part access tariff was both allocatively and dynamically efficient.
Finally, Chapter 7 demonstrated that the linear access price for investors that maximised 
the benefit to society was neither dynamically nor allocatively efficient. It was an 
example of a second-best efficient price. The separate effects that price and ROR 
regulation had on the investor were detailed, and a numerical example illustrated that 
price regulation of the competitive or ROR-regulated monopoly investor, generated the 
best outcome for society where two-part access tariffs could not be used. The 
comparison of BL and FL cost regulation of the monopoly investor reinforced the 
results from Chapter 5.
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